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You're not wrong. However there are more than two parties. Buy into the trap of binary thinking - that it's an either/or choice, and you're still playing their game - only now they can dismiss your discontent as "apathy".

The only political issue that should really matter right now is electoral reform. We need to change the system so that two parties cannot dominate any election each through fear of the other being elected.

http://www.electionmethods.org/ is a good place to start.

I think he's getting at a much simpler answer--condorcet elections. http://electionmethods.org/CondorcetEx.htm

I left out the issue of loops causing no clear winner being determined because I don't think it is a huge problem. Yes, in theory, they can occur. With a single voter it is easy to illustrate. (I like A over B because of his policy on education, and I like B over C because of her stance on criminal justice, but I like C over A because of his support for tax cuts.) However, you can't actually vote a cycle with rankings. Either they tie, or they don't. You can't create a loop. I think with such large numbers of people involved it would be very very unlikely that such a loop would exist. I don't have any mathematics to back that up, however.

I don't think IRV is a "secondary" solution, as it does not solve the third-party "spoiler effect" problem, it just disguises it. It has other problems of its own. Individual IRV sums cannot be summed together like Condorcet can, making it impractical for large (districted) elections that depend on sub-tallies. Mathematically, IRV meets even fewer of the criteria for a fair election method than plurality does. One I just mentioned, but the biggest one is that it is non-monotonic - meaning that if you rank your favorite candidate lower, it may actually help him win, and ranking a disfavored candidate higher may cause him to lose. Such an illogical and unintuitive system should be rejected outright. This problem is much more blatantly offensive than the possible issue of loops arising in a Condorcet vote, because there's no way to fix it. Resolving a loop may seem a little bizarre, but the rational basis for how it's done makes sense - basically if you can't find a single candidate that won the most, find one that lost the least (to state it very nontechnically).

IRV gives a convincing illusion that third parties are included fairly, but until one becomes a major party it will always be excluded, and only the relative ranking of the two major parties (for the final round) makes any difference. The system does not evaluate all preferences simultaneously but sequentially, discarding part of your ballot as it goes. If the system throws out part of your vote, then it's no longer using your honest vote, which defeats the whole purpose! Our current system is basically a runoff system in a way, with all rounds prior to the last taking place in the media. Everybody "knows" that the only choice that matters is R-v-D, so that's the only one they bother with.

If we seriously can't go to a Condorcet voting system, I'd rather use Approval voting. Sure, the uneducated masses may continue to vote only "D" or "R" and ignore other unknown candidates they'd likely agree with, but those who are informed can at least vote honestly without wasting their ballot. We'd have a truer indication of the support that third parties have, which means they'd get more coverage. Over time, this feedback loop may actually enable a third party to win. (Imagine what would happen to the left and the right if they suddenly discovered that Ralph Nader or Michael Peroutka actually did have the support of 30% of the electorate. I bet the Duopoly would be furiously scurrying to head off another 20% waking up to the fact that there are other options.) A bonus to Approval is that it can work with current voting machines.

I left out the issue of loops causing no clear winner being determined because I don't think it is a huge problem. Yes, in theory, they can occur. With a single voter it is easy to illustrate. (I like A over B because of his policy on education, and I like B over C because of her stance on criminal justice, but I like C over A because of his support for tax cuts.) However, you can't actually vote a cycle with rankings. Either they tie, or they don't. You can't create a loop. I think with such large numbers of people involved it would be very very unlikely that such a loop would exist. I don't have any mathematics to back that up, however.

I don't think IRV is a "secondary" solution, as it does not solve the third-party "spoiler effect" problem, it just disguises it. It has other problems of its own. Individual IRV sums cannot be summed together like Condorcet can, making it impractical for large (districted) elections that depend on sub-tallies. Mathematically, IRV meets even fewer of the criteria for a fair election method than plurality does. One I just mentioned, but the biggest one is that it is non-monotonic - meaning that if you rank your favorite candidate lower, it may actually help him win, and ranking a disfavored candidate higher may cause him to lose. Such an illogical and unintuitive system should be rejected outright. This problem is much more blatantly offensive than the possible issue of loops arising in a Condorcet vote, because there's no way to fix it. Resolving a loop may seem a little bizarre, but the rational basis for how it's done makes sense - basically if you can't find a single candidate that won the most, find one that lost the least (to state it very nontechnically).

