Possibly due to the security offered by a non-re-writable medium? I guess if you're certain that the back-ups aren't going to be over-written by the misplaced click of the mouse at some point that might be worth the premium.
Please note that I said 'might'. I can't say I'm entirely confident in that as a benefit worth the price; however if the medium follows the same increases in size as hard drives have then I'm happy to watch. Especially as, I think, the data-recovery from the disk exceeds most other forms of archival media. With the exception, I think, of the HDD.
Frankly I'm just glad to have holographic storage as an option, though I'd still prefer the Superman-style crystals simply for the sheer class and style. Though, apparently, they were never labelled. Which might make back-ups and recovery a problem...
Sorry, but it just doesn't have the same ring to it.
True enough but, on the bright side, at least we'll not have to trek to Mordor to dispose of it anymore.
On the other hand...if crapware subsidises the cost of the MS installed OS and Dell then reimburses the cost of that OS if you don't plan to use it...I can't help but consider it a better ploy to buy the subsidised option and then do a wipe/install.
Admittedly I base this on the rationale of cost rather than ease of use, which is oft-times the vastly more important metric.
How can one strip out features that they never happened to implement in the first place? That was not part of the development cycle, but the planning cycle, also known as bait-and-switch, wishful thinking or vaporware cycle.
Ah? My mistake then, I never really followed its development from inception, I only really started to pay attention once it started hitting its beta test-release. I was just aware that a lot of planned features weren't in there as initially announced.
But then again perhaps the lower sales reflect a consumer base more accustomed to the failures of Version 1.0, or, for those with more technical experience, are aware that much of Vista's development cycle seemed to consist of stripping out features, such as WinFS and whatever else it was.
It could also, of course, represent a level of success with the still-competent Win XP.
...I know this is/. so I'm hoping, at best, to modded funny for that last sentence, there's still no dumb-ass mod, right..?
I read your comment as being an assertion that each padlock should have its own unique key, which, let's face it, is reasonable. But since car manufacturers are unable to reliably provide unique keys to their, far more expensive, vehicles I'd suggest that even then it's a form of security through obscurity. But that's aside from the point I want to make.
Padlocks are arguably less secure than user-name/password protected equipment (lock-picking and key-bumping, mechanical destruction with tools and so on) but their prevalence allows it to be impracticable to try all possible keys. Randomly assigned user-names and passwords are probably an order of magnitude more secure (though obviously it depends on the computational power available to an attacker) however this causes its own problem. If the randomly assigned details are set at the factory then what happens when the factory messes up its packaging, with the wrong details being sent with the router?
That's the only reasonable, so far as I can see, use for obvious factory-defaults, to allow guaranteed (so long as the firmware's not been messed up by the user in the meantime) access to the router's configuration panel. But, while in the default state, it shouldn't be allowed to connect to an external network in order to prevent/reduce potential harm to the user's network.
That'd be fine but surely you've got to have some form of a failsafe option in that scenario for the wrong sticker in the manual of the equipment: if the router's set with random password 'Ghe443sXTp23' and the sticker reads 'Ghe443r6Tp23' then the consumer's kinda screwed without some form of absolute hard-reset to an easy default user-name/password.
While I don't advocate the stupidity of, with my own BT Voyager 220v, the default user-name/password of 'admin'/'admin' I do think that, as suggested by another poster, there should be a default state of non-connectivity to external networks until the default user-name and password have been changed, with an obvious blatant message on the config/router-installation software. That way the manufacturer is able to retain the hard-reset to known defaults and the consumer is at least somewhat protected from attacks from external sources until the defaults have been changed.
Admittedly I'm using the default BT router, so I have limited geek-credential, so I bow to further, probably better-qualified, suggestions from more experienced users and/.-ers.
While I'm not inherently subject to these laws/conditions, living in the UK, I can't see that they're in any way fair or balanced. If it's not possible to isolate the IP traffic of one particular individual I can't see that it's fair to violate the privacy of everyone else that happens to be in that pipe. I seem to recall reading that law/criminal justice is based on the presumption of innocence (naive, perhaps, but it seems to be the predicate...I could be wrong, of course, given current developments).
Whether I'm doing anything illegal or otherwise I don't expect to be subject to surveillance simply because someone else in the pipe I share is suspected of doing something. If it's not possible to isolate the suspect from the crowd then surely the surveillance is too broad.
Plus, as an aside, until I'm able to see the means by which such monitoring is over-seen then I don't necessarily trust those with the relevant authority to act on my behalf to protect my privacy.
It might give the device manufacturers an out but, more importantly, won't it equally give the Linux family an 'in'?
The point isn't, so far as I can see, to make any profit from the scheme other than to spread the word of Linux and increase the potential compatibilities/reduce the incompatibilities.
Plus, as a bonus for the device driver writers, it's an impressive CV when you consider the varieties of hardware that are supported by the various Linux distros and the work, and potential elegance, that goes into solving the various demands.
It seems win-win for everyone, really. And a good, and generous, idea.
But surely a cheaper OS X still requires the Mac hardware upon which to run? The comparison between the Apple OS X and Windows XP isn't entirely, if you'll forgive the phrase, apples to apples.
If the Mac hardware were cheaper I suspect that might make a difference to Microsoft's sales of XP, but it's hardly a guarantee. I don't think that reducing the sale-price of a platform-restricted OS will make any dent in XP's sales.
