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Full end-to-end encryption where the client and the server certificates are signed by the same solves this Tor-endnode problem.

Whenever an roque end node tries to run a sssltrip MitM, it will be detected at the client. And that can be reported to the Tor network.

It's called Eccentric Authentication.

See: http://eccentric-authenticatio...

Why are we still using passwords?

Time to deploy client certificates. That can be done pseudonymously. And with Tor even anonymously.

http://eccentric-authentication.org/

All it takes is a web site that signs its visitors customer certificates by itself.

This allows visitor to send encrypted messages to be send, even without the site reading along.

With proper protection from a Perspectives-like certificate log, it protects against MitM attacks.

With DNSSEC in the mix, it protects against phishing and hostile takeovers.

With independent channels, people can keep communicating, even when the original site goes down.

Read: http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/08/31/the-holy-grail-of-cryptography.html and http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/09/05/a-subversive-idea.html

Guido.

All it takes is a web site that signs its visitors customer certificates by itself.

This allows visitor to send encrypted messages to be send, even without the site reading along.

With proper protection from a Perspectives-like certificate log, it protects against MitM attacks.

With DNSSEC in the mix, it protects against phishing and hostile takeovers.

With independent channels, people can keep communicating, even when the original site goes down.

Read: http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/08/31/the-holy-grail-of-cryptography.html and http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/09/05/a-subversive-idea.html

Guido.

Most people have only one email address. Whether or not its your real name or a nickname, it's tied to your identity.

We can go one step further than Persona and let the web site sign client certificates. It lets people sign up with any nickname, the browser creates the private key and the site's CA signs it.

It gives the same security benefits but with improved privacy for the user.

If Mozilla doesn't like to build it into Firefox, I've gotten it as a web proxy service that you can run on your own box. Not even firefox (or any javascrip) can learn your private keys.

How's that for privacy?

Check http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/five-minute-overview.html Cheers, Guido.

I have this website for you:

http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/design-goals.html

also check out:

http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/five-minute-overview.html

In short, it encrypts everything. It hides all the crypto at the application. No more difficult questions to answer wrongly.

In fact, you can already create an account at my demo dating site and communicate securely with others without having to touch nor verify a cryptographic certificate. Just create an account and send messages. Use Tor if you want to hide your endpoint.

I have this website for you:

http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/design-goals.html

also check out:

http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/five-minute-overview.html

In short, it encrypts everything. It hides all the crypto at the application. No more difficult questions to answer wrongly.

In fact, you can already create an account at my demo dating site and communicate securely with others without having to touch nor verify a cryptographic certificate. Just create an account and send messages. Use Tor if you want to hide your endpoint.

If the feds want your keys they would have to come to you!

This will raise the bar a little: http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/five-minute-overview.html

(With current operating systems, that's still too easy, hence I can only raise the bar. not solve it...)

Or at least the sort of computer design that deliberately walked away from having security built into all levels.

That was exactly that happened when people moved away from central mainframes to local PCs.

Also, neither PC nor Web architecture attempted to make certificates and keys into palpable first-class entities that users could more easily understand and manipulate, so the potential for verification and privacy were not realized.

There is a link missing in the chain. It is the list of which web sites are signed by which CA. Without that list, checking certificates is Russion Roulette. You get lucky most of the times.

Right now, some of the best stopgaps against this miserable history are projects like Qubes, Tor and I2P. Qubes lets me handle each thing I do in separate hardware-and-GUI enforced domains. Tor enables privacy for web and is familiar to many people. I2P gives me more than web connectivity, and the expectation that sites I connect to won't need Javascript (hardly ever) and is more future-proof than Tor.

I've come up with a way to get out this mess. It uses all the standard cryptography components but in a different way; and it is very easy to integrate into the current Internet structure.

I call it Eccentric-Authentication. See http://eccentric-authentication.org/

How many people call their bank and check the SSL's fingerprint? Nope, we just trust the CAs. How weird.

It's the Riddle of the Correct CA.

The CAs have neglected to create a solution for that. Now we are left to trust them. Trust that gets abused by the least secure of the bunch...

See: http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/threat_model.html at threat #2.

I know you're trying to plug your thing here, but what you are saying is just naive. People use credit cards on the internet, you can't just magic that away with bitcoins or something. At least not yet. The technology isn't there. Do you suggest never using a credit card in real life? Or never telling anyone your name? At that point it is public information right?

Well spotted, I try to plug my thing.

And you are completly correct: the moment you provide personal identifyable information on an account, that account will be tied to your real identity. Everything you have done in the past and everything you will do in future will be tied to your person. For ever.

The thing that I plug is that people should have many separate identities at many separate sites. IE. You don't have just one account, you have a multitude. All anonymous. No one can figure out that these belong to the same person.

What I'm plugging with my protocol is that you use as many pseudonyms as you want. In fact, signing up for a new pseudonym should be so easy that it's considered a no brainer not to do so. It is easier than creating a new account with a throwaway email address. Anything more difficult on the client side is a bug, anything more difficult from the server side is considered hostile (like google's real name policy).

When shopping, create a new account, order and pay with credit card, fill in postal delivery address and destroy the private key that belongs to this account after delivery. That way, the shop knows that someone at your address ordered something but no one will ever learn of your other accounts. Not even the shop learns of your other accounts at that same shop.

If you tell your true name using one of your many pseudonyms, that ties that pseudonym to your real life identity for ever. Don't reveal your identitiy it unless you want to tie that pseudonym to your real identity.

It sucks if your real identity gets known by accident or just stupidity on your side. Rest assured, most of your other pseudonym accounts are still anonymous.

That's the amount of privacy control I give you with my protocol. You, the end user is in control. My tools are there to make it easy to keep your many accounts/identities private.

To plug it again: http://eccentric-authentication.org/eccentric-authentication/anonymous_logins.html

Users can't do it wrong anymore. Play with the demo at: http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/06/07/run-it-yourself.html or take a look at the walkthrough.

Don't just encrypt private details.

Get rid of users private data, so there is nothing to steal in the first place.

Use eccentric authentication*. Replaces passwords with anonymous client certificates.

Check my: http://eccentric-authentication.org/

We should get rid of any remote password protocol.

I propose http://eccentric-authentication.org/

That's why we need tools to make cryptography the default choice.

Check out: http://eccentric-authentication.org/blog/2013/06/07/run-it-yourself.html

Disclaimer: it's my site.

Or take a look at http://eccentric-authentication.org/