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Updated Information On Columbia Shuttle Tragedy
Thanks to all the readers who have sent links related to today's shuttle disaster. An Associated Press story carried on Salon says that an independent board (with members from the Air Force, Navy, Transportation Department and other federal agencies) has been appointed to investigate the disaster. CNN is carrying official statement from President Bush. Rediff.com has an article on the life of Indian astronaut Kalpana Chawla. borisonanovitch points to "more info on the science aboard Columbia and links to other NASA research." fabel reminds us "Most of the media is focusing on the slight damage that ocurred at takeoff (that NASA discounted at the time) but STS-107 was *delayed* for 6 months (original launch date 19 Jul 2003) Update: 02/01 23:51 GMT by T : [Note, should read "2002."] because of
cracks in the propellant feed lines to the 3 main engines. A defect that could have caused catastrophic failure. Did the fix work or not?"
No, it's highly unlikely that it was the fuel lines. The Shuttles engines are not even running on re-entry; it's just a glider at that point.
Liberal (adj.): Free from bigotry; open to progress; tolerant of others.
OMS does have motors and fuel, but the OMS do not use the same lines and fuel as Main Engines.
"orbital maneuvering system provides the thrust for orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, deorbit, abort to orbit and abort once around and can provide up to 1,000 pounds of propellant to the aft reaction control system. The OMS is housed in two independent pods located on each side of the orbiter's aft fuselage. The pods also house the aft RCS and are referred to as the OMS/RCS pods. Each pod contains one OMS engine and the hardware needed to pressurize, store and distribute the propellants to perform the velocity maneuvers. The two pods provide redundancy for the OMS. The vehicle velocity required for orbital adjustments is approximately 2 feet per second for each nautical mile of altitude change."
"Before the deorbit thrusting period, the flight crew maneuvers the spacecraft to the desired deorbit thrusting attitude using the rotational hand controller and RCS thrusters. Upon completion of the OMS thrusting period, the RCS is used to null any residual velocities, if required. The spacecraft is then maneuvered to the proper entry interface attitude using the RCS. The remaining propellants aboard the forward RCS are dumped by burning the propellants through the forward RCS thrusters before the entry interface if it is necessary to control the orbiter's center of gravity.
The aft RCS plus X jets can be used to complete any planned OMS thrusting period in the event of an OMS engine failure. In this case, the OMS-to-aft-RCS interconnect would feed OMS propellants to the aft RCS.
From entry interface at 400,000 feet, the orbiter is controlled in roll, pitch and yaw with the aft RCS thrusters. The orbiter's ailerons become effective at a dynamic pressure of 10 pounds per square foot, and the aft RCS roll jets are deactivated. At a dynamic pressure of 20 pounds per square foot, the orbiter's elevons become effective, and the aft RCS pitch jets are deactivated. The rudder is activated at Mach 3.5, and the aft RCS yaw jets are deactivated at Mach 1 and approximately 45,000 feet.
The OMS in each pod consists of a high-pressure gaseous helium storage tank, helium isolation valves, dual pressure regulation systems, vapor isolation valves for only the oxidizer regulated helium pressure path, quad check valves, a fuel tank, an oxidizer tank, a propellant distribution system consisting of tank isolation valves, crossfeed valves, and an OMS engine. Each OMS engine also has a gaseous nitrogen storage tank, gaseous nitrogen pressure isolation valve, gaseous nitrogen accumulator, bipropellant solenoid control valves and actuators that control bipropellant ball valves, and purge valves.
In each of the OMS pods, gaseous helium pressure is supplied to helium isolation valves and dual pressure regulators, which supply regulated helium pressure to the fuel and oxidizer tanks. The fuel is monomethyl hydrazine and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide. The propellants are Earth-storable liquids at normal temperatures. They are pressure-fed to the propellant distribution system through tank isolation valves to the OMS engines. The OMS engine propellant ball valves are positioned by the gaseous nitrogen system and control the flow of propellants into the engine. The fuel is directed first through the engine combustion chamber walls and provides regenerative cooling of the chamber walls; it then flows into the engine injector. The oxidizer goes directly to the engine injector. The propellants are sprayed into the combustion chamber, where they atomize and ignite upon contact with each other (hypergolic), producing a hot gas and, thus, thrust."
The Apollo 1 fire occurred on January 27, 1967, killing three astronauts on the launchpad. The next flight was Apollo 7, which lifted off on October 11, 1968, a delay of one and a half years. Bear in mind that the US space program was under intense pressure to meet a December 31, 1969, deadline to land a man on the moon.
The Challenger disaster (STS-51L) occurred on January 28, 1986, killing seven astronauts shortly after launch. The next mission (Discovery, STS-26) took off on September 29, 1988, a delay of two and a half years.
