The buy-in cost of a game is a big factor in whether people will buy it, so companies want to keep the buy-in cost low, but have more purchases more frequently. The push to shorter games isn't about making consumers happier, its about getting more of them to purchase game content, and getting them to do it more frequently.
I really don't think they aren't going to really cut the prices.
They might cut the buy-in price, but not the price per (expected) average players hours-of-play per title.
You can't fix cable without fixing the cable companies, not the box.
Since cable went digital, all a cable company is is an ISP with a reasonably fat pipe to the home with an agreement with content providers to provide TV content that provides a set-top box to display that content on the TV.
Google is -- with its Kansas City demonstration project -- becoming an ISP with a fat pipe to the home. With SageTV and Motorola acquisitions, its got both quality PVR software and an established STB business. They are missing only the agreement with cable providers to become a cable company, and one with an unusual degree of integration.
And Cable TV wouldn't be the first market google entered simply because the incumbents in that market weren't doing things in the way that best served Google's interests, and Google thought they could make customers happier while at the same time reshaping the market to serve Google's interests better.
Then Google has truly failed because this move will force many handset makers away from Google and into the willing arms of Microsoft
No, it won't. There is no rational reason for them to engage in this behavior, and, more to the point, all of the major Android handset makers have praised the deal for demonstrating Google's commitment to defend Android.
Microsoft's desperate spin is that this is a bad thing for Android handset manufacturers, but that's just Microsoft trying to find some way to mitigate the harm the Google move has done to their patent-war strategy.
In fact if I didn't know better I would say Microsoft had installed a Google insider ala Nokia and tricked Google into angering handset makers.
Except none of the handset makers are actually angry. The whole idea that this is bad for handset makers is coming from Microsoft's PR department and their willing dupes.
They aren't any more thanks to 12 billion spent. That will take decades to recover, longer if carriers start fleeing.
Capital investments often do, and why would carriers be fleeing? Even Microsoft's irrational fantasies only have handset manufacturers, not carriers, leaving because of the deal.
The STB business has the cable companies as their sole clients. How does that help them sell to consumers to bypass the cable companies?
Google's already laying fiber to the home in a demonstration project. All they have to do is get an agreement with content providers and they are a cable company.
And now they know they will still be attacked while at the same time Google is competing directly against them manufacturing headsets.
Which, I suppose, is why the heads of HTC, Samsung Mobile, Sony-Ericsson, and LG Electronics Mobile have all made public statements praising the acquisition of Motorola by Google.
Then I would think you'd be rather more upset given the number of hardware makers that are going to switch away from Android after this.
Hmm. Seems that the actual hardware makers are positive on this, contrary your position:
“We welcome today’s news, which demonstrates Google’s deep commitment to defending Android, its partners, and the ecosystem.” – J.K. Shin President, Samsung, Mobile Communications Division
“I welcome Google‘s commitment to defending Android and its partners.” – Bert Nordberg President & CEO, Sony Ericsson
“We welcome the news of today‘s acquisition, which demonstrates that Google is deeply committed to defending Android, its partners, and the entire ecosystem.” – Peter Chou CEO, HTC Corp.
“We welcome Google‘s commitment to defending Android and its partners.” – Jong-Seok Park, Ph.D President & CEO, LG Electronics Mobile Communications Company
One analysis I've seen noted that the price of the Google deal was, to the penny, the same $/patent as the coalition of Microsoft and others paid for the Nortel patents.
That is the most singularly stupid way to think about the whole thing I've ever seen, just about as stupid as losing a bid because you were trying to be clever and bid "PI".
Thinking about the actual facts is stupid?
The quantity of patents matters not at all, it's all about what you have patented.
Most analysis I've seen is that the Motorola patents are, on balance, more valuable on average than the Nortel patents, which would tip the balance even more strongly in Google's favor. The "if, on average, the Motorola patents are as useful as the Nortel patents" bit you cut out was a conservative evaluation.
Google could have acquired 10x the number of patents and the end result would be the same; stalemate in the patent lawsuit game.
You are assuming that the "patent lawsuit game" threatening Google OS's (Android and Chrome) in the consumer space begins and ends with the current battle with Apple and Microsoft, and that there would be no threat anywhere else. The more (and the more types of) patents Google has, the less patent risk they face from other patent challengers that may not have the same particular vulnerabilities as Apple and Microsoft.
