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Virtual War
When it comes to war, writes author Michael Ignatieff, virtual reality is seductive. We see ourselves as noble warriors and our enemies as despicable tyrants. We deploy our sophisticated weaponry -- in our minds itself the hallmark of a superior civilization -- against one-dimensional villains fighting with clubs and spears. We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we mis-describe ourselves and the instruments of death. "We need," he writes, "to stay away from such fables of self-righteous invulnerability. Only then can we get our hands dirty. Only then can we do what is right."
In recent years, Americans have made it clear they don't want to get their hands dirty, and there isn't anything close to a consensus of what is right. Believing their technology to be superior and infalliable, they are happy to let it do their fighting for them.
Part of the sometimes horrific history of the 20th century is that technology is no good or worse than the moral character of the people using it. The idea of the Virtual War is a uniquely American contribution to this chilling history.
The philosopher Paul Kahn has argued that 'riskless warfare in pursuit of human rights' is a moral contradiction, since the idea behind human rights is that all life is of equal value. So called "risk-free warfare" presumes that our lives matter more than those we are intervening to save.
This idea is underscored in this devastatingly-documented attack on the lack of reason, moral foundation, clear goals or concrete results behind the recent conflict in Bosnia, an American-conceived Virtual War fought primarily by by hi-tech weaponry rather than people. The war was meticulously designed not only to force the Serbs out of Kosovar, but perhaps equally important, to be politically palatable to the American public. Thus the idea of the Virtual War, a conflict in which our technology would supplant the warrior willing to die on our behalf. In the Virtual War, machines do all of the fighting and bleeding for us. Except, of course, for their hapless targets.
Ignatieff (a frequent contributor to the New Yorker and producer of an award-winning TV series on natonalism) was present in the Balkans before, during and after the Bosnian conflict, writes clearly and with laser-like authority and confidence. He zeroes in on American techno-hubris, the idea that a handful of people running computer consoles in distant bases can wage or win a complex military victory, even in the most complex of conflicts.
He reminds us that the victory in Kosova was, to say the least, ambiguous. Far fewer Serb soldiers and equipment were killed in the Virtual Combat than we were led to believe. Although the Serbs did eventually withdraw, in part because of our relentless bombing of civilian targets far from the battlefield, and NATO troops entered Kosovo in their wake, there was no Serb surrender. Nothing was resolved. No legal or other agreements to resolve the conflict have been negotiated or ratified.
On a smaller but still bloody scale, the conflict continues today and is, in fact, worsening. The tanks NATO generals assured us had been destroyed mysteriously emerged from the brush and rumbled back home. Serbia is rebuilding its infrastructure.
"Why do virtual wars end so ambiguously?" asks Ignatieff: "Nations impose unconditional surrender on their enemies only when they have suffered some harm -- death of their citizens, loss of their territory -- which seems to require a fight to the death. Wars fought in the name of the human rights of other nation's national minorities are bound to be self-limiting. We fight for victory and unconditional surrender only when we are fighting for ourselves."
The political and military leaders who planned the Virtual War in Kosovo clearly grasped this idea from the first, even though the American public was never directly told. Missiles and smart bombs assaulted what pilots and data-interpreters hundreds, even thousands of miles away, believed were tanks, troop carriers and gun emplacements. Only a handful of NATO troops, mostly Americans, were involved, and the only casualties they suffered during the conflict were accidental, not in combat. Many of the casualties were civilians killed indirectly by technicians hundreds of miles away who often had no idea anybody had been killed.
"Virtual Wars" is a brilliant exercise both in journalism and moral reasoning. It's also yet another parable and warning about the unthinking American fascination with technology as an all-encompassing, infallible means to and end. Ignatieff documents that the technology used in this Virtual War was much less effective than we were led to believe during the fighting. In any case, he foresees, the American monopoly on this machinery will inevitably end, and it will soon be available to other countries and political groups. We are, he cautions, setting an awful precedent -- it's all right to unleash fearful weapons on unseen targets if you do so in the name of human rights.
The Virtual War was more or less invented in the Persian Gulf when transfixed Americans were hypnotized by the laser-guided video bomb flights and explosions released every night for the evening news. Here was a savvy, spin-conceived conflict if ever there was one: an unequivocally bad dictator pummeled by thousands of superbly-armed American soldiers who suffered few casualties and were led by a General as good with sound bites as he was with a field map. Years later, some people still puzzle why Saddam is still in charge, why the core of his army is intact, why many of the people who were encouraged by the United States to challenge him have been slaughtered, why he is rearming. But that is less riveting than the notion of the Virtual War, and the video on the evening news.