At the present time there is pressure to continue construction of the International Space Station. Unless the ISS is to be mothballed, this will probably mean that at least one launch will have to happen within a year or so.
Toronto-area transit rider? Rate your ride.
Not sure of its been posted by anyone on the two threads, but here's a Radar Image of the debris rain being picked up by weather stations.
"But remember, most lynch mobs aren't this nice." (H.Simpson)
-- Joe
Basically it's the same thing you do when you're skiing and want to bleed off speed. It's a pretty common aviation maneuver used to bleed off speed, or in the case of general aviation, to check your blind spots before landing.
Essentially, it's a series of slow, lazy turns from side to side in a sort of half figure eight (resembling and S, ergo: S turns).
-E2
The evil monkey commands you to dance.
Karma: 0 (But I wield a mean +10 Vorpal Apathy)
The Space Shuttle OMS engines provide the thrust to enter and exit low-earth orbit, and allow adjustment of the altitude and minor inclination changes while on orbit. The two major orbital operations, orbit entry and deorbit, are made with the two OMS engines. On-orbit propulsion thrust is also available for rendezvous maneuvers and altitude changes using the OMS engines with attitude control from the RCS thrusters. While attitude control and close-proximity maneuvers are provided principally by the RCS, the OMS can augment these operations with both fuel and thrust since both the OMS and RCS use the same fuel and oxidizer.
The primary OMS/RCS structures are the forward RCS section and the two OBS/RCS pods in the aft section which contain the two OMS engines and RCS thrusters. The two OMS/RCS pods on the aft fuselage contain the OMS engines, RCS thrusters, fuel, pressurization system and associated distribution and control systems.
Shawn Shephard discusses the potential "tire pressure problem". From the video:
Here is a link to the last audio received from Columbia: http://www.canada.com/toronto/globaltv/info/video/ 020103audio.ram
First, this is a tragedy for the astronauts and their families. I extend condolances to all who have been affected.
N ews.Rele ases/Previous.News.Releases/97.News.Releases/97-03 .News.Releases/97-03-28.Shuttles.New.ET.Completes. Testss tsstat/ 1998/sep/9-10-98s.htma ce/updates/sto32.htmle dc/newsreleases/1999/99 -041.htm/ releases/2 002/02-234.html
However, this problem is nothing new. The insulation material on the external fuel tanks was changed in 1997 and immediately caused problems. Lockheed-Martin was recently contracted to provide an external camera to monitor insulation loss. I have not found any documentation of the insulation problems from late 1997 until the cameras were installed.
See:
http://spacelink.nasa.gov/NASA.News/NASA.
http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/status/
http://ltp.arc.nasa.gov/sp
http://www.arnold.af.mil/a
http://www1.msfc.nasa.gov/NEWSROOM/news
for details about NASA's work on the problem.
Actually, there's a fairly interesting piece up on the TIME website where they discuss the three most probable (in their opinion) causes for the crash. Their 3 leading suspicions are improper piloting leading to a roll which caused structural breakup, the heat tiles that fell of during launch, and the possibility that what little fuel is reserved for the maneuvering engines ignited somehow.
They also toss some juicy quotes like: "The shuttle was built as a space truck, and then the International Space Station was built to give it something to do. Both programs are likely to suffer as a result of this disaster. " and "it's unlikely that NASA will undertake any further shuttle missions or any other manned space flights for the next two years."
I would HIGHLY doubt that this could be the cause. First and foremost is that the main engines are not really used in the decent once the shuttle enters the atmosphere. The main engines are used only during the decent manuver for a braking manuever BEFORE entering into the atmosphere. The shuttle is then swung around to enter the atmosphere on its heat shield. The main engines would then not be used in the decent as they would be thrusting the "wrong" way. Only the manuvering thrusters would be used to maintain stability during the actual passage through the atmosphere.
We were all warned a long time ago that MS products sucked, remember the Magic 8 Ball said, "Outlook not so good"
Has anybody explained why they couldn't have done a spacewalk to inspect the damage from the insulation strike?
Yes, they have. It was not possible to inspect the bottom of the shuttle during this flight because (1) the cargo bay was being occupied by the science package and had no remote manipulator, (2) there are no handles or tethers on the bottom of the shuttle, and (3), shuttles are simply not equipped nor is it recommended for spacewalks to occur without tethering or the robotic arm. Thus, no spacewalks to the bottom of the shuttle.
All I've heard is that it wouldn't have made any difference if they had done one, since they weren't equipped to repair it.
I think also that the Columbia is too heavy to make the higher orbit of the ISS, and OMS and RCS thrusters would not have been enough to boost it to that level. The Columbia is heavier because it was overbuilt... the later shuttles are much lighter. This is why the Columbia has *never* gone to the ISS.
