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AMI Introduces 'Trusted Computing' BIOS
An anonymous reader writes "American Megatrends announced its 'trusted computing' Palladium BIOS on Jan 6. It seems that the encrypted BIOS' integrity will be verified by a special chip or flash ROM, and will in turn verify the 'authenticity, integrity and privacy' of the boot loader and the operating system. Does that mean such machines may refuse to boot any other non-'trusted' OS? After all, the list of supporting corporations include AMD, Intel, IBM, and HP, of whom we heard quite favourable statements about Linux (just for example -- *BSDs will be equally affected) so far."
This will go a long way towards the war on terror. Terrorists wont be able to install and use unauthorized OS's. This could potentially save thousands of lives.
Does that mean such machines may refuse to boot any other non-'trusted' OS?
I'm pretty sure it won't. For now it'll just not have a trusted signature, so no access to Palladium-protected content. But I'm pretty sure that's the bait of a bait&switch operation...
Kjella
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
...the first "trusted" bootsector virus appears?
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This could as easily be for military computers as well as the great unwashed. So I don't think we will be seeing these in home PC's just yet.
Not only that we don't know yet what OS they will work with. So lets not start doomsaying until the first of these are out and there is proof they refuse to run certain operating systems.
--Won't that be grand? Computers and the programs will start thinking and the people will stop. - Dr. Walter Gibbs
"American Megatrends" appears to be an anagram of "reincarnated smegma". Just felt the urge to share that,
Modest doubt is called the beacon of the wise. - William Shakespeare
One of the key benefits of Palladium, of course, being a PC that boots up! People will really embrace Palladium's "booting PC" feature when compared to the "non-booting PC" features of the competition!
The original Palladium spec calls for a trusted machine to only allow trusted access by trusted operating systems. This means Palladium-encrypted code won't run except under a Palladium-rated OS. If the OS isn't trusted, then no Palladium-enabled programs can run.
This will mean that WINE will be useless for many future Windows apps, especially those dealing with multimedia. It also means future versions of Windows will be written specifically to defeat applications like VMware, so as to not violate the security.
These are bad, though they don't prevent one from booting a non-Palladium-enabled OS and using alternative applications. What I keep worrying about is the TCPA *2.0* specification. The original spec allows an alternative to a "trusted" platform, but future specs may require a PC boot a Palladium-enabled OS -- or none at all.
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I honestly don't understand the value (or perceived value) in having this.
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
That's it. A remote site can know whether or not you're running a trusted (IOW "unhackable") OS/apps. If you do, they'll send you decryption keys for playback and be reasonably sure you won't intercept them, store them permanently etc.
Just follow this little (hypothetical) chain of events:
/dev/null of the computing industry, the OS community is going to need each other to maintain a DRM-free computing zone. Open source, open protocols, open formats, open beer.
1) BIOS on new motherboard will only go into "Palladium-mode" if you're booting a "trusted" OS. For the time being, you can still run linux, but it won't have access to any "Palladium" features.
2) If you're running a "trusted" OS (eg. MS Windows UY [Up Yours]), the OS can hit the 'Net and automatically download and apply updates to itself. At some point, it could quite easily detect the BIOS on your system and apply an update so that...
3) The BIOS will no longer boot non-trusted systems. Also...
4) The OS could download a new protocol stack that could render it inoperable with other protocols. An entire new Internet based on the MSOY/BO (Microsoft Ownz You/Bend Over) protocol could spring up almost over night. MS-only network services, online shopping, etc.
Is any of this likely to happen? I don't know. But it would be possible, and I'm not sure I trust Microsoft not to try it. Even if Open Source doesn't relegate MS to the
bytesmythe
Hypocrisy is the resin that holds the plywood of society together.
-- Scott Meyer
Also, conceptually, this will still not solve the trust issue, as someone could still open up their case and replace their BIOS chip.
:-)
Ever tried to replace a BIOS that is soldered directly to the board? if so, please let me know how it went.
"See, we plan ahead! That way, we never have to do anything now."
