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Hong Kong Smart Identity Cards In 2003
griffinn writes: "The Hong Kong Government has announced its plan to replace the identity cards of all Hong Kong citizens with smart cards, starting 2003. I don't know anything about smart card technology, but I suppose some sort of asymmetric cryptographic scheme is employed to fortify any data stored in it, so smart ID cards should be immune from DeCSS fiascos. But is it possible for someone to just make an identical copy of my smart ID card, and 'become me'?"
For information that comes straight from the "HK Special Administrative Region Government," there's more information in here than I expected. Two paragraphs in particular caught my attention:
Besides, immigration officers would be able to update a temporary resident's conditions of stay readily. In anti-illegal immigration operations, law enforcement officers in the field can use a special reader to confirm instantly whether a person's permission to stay was valid without holding him up for further checks.Your papers, please?"More importantly, a smart card with biometric data stored on it will lay the foundation for the Immigration Department to introduce automated passenger clearance system in future which will bring benefits to the travelling public as more immigration counters can be opened without increase of manpower," Mrs Ip said.
First, I have to remind ignorant Americans that Hong Kong (two words, not one) is under the control of China, but it is governed as a Special Administrative Region. That means we have our own government, we vote for our own politicians, we don't have a large controlling communistic party, and we have a freedom to travel as much as when Hong Kong was still a British colony.
Finally, for someone spreading FUD like you, your last sentence
"This is not america and they do not give a shit about human rights, rights to privacy..."
should be
"This is not america and i do not know what i am talking about, i will regurgitate human rights, privacy concerns from the media...
Sorry, that was too tempting.
Your facial geometry
Interestingly, according to This review on zdnet, you can often get past commercial face recognition software by taking a photo of the person's face, printing it out as a mask, cutting a nose hole (for someone with a similar nose), and putting on:
The face recognition systems proved easier to crack than the fingerprint or voice recognition systems. We tried to gain entry using a mask we created by printing a digital image from a color printer. This didn't work. But then we cut a nose hole in the mask and placed the mask on someone with a somewhat similar nose. At the default thresholds, we were able to fool Miros's TrueFace Network several times and Visionics' FaceIt NT once.
Retina, hand and fingerprint scanners would be as secure as could be expected but facial geometry systems tend to be less secure. Multi-camera set-ups would doubtless be more secure, but the price would start getting very high.
Personally, my favourite technology is te retina (or iris) scanner, because they can distunguish living from dead, so there's no risk of someone taking a chainsaw to your hand to get access to your bank account. They'll just have to do it at gunpoint...
Michael
...another comment from Michael Tandy.
"Goodness me, how unlike the FBI to abuse the trust of the American public." -- The Onion
Does anyone know if there is sucha thing as a fully anonymous smart card that identifies a person uniquely. So I could say scan the card into a computer terminal and buy/sell with the money I have on the card and build something similar to a trust rating (karma points) based on the id I had on the card but there'd be no way to track my identity back to who I was irl from that card even if I had done business with you in person? (ie you'd of course know my id for this transaction which would let you look up information about me as of that transaction but you could not check out any other transactions I'd made or learn anything about me you didn't learn in person).
Dunno. It just seems to me there are benefits of being known and anonymous both so I'd like to be able to do both at the same time. This sounds unlikely but if you think about it you do this when you go to a costume party to some extent. You can become known within the limited confines of the costume but unless you offer your real identity you will again be unknown when you switch costumes (unless you have a lame costume of course). Would this be something like American Expresses's one use credit cards?
At what price learning? At what cost wisdom? The price is a man's peace of mind, and the cost is his life.
Most smart cards are protected from "physical" tampering. If you try to short the card, glitch the circuit, etc. the card can set itself as "dead".
Maybe Siemens web site have information about this, as they are one of the more important producers of the chips that are on these cards. I think smart cards are pretty secure now.
Orzak
From what I saw when I was over there, on the day-to-day level HK is still mostly free. The police keep a low profile (except on a Friday night in the red-light district, when they're everywhere, which is very nice), the courts are independent, Internet access is unfiltered, and HK citizens are free to travel overseas if they want. Human rights groups can and do operate from HK,, and keep a close eye on mainland China from there, as I understand it.
However, the local legislature is not really democratically elected - some of the seats are, but most are elected by special "constituencies", such as "business associations" and the like, guaranteeing that China gets a majority of the people it wants on the legislature. The "Chief Executive" is selected by the legislature, so he is the guy Beijing wants.