Even if they did find the damage, they also have no way to fix it. All of the tens of thousands of tiles on the surface of the shuttle are unique. Each one has different dimensions, and fits in only one place. Obviously, it would be impossible to carry a replacement for every one.
Lastly, if they discovered the problem during reentry maneuvers, it was still too late. The best NASA could have done was say "It was nice knowing you. God be with you." Once the reentry sequence has started, there is no way to abort. Either they make it, or they don't.
"Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives" should be a convenience store, not a government agency.
Comment removed based on user account deletion
That was after the Challenger explosion...
Why, yes, it did, you moron. Three years the space shuttle was on hold.
When will we reject the space shuttle for the next true manned, reusable space vehicle? I'll pay any deficit George Frickin' Bush chooses to shove down my throat for the next-gen vehicle. :-(
Because they had Spacelab in their cargo bay and bolted onto their airlock. Which as far as I know means that they'd have no way to get out. Thus they probably didn't even bring up EVA suits.
More interestingly, they didn't use the Canadarm to inspect the left wing. This arm is on the left side. Anybody know if it wasn't flying this mission? It would make sense if they weren't planning on using it.
> [...]perhaps getting them out to the ISS [...]
Sorry, the laws of orbital mechanics prevent that. You can't change your orbital inclination without using massive quantities of fuel. Altitude and phase are easy to change, but ISS is at an inclination that is right at the limits of NASA's shuttles. Getting there after you've achieved orbit is completely impossible. Besides, they had Spacelab in their cargobay, not the required ISS docking tunnel.
Slashdot monitor for your Mozilla sidebar or Active Desktop.
ISS's future (at least near-term) is in serious jeopardy right now. Without the shuttle fleet, the only emergency escape vehicle for the crew is the Souz module. There are only 2 of those in a completed state right now and they are designed to last in space for only 6 months. And it takes 2 years to build one.
There is also a question of keeping ISS in orbit. That job was done mainly by the shuttle by boosting it into higher orbit with each visit. Technically, the Russian Proton rockets can do the job, but apparently the RosAviaCosmos (Russian's space agency) is saying today that there aren't enough of those either to do this for a long enough time. And again, it takes over a two years to build the rocket.
Well, they would have been partially protected if the cabin didn't break up... but it's hard to say what happened.
In any case, air resistance isn't what causes the really high temperatures. It's air compression. It's the same thing that allows refridgerators to work. When a gas is compressed it will get hotter, if it is expanded it will get cooler. That's also why spray cans get cold when you use them.
I concur about the S-turn not placing undue loads on the airfame, or causing the catastrophic failure.
On the other topic, the similarity of the S turns used in general aviation, vs Orbiter re-entry is only the shape. Obviously a series of 180 banking maneuvers would tear the shuttle apart at Mach 18, but a slow series of banks does help the Orbiter bleed off speed, and allow it to slow to a velocity when normal aerodynamic flight surfaces can be used.
Reference: http://www.howstuffworks.com/space-shuttle12.htm
(NASA site is slammed, sorry bout the 3rd party link)
-E2
The evil monkey commands you to dance.
Feynman was flamboyant and made a great show of the O-ring problem in front of TV cameras, an unrehearsed and disruptive performance
I wouldn't call it flamboyant.You can watch a video of Feynman demonstrating the O-ring problem; he demonstrates the problem and describes it in a very matter-of-fact fashion. (Sorry for the link to a RealMedia file!)
Feynman's appendix to the Roger's Commission report on the Challenger disaster is a very interesting read. He makes the estimate that there is a 1 in 100 chance of a catastropic failure (pretty close, since the actual rate is now 2 in 107).
The appendix calls into question the management practices at NASA; I'm not sure how the agency has changed since then, but I am certain many of the points he makes are still highly relevant today.
Some better information, including a timeline of telemetry anomalies, is on Aviation Week's website:s ts107.jsp
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/spSec/
No they weren't. The Orbiter is built largely from very normal aluminium. The thermal protection is provided by tiles. There are two types of tiles: black and white. Only the black ones can stand the full temperature of re-entry, and they are placed over the nose and flat bottom of the craft. The white tiles on the top and sides can only deal with the lesser temeratures that leak around.
The shuttle re-enters "bottom first", not in a glide like an aircraft (that bit comes later). The black tiles on the flat bottom create the same effect as an Apollo or Soyuz capsule, and cause an area of ionisation which actually takes the brunt of the heat like a buffer.
So it requires fairly precise alignment to make the whole thing work. Once a wing rips off, the structure will tumble and rapidly decelerate. If there are organic remains, it is because the temperatures were not very high for very long, not because the crew were encased in something that was designed to withstand that temperature from any orientation.
