Security Hole In SNMP
wiredog writes: "From ZDNET comes the news that there is apparently a serious security flaw in the Simple Network Management Protocol, used to control routers and other network devices." An anonymous reader points to the CERT advisory as well.
So far, DShield does not have too much scanning for it yet (data).
But I guess the kiddies are still sharpening the tools...
---- join dshield.org Distributed Intrusion Detec
Getting them installed may be a different story. There are probably a lot of "forgotten" SNMP devices out there...
This is a security hole in many implementations of SNMP, not in the protocol itself. This means that products can be patched without switching to a new protocol. Of course, SNMP devices will still be insecure if you don't change the default community strings (and even then, SNMPv1 sends the strings in plaintext).
Turning off SNMP was one of the strong recommendations in the Top 20 Internet Security Threats that the FBI's NIPC and SANS and the Federal CIO Council issued on October 1, 2001. If you didn't take that action then, now might be a good time to correct the rest of the top 20 as well as the SNMP problem. The Top 20 document is posted at http://www.sans.org/top20.htm
Wheeeee
Once again a security flaw is found, but nobody tells anyone what the security flaw is.
Bullshit:
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/107186
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/854306
These are linked to on the first page of the CERT Advisory. RTFA, doofus.
Edith Keeler Must Die
SNMP is well known to be a security problem (at least in the networking community). The answer is to cut all of it off at your firewall, and make sure your internal networks are zoned appropriately. The best way to deal with it right now is to put all your equpiments' management addresses in a management VLAN, of which none of the user ports are members, and then control access to it via the router you'll use to get to the VLAN.
Ever heard of SNMPv3?
The security flaw is not in the protocol, but rather in how people and companies have implemented it. Unfortunately, most people did in fact implement it in such a way that makes the products vulerable to crashing and /or buffer-overflow attacks. A good portion of the SNMP code to date is written based on early work from the cmu-snmp package, which was a reference release of the protocol. Hence, many of the companies and products that make use of that original code (including ucd-snmp and net-snmp, which I'm the lead developer for) are subject to the vulnerabilities as well. The ucd-snmp and net-snmp packages have been fixed as of a few months ago (and upgrading software is easy on linux, *bsd, etc boxes). However, people with flashroms containing software will have a much more challanging time getting updates from their vendors and installing them in a quick fashion if the deployment numbers of those types of boxes are large.
The next site to slashdot will be ready soon, but subscribers can beat the rush and start slashdotting it early!
In fact, there are several different buffer overflow and format string bugs, in different SNMP implementations. The OUSPG report (which triggered this advisory) seems to be more detailed, but I still have to read it. (OTOH, SNMP vulnerabilities are rather boring stuff nowadays, any sane person blocks SNMP at the closest router.)
This is why I've always tended to run snmp on a non routable address block. It's saved me a few times.
You'll notice that Microsofts response was to turn off the SNMP service until they get a patch ready.
Yeah, those bastards. Why can't they do things like the following model citizens?
The advisories contain a link to a tool that will test the vulnerability. There are no secrets being kept, it's all out in the open. The problem is that no "easy-to-use" tool has been created (except for checks that have been added to scanners).
According to ZDNet, this vulnerability was reported to CERT by a research team one year ago. It was only today announced in an advisory. CERT maintained a multiple-month window of time to suppress the advisory.
And yet, looking at the advisory, the most important vendors don't yet have patches . In particular, Microsoft, Cisco, and Sun remain vulnerable, with no released patches!
The entire rationale behind keeping vulnerabilities quiet is to enable vendors to fix the problem before the exploit falls into the hands of attackers. The entire rationale behind CERT's very existance is to act as a clearinghouse for vulnerabilities so that fixes can be coordinated prior to announcements. Virtually every credible security researcher has repeatedly exclaimed that CERT's model doesn't work. I can't imagine a clearer vindication for CERT's critics than this.
Not that I'm trying to validate CERT's model mind you...
They were somewhat forced into releasing today. There was a leaked early version of the advisory (with no details) that had a release date of February 20th. Details were spilling out from various sources. Given how many patches were announced today after the advisory, it's safe to say that those vendors must have been pretty close to being ready.
It also demonstrates that it's not possible to try and give that many vendors that much warning, and not have leaks.