Virtual War

In a powerful new book on the conflict in Kosovo, author Michael Ignatieff asks not only whether virtual war is moral, but whether it can work. Precision violence, he warns, is now at the disposal of a risk-averse culture, unwilling to sacrifice and determined to stay out of harm's way. A compelling and convincing look at more (in this case, tragic) unthinking use of technology. (Read More) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond author Michael Ignatieff pages 246 publisher Metropolitan Books rating 9/10 reviewer Jon Katz ISBN 0-8050-6490-7 summary Why Virtual Wars don't work

When it comes to war, writes author Michael Ignatieff, virtual reality is seductive. We see ourselves as noble warriors and our enemies as despicable tyrants. We deploy our sophisticated weaponry -- in our minds itself the hallmark of a superior civilization -- against one-dimensional villains fighting with clubs and spears. We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we mis-describe ourselves and the instruments of death. "We need," he writes, "to stay away from such fables of self-righteous invulnerability. Only then can we get our hands dirty. Only then can we do what is right."

In recent years, Americans have made it clear they don't want to get their hands dirty, and there isn't anything close to a consensus of what is right. Believing their technology to be superior and infalliable, they are happy to let it do their fighting for them.

Part of the sometimes horrific history of the 20th century is that technology is no good or worse than the moral character of the people using it. The idea of the Virtual War is a uniquely American contribution to this chilling history.

The philosopher Paul Kahn has argued that 'riskless warfare in pursuit of human rights' is a moral contradiction, since the idea behind human rights is that all life is of equal value. So called "risk-free warfare" presumes that our lives matter more than those we are intervening to save.

This idea is underscored in this devastatingly-documented attack on the lack of reason, moral foundation, clear goals or concrete results behind the recent conflict in Bosnia, an American-conceived Virtual War fought primarily by by hi-tech weaponry rather than people. The war was meticulously designed not only to force the Serbs out of Kosovar, but perhaps equally important, to be politically palatable to the American public. Thus the idea of the Virtual War, a conflict in which our technology would supplant the warrior willing to die on our behalf. In the Virtual War, machines do all of the fighting and bleeding for us. Except, of course, for their hapless targets.

Ignatieff (a frequent contributor to the New Yorker and producer of an award-winning TV series on natonalism) was present in the Balkans before, during and after the Bosnian conflict, writes clearly and with laser-like authority and confidence. He zeroes in on American techno-hubris, the idea that a handful of people running computer consoles in distant bases can wage or win a complex military victory, even in the most complex of conflicts.

He reminds us that the victory in Kosova was, to say the least, ambiguous. Far fewer Serb soldiers and equipment were killed in the Virtual Combat than we were led to believe. Although the Serbs did eventually withdraw, in part because of our relentless bombing of civilian targets far from the battlefield, and NATO troops entered Kosovo in their wake, there was no Serb surrender. Nothing was resolved. No legal or other agreements to resolve the conflict have been negotiated or ratified.

On a smaller but still bloody scale, the conflict continues today and is, in fact, worsening. The tanks NATO generals assured us had been destroyed mysteriously emerged from the brush and rumbled back home. Serbia is rebuilding its infrastructure.

"Why do virtual wars end so ambiguously?" asks Ignatieff: "Nations impose unconditional surrender on their enemies only when they have suffered some harm -- death of their citizens, loss of their territory -- which seems to require a fight to the death. Wars fought in the name of the human rights of other nation's national minorities are bound to be self-limiting. We fight for victory and unconditional surrender only when we are fighting for ourselves."

The political and military leaders who planned the Virtual War in Kosovo clearly grasped this idea from the first, even though the American public was never directly told. Missiles and smart bombs assaulted what pilots and data-interpreters hundreds, even thousands of miles away, believed were tanks, troop carriers and gun emplacements. Only a handful of NATO troops, mostly Americans, were involved, and the only casualties they suffered during the conflict were accidental, not in combat. Many of the casualties were civilians killed indirectly by technicians hundreds of miles away who often had no idea anybody had been killed.

"Virtual Wars" is a brilliant exercise both in journalism and moral reasoning. It's also yet another parable and warning about the unthinking American fascination with technology as an all-encompassing, infallible means to and end. Ignatieff documents that the technology used in this Virtual War was much less effective than we were led to believe during the fighting. In any case, he foresees, the American monopoly on this machinery will inevitably end, and it will soon be available to other countries and political groups. We are, he cautions, setting an awful precedent -- it's all right to unleash fearful weapons on unseen targets if you do so in the name of human rights.