Again, Google paid $12b just to arrive at a draw when Apple/Microsoft paid perhaps $1b each for the same result.
Absent the patent threat, Google is the one rapidly gaining ground in the mobile OS market; a stalemate in the patent war is a win for Google; so what that boils down to, even if we assume that the entire value of the patents is derived from the defensive value in the Apple/Microsoft v. Google conflict, is that Google spent more money to win than Apple & Microsoft each spent to continue to lose.
You do not "fein interest" in something by bidding a few billion dollars. What if they had won?
A diversion works best when you visibly devote real resource to a plausible and worthwhile objective that is worth winning, but which also diverts attention from a bigger goal that's even more worth winning.
And speaking of "overpaying" - Motorola has been losing money. It's not like Google has ONLY paid 12 billion dollars
Yeah, its not like they paid $12 billion at all, given the $3+ billion in Motorola cash they get out of the deal.
And in case you hadn't noticed, 12 billion is a HUGE sum, far more than Microsoft and Apple shelled out individually - how can you say in one breath that those companies overpaid when Google bought the same commodity (patents) for a far steeper price?
Uh, becuase Google bought far more of them for that price. In fact, the $/patent in both deals was the same (according to some reports, to the penny.)
mean yes Google can use these patents against Apple/Microsoft but I question if the Motorola patent base has the same level of quality as what Microsoft/Apple had individually, never mind the Nortel stuff.
Most analysis I've seen suggests that the Motorola patents are far more valuable and fundamental to the mobile market than either the Nortel patents or anything Apple/Microsoft had before. Given Motorola's role in the industry, that's pretty plausible.
Because now Android HAS to start making Google some serious money in a way it did not before.
Android appears to have always been, first and foremost, a tool to prevent anyone gaining a hold on the mobile OS space that would allow them to lock Google's money making services out (or extract rents from them that have nearly the same effect on Google's profitability.) Android's job isn't to make money directly, its to allow Google's online services to continue making money in the mobile space. without paying rent to a mobile OS monopoly vendor, and to keep pushing the mobile marketplace in directions which create new opportunities for Google's online services. Given the recent patent attack by various competitors, it needed a patent infusion to do that job, but the way it needs to increase Google's profitability is still the same indirect method as it was before.
Then I would think you'd be rather more upset given the number of hardware makers that are going to switch away from Android after this.
There is no rational reason to expect that. In fact, this gives manufacturers less reason to switch away from Android than they had before the acquisition, given that the main threat wasn't consumer appeal of another platform that they could switch to, but patent threats to Android which this acquisition puts Google in a position to address.
If Google decided to develop Android enhancements primarily for its new hardware subsidiary as a privileged vendor before making them part of Android proper (which is owned by the Open Handset Alliance), this would be a reason for vendors to reassess their investment in Android, but it would be irrational to do that, since doing so would reduce the breadth of the reach of Android and its ability to serve as a tool to push Google products and services.
People have counted Microsoft out but Microsoft is perfectly positioned to take over all of the gains Android has enjoyed
How, exactly?
and is now telling handset makers "we are the only mobile OS not competing with you".
Sure, that's their sales pitch. Doesn't mean that any of the major handset vendors are buying it.
So to put it very simply, Apple/Microsoft spent less than $2 billion each on offense, while Google spent $12 billion on defense.
That's only a loss if Apple/Microsoft got the same value for offense that Google got for the $12 billion on defense. One analysis I've seen noted that the price of the Google deal was, to the penny, the same $/patent as the coalition of Microsoft and others paid for the Nortel patents. If, on average, the Motorola patents are as useful as the Nortel patents, Google got a bigger and equally cost-effective patent arsenal (with a hardware manufacturer thrown in for free.)
You might want to actually read the study because it doesn't say that anywhere.
It doesn't measure the false positive rate at all, and it appears there is no testing against non-malware links done. So, I could beat IE's score, if I just wrote a program that treated every URL as hostile.
It certainly doesn't say that the scenario GP proposes (IE "won" by being overly paranoid) is true, but it certainly is consistent with that scenario.