Slashdot Mirror
There's always a down-side to any new technology; there's no need to draw attention to that aspect. Not when we're still stunned by the price.
Ugh...I can feel more Voyager nightmares heading my way...
Possibly due to the security offered by a non-re-writable medium? I guess if you're certain that the back-ups aren't going to be over-written by the misplaced click of the mouse at some point that might be worth the premium.
Please note that I said 'might'. I can't say I'm entirely confident in that as a benefit worth the price; however if the medium follows the same increases in size as hard drives have then I'm happy to watch. Especially as, I think, the data-recovery from the disk exceeds most other forms of archival media. With the exception, I think, of the HDD.
Frankly I'm just glad to have holographic storage as an option, though I'd still prefer the Superman-style crystals simply for the sheer class and style. Though, apparently, they were never labelled. Which might make back-ups and recovery a problem...
True enough but, on the bright side, at least we'll not have to trek to Mordor to dispose of it anymore.
On the other hand...if crapware subsidises the cost of the MS installed OS and Dell then reimburses the cost of that OS if you don't plan to use it...I can't help but consider it a better ploy to buy the subsidised option and then do a wipe/install.
Admittedly I base this on the rationale of cost rather than ease of use, which is oft-times the vastly more important metric.
Well yes. Only now they'll be prying off your cold, dead fingers too.
So...you're happy, they're happy: everybody wins!
Ah? My mistake then, I never really followed its development from inception, I only really started to pay attention once it started hitting its beta test-release. I was just aware that a lot of planned features weren't in there as initially announced.
"Wow."
...
And now I feel dirty...
But then again perhaps the lower sales reflect a consumer base more accustomed to the failures of Version 1.0, or, for those with more technical experience, are aware that much of Vista's development cycle seemed to consist of stripping out features, such as WinFS and whatever else it was.
It could also, of course, represent a level of success with the still-competent Win XP.
...I know this is /. so I'm hoping, at best, to modded funny for that last sentence, there's still no dumb-ass mod, right..?
I read your comment as being an assertion that each padlock should have its own unique key, which, let's face it, is reasonable. But since car manufacturers are unable to reliably provide unique keys to their, far more expensive, vehicles I'd suggest that even then it's a form of security through obscurity. But that's aside from the point I want to make.
Padlocks are arguably less secure than user-name/password protected equipment (lock-picking and key-bumping, mechanical destruction with tools and so on) but their prevalence allows it to be impracticable to try all possible keys. Randomly assigned user-names and passwords are probably an order of magnitude more secure (though obviously it depends on the computational power available to an attacker) however this causes its own problem. If the randomly assigned details are set at the factory then what happens when the factory messes up its packaging, with the wrong details being sent with the router?
That's the only reasonable, so far as I can see, use for obvious factory-defaults, to allow guaranteed (so long as the firmware's not been messed up by the user in the meantime) access to the router's configuration panel. But, while in the default state, it shouldn't be allowed to connect to an external network in order to prevent/reduce potential harm to the user's network.
That'd be fine but surely you've got to have some form of a failsafe option in that scenario for the wrong sticker in the manual of the equipment: if the router's set with random password 'Ghe443sXTp23' and the sticker reads 'Ghe443r6Tp23' then the consumer's kinda screwed without some form of absolute hard-reset to an easy default user-name/password.
While I don't advocate the stupidity of, with my own BT Voyager 220v, the default user-name/password of 'admin'/'admin' I do think that, as suggested by another poster, there should be a default state of non-connectivity to external networks until the default user-name and password have been changed, with an obvious blatant message on the config/router-installation software. That way the manufacturer is able to retain the hard-reset to known defaults and the consumer is at least somewhat protected from attacks from external sources until the defaults have been changed.
Admittedly I'm using the default BT router, so I have limited geek-credential, so I bow to further, probably better-qualified, suggestions from more experienced users and /.-ers.
While I'm not inherently subject to these laws/conditions, living in the UK, I can't see that they're in any way fair or balanced. If it's not possible to isolate the IP traffic of one particular individual I can't see that it's fair to violate the privacy of everyone else that happens to be in that pipe. I seem to recall reading that law/criminal justice is based on the presumption of innocence (naive, perhaps, but it seems to be the predicate...I could be wrong, of course, given current developments).
Whether I'm doing anything illegal or otherwise I don't expect to be subject to surveillance simply because someone else in the pipe I share is suspected of doing something. If it's not possible to isolate the suspect from the crowd then surely the surveillance is too broad.
Plus, as an aside, until I'm able to see the means by which such monitoring is over-seen then I don't necessarily trust those with the relevant authority to act on my behalf to protect my privacy.
It might give the device manufacturers an out but, more importantly, won't it equally give the Linux family an 'in'?
The point isn't, so far as I can see, to make any profit from the scheme other than to spread the word of Linux and increase the potential compatibilities/reduce the incompatibilities.
Plus, as a bonus for the device driver writers, it's an impressive CV when you consider the varieties of hardware that are supported by the various Linux distros and the work, and potential elegance, that goes into solving the various demands.
It seems win-win for everyone, really. And a good, and generous, idea.
But surely a cheaper OS X still requires the Mac hardware upon which to run? The comparison between the Apple OS X and Windows XP isn't entirely, if you'll forgive the phrase, apples to apples. If the Mac hardware were cheaper I suspect that might make a difference to Microsoft's sales of XP, but it's hardly a guarantee. I don't think that reducing the sale-price of a platform-restricted OS will make any dent in XP's sales.