IRV gives a convincing illusion that third parties are included fairly, but until one becomes a major party it will always be excluded, and only the relative ranking of the two major parties (for the final round) makes any difference. The system does not evaluate all preferences simultaneously but sequentially, discarding part of your ballot as it goes. If the system throws out part of your vote, then it's no longer using your honest vote, which defeats the whole purpose! Our current system is basically a runoff system in a way, with all rounds prior to the last taking place in the media. Everybody "knows" that the only choice that matters is R-v-D, so that's the only one they bother with.

If we seriously can't go to a Condorcet voting system, I'd rather use Approval voting. Sure, the uneducated masses may continue to vote only "D" or "R" and ignore other unknown candidates they'd likely agree with, but those who are informed can at least vote honestly without wasting their ballot. We'd have a truer indication of the support that third parties have, which means they'd get more coverage. Over time, this feedback loop may actually enable a third party to win. (Imagine what would happen to the left and the right if they suddenly discovered that Ralph Nader or Michael Peroutka actually did have the support of 30% of the electorate. I bet the Duopoly would be furiously scurrying to head off another 20% waking up to the fact that there are other options.) A bonus to Approval is that it can work with current voting machines.

You forgot about another set of problems: vote-buying & extortion.

It is much easier and more effective to commit election fraud via tampering with the counting process. It was, however, specifically with an eye towards goon squads that I specifically stipulated that individual voters could chose to discard their receipt before leaving the polling place. If you are concerned, about these things, however, there was a system with graphically encrypted receipts discussed here a while back.

Condorcet methods have their advantages, but they're somewhat vulnerable to strategic voting, and almost no one understands them. If you want a different system, use approval voting -- it's better, and much easier for Joe Voter to understand.

I don't think approval voting is as good as condorcet though it is better than the current system. All usable systems are somewhat vulnerable to strategic voting but almost any system is less vulnerable than our current system which basically demands strategic voting. Some have argued that approval voting is less vulnerable to strategic voting than condorcet but it isn't very convincing. Indeed, I can easily see both democrats and republicans not checking the box for a moderate third candidate (who otherwise would win outright) in order to bury them. Approval voting as it would likely be implemented on old voting equipment would be extremely vulnerable to tampering. You can get around this by requiring an explicit yes or no rather than selecting but ranking systems prevent the incorrect use of old equipment. Ranking candidates, which is what the general public needs to understand, is not hard to understand. The tabulating methods are confusing but anyone who wants to understand those can find documents that explain how and why particular systems are used. electionmethods.org and wikipedia have more info for those who want to find out more.

IRV has many problems. Also see this example. There was/is a compare between several election methods on the same website but i cannot find it right now.

IRV has many problems. Also see this example. There was/is a compare between several election methods on the same website but i cannot find it right now.

Read this now. Then read this.

Read this now. Then read this.

Yes, we have run-offs. Mathematically, run-offs are a very poor solution. They don't solve the problem. Condorcet voting does.

I don't object to a primary/caucus system being used by a party to select it's candidate - but Condorcet voting should be used there, too. I do object to "general" or "open" primaries because they are just run-offs then, which fail every mathematical test for what a voting system ought to be. The only virtue of run-offs is that they are simple to comprehend, but if they're not selecting the right person, what's the point?

I hate the way that IRV advocates like to say there should be more than two choices in the voting booth, yet they are only willing to consider two choices for voting systems.

Yes, IRV is slightly better than Plurality. But if you're going to bother with complex ranked ballots, you may as well go whole hog with Condorcet. IMO, Approval Voting beats IRV by a wide margin and is several-fold simpler to implement.

Not feasable given the current structure. To vote your hopes instead of your fears: Instant Runoff Voting (specifically
Condorcet Voting with Clone Proof Schwartz Sequential Dropping Cyclic Ambiguity Resolution
("majority prefers" is not transitive)).

The problem is that if a voting machine is programmed to cheat, it is easy enough to fake a paper receipt. I could cast a vote for A, have the screen verify that I am voting for A, receive a printed receipt that tells me I voted for A, and STILL have that vote count for B within the black box.

That's why you the paper ballots should used for the real count. The electronically recorded votes should be used for a fast but tentative initial count and also as a substitute for lost or severaly damaged paper ballots. See this.