I couldn't believe they would pre-emptively publish this, and thought the above must be a joke, but google news remembers it was there, and also found a place where it is still up: http://www.boston.com/dailynews/032/nation/Columbi a_streaks_toward_Florid:.shtml
we know not to trust the media, but this is crazy
The shuttle does one final burn to de-orbit. After that they enter the atmosphere and land unpowered. The engines are not ever used during the landing procedure (they worry more about slowing down). The shuttle becomes basically the worlds largest/heaviest/fastest glider. Interesting fact #2: The 2 offical landing strips (Texas and Florida) are the flattest strip of land on the planet. (they were built to be flatter then the curvature of the Earth.)
"The price good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men." ~Plato (427-347 BC)
1. Before 7:53am, everything was nominal.
2. ~7:53am, portside hydraulic sensors went offline.
3. ~7:56am, portside elevator and aileron temperature sensors went offline.
4. ~7:58am, portside landing gear pressure and temperature sensors went offline.
5. ~8:00am, crew confirms portside landing gear sensor problems.
6. ~8:00am, all communication went offline.
jim@angband.s1.gov
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 88 15:45:52 PST
Subject: Shuttle Disaster Premises
Here are the premises of the Shuttle disaster scenarios (my apologies
to those who find all this painfully obvious, but the noise level
around here has made it necessary that I belabor these points):
1 The SSME turbine pump blades have been found to be a weakness
in the SSME design that has yet to be dealt with adequately.
2 The failure of these blades would result in a failure mode that
has not been adequately tested, thus the turbine blade containment
ring may not succeed in fully containing the debris.
3 The 3 APU's have been found to be a weakness in the Shuttle
system design as 2 of the 3 have failed in a single mission
with the 3rd found to be near failure after landing.
4 According to James Fletcher, the NASA Administrator appointed
by President Reagan to reform NASA's Shuttle program after the
Challenger disaster, the Space Transportation System is on
the verge of becoming "economical". (While I may not agree with
this opinion, it is certainly reasonable to assume the statements
of such a person to be "plausible" in these scenarios.)
5 An "economical" launch system is what the military needs to
launch its crushing backlog of spy satellites and Vandenburg
is the only launch site which can make polar orbit without
going over populated areas.
6 The trajectory of a Shuttle launched to the south into a polar
orbit (which is the typical orbit of spy satellites) from Vandeburg
reenters over the major western Soviet cities in the event that
an abort to once around option is attempted and falls short due
to inadequate thrust (such as OMS engine failure secondary to
SSME failure).
7 RTG's are a far less vulnerable power source for spy satellites than
solar cells and the military is increasingly concerned about
solar panel vulnerability.
8 Unavoidable clear air turbulence is common over the Shuttle
landing site at Edwards AFB.
9 The OMS fuel and pressurization lines are in reasonable proximity
to the SSME turbine blades.
10 The Pu239 oxide cannisters have not been adequately tested since
when they were subjected to an explosive test, they did fail and
NASA proceeded to proclaim them flight ready because the explosive
test was "invalid".
11 We have no way of rescuing Shuttle astronauts stranded in orbit.
Some other facts, pointed out to me privately, that could be used for
future Shuttle disaster scenarios:
12 Orbital debris is a significant threat to the Shuttle as we have
already experienced damage during one flight.
13 The SSME bell is not being adequately inspected for hairline cracks
which could fail catastrophically during launch.
There are many classes of plausible disaster scenarios based on these
premises. I've chosen to write on just a few exemplary cases which
are particularly horrific. They are worth contemplating because they
are so horrific.
NASA is intransigent when it comes to pursuing important technical
activities that have little immediate political import. Therefore,
it invested in SRB redesign only AFTER catastrophic SRB failure.
Now that it is "safe", NASA continues to invest more and more money
in SRB research to the exclusion of other areas of far greater
weakness in the Shuttle system. Obviously, it will not invest adequate
money in those areas until they, too, fail catastrophically.
Tom Neff, Bob Pendleton, Jim Merrit, et al, start educating the
net for a change. Maybe you should start by reading some nonfictional
accounts of space technology and history rather than continuing to
worship mythology authored by such great story-tellers as Hans Mark, Gen.
Abramson, Isaac Asimov, Robert Heinlein, Barney Roberts, Jessco Von
Puttkammer, James Fletcher, et al.
PS: If NASA ignores reality in its largest, currently most important
and most immediate program -- the Shuttle program -- how do you think
it is doing on future systems like Shuttle C, NASP, Space Station,
lunar bases, space resource utilization and mars missions?
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 88 18:17:25 PST
From: jim@angband.s1.gov (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Stranded in LEO due to APU failure
In order to prepare for the next Shuttle disaster, we need to examine
the various scenarios that may occur, their likelihood, consequences
and what work should be done, in advance to prepare ourselves, our
space program and our citizenry.