BIOS starts...addressing the TPM chip that verifies the authenticity of the BIOS.
What good is it for the BIOS to verify itself?
If it's not authentic (i.e. compromised), would it really bother to address the TPM chip at all?
"It's a very tangled subsystem." --Windows kernel guru
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I told AMI (link in the article: marketing@ami.com) that I don't think of this as a "feature". Computer manufacturers have backed down on much less invasive technologies (Pentium III's unique ID, for instance) before; I'm still a little bit hopeful that with all the competition in the mainboard scene we might be able to convince manufacturers not to adopt consumer-hostile technology like this.
The minute Palladium is up and running on these boxes, watch for manufacturers to go "WinModem" only: meaning BIOS's that only boot Windoze.
Want to boot FreeBSD, so you played around with the BIOS? DMCA days "Go Directly To Jail, Do Not Pass SourceForge, Do Not Collect $200"
I run OSX and Linux on PPC machines. I do not miss the world of the paranoids in Redmond.
I don't need a 4 gig chip to type a paper or Photoshop a picture of Rumsfeld and a goat.
Frame rate for games? Got my PS2 for that.
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1. Input
2...499. None of your your damn business
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"Trusted computing", hah! Sure, the apps might trust each other and the system, but I won't!
How about better online games? Consider MMORPGs. To prevent cheating, they have to do various things server-side that would actually make more sense from a resource allocation point of view to do on the client.
For example, DAoC has to handle stealth on the server, calculating who should be able to see a stealthed character, and only sending that character's positions to clients that should see him, so that people with DAoC's equivalent of ShowEQ won't see them. However, those people can still see people who are hiding behind trees or hills or buildings--it would be too much work for the server to do the visibility calculations for everyone.
With a trusted client, they could just send the data on everyone in the area, and trust the client to not show what the player is not supposed to see.
Or how about monster AI? The monsters could be a lot smarter if they could run the AI on the client, instead of on the server.
Microsoft is not interested in your security. Microsoft doesn't even much care about their own security, as long as the license is already paid for. They only want to make money and lock you into long term deals. The massive and drastic tactics by Microsoft to lock consumers into their platform indefinately is because there is actual competition (Linux, and an invigorated Macintosh) now. It is so plainly obvious that it stuns the senses.
History should already be telling the world never to trust anything from Microsoft.
Well, I am worried about the development too, but at the same time, I think we must realize that no matter what they throw at us, someone will crack the protection.
Ultimately, the entertainment industry will only be able to control individuals who allow themselves to be controlled.
The rest of us will actively seek solutions that remove us from the evil claws of "Digital Rights Management", or rather "Consumer Ass Ramming" as it should really be called.
They can encrypt and protect all they want, but someone will come through. Someone will work constantly on giving us our rights back - even if it means doing so illegally.
If it becomes illegal to have control over one's own system and play off whatever one pleases, I will stand in line to break the law. Constantly. The more they try to control me, the more I will break laws.
I am not saying that people's concerns about violated rights to control one's own system is not justified. I am just saying that we will prevail in the end. With the incredible amount of brainpower available to those with a liberal mind, the entertainment industry may win over the sheep who do not realize what is happening, but they will not get the ones that don't want to be ass-rammed.
Sorry for the rant, but hopefully someone else agrees that the fight is far from over, and no matter what they tro to do, we will continue to fight...
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This technology is intended to support the TCPA 1.0 specification for "trusted computing". What "trusted computing" is supposed to mean is that if a file has a label on it saying "don't copy me", then it is in principle impossible for the user to copy the file (other than in the ways permitted by the digital "rights" management label).
Once you understand this, you'll see that the purpose is quite clear: of course boxes equipped with this BIOS will refuse to boot Linux. That's the whole point; they will be intended only to boot operating systems that strictly support DRM. Each machine will have unique "integrity tokens" which can be used as digital signatures, so that everything you do on the machine (create a document, contact a web site) can be traced. Since you'll have to pay for your downloads on a credit card, this can all be cross-correlated. The integrity tokens will be digitally signed by the manufacturer, so that any action taken on the net by the owner of one of these beauties can, at least, be traced to the original purchaser of the machine. Secret, DMCA-protected protocols will assure that only "trusted computers" can connect to their web sites.