Ideal malware detection detects all malware and only malware. A system that presents a low false negative rate isn't good if it presents a high false positive rate (since then users will learn quickly to ignore or disable its warnings.) This test is useless, since it doesn't address false positives.
First mover advantage. iPhone sales started 3 years before the first WP7 phone went on sale; Android phones went on sale 2 years before the first WP7 phone went on sale.
Windows Phone 7 wasn't the first release of Microsoft's smartphone OS. Yeah, WP7 is newer than the iPhone, but the first smartphone-specific WinCE-based OS was Windows Smartphone 2002, which was 5 years before the iPhone. Now, Windows Smartphone 200x and Windows Mobile (after the PocketPC and Smartphone lines got a common branding) never were as popular as iPhone/iOS devices became as soon as the latter were available, but it has got nothing to do with "first mover" advantage, it has to do with customer perception of value, which Apple managed to generate where Microsoft hadn't (and still, for the most part, hasn't.)
People aren't "demanding Android," they're saying "I really don't want to have to adjust to a whole new phone, buy a whole bunch of new apps, and set up a bunch of new stuff on my computer to manage things."
That would explain a slowly degrading Android marketshare driven by upgrades with new users not particularly attracted to Android, it doesn't explain the reality of Android, and to a lesser extent iOS, continuing to have growing smartphone marketshare while RIM, Microsoft, and Symbian continue to lose ground. Those trends are explained by Android and iOS continuing to lead in the battle for customer-perceived value, not merely hanging on to users they already have because it is a pain to leave.
With the exception of a small minority of geeks, people buy Android because that's what the handset makers are using on the handsets, not because "The people demand their Android."
Most smartphone handset makers have Windows and Android offerings and iOS, OTOH, does quite well with only one handset maker supporting it. So I don't think the facts support your claim that the success of Android is simply a factor of the number of handset makers supporting it compared to the alternatives.
I think its much more likely that consumer perception (either of the OS itself or of the features of the phones that handset makers choose to put the OS on) is the main factor.
You're correct that the handset makers will go where the sales are - if Motorola suddenly has favored status with Android releases at the expense of Samsung & HTC's sales
Yes, and since Google's main interest with Android is as a gateway to Google's online services, that's exactly why Google won't kneecap non-Google handset manufacturers that way. There's no upside for them.
The OHA sounds great on paper, but Google is still responsible for writing the vast majority of the code in Android. If Google is now making handsets, then this means that future versions of Android are likely to be tailored to the capabilities of the Google devices
Not particularly.
Google makes a browser (and a netbook OS, and a mobile OS) now, but while its web service offerings certainly will exploit the features of those platforms when they are available, they aren't tailored to those platforms.
In the same way that tying Google Search to Chrome would be bad for Google, tying Android to Google hardware would be bad for Google.
Android is a tool to open markets for Google services, not for Google hardware. Aside from patents, Google's acquisition of Motorola Mobility is more about using hardware as a tool to push Android and in turn to push Google services, not to use Android as a tool to sell hardware.
Of course, since it's open, they can hire developers to improve their version, but that costs money. The question that they will be asking is whether it costs more to do this than it costs to pay MS for their OS.
Well, no, the relevant question in that regard will be whether the cost of customizing Android is lower than the cost of licensing Windows plus the cost of customizing it, not simply whether the cost of customizing Android is less than the cost of licensing stock Windows.
Of course, there are all kinds of other issues (perceived customer value in the platform from app availability, etc.)
So what stops them from using variety of real products without the paid placement to keep things realistic?
Concerns about possible legal hassles involving copyright and trademark law, mostly. The same reason brand logos, etc., are often blurred out in documentaries.
I love how it's assumed that somehow the acquisition of Moto will make Android less open to the Android alliance members...
And you are assuming it won't.
Which is a pretty reasonable assumption, since it is the Open Handset Alliance -- not Google -- that actually owns Android. When Google bought Android, they only held on to it until the OHA was formed, at which point it was transferred to the OHA.
Does anyone outside of Google and maybe Moto execs know the exact implications?
I'm pretty sure the OHA would have to know of anything that transferred ownership of Android back to Google from the OHA.
What is your point? Nokia is their most valuable partner. That doesn't mean that Microsoft isn't supporting all of the hardware makers.