For example, consider what would happen if an orbiter were stranded
in LEO due to total APU failure. The logic of the situation would
unfold in this scenario:
Hundreds of millions of people on Earth would watch every detail
of the dramatic situation unfold over several days (assuming they
have that much life support). During the first few days, there
will be many attempts to repair the problem with ground crews working
round the clock on a simulated orbiter in a similar failure
mode. They will come up with any of a number of futile attempts
to fix the problem which the astronauts will, at first, dutifully
carry out. This work will proceed even though there is little or no
possibility of an actual fix. The public, the astronauts and NASA
personnel will feel hope and dispair in cycles at each attempt,
until, eventually, the charade will wear thin. At that point, the
astronauts, the ones who are facing certain death, will be under
enormous psychological pressure to end the charade.
Such a break-point will carry with it the likelihood of one or more
astronauts venting frustration and hostility -- possibly built up
over many years of disillusionment as part of the crippled US space
effort.
NASA will attempt to blank-out all communications with
the astronauts at or before this point. Some or all astronauts will
not want to cooperate with this black-out and will refuse to allow
the their communications to be encrypted. Ham radio operators and
others around the world will band together to pick up the transmissions
of the doomed astronauts and make them available to the public.
After breaking from the bureaucracy's authority, the astronauts
may become extremely critical of specific individuals in NASA and
its contractors. They will have nothing to lose and will finally
have a chance to right what they perceive as the wrongs in the
space program.
A few weeks after the dying words of the astronauts are heard,
the shuttle will reenter the atmosphere at 5 or 6 miles per second.
It will break up. A few large fragments will scatter widely and
unpredictaby, hitting the ground before total disintigration due
to the ablative coating. The public, ignorant of probability theory,
will be in terror at the thought of the shuttle crashing into their
communities causing mass destruction. The fireball could easily be
visible from large population centers and will most likely be viewed
on television broadcasts around the world.
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 88 21:52:48 PST
From: jim@angband.s1.gov (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Possible consequence of terminal approach APU failure
Another possible Shuttle disaster:
During reentry 2 of the APUs fail and the third has some problems (as
has occured before). But unlike the previous instances, the Shuttle
comes into the terminal area energy management manuver a little bit high
and a little bit fast. It encounters a little clear air turbulence
while in a tight turn to bleed off this excess energy. As the pilot is
lining up on the runway, the third and last APU gives out due to the
buffetting. Unfortunately, the APU failed before he completed the final
turn. The control surfaces go dead. The Space Shuttle, now out of
control, impacts at supersonic speed into the waiting crowd which never
hears it coming. Thousands perish.
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 88 21:17:18 PST
From: jim@angband.s1.gov (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Secret Shuttle Launch Disaster Scenario
Here's another possible Shuttle disaster:
The DoD reopens the Vandenburg Shuttle launch facility. A payload
with a plutonium radioactive thermal generator needs to be placed in
an LEO polar orbit. About 2 minutes after SRB separation, a main
engine pump turbine blade fails causing the turbine to fly apart
at supersonic speed. The containment works pretty well but a few
blades get out. One of them nicks the pressurization system for
the fuel oxydizer tanks in one of the OMS pods. The astronauts sense a
loud THUD and the loss of one of the main engines. They opt to abort
once around using the remaining two main engines. Everything goes
according to the contingency plan. All fuel is consumed from the
main tank. The tank separates. The OMS engines start up. Only
one of them lights. Since this produces an off center thrust, the
RCS consumes excessive amounts of fuel to keep stability. The OMS
system, only capable of using half its fuel, fails to put the Shuttle
into a once around trajectory. It reenters short, somewhere near
the Persian Gulf. In the early phase of reentry, when the aerodynamic
control surfaces are insufficient to orient the spacecraft, the already
overtaxed RCS runs out of fuel. The Shuttle begins tumbling somewhere
over the Caucasus Mountains. By the time the control surfaces could
be used, the Shuttle is in a fatal spin. It breaks up. When it
breaks up, the RTG canister, designed to withstand reentry, is struck
by one of the structural members of the Shuttle. Not being designed
to withstand this, it shatters. 22 kilograms of Pu238-dioxide are
distributed in the atmosphere over Moscow, Kalinin and Lenningrad.
The Soviet ballistic missile warning radars, primarily facing north,
are briefly treated to the spectacle of hundreds of reentering
objects coming down around Moscow and Lenningrad. The two largest,
most economically important and strategically significant cities in
the Soviet Union.
Pu238 is 284 times more radioactive than the fissionable isotope Pu239
due to its relatively short half-life of 86 years. It decays by alpha
emmission of 5.5Mev. While this is somewhat higher than the decay
energy of Pu239, it is far higher than the decay energy of U235 and
not similar to the decay energy of any other common nuclide. Thus
to the relatively unsophisticated instruments initially used to
evaluate the sudden release of radioactive material, it will appear
as though 5.5 metric tons of weapons-grade Pu239 has suddenly reentered
over Moscow.