1. There may be a 49/49 tie, and it has to be broken somehow.

Ties aren't unique to Plurality. What if the vote breakdown of an IRV election is 49 RLD, 49 DLR, 2 LRD? Libertarians are eliminated, then there's a tie between the Democrats and the Republicans, just like in Plurality. Ties pop up in Condorcet, too. No matter what voting system you use, there's just no avoiding the chance of a tie. It's a people issue, not a system issue.

2. With IRV, you aren't forced to choose a second, third, etc. choice. You can stick with just your first choice.

Nor are you in Condorcet. You just specify your first choice, then leave the rest unspecified. They all tie for last place by default -- which is exactly the same as what happens in IRV. If you honestly think all the others are equally bad, this is a good thing, but if you actually have an opinion, you're giving up your chance to express it. (For instance, I'm a rampant little-l libertarian on social issues, so despite the fact that I don't want the Republicans in office because I'm economically center-left, I *still* think they're better than the neo-Nazis in the Constitution Party. If I truncated my preferences, and by some nightmare scenario the Constitution Party were a serious contender this election, I'd be letting them waltz into office.)

This attitude that ranking is a bad thing stems from the mathematical fact that IRV throws away most of your ballot. This page shows some example rankings and demonstrates how much is thrown away by IRV:

• 63: A,B,C,D,E -> 63: A,B
• 75: B,A,C,D,E -> 75: B
• 100: C,D,B,E,A -> 100: C
• 86: D,E,C,B,A -> 86: D
• 73: E,D,C,B,A -> 73: E,D

1st round: A eliminated, xfer to B. 2nd round: E eliminated, xfer to D. 3rd round: C eliminated, xfer to D. 4th round: D wins. C was the candidate with the most 1st place votes, and the Condorcet winner, but it still loses.

If I'm not mistaken, the Avy method of IRV passes the Monotonicity Criterion.

http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.htm says both IRV and Condorcet fail Participation Criterion. As to whether the Avy method fails PC, I don't know.

How is this idea formalized? Can anybody comment if this is indeed a problem with Condorcet?

On the other hand, there seems to be loads of problems with IRV. In particular, with IRV:

1. voting a candidate higher can cause the candidate to lose, and voting a candidate lower can cause the candidate to win.
2. adding one or more ballots that vote X over Y can change the winner from X to Y.

You do realize Condorcet is flawed, right? http://www.mich.com/~donald/x2002d.html will explain some of why it's flawed, if you find the second occurrence of the word "Condorcet".

Condorcet can elect one of your lower choices, unlike IRV. With Condorcet, each lower choice vote has the same weight as one of the higher choices.

With IRV, you should NEVER vote for a candidate you don't want, even if it's a protest vote. You should really vote for a candidate you would want to win.

You mentioned http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.html, which has the below. The below is flawed in it's logic. It assumes that the Libertarian's second choice transfers to the Republicans, which may be correct. Well, if Republicans come in third place, thus being elimanted, who do you think the Republicans voted for second, Democrats? Yeah right, more likely the Republicans voted for Libertarians as their second choice in that three major party race. The below seems to assume that Republicans didn't list a second choice.

http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.html
Suppose my true preference is for the Libertarian first and the Republican second. Suppose further that the Libertarians are the strongest "minor" party. At some round of the IRV counting process, all the candidates will be eliminated except the Republican, the Democrat, and the Libertarian. If the Libertarian then has the fewest first-choice votes, he or she will be eliminated and my vote will transfer to the Republican, just as I wanted. But what if the Republican is eliminated before the Libertarian? Unless all the Republican votes transfer to the Libertarian, which is extremely unlikely, the Democrat might then beat the Libertarian. If so, I will have helped the Democrat win by not strategically ranking the Republican first. But that's the same situation I'm in now if I vote my true preference for the Libertarian!

You do realize Condorcet is flawed, right? http://www.mich.com/~donald/x2002d.html will explain some of why it's flawed, if you find the second occurrence of the word "Condorcet".

Condorcet can elect one of your lower choices, unlike IRV. With Condorcet, each lower choice vote has the same weight as one of the higher choices.

With IRV, you should NEVER vote for a candidate you don't want, even if it's a protest vote. You should really vote for a candidate you would want to win.