The one area that is a little disconcerting is the mainstream media. They are a cheer squad for Beijing, mostly, and their coverage of domestic (HK) politics is timid in the extreme. The economy, by their own high standards, was performing very badly while I was there. In most countries, if this is the case, the incumbent government gets heavily criticized. I didn't see a peep of any of media directly criticizing the government. Instead, the major political angle they covered was the large number of stray dogs! The South China Morning Post is particularly bad - I gave up reading it after a few days. The Standard, the other English-language daily, is slightly better, but still not great. I'm told that the Chinese-language papers are mostly considerably worse. However, dissenting voices do exist, and the authorities seem to leave them alone. One of the local street newspapers (well, actually, it was a street magazine) rather brutally satirized the Chinese government as their editorial column.
Anyway, HK still remains a largely free country. It's a heck of a lot better than what goes on in China proper.
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
--Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)
Smartcards should interest hackers. They come in two main variants: memory cards and processor cards. The first can be seen as a miniature, secure filesystem, the latter adds some kind of processing power to the former. Costs for CPU cards can be a few dollars each, even in large quantities.
There are some interesting properties of smartcards. First, they are assumed to be *somewhat* tamper proof. This includes a degree of difficulty in using physcial, electrical, even social engineering to find out what's inside. There are many nice papers on tampering, especially Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note
which is somewhat of a classic on the perils of believing something to be unhackable.
Ah, some nostalgia... the Java Card, which I had the fortunate to be part of developing back in 1997, is a cool device, deploying a Java VM in a few K of ROM and some 256 bytes of RAM. Yes, that is tiny!
This is going to move technology status in Hong Kong a large step forward due to the fact that everyone HAS an ID card and under the law of Hong Kong (HK is not under Chinese law), a citizen of Hong Kong will have to carry his/her ID card wherever he/she goes. (Police force in HK carry out ID card checking) Using this as a auth. method can be secure and should be available to anyone in local trading. I was told that the reason for changing ID to smartcard is not only about technology advancement but also about the fake ID that some ID cards that illegal immigrants are carrying. (The ID cards before were very low tech)
There's always a way around these things. Naming a product 'SmartCard' only fools the population for a short period.
-- Hob - Java Spectrum Emulator
Copying the card would have the same effect as using your older brother's ID to purchase alcohol. It may work in some cases, but if someone looks at the ID they will obviously realize it is not you.
- I don't care if they globalize against free speech. All my best free thoughts are done in my head.
China:
United States of America :
My take on it: China commits some serious violations of human rights, and I'd be worried about the smart card IDs there. But I'm a U.S. citizen, and I'd also be worried about smart card IDs here. We've got our own human rights issues to work out. I'm an optimist, so I think that the U.S. won't turn into big brother, but I also think this is possible only through the constant vigilance of people like you and me.
The smart person who wants to break a secure smart card system would attack the weakest link - which, if done right, is not the smart card itself but the government system used to verify it. Once a system is put in place in any government, some level of corruption starts.
Very soon there will be the shady characters that can insert, delete, or change records - for a price of course. Viola! Smart cards broken.
This is a big step towards making sci-fi novels a reality.
It's not for everybody
More importantly, a smart card with biometric data stored on it...
If Hong Kong has biometric information stored on their smart cards, then more than likely someone could not "become you" since, as most of you know, biometric data is specific to one person.
My Vote's On This Doofus
great comedy company.
First, I have to remind all of you that HongKong is under the control of China. And they are one of the worst violators of the human rights. So having ID cards with biometrics could lead to even more policing by the state. This is not america and they do not give a shit about human rights, rights to privacy...
A coworker of mine was doing smart card security research recently. A smart card is not simply a data storage device, but instead actually contains a small processor. This processor can be programmed to perform public key encryption and hashing, and thus, the smart card is able to limit data access. Rather than pass out the private key to the computer where the person is trying to to authenticate themself, the smartcard receives a secret which can be signed with the private key, passed back out to the authenticating computer, and there compared with the public key with that user. It can be done in a manner similar to PGP signing of email, without the card even possessing the instructions necessary to export the private key from the card.
The equipment that would be needed to get the private key off would be pretty expensive, since you would need to be able to break the card apart and read individual memory locations with some sort of electron scanning microscope or something. (Which is tougher than it sounds.) However, Hong Kong's use of biometric data makes that even more difficult, because you would then have to modify the person carrying the copied card so their biometric data matches what's stored on the card.
Essentially, copying a smartcard like this is astronomically difficult, and at the very least, m uch more difficult than xeroxing a paper card or making a duplicate of a plastic card with a hologram.
A smart cards API is via a file-system. You read a file like /etc/services with commands like GET FE/A9
where FE is the equivilent of etc. Most smart cards have your personal configuration written on it in a
root directory, which is only accessible after you punch in your PIN. Other services are readonly for all
card readers and read/write for specific card readers.