5.5 metric tons of Pu239 is enough to support on the order of 500
warheads. Areasonable surmize would be that a US secret launch out
of Vandenburg was to illegally emplace a facility containing 500 or
so nuclear warheads into an orbit where it would pass over the
Soviet Union 4 times per day from the south whre their early warning
radars could not detect it until it was far too late.
Vandenburg is a highly secured facility. Due to the local geography,
neither the launch pad nor the assembly building can be viewed from
sites not on the base. The Soviets will have very limited intelligence
about launch preparations and the launch itself. Our belated
protestations that it was merely a routine Shuttle launch will be met
with a great deal of skepticism.
The Soviets, sensitized by the Chernobyl disaster to nuclear
catastrophe, will be react unpredictably.
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 88 08:24:13 PST
From: jim@angband.s1.gov (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Brilliant Soviet Rescue of Astronauts Stranded in LEO
As in the "Stranded in LEO Due to APU Failure" scenario, all 3 APU's fail,
leaving the astronauts helplessly adrift.
The Soviets, hearing Tom Neff's idea of a rescue effort, come up with
a brilliant plan. They launch an unmanned Soyuz from Space City
with the stated intent of making a rendevous with the drifting Shuttle
and rescuing some of the astronauts (the Soyuz wouldn't have capacity
for all of them). Space City, being at a much higher latitude than
KSC, gives the Soyuz craft a much higher inclination orbit than the
Shuttle. The Soyuz, being incapable of correcting its inclination
by the required amount, intersects with the Shuttle's orbit at a few
miles second or so.
Thus the Soyuz saves our brave astronauts from the senseless torture
of a slow death.
Why would the Soviets would go along with such an imbicilic
rescue attempt when it requires the sacrifice of a launched Soyuz
(worth $15 to $20 million)? The Soviets draw attention and blame
for the disaster away from NASA. This allows NASA to contain the
political damage and maintain its appearance of conducting a space
program, leaving the Soviets free to develop space without competition.
---------------
And now for a little space policy...
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 88 21:43:32 PST
From: jim@angband.s1.gov (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Diversity vs Monolithism
Humanity can promote the richness and diversity of life by providing a
greater variety of habitats in space rather than encroaching on existing
terrestrial habitats. We can enhance richness and diversity in systems
at all levels -- technological, economic, governmental, cultural, and
biological. We can bring this gift to our world and, indeed, our
universe, if we adhere to the principle that it is better to
err on the side of diversity than on the side of monolithism.
In a series of seminars with environmental groups over a period of
years, space activists in the San Diego area have succeeded in laying
a foundation of trust with these groups based on the above vision.
This trust is a fragile one, more prone to misunderstandings than
the internal factions of the National Space Society.
As guardians of the biosphere, environmental groups are particularly
sensitive to the issue of diversity and quality of life. The vision
of space habitats usually comes wrapped in conventional aerospace
concepts such as "the space program" and the National Commission on
Space's "50 year plan". Unfortunately, for too many of us, this
wrapping is an accurate reflection of our values. Environmental groups
reject our vision, and rightfully so.
Until we clean up our own act, and recognize that large government
projects are not the way to a diversity of space activities, we will
fail to make inroads with grass-roots America, and our gift will be
rejected by those in the environmental movement who can lend it
deeper ethical and moral credibility.
We are desparate for things to happen in space. We are easy prey for
the agents of monolithic space programs who would use us to
prop up funding for such dubious big projects as Space Shuttle
and now Space Station. These projects do more than waste money, they
sap the will of our people to take responsibility for space activities
into their own hands. Like monocropping, they displace the richness
and diversity of natural selection with the errors of monolithism.
We were willing to wait a decade for NASA to build Shuttle. It failed
miserably to live up to our expecations. Now, 15 years later, NASA is
asking us to, again, wait a decade for Space Station. It will have
been 25 years of waiting from Skylab to a pig-in-the-poke Space Station.
25 years.
Think about it.
The monolithism of our government's "X year plans" is as abhorrent
as the "5 year plans" of totalitarian bureaucracies of communist nations.
Do we really need the government's "help" in the form of "the space program"
in order to realize the potential of space?
No!
"The space program" is merely the decaying carcas of Apollo which
monolithists keep around like a psycho with his long dead mother.
The stench is becoming unbearable.
If we are going to wait 5, 10, 25 or 50 years for something, let it be for
something of real and abiding value. Just as it takes several years
for a dispoiled environment to regain its biodiversity, so it will take our
economy several years to fill the markets dispoiled by government encroachment.