You mentioned http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.html, which has the below. The below is flawed in it's logic. It assumes that the Libertarian's second choice transfers to the Republicans, which may be correct. Well, if Republicans come in third place, thus being elimanted, who do you think the Republicans voted for second, Democrats? Yeah right, more likely the Republicans voted for Libertarians as their second choice in that three major party race. The below seems to assume that Republicans didn't list a second choice.

http://electionmethods.org/IRVproblems.html
Suppose my true preference is for the Libertarian first and the Republican second. Suppose further that the Libertarians are the strongest "minor" party. At some round of the IRV counting process, all the candidates will be eliminated except the Republican, the Democrat, and the Libertarian. If the Libertarian then has the fewest first-choice votes, he or she will be eliminated and my vote will transfer to the Republican, just as I wanted. But what if the Republican is eliminated before the Libertarian? Unless all the Republican votes transfer to the Libertarian, which is extremely unlikely, the Democrat might then beat the Libertarian. If so, I will have helped the Democrat win by not strategically ranking the Republican first. But that's the same situation I'm in now if I vote my true preference for the Libertarian!

Here's why.

BTW, I've also used the "political vector space" analogy. It's silly to think that 1 dimension adequately describes the complex issues of the political arena.

5a. Use IRV to determine the winner of the state popular vote. That winner receives two electoral votes.

Please don't support IRV. Australia's used IRV for almost a century, and they still have a two-party mess because IRV becomes just as unstable as our current system when a third party becomes powerful. For a peek at a similar system, look back at the two-round runoff elections used in France in 2002, when the lefties were so busy nominating their vanity candidates as their first choice that their second choice Jospin was eliminated in the first round, leaving center-right Chirac opposed to far-right racist LePen. IRV is also a nightmare to tally, since the data of each individual ballot must be kept separate (you can't just add up the votes, you have to have all 120 million ballots shipped to a central location). Support Approval or Condorcet instead, neither of which have these deficiencies and both of which encourage third parties.

5a. Use IRV to determine the winner of the state popular vote. That winner receives two electoral votes.

Please don't support IRV. Australia's used IRV for almost a century, and they still have a two-party mess because IRV becomes just as unstable as our current system when a third party becomes powerful. For a peek at a similar system, look back at the two-round runoff elections used in France in 2002, when the lefties were so busy nominating their vanity candidates as their first choice that their second choice Jospin was eliminated in the first round, leaving center-right Chirac opposed to far-right racist LePen. IRV is also a nightmare to tally, since the data of each individual ballot must be kept separate (you can't just add up the votes, you have to have all 120 million ballots shipped to a central location). Support Approval or Condorcet instead, neither of which have these deficiencies and both of which encourage third parties.

1. Absolutely, under all circumstances, mandatorily demand a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail. This applies not only to touch-screen technology, but to all voting machines. NO EXCEPTIONS, THIS MEANS YOU.
2. Having accomplished #1, Condorcet voting would be nice, maybe with Approval voting while we wait for everyone to get used to the idea. The Republicrat duopoly needs to end, and though I disagree with the Libertarians on economic issues, it'd be nice to see some real dialog rather than thumping gay abortionist Bibles for the imminently threatening Iraqi children.
3. Abolish the Electoral College and directly elect the President. This is about equally as important as #2. Land doesn't vote, so why should one land's people get more voting power than another's?

A while back, I wrote this rant on #2, and just last week I wrote this letter to my state legislators regarding #1 and #2. Please, please, PLEASE do the same to your own legislators. (Remember, don't bother so much with your federal legislators. For the forseeable future, the Electoral College will stay in place, and that means each individual state decides its own standards on audit logging and election methods. Only your state legislators currently have any say with regard to #1 and #2, so the rise of Condorcet/Approval will have to be a state-by-state thing.)

1. Absolutely, under all circumstances, mandatorily demand a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail. This applies not only to touch-screen technology, but to all voting machines. NO EXCEPTIONS, THIS MEANS YOU.
2. Having accomplished #1, Condorcet voting would be nice, maybe with Approval voting while we wait for everyone to get used to the idea. The Republicrat duopoly needs to end, and though I disagree with the Libertarians on economic issues, it'd be nice to see some real dialog rather than thumping gay abortionist Bibles for the imminently threatening Iraqi children.
3. Abolish the Electoral College and directly elect the President. This is about equally as important as #2. Land doesn't vote, so why should one land's people get more voting power than another's?