If "Virtual War" has a flaw, it may be in failing to take account the influence of modern media on the shaping of military conflicts. The U.S. military left Vietnam convinced they were undermined as much by grisly TV footage shown at home as by the North Vietnamese. Since that war, the military has taken extraordinary pains to make sure that they control the footage that makes it to the evening news. If they can't always win on the battlefied, they've sure conquered the mainstream media, desperate for such graphic, riveting footage. Consider the TV images from Vietnam to Iraq: mangled American bodies to imploding Iraqi radar stations and warehouses. But that's a minor oversight This a terrific book, richly documented, written in a spare and accessible way, and profoundly persuasive.
Ignatieff asks the right questions. Is it moral to kill others when we refuse to make any sacrifices ourselves? Can a "Virtual War" fought by machines controlled from great distances, really conquer countries, resolve conflicts, and promote lasting settlements?
Can any country like the U.S. muster the determination and will -- evident in all of its previous wars up until Vietnam -- to do whatever it takes to win even as our leaders concede the conflict --thus the principle -- isn't worth any any substantial material or human cost to us?
The Kosovo operation, writes Ignatieff, is the paradigm of this paradoxical form of warfare: where technological omnipotence is vested in the hands of risk-averse political cultures. "Precision violence is now at the disposal of a risk-adverse culture, unconvinced by the language of military sacrifice, skeptical about the costs of foreign adventures and determined to keep out of harm's way."
Purchase this book at Fatbrain.
We fight wars with guns in the real world. We fight wars with scripts, computers, and bandwidth online. We trade money online through credit cards, we chat online through e-mail and IRC. We telecommute for our jobs. We have a plethora of technologies to interface the realworld's knowledge and information directly into the virtual one.
Yet despite the overwhelming evidence that the virtual world is a mirror of the realworld, we continue to treat this medium as somehow different from the real one. Our legal conventions somehow didn't cross the digital divide, and we're left with the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, the CDA, software patents, and "e-commerce". It seems that the world has fallen under the dillusion that if someone creates something "new" in the virtual world that is "old" in the real world.. it must be valuable and something to be protected. This is the single most dangerous idea threatening the virtual world - it could easily destroy it or render it a useless wasteland of advertisements and billboards, push technology, and download-only bandwidth.
That's my take on virtual morality - it is just the same as realworld morality, only mirrored and adapted. Minus one minor glitch in people's thinking: that the two are somehow seperate and not to be mixed.
We should also ask ourselves the real reasons for the Persian Gulf "war". Contrary to popular belief, it wasn't about oil--only 11% of the United States total oil consumption for that year came from nations that could possibly have been affected (Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). In fact, we were getting more oil from Iraq than from Kuwait in the year before the war started. Even after the war, the United States government repeatedly chastized the restored Kuwaiti government for its poor human-rights record, but did this out of the spotlight in venues that the U.S. public was unlikely to explore.
What's the agenda here? Why is the United States spending so much time and effort bombing people with alleged "precision" munitions (munitions which, in the Gulf War at least, were later shown to have only a 40% hit rate--a far cry from the perception that every bomb hit every target). We need to ask ourselves what the government is doing with all of this money, and who the next target of those weapons will be.
The United States government has shown, in recent years, a great intolerance for certain "fringe" groups. These munitions, once honed to perfection (after being tested on foreign soil in conflicts that are generated out of thin air), may be used in the future to silence groups that dare to speak out against the government.
We are right to be afraid of this, but we should not let that fear paralyze us. The government prefers to use smoke and mirrors when fighting these battles; only the blinding light of the truth will save us.
www.alarmist.org
It seems to me that the guy is saying that in order for a war to be moral enough people on your side have to be killed.
Minimum acceptable loss ratio?
"Sorry, gentlemen, you suffered less than 15% of our casualties. It is now quite clear that we are the 'good' side and you are the 'evil' side."
I can understand being morally uncomfortable about risklessly killing people at a distance. I would guess this is a remnant from the times when personal man-to-man battles were the only honorable form of combat. But, really, arguing that you MUST pay in blood to achieve military goals...
Kaa
Kaa
Kaa's Law: In any sufficiently large group of people most are idiots.
A "virtual war" in Ignatieff's work, is a fiction, invented by the American armed forces. It is not some Web based DDOS attack, or anything to do with the 'net. He is talking about how the armed forces want to portray themselves as powerful, and inflicting massive damages, without actually putting themselves at risk. Arguably, minimizing their involvement.