Let us abandon the idea of "the space program" for the atavism it is. Let us
not wait for yet another miracle from Uncle Sam. Instead, let us wait for the
life force, as embodied on our free enterprise economy, to grow and flourish,
filling all the territories that "the space program" has dispoiled by its
decaying presence. Let us no longer accept morsels of opiated carrion from
NASA to satiate our craving for space activity. Let us, instead, get back
in touch with our true needs which are the mother of invention.
Beyond business regulatory functions, let government restrict itself
to the support of basic research through a wide variety of independent
agencies that have their own reasons for being interested in space.
Leave technology development and services exclusively in the hands of
the citizens, buying technology and services on the open market when needed.
When our people see groups of other citizens getting together to do things
in space on their own initiative, without government help or interference,
the life force will speak to them. Then, the National Space Society's
mission will be accomplished and only then will we the people understand
that space is a place to live work, play and grow.
Jim Bowery
PO Box 1981
La Jolla, CA 92038
INET: jim@pnet01.cts.com
Seastead this.
Really?
/ re ad/30103
e s/ 2000a/012400e.htm
Take a moment and look at the position of Senator Mondale in the 1960s.
http://www.ad-astra.net/cgi-bin/BBS/SpacePolicy
"The worse thing about Mondale is his unrelenting, unbending opposition to the exploration of space. This opposition was dramatized in the wonderful HBO series on the Apollo Program when Mondale pops up as a charector making political hay after the Apollo Fire. While he did not openly oppose the Apollo Program, it being a done deal by the time he entered the Senate, Mondale's views on human space flight were no secret, even then. After Apollo 11 he helped to lead fights against any and all efforts to expand human presence in space. The crippling of the human space program can in part be laid at his door."
" 'A Webb aid remembers him (Webb) asking Mondale, "In all due humility, Senator, what have we done wrong? Why are you so down on us?" Webb wanted to know why Mondale was upset and what he could do to rectify the situation. He and other visitors from NASA were standing in front of Mondale's desk. The Senator leaned back in his chair and instructed Webb, "I intend to ride this for every nickle's worth of political power I can get out of it. I don't give a hoot in hell about the space program or your future," a NASA official with Webb recalls Mondale saying.'"
http://www.floridatoday.com/space/explore/stori
"For example, Faries cites the reduction in NASA's budget over the five years since Weldon came to office. But he fails to point out that in each of those years, President Clinton sent a budget to Congress that cut NASA from his prior request. And Faries ignores the fact that in response to Clinton's cuts, Congress found money to increase NASA's budget above the president's request for the last three years."
Then look at what the OMB and Congress did to NASA and DoD space prgram funding from 1965 on, cut, cut, cut, cut.
You are right, NASA is what it is today because of the Democrats, instead of getting Dyna-Soar, Skylab, heavy-Lift and a re-usable by 1982 we got Shuttle. When DoD and NASA said we needed 5 Shuttles, three at KSC and 2 at Vandenberg, they got 3, and had to fight and scrouge for funding the 4th one in 1977.
it looks like the seller was just trying to sell it and then this happened.
If they had spent longer at high altitude, then although the peak heating is lower, if you do the maths, the overall heat soaking into the vehicle would be higher, as it would take longer to slow down, so more heat would have time to enter. So the vehicle would melt.
If the vehicle were to reenter at a steeper angle then the peak heating rate is higher, but the overall heating would be less; but then the aerodynamic forces would be higher, and the wings would snap off.
About the only thing the orbiter could have seriously done to try to save itself would have been to jetison the science module whilst on orbit, but I doubt that they had the tools for that onboard, and it probably wouldn't have worked anyway- the orbiter itself weighs a lot more than the cargo, and they didn't know that they were in trouble prior to reentry anyway.
-WolfWithoutAClause
"Gravity is only a theory, not a fact!"I just heard a report on NPR that the most likely cause of the loss of the shuttle was a auxilary power unit exploding and causing a quick loss of control.
The APU's are turbines that use hydrazine fuel. It's highly explosive and there's been talk of finding a safer power source, but the problem is that batteries would be much heavier, and coming up with a lightweight replacement would be a multi billion dollar research project.
Anyway the turbines were due to come on line about the time the shuttle broke apart.
Scientist Michio Kaku said that the explosion was "par for the course" in that "about 1 in 75 space launches explodes" and this was columbia's 102 mission. Which is only to say that rockets are a dangerous form of transportation.
His next point was that this is a reason to think that the nuclear powered rockets that some (who?) are considering are a bad idea.
Rocky J Squirrel
Here is a better collection of stories than the rediff one on kalpana chawla. Incidentally, chawla was the most experienced of the crew, this being her 2nd trip & she is is the 2nd Indian in space after Rakesh sharma did it with the Russians in 1984.