It does, however, mean that Microsoft's claim that, with Google acquiring Motorola Mobility, Windows Phone is the only remaining mobile platform where all hardware vendors are treated equally is false, or at least if it is true it is true only in the Animal Farm sense of "all vendors are treated equally, but some are treated more equally than others".
Since partnering with Nokia they have also added ZTE, Fujitsu, and others.
And Android is still owned by the Open Handset Alliance, which includes more device makers than just Motorola, more software vendors than just Google, and a bunch of wireless carriers, component manufacturers, and other firms in markets where Google doesn't play and isn't buying anyone at the moment.
If we assume all new changes are good ones, and all new versions are backwards compatible with whatever came before
Don't assume that.
Assume that all new versions should be compatible except for specific announced incompatibilities. Also assume that all new versions are not compatible where you stand to lose anything of value until you've tested them.
So then when there's Firefox version 4 through version 392 (if they even make it that far), it's impossible to know which break compatibility and which are small updates.
There is a very clear mechanism for extension maintainers to identify which versions of Firefox break their extensions, its called testing.
Which, in practice, was necessary even when Firefox distinguished major and minor versions.
Each pilot would normally have control of one plane, but each pilot that gets a special pass through security could, if they were inclined to do nefarious things, brings weapons through and deliver them to terrorists inside the "secure" area who had already passed through security (since they aren't pilots) but who would each board other planes.
Immediately after 9/11 -- with the reports from the planes of weapons including not only box cutters, but also guns -- there was a lot of speculation that this is essentially what happened with the terrorists in those attacks, that weapons had been brought through by one or more airline employees who were permitted to bypass the screenings that were in place for passengers entering the secure area of airports. That was one of the reasons given for federalizing airport security and eliminating the exceptions to the screening requirements.
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Doesn't make money as effectively.
The buy-in cost of a game is a big factor in whether people will buy it, so companies want to keep the buy-in cost low, but have more purchases more frequently. The push to shorter games isn't about making consumers happier, its about getting more of them to purchase game content, and getting them to do it more frequently.
They might cut the buy-in price, but not the price per (expected) average players hours-of-play per title.
Since cable went digital, all a cable company is is an ISP with a reasonably fat pipe to the home with an agreement with content providers to provide TV content that provides a set-top box to display that content on the TV.
Google is -- with its Kansas City demonstration project -- becoming an ISP with a fat pipe to the home. With SageTV and Motorola acquisitions, its got both quality PVR software and an established STB business. They are missing only the agreement with cable providers to become a cable company, and one with an unusual degree of integration.
And Cable TV wouldn't be the first market google entered simply because the incumbents in that market weren't doing things in the way that best served Google's interests, and Google thought they could make customers happier while at the same time reshaping the market to serve Google's interests better.
No, it won't. There is no rational reason for them to engage in this behavior, and, more to the point, all of the major Android handset makers have praised the deal for demonstrating Google's commitment to defend Android.
Microsoft's desperate spin is that this is a bad thing for Android handset manufacturers, but that's just Microsoft trying to find some way to mitigate the harm the Google move has done to their patent-war strategy.
Except none of the handset makers are actually angry. The whole idea that this is bad for handset makers is coming from Microsoft's PR department and their willing dupes.
Capital investments often do, and why would carriers be fleeing? Even Microsoft's irrational fantasies only have handset manufacturers, not carriers, leaving because of the deal.
Google's already laying fiber to the home in a demonstration project. All they have to do is get an agreement with content providers and they are a cable company.
Which, I suppose, is why the heads of HTC, Samsung Mobile, Sony-Ericsson, and LG Electronics Mobile have all made public statements praising the acquisition of Motorola by Google.
Hmm. Seems that the actual hardware makers are positive on this, contrary your position:
“We welcome today’s news, which demonstrates Google’s deep commitment to defending Android, its partners, and the ecosystem.”
– J.K. Shin
President, Samsung, Mobile Communications Division
“I welcome Google‘s commitment to defending Android and its partners.”
– Bert Nordberg
President & CEO, Sony Ericsson
“We welcome the news of today‘s acquisition, which demonstrates that Google is deeply committed to defending Android, its partners, and the entire ecosystem.”
– Peter Chou
CEO, HTC Corp.
“We welcome Google‘s commitment to defending Android and its partners.”