A card reader can gain access to a slot (a part with some 1024 bytes of free space) by passing a challenge, the card sends an ID to the reader and the reader does a encryption on that and passes is back to the card. If the card has the same result the readed is OK-ed. This process is not unlike passwd does it stuff, and we all know that is pretty hard to fake.
A card reader actually has another smart-card embedded that will do the encryption-handshake, which means that copying a reader is just as hard as copying a card itself.
The card is a micro-processor which is burnt in the factory and is afterwards made readonly. The programming that is used in the card is in my knowledge the only thing that poses any thread (read security through obscurity) because if I have the code I could emulate the chip and pretend I have all the data the card-reader would want.
This kind of technology has been in use in Holland (Europe) for a number of years as virual cach allready. Moderately succesfull.
But is it possible for someone to just make an identical copy of my smart ID card, and 'become me'?
This depends on how well the security is done. The simplest smart cards simply store data, i.e. you input data and then if you send a standardised command, you get it back.
The most advanced smart cards process commands like an unopenable, solid box with a computer in.
An example way they could identify each card securely would go something like this:
Verifying terminal sends the card some random data
Smart card accepts data and is programmed to digitally sign it with a public/private key algorithm.
Smart card returns data to terminal
A more complex model might be:
Every card has a private key, and every card has a matching public key, held in a goverment database.
A goverment terminal sends a request for data (i.e. What is this person's SSN?) signed with an official goverment key
The smart card checks the govt signature against the public key stored internally.
The smart card returns the requested data, signed with the card's private key.
The govt terminal checks the signature against the public key database.
They can take pretty much as much programming as you care to put in, if you buy a good card. You could, for example, require a password to be sent to the card before it works. Anything you want, within reason. Including wiping the card if someone tried to probe it.
If you wanted to make yourself a new identity, if you could get a blank card and a copy of the programming, and you could get a new public key inserted on the official database, it might be possible to make yourself a card, but it would require substantial technical knowledgability, if it was all secured properly. It would probably be easier to wrongly send for the ID card requisition forms and fill them in with fake details.
Michael
...another comment from Michael Tandy.
"Goodness me, how unlike the FBI to abuse the trust of the American public." -- The Onion
With all of the various authentication systems emerging I sometimes tend not to think "Can this user be trusted" but "Can I trust the system?"
Example:
(yes I understand that my example has to do with controlling access to a facility, but it introduces an interesting idea that more security is in fact less secure.)
Traditional authentication systems make use of material items which cannot be duplicated easily. I have a drivers' license. It cannot easily be duplicated by just anybody such that it is an exact replica. Many consider these to be analog authentication systems, where, after a period of use, the quality of the materials degrade.
Newer, digital authentication, is alleged to be even more secure but I must argue otherwise.
Possibly a solution which makes use of digital and analog identification would be even more secure.
But hey, this is a topic that requires much more research than I have time .. so make what you will of this comment :-)
Every smartcard is uniquely identified at it's inception with a serial number, this is absolutely unchangeable and as such, is the perfect base for checksums and hashing algorithms.
:))
Any attempt to copy a smartcard can be foiled as the base seed is no longer correct.
As for data encryption, this is up to vendor of the smartcard system, which can be aided with the help of the limited logic a smartcard is capable of.
The data region of a smartcard has two seperate areas, write-once-read-many and re-writeable. The WORM area of a smartcard, once written to, will not allow any form of modification. The re-writeable area (commonly used for electronic purses, transaction histories, expiries, etc etc) can be re-written to, but most vendors obfusticate and encrypt the data using the unique card serial #, and various seeds/algorithms stored either on the firmware of the card reader, or a central server.
All of this is also protected by a PSC (personal security code) which is factory defaulted at inception, but can be changed at any time. The PSC is required to be presented in order to modify any data on the card.If the PSC is presented wrong three (or is that four?) times, the smart card locks itself up, rendering itself completely useless for writing.
(Disclaimer: Although I have had some experience with the Motorola/Mondex/Keycorp/Smarttech variety of smartcards & readers, my experience is mostly based on technology that is one layer up on the LCR200 boards and is extremely proprietary. So what I work with might not be the 100% the norm, but then again, considering the power-struggles with smartcard standardisation that are going on now, what is the norm?
Even totalitarians need an illusion of justice. Have you read the Chineese constitution? It sounds very similar to our own bill of rights, with a few little changes that open the door for total government control.
Link to China's Constitution
Here are some good parts:
Article 22 [Culture]
1) The state promotes the development of literature and art, the press, broadcasting, and television undertakings, publishing and distribution services, libraries, museums, cultural centers and other cultural undertakings, that serve the people and socialism, and sponsors mass cultural activities.