The Virtual War was more or less invented in the Persian Gulf when transfixed Americans were hypnotized by the laser-guided video bomb flights and explosions released every night for the evening news. Here was a savvy, spin-conceived conflict if ever there was one: an unequivocally bad dictator pummeled by thousands of superbly-armed American soldiers who suffered few casualties and were led by a General as good with sound bites as he was with a field map. Years later, some people still puzzle why Saddam is still in charge, why the core of his army is intact, why many of the people who were encouraged by the United States to challenge him have been slaughtered, why he is rearming. But that is less riveting than the notion of the Virtual War, and the video on the evening news.

If "Virtual War" has a flaw, it may be in failing to take account the influence of modern media on the shaping of military conflicts. The U.S. military left Vietnam convinced they were undermined as much by grisly TV footage shown at home as by the North Vietnamese. Since that war, the military has taken extraordinary pains to make sure that they control the footage that makes it to the evening news. If they can't always win on the battlefied, they've sure conquered the mainstream media, desperate for such graphic, riveting footage. Consider the TV images from Vietnam to Iraq: mangled American bodies to imploding Iraqi radar stations and warehouses. But that's a minor oversight This a terrific book, richly documented, written in a spare and accessible way, and profoundly persuasive.

Ignatieff asks the right questions. Is it moral to kill others when we refuse to make any sacrifices ourselves? Can a "Virtual War" fought by machines controlled from great distances, really conquer countries, resolve conflicts, and promote lasting settlements?

Can any country like the U.S. muster the determination and will -- evident in all of its previous wars up until Vietnam -- to do whatever it takes to win even as our leaders concede the conflict --thus the principle -- isn't worth any any substantial material or human cost to us?

The Kosovo operation, writes Ignatieff, is the paradigm of this paradoxical form of warfare: where technological omnipotence is vested in the hands of risk-averse political cultures. "Precision violence is now at the disposal of a risk-adverse culture, unconvinced by the language of military sacrifice, skeptical about the costs of foreign adventures and determined to keep out of harm's way."

Purchase this book at Fatbrain.

Comments

Huh?

[Kaa]

It seems to me that the guy is saying that in order for a war to be moral enough people on your side have to be killed.

Minimum acceptable loss ratio?

"Sorry, gentlemen, you suffered less than 15% of our casualties. It is now quite clear that we are the 'good' side and you are the 'evil' side."

I can understand being morally uncomfortable about risklessly killing people at a distance. I would guess this is a remnant from the times when personal man-to-man battles were the only honorable form of combat. But, really, arguing that you MUST pay in blood to achieve military goals...

Kaa

Interesting how some don't read the article...

[Jinker]

Just reading through the previous comments, I get the feeling that many are red herrings.

A "virtual war" in Ignatieff's work, is a fiction, invented by the American armed forces. It is not some Web based DDOS attack, or anything to do with the 'net. He is talking about how the armed forces want to portray themselves as powerful, and inflicting massive damages, without actually putting themselves at risk. Arguably, minimizing their involvement.

Once the smart bombs have blown up the wooden shacks and accidentally destroyed the embassies, and the 'bad guys' leave, the real work begins, with soldiers on the ground. *These* are the ones risking their lives.

IMO, it is not the one who inflicts the most physical damage who is making the greatest contribution, but the one who is willing to make the greatest sacrifice, take the greatest risk for the cause. I have infinitely more respect for infintry cum peace keepers than jet jockies and button pushers on warships. They seem to only die in accidents these days, not in fighting.

The guys in blue helmets, who deliver food, who go door to door looking for weapons stashes, and try to defuse disagreements on the street corner before they get messy are the ones who should be proud.

Killing a lot of people or destroying a lot of hardware is EASY. Any kook with a big enough bomb can do that. Terrorism is much more efficient at that than a military strike. What's hard is actually PURSUING THE GOAL of peace.

At some point, the bombing has to stop in any war, and when it does, what you do next is much more meaningful to determine how things work out in the end.

Military force *IS* a useful, and necessary, last resort. But it should *NOT* be considered a goal or ideal. It should NOT be the chosen path, just because it's easier to justify the deaths of a bunch of people who'll never get on TV than a few GI's on the ground.

I'm from Canada. Can you tell?

Greg

Virual Conflicts

[Noryungi]

A "virtual conflict" or a "virtual war" simply does not exist: it's a contradiction in terms.

The main reason the wars in Kosovo, Iraq and Vietnam were fought and "won" against different "enemies" has more to do with public perception and national interest than with questions of human rights.

Remember, as well, that there are only three types of strategies: occidental, chinese and "japanese".