– Jong-Seok Park, Ph.D
President & CEO, LG Electronics Mobile Communications Company
Thinking about the actual facts is stupid?
Most analysis I've seen is that the Motorola patents are, on balance, more valuable on average than the Nortel patents, which would tip the balance even more strongly in Google's favor. The "if, on average, the Motorola patents are as useful as the Nortel patents" bit you cut out was a conservative evaluation.
You are assuming that the "patent lawsuit game" threatening Google OS's (Android and Chrome) in the consumer space begins and ends with the current battle with Apple and Microsoft, and that there would be no threat anywhere else. The more (and the more types of) patents Google has, the less patent risk they face from other patent challengers that may not have the same particular vulnerabilities as Apple and Microsoft.
Absent the patent threat, Google is the one rapidly gaining ground in the mobile OS market; a stalemate in the patent war is a win for Google; so what that boils down to, even if we assume that the entire value of the patents is derived from the defensive value in the Apple/Microsoft v. Google conflict, is that Google spent more money to win than Apple & Microsoft each spent to continue to lose.
The difference is that in G+, you can selectively wall off stupidity much more easily than on FB.
A diversion works best when you visibly devote real resource to a plausible and worthwhile objective that is worth winning, but which also diverts attention from a bigger goal that's even more worth winning.
Yeah, its not like they paid $12 billion at all, given the $3+ billion in Motorola cash they get out of the deal.
Uh, becuase Google bought far more of them for that price. In fact, the $/patent in both deals was the same (according to some reports, to the penny.)
Most analysis I've seen suggests that the Motorola patents are far more valuable and fundamental to the mobile market than either the Nortel patents or anything Apple/Microsoft had before. Given Motorola's role in the industry, that's pretty plausible.
Android appears to have always been, first and foremost, a tool to prevent anyone gaining a hold on the mobile OS space that would allow them to lock Google's money making services out (or extract rents from them that have nearly the same effect on Google's profitability.) Android's job isn't to make money directly, its to allow Google's online services to continue making money in the mobile space. without paying rent to a mobile OS monopoly vendor, and to keep pushing the mobile marketplace in directions which create new opportunities for Google's online services. Given the recent patent attack by various competitors, it needed a patent infusion to do that job, but the way it needs to increase Google's profitability is still the same indirect method as it was before.
There is no rational reason to expect that. In fact, this gives manufacturers less reason to switch away from Android than they had before the acquisition, given that the main threat wasn't consumer appeal of another platform that they could switch to, but patent threats to Android which this acquisition puts Google in a position to address.
If Google decided to develop Android enhancements primarily for its new hardware subsidiary as a privileged vendor before making them part of Android proper (which is owned by the Open Handset Alliance), this would be a reason for vendors to reassess their investment in Android, but it would be irrational to do that, since doing so would reduce the breadth of the reach of Android and its ability to serve as a tool to push Google products and services.
How, exactly?
Sure, that's their sales pitch. Doesn't mean that any of the major handset vendors are buying it.
That's only a loss if Apple/Microsoft got the same value for offense that Google got for the $12 billion on defense. One analysis I've seen noted that the price of the Google deal was, to the penny, the same $/patent as the coalition of Microsoft and others paid for the Nortel patents. If, on average, the Motorola patents are as useful as the Nortel patents, Google got a bigger and equally cost-effective patent arsenal (with a hardware manufacturer thrown in for free.)
It doesn't measure the false positive rate at all, and it appears there is no testing against non-malware links done. So, I could beat IE's score, if I just wrote a program that treated every URL as hostile.
It certainly doesn't say that the scenario GP proposes (IE "won" by being overly paranoid) is true, but it certainly is consistent with that scenario.
Ideal malware detection detects all malware and only malware. A system that presents a low false negative rate isn't good if it presents a high false positive rate (since then users will learn quickly to ignore or disable its warnings.) This test is useless, since it doesn't address false positives.
Windows Phone 7 wasn't the first release of Microsoft's smartphone OS. Yeah, WP7 is newer than the iPhone, but the first smartphone-specific WinCE-based OS was Windows Smartphone 2002, which was 5 years before the iPhone. Now, Windows Smartphone 200x and Windows Mobile (after the PocketPC and Smartphone lines got a common branding) never were as popular as iPhone/iOS devices became as soon as the latter were available, but it has got nothing to do with "first mover" advantage, it has to do with customer perception of value, which Apple managed to generate where Microsoft hadn't (and still, for the most part, hasn't.)