Once the smart bombs have blown up the wooden shacks and accidentally destroyed the embassies, and the 'bad guys' leave, the real work begins, with soldiers on the ground. *These* are the ones risking their lives.
IMO, it is not the one who inflicts the most physical damage who is making the greatest contribution, but the one who is willing to make the greatest sacrifice, take the greatest risk for the cause. I have infinitely more respect for infintry cum peace keepers than jet jockies and button pushers on warships. They seem to only die in accidents these days, not in fighting.
The guys in blue helmets, who deliver food, who go door to door looking for weapons stashes, and try to defuse disagreements on the street corner before they get messy are the ones who should be proud.
Killing a lot of people or destroying a lot of hardware is EASY. Any kook with a big enough bomb can do that. Terrorism is much more efficient at that than a military strike. What's hard is actually PURSUING THE GOAL of peace.
At some point, the bombing has to stop in any war, and when it does, what you do next is much more meaningful to determine how things work out in the end.
Military force *IS* a useful, and necessary, last resort. But it should *NOT* be considered a goal or ideal. It should NOT be the chosen path, just because it's easier to justify the deaths of a bunch of people who'll never get on TV than a few GI's on the ground.
I'm from Canada. Can you tell?
Greg
The main reason the wars in Kosovo, Iraq and Vietnam were fought and "won" against different "enemies" has more to do with public perception and national interest than with questions of human rights.
Remember, as well, that there are only three types of strategies: occidental, chinese and "japanese".
Here are just a couple of examples of what I mean:
So... As far as I am concerned, there are no "good" or "bad" wars. All wars are just determined by national self-interest, which then influences public perception of the war.
Kosovo (and the rest of the Balkans) are a complete mess because public perception and self interest were out of whack. The sad thing is that most industrial and military powers in the world today could not care less if the Serbs massacred all Kosovars (and butcher they did). Half-hearted attempts were made to find a diplomatic solution. Then, a half-hearted attempt was made at stopping the bloodshed. When in doubt, bomb 'em back to the Stone Age! Predictable result: the serb civilians rallied around the flag and supported the murderous tactics of their government.
Why are the Balkans still a mess? Because occidental powers have no national interest in solving the long-term problems in the region. Watch the situation in Montenegro: this is probably going to be the next Croatia or Kosovo. All of this because national interest is the dominant force behind the wars men wage.
Clemenceau was right when he said: "war is waged by nice people who kill each other without even knowing their names, all of this to the benefit of perfect b______s, who know each other very well, but will never kill each other"...
The right to offend is far more important than the right not to be offended. (Rowan Atkinson)
I was a rifle company XO in the 3-14 INF, 10th Mountain Division, and was deployed in the Lower Jubba Valley of Somalia from December of '91 to late March of '92.
I can't hope to compete intellectually with those of you who have seen all the Star Trek episodes, ready all the political science books, and figured it all out. However, I can offer a few observations based on my experience.
1) Anyone who tells you, based on watching television and reading the newspaper, that they really know what's going on in a war zone is totally full of shit. Usually the people on the ground don't even know exactly what's going on.
2) If you carry that analogy to the air, do you think the guys in their fast-movers really know what they're dropping their bombs on, or whether they were successful? After the USAF claimed to have knocked out scores of Scud launchers (in the desert, perhaps the most benign environment possible for air warfare), the GAO did a review and determined that in actuality, they had knocked out ZERO Scuds on the ground.
3) In order to prevail over the long haul in any kind of sustained military or military/humanitarian mission, you need to commit to a sustained presence on the ground. So-called precision warfare from the air can be quite helpful (note that the North Vietnamese returned to the discussion table after the US unleashed the B-52s), but it is part of a mix of capabilities necessary to achieve the long-term POLITICAL goals of the operation.
4) As a guy named Clausewitz has mentioned before, war is an extension of politics. Politics and economics are in most cases joined at the hip, not because economics is an evil that infects politics, but because economics is an essential component of human existence. We all want, but there is only a finite supply.
5) If the political will isn't there, it ain't gonna happen. To those of you who were around during the Vietnam era, this will sound familiar, but we really were making good progress in Somalia. The failed Mogadishu raid was in military terms, a great success. A difficult, extremely grueling mission where men lost their lives, but in persuit of a difficult goal, it was a big success. People back home saw the bodies being carried through the streets, and decided it was not worth losing American lives to save Somalis from themselves. Note that there were stupendously stupid battles during WWII, with casualties well over 50%. Had any of these battles occurred today, those in charge would be sacked, condemned, and punished. It's economics - saving Europe was important then. Saving Europe is kind of important now, but most Americans would just rather let the Europeans figure out how to do it themselves.
