Slashdot Mirror

well said.
Unfortunately, this time Europe is more corrupted by Russia.

British are weak, as "Russians are your major investors and bought a couple of football clubs". Besides, I question their army's ability to do their trade.
German responce seemed hard, but unfortunately CDU's coalition partner, SPD are in reality russian agents. Former chancellor from that party is now employed by russian gas company. Besides, for russian-german relations it is business as usual (LetterOne is russian).
France would traditionally do anything to retreat or surrender. And communist trade unions would do anything to support rebuilding "USSR 2".
Italy is a corrupt farce that was unable to impeach a paedophile moron from the post for over a decade. They have very amicable relations with Russia.
Austria does plenty of business with Russia, they are HQ for russian company's subsidiaries in EU.
Greece, Bulgaria will remain silent, as "Russians are their brothers in orthodox faith".
Sweden lost ability to defent itself from own crowd, and with strong socialist sentiment they are unlikely to fight, in physical way, anyone.
Spain, Portugal fart in general direction of any troubles on the opposite side of continent.
Hungary seemed to act "independently" to some point, but few months ago prime minister Orban was "pacified" by Putin with major russian investment.
Czechs are trained in France to prepare quick welcome parties to any occupiers.
Poland, Romania and Lithuania are too weak to stand against Russia. They are heavily dependent on Russian petrol/gas. While they mostly understand the severity of situation, will remain not understood by the rest of EU, as "they are idiots who are always agains Russia".
Estonia, Latvia are checkmated, as they have huge (40%) Russian minority. If they speak too loud, Moscow will "hear Russians living in Tallin, requesting help"..
Finland and Slovakia will remain silent in hope, that in case of conventional military conflict Russian troops will opt to drive through other countries.
Cyprus is Russian bank.

Don't expect any Churchills :-(

Various Swedish legal experts have fallen on either side of the debate, for example fairly critical article on Assange quotes Swedish professor emeritus of international law, Ove Bring, as saying: "the evidence is not enough to charge him with a crime". So even the experts disagree. Unless you have some inside knowledge I do not see how you can be so sure as to say "technically the charges would come after". So your remarks smell like trolling to me...

Consider that Sweden wiretapped russian international traffic for the NSA and vetoed EU investigation against US spying the message is clear. They are not stepping back even when is clear for everyone what they are perpetrating, just keep raising the bets.

I suggest you learn a fact or two instead of repeating bullshit.

Good advice. I suggest you take it:

As for Swedish law, there are no provisions preventing prosecutors from interrogating suspects abroad. Doing so is, in fact, a routine matter. An example: In late 2010, at roughly the same time that Ms. Ny decided to issue a European Arrest Warrant for Assange, Swedish police officers went to Serbia to interview a well-known gangster suspected of involvement in an armed robbery.

In a radio interview last Friday, a Swedish professor emeritus of international law, Ove Bring, confirmed that there are no legal obstacles whatsoever preventing Ms. Ny from questioning Assange in London. When asked why the prosecutor would not do so, Professor Bring responded that ”it’s a matter of prestige not only for prosecutors, but for the Swedish legal system”

On the contrary, having a vehicle can still get you ticketed: http://www.friatider.se/parking-tickets-issued-on-wrecks-while-stockholm-burns

I am expressly not listing any elements involving the validity of the allegations themselves, but only such ones that may influence Assange that are outside the scope of the alleged crimes. There is more to be said (see links in the text), but here are the main points of swedish behaviour which are likely to trouble Assange:

• Preliminary investigation: failures to follow procedure and the probable biais of an investigating officer due to personal acquaintance with one of the defendants unfortunately put the investigation itself in a bad light.
• No case: the investigation was opened, closed, then re-opened on request of the lawyer representing the two women. The investigators themselves did not consider the evidence sufficient for court.
• Proportionality: the fact that Assange has already been held in house arrest for over 500 days and faces at least short imprisonment in Sweden prior to any trial raises serious proportionality concerns. Given this result, I believe the argument of Assange's lawyers in court, that the use of an European Arrest Warrant simply in order to further an investigation before any actual prosecution takes place is disproportionate, to be valid. However, opionions are divided on this issue.
• Questioning in the UK: there is no legal problem whatsoever for the prosecutor to do this outside of Sweden, and indeed Sweden has questioned defendants or suspects abroad in the past. This is a decision that is entirely up to the prosecutor, and that decision has not satisfactorily been explained (audio interview with Swedish prosecution authority). Only recently, one justification has been given, and it is essentially one of prestige, which is a rather poor explanation given the fears expressed by Assange and the lack of any non-extradition guarantees by the Swedish government. I would be very curious to know what the real justification was before the case blew up.
• Connections: as mentioned in previous post.
• Expected future behaviour: opinions expressed in the press by Swedish journalists and intellectuals have become virulent, to say the least. Along with the media, public opinion has swayed in disfavor of Assange, giving cause for Assange to fear a fair trial, should it ever come to one. This case would likely collapse before any trial, according to Ove Bring, professor Emeritus of the Swedish national defence college (see previous link). However, with media and public opinion and concerns of prestige being as they are, this has become less likely. Interestingly, similar reasons may be given to argue that an actual extradition from Sweden to the US has become even less probable. It would go down very poorly in the court of global, public opinion should Sweden do so after months of trying to get him to return to Sweden for completely unrelated reasons. Personally, I believe Assange's fears have alway also centered around receiving a fair trial. With time, this fear has probably become increasingly real.

I am expressly not listing any elements involving the validity of the allegations themselves, but only such ones that may influence Assange that are outside the scope of the alleged crimes. There is more to be said (see links in the text), but here are the main points of swedish behaviour which are likely to trouble Assange:

• Preliminary investigation: failures to follow procedure and the probable biais of an investigating officer due to personal acquaintance with one of the defendants unfortunately put the investigation itself in a bad light.
• No case: the investigation was opened, closed, then re-opened on request of the lawyer representing the two women. The investigators themselves did not consider the evidence sufficient for court.
• Proportionality: the fact that Assange has already been held in house arrest for over 500 days and faces at least short imprisonment in Sweden prior to any trial raises serious proportionality concerns. Given this result, I believe the argument of Assange's lawyers in court, that the use of an European Arrest Warrant simply in order to further an investigation before any actual prosecution takes place is disproportionate, to be valid. However, opionions are divided on this issue.
• Questioning in the UK: there is no legal problem whatsoever for the prosecutor to do this outside of Sweden, and indeed Sweden has questioned defendants or suspects abroad in the past. This is a decision that is entirely up to the prosecutor, and that decision has not satisfactorily been explained (audio interview with Swedish prosecution authority). Only recently, one justification has been given, and it is essentially one of prestige, which is a rather poor explanation given the fears expressed by Assange and the lack of any non-extradition guarantees by the Swedish government. I would be very curious to know what the real justification was before the case blew up.
• Connections: as mentioned in previous post.
• Expected future behaviour: opinions expressed in the press by Swedish journalists and intellectuals have become virulent, to say the least. Along with the media, public opinion has swayed in disfavor of Assange, giving cause for Assange to fear a fair trial, should it ever come to one. This case would likely collapse before any trial, according to Ove Bring, professor Emeritus of the Swedish national defence college (see previous link). However, with media and public opinion and concerns of prestige being as they are, this has become less likely. Interestingly, similar reasons may be given to argue that an actual extradition from Sweden to the US has become even less probable. It would go down very poorly in the court of global, public opinion should Sweden do so after months of trying to get him to return to Sweden for completely unrelated reasons. Personally, I believe Assange's fears have alway also centered around receiving a fair trial. With time, this fear has probably become increasingly real.