That would explain a slowly degrading Android marketshare driven by upgrades with new users not particularly attracted to Android, it doesn't explain the reality of Android, and to a lesser extent iOS, continuing to have growing smartphone marketshare while RIM, Microsoft, and Symbian continue to lose ground. Those trends are explained by Android and iOS continuing to lead in the battle for customer-perceived value, not merely hanging on to users they already have because it is a pain to leave.
Actually, a distant fourth in most analysis I've seen, falling way behind RIM. (But RIM is falling faster.)
Most smartphone handset makers have Windows and Android offerings and iOS, OTOH, does quite well with only one handset maker supporting it. So I don't think the facts support your claim that the success of Android is simply a factor of the number of handset makers supporting it compared to the alternatives.
I think its much more likely that consumer perception (either of the OS itself or of the features of the phones that handset makers choose to put the OS on) is the main factor.
Yes, and since Google's main interest with Android is as a gateway to Google's online services, that's exactly why Google won't kneecap non-Google handset manufacturers that way. There's no upside for them.
Not particularly.
Google makes a browser (and a netbook OS, and a mobile OS) now, but while its web service offerings certainly will exploit the features of those platforms when they are available, they aren't tailored to those platforms.
In the same way that tying Google Search to Chrome would be bad for Google, tying Android to Google hardware would be bad for Google.
Android is a tool to open markets for Google services, not for Google hardware. Aside from patents, Google's acquisition of Motorola Mobility is more about using hardware as a tool to push Android and in turn to push Google services, not to use Android as a tool to sell hardware.
Well, no, the relevant question in that regard will be whether the cost of customizing Android is lower than the cost of licensing Windows plus the cost of customizing it, not simply whether the cost of customizing Android is less than the cost of licensing stock Windows.
Of course, there are all kinds of other issues (perceived customer value in the platform from app availability, etc.)
Concerns about possible legal hassles involving copyright and trademark law, mostly. The same reason brand logos, etc., are often blurred out in documentaries.
Which is a pretty reasonable assumption, since it is the Open Handset Alliance -- not Google -- that actually owns Android. When Google bought Android, they only held on to it until the OHA was formed, at which point it was transferred to the OHA.
I'm pretty sure the OHA would have to know of anything that transferred ownership of Android back to Google from the OHA.
I don't know if you mean "dilute the word" or "delude the world". I suppose either works.
It does, however, mean that Microsoft's claim that, with Google acquiring Motorola Mobility, Windows Phone is the only remaining mobile platform where all hardware vendors are treated equally is false, or at least if it is true it is true only in the Animal Farm sense of "all vendors are treated equally, but some are treated more equally than others".
And Android is still owned by the Open Handset Alliance, which includes more device makers than just Motorola, more software vendors than just Google, and a bunch of wireless carriers, component manufacturers, and other firms in markets where Google doesn't play and isn't buying anyone at the moment.
No, the real challenge is getting a particularly low (or particulary high, but defined) Erdos-Bacon number.
"It's a custom OS built on the Android kernal"
Not to be confused, I suppose, with the widely used Android kernel.
Don't assume that.
Assume that all new versions should be compatible except for specific announced incompatibilities. Also assume that all new versions are not compatible where you stand to lose anything of value until you've tested them.
There is a very clear mechanism for extension maintainers to identify which versions of Firefox break their extensions, its called testing.
Which, in practice, was necessary even when Firefox distinguished major and minor versions.
Each pilot would normally have control of one plane, but each pilot that gets a special pass through security could, if they were inclined to do nefarious things, brings weapons through and deliver them to terrorists inside the "secure" area who had already passed through security (since they aren't pilots) but who would each board other planes.
Immediately after 9/11 -- with the reports from the planes of weapons including not only box cutters, but also guns -- there was a lot of speculation that this is essentially what happened with the terrorists in those attacks, that weapons had been brought through by one or more airline employees who were permitted to bypass the screenings that were in place for passengers entering the secure area of airports. That was one of the reasons given for federalizing airport security and eliminating the exceptions to the screening requirements.