A while back, I wrote this rant on #2, and just last week I wrote this letter to my state legislators regarding #1 and #2. Please, please, PLEASE do the same to your own legislators. (Remember, don't bother so much with your federal legislators. For the forseeable future, the Electoral College will stay in place, and that means each individual state decides its own standards on audit logging and election methods. Only your state legislators currently have any say with regard to #1 and #2, so the rise of Condorcet/Approval will have to be a state-by-state thing.)

The short of it is that you change the directions from "vote for one" to "vote for any". The whomever has the most number of approvals wins. It doesn't let people express preference between two candidates they find acceptable but it makes up for that in that it's simple for people to understand and it should be possible to use our existing style ballots.

There is a technically superior voting method, similar to IRV, called Condorcet but it's more complicated and therefore would be less easy to understand by the general public and I think it's important that people be able to understand the election process as much as possible.

The short of it is that you change the directions from "vote for one" to "vote for any". The whomever has the most number of approvals wins. It doesn't let people express preference between two candidates they find acceptable but it makes up for that in that it's simple for people to understand and it should be possible to use our existing style ballots.

There is a technically superior voting method, similar to IRV, called Condorcet but it's more complicated and therefore would be less easy to understand by the general public and I think it's important that people be able to understand the election process as much as possible.

But I agree with your general idea. Almost any voting method would be better than the current system, and people need to be aware just how much it's hurting the political landscape in many countries.

(People also need to be aware that political character is more than just a one-dimensional left-vs-right range. People's assessments of the balance of power between government and people, between government and business, between minorities and the mainstream, &c. aren't necessarily the same. There's a thought-provoking site here which explains this rather well.)

It isolates voting irregularities to a single state.

It balances differences in voter turnout.

If a state has a large immigrant population, it is important the state's interests are represented in proportion to its size even though many of its residents may be unable to vote.

The electoral college ensures elections will always have a definite outcome.

How about changing us away from a 2-party system.

I'd go into the requisite spiel on why plurality voting is broken and forces a two-party system on us, but instead I'll just point you to this article on electionmethods.org about the best alternative.

I agree that the plurality vote is bad, but IRV is flawed, too. Approval voting is the way to go. Read a good summary of the issues at ElectionMethods.org.

Personally, what I want is condorcet voting ( http://electionmethods.org/CondorcetEx.htm ).

I know that there are technically things wrong with every possible approach, but if one counts the frequency of occurance and estimates the severity of the problem, the choice seems straight-forwards.

As a prior Election Official, do you have any views on voting system reform? Questions such as switching to an approval voting system or even eventually abolishing the Electoral College and implementing a ranked voting system over a plurality voting system?

I was recently introduced to the site ElectionMethods.org which discusses election reform and I have been *extremely* interested in it.

Did you read their opinion regarding the EC? I agreed with many of the points there and I would appreciate hearing a thought out refute of it.
Why the Electorial College Should be Abolished

Also, here is their opinion of the complexity of the system in regards to the layman:
Is Condorcet Voting Too Complicated?

Did you read their opinion regarding the EC? I agreed with many of the points there and I would appreciate hearing a thought out refute of it.
Why the Electorial College Should be Abolished

Also, here is their opinion of the complexity of the system in regards to the layman:
Is Condorcet Voting Too Complicated?

oops, fixed links:
ElectionMethods.org and AccurateDemocracy.com.

Let me offer you a reasonable way of thinking about this.

The election system is flawed. Even Afghanistan has a better election system. A simple plurality vote allows the presence of "spoiler" candidates.

Thought problem: 60% of people want a candidate with position A and 40% of people want a candidate with position B.

Unfortunately, there are 2 candidates with position A. With the votes split between them, the single candidate with position B will win. This is a serious and dramatic flaw of the electoral system. People who say otherwise are deceiving themselves.

In a runoff election, successive pairs of candidates are voted for until a solid majority is obtained. That makes spoilers impossible.

But unfortunately, with the current system, spoilers are possible.

In order to not break the system, you have to pretend that this is the last phase of a run-off election. You have to choose between the pair of candidates most likely to win. In reality, nothing has been lost. You need to recognize that even in a real run-off election, Kerry and Bush would probably have been the two run-off finalists.

And so, under this point of view, you are morally obligated to vote for the one of the two run-off candidates that you would most like in office.

Pick your battles! Call for election reform this coming year. Gain recognition by voting third party candidates into lesser offices; Libertarians, for instance, hold a number of offices nation wide.