Here are just a couple of examples of what I mean:

• World War I: conflict between major powers (UK/USA/France vs Germany), trying to assert once and for all who was the dominant continental european power ( = national interest). Nationalism was the dominant public perception and obscured all pretense of rational discourse. Please note that the fact that democratic rights and freedom of speech was totally inconsequential in the conflict. Germany, though not a democracy at the time the war erupted, had better social protection than UKUSA+France.
• World War II: again, classical/occidental strategy conflict between Continental European powers. The USA only intervened after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Let's not forget that the UK were litterally the last european bulwark against the nazis for a couple of years. Again, a classical case of self-interest. If Japan had signed a peace treaty with the USA over the occupation of China (which was the problem at the time), most of Europe would be under Nazi rule today. See Philip K. Dick and other sci-fi books for examples of this... That does not mean the intervention of the USA was a bad thing (far from it). It's just that America's reasons for entering the war were, from the start, pure self-interest. The fact that Nazis were such butchers really helped get the public perception in line with the military objectives. Once the war was won, history being written by the victors, the goals of the wars were presented in a much more
• Korea/Vietnam: classical sword-swinging/geopolitical game between the USA and USSR/China. USA applied the "domino theory" (japanese strategy) and determined that communist containment was in its best self-interest. Vietnam was seen as a test against communism. Unfortunately, the USA military severely underestimated the Vietnamese resilience and will to fight, as well as the civilian support, in America itself, for a conflict in South-East Asia. The human rights and right to self determination of the Vietnamese people were conveniently ignored. Korea, though a successful containment, became a dictature for several decades (which was also the case for South Vietnam). Some may argue that South Korea became a modern nation during that time, but, again, that was probably in the best interest of the USA. A prosperous South Korea was less likely to throw itself in the arms of communists.
• Don't even get me started on Iraq. I'll have just one word for you: OIL. 'Nuff said.

So... As far as I am concerned, there are no "good" or "bad" wars. All wars are just determined by national self-interest, which then influences public perception of the war.

Kosovo (and the rest of the Balkans) are a complete mess because public perception and self interest were out of whack. The sad thing is that most industrial and military powers in the world today could not care less if the Serbs massacred all Kosovars (and butcher they did). Half-hearted attempts were made to find a diplomatic solution. Then, a half-hearted attempt was made at stopping the bloodshed. When in doubt, bomb 'em back to the Stone Age! Predictable result: the serb civilians rallied around the flag and supported the murderous tactics of their government.

Why are the Balkans still a mess? Because occidental powers have no national interest in solving the long-term problems in the region. Watch the situation in Montenegro: this is probably going to be the next Croatia or Kosovo. All of this because national interest is the dominant force behind the wars men wage.

Clemenceau was right when he said: "war is waged by nice people who kill each other without even knowing their names, all of this to the benefit of perfect b______s, who know each other very well, but will never kill each other"...

Re:What's Really Important Here

[skwang]

Whoa, the War in the Gulf was directly about fringe groups? I think it was about two things:

1. Oil
2. Regional Stability

1. We (United States) may not get our Oil supply from Kuwait, and while you are correct that Iraq supplied more Oil to the US before the war began, the threat of Iraq was not against Kuwait but against Saudi Arabia, which supplies the largest percent of Oil to the US (check out http://www.energy.ca.go v/database/multisector/usoilimp.html). While Iraw did not invade Saudi Arabia the problem is that Amiercan Foreign policy is all about...

2. Regional Stability. As long as the US maintains hegomony (sp?) it will want to preserve its "Spheres of Influence" on parts of the world. In the middle east, the US has definite interests in keeping the Oil trade open, with US control over the region.

(asise)Take Saudi Arabia, look at its Human rights record. Here is a country with a emmensly rich royal family that controls the government 100%, a country were corperal punishment is still on the books, a country were NO ONE has the right to vote (according to the CIA), but the US sends millions of dollars to, sells modern military weapons, and even looks the other way on human rights! But since they supply so much Oil, we let them get away with it.

So why did we get involved with in the Gulf? Lets take a view point from a Foreign policy/politician standpoint:

1. Iraq invaded Kuwait, CIA reports that they may be building chemical and biological weapons (true)
2. Iraq's leader frequency refers to the United States as an enemy, conlusion: he is not a friend (very true)
3. Iraq threatens Isreal (verbally); an ally of the US, and asks other Arab nations to join (Jordan)

So what do US planners think?

1. They think Iraq may threaten Isreal, an ally
2. They think Iraq may threaten Saudi Arabia, a major trade partner
3. They think Iraq may be building Weapons of Mass Destruction (WoMD)
4. Iraq is definatly threatening regional stability!
5. Conclusion: Iraq must be stopped

So the Bush administration turnes to the military. The resulting war is fought with weapons that (as you said correctly) were not as preceice as the Amiercan public was lead to believe. And ironically in the end, although Saddam Hussain is still in power, US planer probably achieved their goals:

1. Iraq is no longer threatening Saudi Arabia or Isreal
2. Iraq is no longer buildings WoMD (well, at least as of recent, UN inspectors were doing their best to shut down production facilities, but now...)

For all Intents and Purposes these goals were achieved for about 10 years. The region is stable (for now).