Read the EFF's Fair Use FAQ
Part of the reason that the USA was reluctant to enter World War II as a combatant was the public awareness of how the British and others had used lies and propoganda to generate political and military support in World War I. Many of the lies and fabrications were publically exposed in the 1920s, leading to mistrust of European politicians. To many Americans, Europeans killing other Europeans was a European problem.
Do you think computers are making decisions? Do you think humans are sitting there, passively, disengaged from the reality of war?
I spent most of ALLIED FORCE at Aviano AFB, which was the tip of the spear for the NATO Air Forces. I traveled throughout Italy, wiring people to information, and wiring information to the clock.
Members of my team traveled into the mud of Albania, served on US Navy ships at sea, and flew combat missions on Command and Control aircraft. (We used Linux, Open Source Tools, and duct tape extensively and successfully, but that is another story).
It was my job to ensure that US Pilots flew their missions with the best intelligence available. We looked for every possible edge to make sure that the pilots and their crews would come home when the campaign was over.
The pilots that fly these missions do not have a free ride. They get shot at with missiles and anti-aircraft batteries, and many do see what they are hitting with the video feeds wired in the tip of their missiles.
They are prepared with reports, photographs, video, and 3D simulations for the mission at hand.
If you recall, some of these men were shot down and rescued. Special Forces engaged in fierce fire fights in order to bring the pilots home. These rescue teams flew at night, over the tree tops, and into enemy fire. This was not virtual, it was a life and death mission under extreme conditions.
Remember the men lost training to fly the Apaches in the mountainous terrain? It is amazing that the search and rescue teamscame home, let alone the downed pilots.
With technology, you can watch genocide in action.
Car loads of Serbian soldiers would drive into a village, and begin burning down the homes of innocent civilians. They would execute entire families as they fled their burning homes.
On one occasion, the Serbs were reinforced by helicopters and more troops. Predator, a surveillance drone, flew overhead, sending a live video feed back to commanders on the ground who then directed pilots forward to thwart the attack.
I watched dozens die on one such broadcast from Predator while anxiously awaiting a fighter with fuel to arrive on target.
Minutes became hours.
Seconds after the last Serb mercenary climbed aboard, and the rotor began to spin, the helicopter was destroyed by a missile.
Justice was served. Should we judge this particular laser guided munition to be immoral? I think not.
NATO didn t save any lives in this town, but the next village down the road sure did appreciate the effort.
The Serbian attack on Kosovar civilians was well planned. It was systematic. Go back and read the articles from CNN, jot down the name of the towns, and plot them on a map.
The first day of the war, all of the major towns on major arteries leading out of Kosovo were attacked. The next day, all of the secondary roads, and the smaller towns were torched. The third day, we watched refugees leaving on trains, the last major transportation artery in Kosovo. These towns, once annotated on a map, gave the appearance of the hours on the face of a clock. Systematic. Brutal. The Serbs wore ski masks to hide their identities from their neighbors.
Try researching hours of gun tape video that DOES NOT reach CNN. The sterile bomb damage assessment (BDA) videos of buildings and parked aircraft make the public Pentagon briefings. It appears that author Michael Ignatieff just researched theseprime time videos, not the actual BDA used by the warriors engaged in making a peace in the Balkans.
You get to see the men standing there in shirt sleeves, smoking, and then looking up right before impact. The picture is too fuzzy to make out their faces.
Pilots did not see death so clearly from 15000 feet in WWII, or in Vietnam.
I was there at the debriefing of the pilot involved in the convoy bombing.
The Serbs were using civilians as human shields, in addition to using civilian vehicles to move from town to town to commit atrocities and loot. I saw the anguish sweep over this pilot, and his General, as they spent hours listening to tapes and watching video, recreating the strike.
I flew home after the first 3 weeks of this virtual war and got just as drunk flying back 5 days later as I did coming home.
For the war fighter and their commanders, it is truly vivid, and real time, even through the lens of a video camera during an air campaign. Thank God we did not see casualties from a ground campaign. Enough said.
Going to war with advanced weapons and vehicle platforms is not immoral. This is a gross simplification of a complex reality.
A simplification designed to sell a book first, and to offer a weak philosophical discussion second. The aforementioned Star Trek episode sounds more intriguing.