Article 35
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration.
Article 37 [Personal Freedom]
(1) The personal freedom of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. (2) No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate or by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. (3) Unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens' personal freedom by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.
Anyway, you get my point. Even the most oppressive government needs an illusion of freedom. Read the whole constution of China, and compare it to the Green Party platform. You might be surprised how similar they are.
-
I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
What is'nt tamperproof are two things:
The terminal that is being used to read the smartcards. (Hack one of those, and you can have it display anything, no matter what's on the card) - the current meatspace equivalent would be bribery.
If there is also data stored centrally by the government that gave you the smartcard (to make sure noone can create their own cards if they know the protocol the smartcard/terminal uses) to identify that you're using a real ID card - e.g: every smartcard has a private key, public key is stored centrally - checking a card's validity involves having the card digitally signing a challenge and subsequently checking the challenge with the public key. These servers are probably a far easier target.
You can get pretty paranoid about these things, but IMHO smartcards are quite safe when you are trying to extract data from them. They can be easily destroyed, or overwritten - but that's no big deal: you just get a new one.
Okay... I'll do the stupid things first, then you shy people follow.
Okay... I'll do the stupid things first, then you shy people follow.
[Zappa]
If this is in conjunction with Sun then it is almost assruedly a java Card. The java Card sepc is public and either downloadable from Sun (java.sun.com) OR buyanle in book form at your lcoal bookstore.
;) )
You can find out more about those cards in a few hours by reading than anyone posting to slashdot seems to know. (Not that knowledge has ever been a pre-requisit for a slashdot opinion
I have a Amex Blue, which is a JavaCard.
Its cryptologoical capabilities keep me financially safe.
What it has on board is a deigital signiture for me and one for Amex. In order to do a web purchase I put the card in a reader on my desk and it authenticates itself to Aemx through the net (and Amex authenticates itself to me.)
I believe it also generates individual authenticatable tokens for each transaction.
Using this card for a net pruchase is as safe as using a card at a store, the data transferred is of no use to anyone but Amex and myself and noone can use my account without physical possession of the card.
Actually, its SAFER, because even with the card you have to enter my PIN in order to gete it to start talking to Amex.
Smart cards IMO are a wonderful thing. Since Java Card is standardized, I can eventually have one single card in my wallet that replaces the 20 or so I now carry (charge cards, supermarket cards. health insurace cards, rental cards, etc)
THATS technology that makes my life but safer and easier.
IANACryptographer, but...
I don't think "symmetry" has anything to do with "crackability". Asymmetry, AFAIK, just means that a different key is used to decrypt than to encrypt. That in itself doesn't say anything about the strength of the encryption. And also AFAIK, DeCSS wasn't broken by a brute force crack, but because the geniuses left the key in plaintext on the DVD (and plus the fact that the key must be distributed in some manner, so the hardware can decrypt).
I believe smartcards do hold a private key, but hey, what're ya going to do? You don't let people steal your *real* id card do you? Well, you don't let them steal your smartcard either (which should probably have a photo on it anyway, just to keep safe). Whether symmetric or not, the secret has to be kept somewhere physical eventually, whether it's in the gray matter in your head, on a smartcard, or in the form of a physical key.
It's 10 PM. Do you know if you're un-American?
who would want to deal with this stuff? is HK planning on educating the population about what they're carrying? think about your grandparents carrying smart ID cards.
... is it possible for someone to just make an identical copy of my smart ID card, and 'become me'?
Smart cards are designed to be difficult to read, even distructively or by "sneak paths" (such as variations in power usage or radio emissions). The engineers working on them, even in private enterprise, are investigated and security-cleared, and work in relatively isolated areas. (I recall when some people working with me at a large chip company were transferred to that project - in a separate building. I'd done classified work before and had no interest in doing it again. B-) )
So copying your smartcard to 'become you' is unlikely - unless that particular smartcard's technology is broken.
If it IS broken, it will likely be by some VERY well-financed sorts - either organized crime or governmental.
If it's governmental they'll want to use the break for covert activity, and will keep as low a profile as possible. So they'll play dirty tricks on their enemies - starting with the "short list".
If it's organized crime, they'll want to make a profit on their investment quickly, before the break is discovered. So there will probably be a sudden large crime wave, looting some very big targets or a great host of smaller ones, and then the smartcards will be replaced with a different technology.
Either could be a problem for some of us here. But I wouldn't worry too much about script kiddies. If they get in on it at all it will likely be on the tail end of the "organized crime" scenario.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way