There are a lot of subtleties in voting. Here are a couple of helpful links.

...and the people who are actutally informed about it agree that it's a big pile of shit. Condorcet has all the advantages of IRV and none of its many drawbacks.

...and the people who are actutally informed about it agree that it's a big pile of shit. Condorcet has all the advantages of IRV and none of its many drawbacks.

And no chance of winning, so he's not really a choice, even if he's on the ballot.

The presidency is not a horse race. The winner is not a foregone conclusion with voters "placing bets". Your vote decides the outcome. If you and your friends and their friends vote for Badnarik, then he will win, just as assuredly as Kerry would win if you vote for him or Bush if you vote for him. If you don't vote for what you believe, you'll never get what you want. It's not as if Bush/Kerry is going to pay more attention to what you say since you voted for him - he'll just be laughing all the way to the White House.

PS You want Condorcet, not IRV.

IRV is garbage.

One issue I have about voting for a "thrid party" candidate is that I feel that make help skew the election in the favor of Bush. If we had a REAL voting method like the Condorcet method I would then be able to indicate my TRUE voting preferences as such:

Badnarik

Peroutka

Cobb

Kerry

Bush

As you can see I REALLY don't want to give Bush another four years and the Condorcet method would allow me to express that.

Yes, it means that if you /really/ do prefer Nader, you can put him as your number 1, and still not give a vote to Bush by putting Kerry as your number 2. But if you EVER expect Nader (or another 3rd party candidate) to have a realistic chance of winning, IRV can betray you. This explains it better.

That link explains it well, but forgets something in its example: it assumes that one party has a strong caucus from which people vote, while another party is split: in reality, factions from both major parties are likely to split to multiple minor parties (Democrats -> Greens + Nader, Republicans -> Libertarians). While IRV is not ideal, it would be better than what we have now, and splitting the vote would not be quite so problematic as they seem to suggest.

IRV is simple enough (just rank the candidates from favorite to least favorite) and it would keep people from having to vote tactically, thus weakening the two party system.

Yes, it means that if you /really/ do prefer Nader, you can put him as your number 1, and still not give a vote to Bush by putting Kerry as your number 2. But if you EVER expect Nader (or another 3rd party candidate) to have a realistic chance of winning, IRV can betray you. This explains it better.

(Also, it's CONDORCET, not CONCORDANT, voting that people are probably meaning to refer to.)

I don't know why modern political-reformists are so fixated on IRV. Of all the technical criteria of "fair voting" IRV fulfills NONE. In this respect it's worse even than "majority vote".

I don't know why modern political-reformists are so fixated on IRV. Of all the technical criteria of "fair voting" IRV fulfills NONE. In this respect it's worse even than "majority vote".

I mean, why would you want to go with a voting scheme, that makes possible situation that adding votes for a candidate causes him to lose, and converselly, removing votes for a candidate causes him to win?

Why not go directly with "aproval" or even "condorcet"?

Robert

PS Go, read the above link to find out what's exactly wrong with IRV.

It's a step in the right direction, but it has real and significant problems.

I'd love a system where you could vote 3 times in priority. If your first candidate wins, your vote stays with him and helps him win. If he doesn't have a chance, then your vote goes to your second choice, etc.

It appears you're talking about instant runoff voting, which is even worse than the plurality system the US currently uses. Or did you plan to Condorcet-count the ballots?

Two options:
1. Convince people to support IRV because plurality is broken, then convince them to support Condorcet because IRV is broken.
2. Convince people to support Condorcet because plurality is broken.

Is it really that hard to pick the better choice?

Fuck IRV. It's more than just a little bad; it is the only major voting system that fails monotonicity. Even plurality satisfies monotonicity fer chrissakes!

If you're going to push for electoral reform, push for something that works instead of something that seems a little better than what we have now on the surface, but completely falls apart under cursory examination.

It was like five different tests to do to a voting system. None of our systems pass all five. I think the term is "monotonicity" for part of the five or something, but I just gave up searching.

Approval voting is subject to voting stratagy though, in some ways more so then our current system. I'll agree that we need a better election system; Personally I'm ultimiately in favor of the Condorcet System of voting because it's strategy free.

Approval voting is subject to voting stratagy though, in some ways more so then our current system. I'll agree that we need a better election system; Personally I'm ultimiately in favor of the Condorcet System of voting because it's strategy free.