Now, of course, initial implementations of this concept are likely to have flaws that can be exploited by crackers (example: find some way to write a program that replaces the "trusted" OS with a BSD or Linux kernel; reprogram the flash chip to disable checks), but I fear that they will get it right eventually.
At some point, then, the net will bifurcate: there will be a world of glorified DVD players calling themselves computers interacting with restricted network sites, and a world of general-purpose computers interacting with sites that follow standard protocols. Attempts to outlaw the "free world" will not succeed because it will do too much damage, but those who participate in the "free world" will be viewed with suspicion, called pirates, etc. ISPs might be pressured into refusing to connect with "untrusted" machines.
After five years or so, though, I expect the whole thing to fall apart, because countries that don't go along with this brain damage will acquire a technological lead, as the US enters an era where computer science is treated the way that the USSR treated science: dangerous state secrets not to be shared.
Okay, my take, based on working knowledge of 'trusted' computing and hardware design (I used to be a support enginner in Intel's server division,) is as follows:
'Trusted computing' relies on the fact that every component is known to be secure. Of course 'secure' is a cagey term, but in this case, it means that the end application knows that nothing is interfering with it. The uses vary, from DRM to financial transactions, to other uses we haven't thought of. But, there are three main pieces in a trusted system:
1. The hardware. The hardware needs to be 'trusted' in that we are certain that there is no hardware tampering or eavesdropping going on (of course, this applies only the the internals of the computer, a packet sniffer, or even a keyboard monitor, would be external, and ouside the scope of monitoring,) and to make sure that the machine is the machine it's supposed to be. This really started with Intel's Pentium III adding a processor serial number. The point of that (as with Palladium) was that each machine could be positively identified. If you had previously made that computer 'trusted', then set it so that only trusted machines could perform a said transaction, we could guarantee that the end user is who he says he is, from a hardware standpoint. This new BIOS is much the same way. Each board with this BIOS will be able to say "Yes, I am the motherboard that was here when this software was installed, so yes, I am the same computer." Obviously, this has implications for hardware failure, even moreso than Windows XP's activation problems.
2. The OS. The OS must have support for trusted computing. It must be able to partition off the 'trusted' applications from the untrusted ones. It must be able to encrypt the contents of the drive, and only allow trusted applications to access protected data, and only allow trusted applications to access the 'trusted' part of memory. (So as to disallow one program from sniffing the program files, memory, or data transport streams of a protected application.) This would probably see alot of use by multiplayer online games, as they could make certain that no third-party applications that reside on the game-running-PC could be used to cheat. (As with some of the 'god map' programs for Everquest.) Again, this does not protect the data stream once it leaves the computer, an encrypted network connection would be required. Obviously, for the OS parts to work, users must log in to the system with a username and password at least. Biometric security would be better, so as to more certainly guarantee that the user is who he says he is.
3. Applications. The entire purpose of 'trusted computing' is the applications. Applications that need to know that the user is who he says he is, and that is done by both the OS and the hardware. As with the game example above, other uses are financial transactions (for example, you could set it so that only your computer has access to your bank account records, so that even if someone stole your hard drive, and your username and password, they still wouldn't be able to get at your data,) and DRM. It makes a perfect DRM vehicle, as now the labels can enforce the one-computer rule. A downloaded file would refuse to play without the original application, OS, and hardware.
The question is if these systems can boot a non-trusted OS? Of course they can! You won't be able to use trusted features (for example, your bank's online account access wouldn't work,) but you could use it just fine for applications that don't use MS' Palladium. Just like the Pentium III's serial number could be disabled, and all you lost was access to the (very few) programs that required it.
Another non-functioning site was "uncertainty.microsoft.com."
The purpose of that site was not known.
Read it here: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/%7Erja14/tcpa-faq.html
The two last sections are worth repeating here:
Trusted Computing FAQ | Free Dawit Isaak!