So what is the cost of regional stability? about a couple hundred American casulaties (and others from the coalition nations), and the popluation of Iraq which must suffer under a trade embargo and die of starvation, disease, and persecution.

And what about the oil? Go to a gas station and find out.

God bless America.

Re:What's Really Important Here

[jalefkowit]

What's the agenda here? Why is the United States spending so much time and effort bombing people with alleged "precision" munitions (munitions which, in the Gulf War at least, were later shown to have only a 40% hit rate--a far cry from the perception that every bomb hit every target). We need to ask ourselves what the government is doing with all of this money, and who the next target of those weapons will be.

The United States government has shown, in recent years, a great intolerance for certain "fringe" groups. These munitions, once honed to perfection (after being tested on foreign soil in conflicts that are generated out of thin air), may be used in the future to silence groups that dare to speak out against the government.

Oh, please. The government is developing smart standoff munitions... to silence internal dissidents? Are you serious? Don't you think that any government that was really interested in cracking down on internal dissent would spend more money on lightweight, concealable small arms and body armor for secret police than for bombs that demolish a city block?

Beyond that, I find the whole premise of the book that Katz reviews to be questionable. (Disclaimer: I have not read the book, so I'm relying on Katz's description of its argument.) The "smart weapons" that Ignatieff deplores did not cause the risk-averse culture that he describes. Vietnam created that culture. We have a generation of leaders for whom war is synonymous with messy, low-intensity light infantry conflicts that drag out for years. So those leaders spend money on anything that promises to make those kinds of conflicts obsolete -- laser guided bombs, cruise missiles, robot aircraft, and the rest. They then employ these weapons instead of infantry, in places where infantry would probably be a more war-winning weapon, solely because they are terrified of repeating the Vietnam debacle. Result: conflicts that go half-won because we have ruled out the use of the most effective tool.

So, what's my beef with Ignatieff? By blaming this pattern on the weapons that we've created, he lifts the responsibility from the place it truly belongs -- the leaders. They make the decision to enter into "limited" wars, or to pull out when the first casualties come home. If they didn't have smart weapons, they'd use B-52s loaded with dumb iron bombs, or artillery sited miles away, or anything else except infantry. It's not the smart weapons that are causing this; you can lay that at the feet of our military and political leaders. The smart weapons are just a convenient tool. (Remember, the term "surgical strike" comes from Vietnam, when no smart weapons were in wide deployment.)

We too often fall into the trap of thinking that our whiz-bang technology is the cause a way of thinking. Technology is an expression of human values in steel or silicon. If those values are out of whack, remember that the fault lies with the toolmaker, not with the tool.

-- Jason A. Lefkowitz

Thoughts from a Somalia veteran

[Infonaut]

I was a rifle company XO in the 3-14 INF, 10th Mountain Division, and was deployed in the Lower Jubba Valley of Somalia from December of '91 to late March of '92.

I can't hope to compete intellectually with those of you who have seen all the Star Trek episodes, ready all the political science books, and figured it all out. However, I can offer a few observations based on my experience.

1) Anyone who tells you, based on watching television and reading the newspaper, that they really know what's going on in a war zone is totally full of shit. Usually the people on the ground don't even know exactly what's going on.

2) If you carry that analogy to the air, do you think the guys in their fast-movers really know what they're dropping their bombs on, or whether they were successful? After the USAF claimed to have knocked out scores of Scud launchers (in the desert, perhaps the most benign environment possible for air warfare), the GAO did a review and determined that in actuality, they had knocked out ZERO Scuds on the ground.

3) In order to prevail over the long haul in any kind of sustained military or military/humanitarian mission, you need to commit to a sustained presence on the ground. So-called precision warfare from the air can be quite helpful (note that the North Vietnamese returned to the discussion table after the US unleashed the B-52s), but it is part of a mix of capabilities necessary to achieve the long-term POLITICAL goals of the operation.

4) As a guy named Clausewitz has mentioned before, war is an extension of politics. Politics and economics are in most cases joined at the hip, not because economics is an evil that infects politics, but because economics is an essential component of human existence. We all want, but there is only a finite supply.

5) If the political will isn't there, it ain't gonna happen. To those of you who were around during the Vietnam era, this will sound familiar, but we really were making good progress in Somalia. The failed Mogadishu raid was in military terms, a great success. A difficult, extremely grueling mission where men lost their lives, but in persuit of a difficult goal, it was a big success. People back home saw the bodies being carried through the streets, and decided it was not worth losing American lives to save Somalis from themselves. Note that there were stupendously stupid battles during WWII, with casualties well over 50%. Had any of these battles occurred today, those in charge would be sacked, condemned, and punished. It's economics - saving Europe was important then. Saving Europe is kind of important now, but most Americans would just rather let the Europeans figure out how to do it themselves.