BTW, this is just in: Columbia crew remains found
Uhm, it looks to me like this is the "they're on their way home" story, not a "they've returned safely story." Note the time stamp, too -- perfectly appropriate story to post 48 minutes prior to the scheduled landing.
Liberty in our Lifetime
I am not an engineer but I would say no. The tiles probably were damaged on the left wing where the big chunk of ice hit at take off. At 12k miles an hour there is nothing you can do.
It was a piece of insulating foam, not ice, that hit the wing during the shuttle's ascent.
The rudder probably flipped voilently upward or downward due to the lack of hydro fluid which probably boiled away if the left wing really did infact overheat.
Rudders control yaw, not pitch. They move left to right, not up and down.
And this post was modded up? C'mon, people, don't be so quick to believe everything you read on the net.
That's pretty scary: 1 flight off from being Challenger all over again, teacher-wise... and what is it with the end of January at NASA?
Thus they probably didn't even bring up EVA suits.
Actually, in the news conference it was noted that they had the ability to EVA, but only in case of a latch problem in shutting the cargo bay doors...they had no way to leave the bay though.
Also, to answer your other question, there was no arm on the Columbia for STS-107.
Mordor...a magical, mythical land where women are more rare than dragons--but where every man would rather find a dragon
The shuttle fleet is another 17 years older than it was when challenger exploded. There are three orbiters left out of a fleet of five. It is one thing to redesign a spacecraft that has twenty years of design life left in it, quite another to make radical changes to a craft that is 20 years old.
The orbiters are now getting old.
Actually, IIRC Columbia was less than halfway through its expected life cycle of ~100 flights, and they _have_ been making design changes to the shuttles as they go.
There are plenty of reasonable criticisms of the shuttle vehicles, but "they're too old" isn't one.
NASA chiefs ignored safety warnings
NASA had "repeatedly ignored" the warnings of a former engineer who had pleaded for a presidential order to halt all space shuttle flights, until safety issues were addressed, the Sunday Observer reported.
Don Nelson, who worked with NASA for 36 years, had written to President George W Bush warning that he should intervene to "prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident".
Nelson was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement in 1998.
Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that NASA management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident.
White House officials rejected Nelson's plea for a moratorium. He tried to talk again to Nasa's administration about his worries in October but was again rebuffed.
Nelson told The Observer that he feared the Columbia disaster was the culmination of 'disastrous mismanagement' by NASA's most senior officials.
"I became concerned about safety issues in NASA after Challenger. I think what happened is that very slowly over the years Nasa's culture of safety became eroded."
"But when I tried to raise my concerns with NASA's new administrator, I received two reprimands for not going through the proper channels, which discouraged other people from coming forward with their concerns. When it came to an argument between a middle-ranking engineer and the astronauts and administration, guess who won."
"One of my biggest complaints has been that we should have been looking for ways to develop crew escape modules, which Nasa has constantly rejected."
Since 1999, space vehicles had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems. In 1999, Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line.
In January 2000, Endeavor was delayed because of wiring and computer failures and in August of the same year, an inspection of Columbia revealed 3,500 defects in wiring.
In October 2000, the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank.
Nelson was the not the only person who had warned NASA. The former chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory panel, Richard Bloomberg, had said last April: "In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as now."
Bloomberg blamed the deferral or elimination of planned safety upgrades, a diminished workforce as a result of hiring freezes, and an ageing infrastructure for the advisory panel's findings.
In September 2001 at a Senate hearing into shuttle safety, senators and independent experts warned that budget and management problems were putting astronauts lives at risk.
Among those who spoke out were Democratic Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who warned: "I fear that if we don't provide the space shuttle programme with the resources it needs for safety upgrades, our country is going to pay a price we can't bear."
"We're starving Nasa's shuttle budget and thus greatly increasing the chance of a catastrophic loss," the Observer quoted him as saying.
... if you read the first paragraph, it does say that Columbia "streaked toward" a landing, not that it had actually landed safely, and all of the quotes were very likely taken before the (presumed) safe landing.
I would say though that the person in charge of the story database should be beaten severely -- I printed a copy of this story out at 11:30 p.m. PST, about 14 hours after the Columbia broke up....
Jay (=
I think the reports that telemetry indicated that tire(s) on Columbia's main landing gear began lossing tire pressure is a clue to this disaster. Aircraft wheels have fuse plugs located in the wheel halves to prevent a catastrophic explosion in the event that the tire is exposed to high temperatures. Heating of the tire will cause the gas used for inflation to expand. I think the shuttle uses liquid nitrogen to fill the tires sometime during re-entry. These fuse plugs are set to melt if the temperature of the wheel assembly reaches an unsafe limit. When the fuse plugs open, obviously the tire will deflate. If there was a burn thru on re-entry, one can assume that temperatures in the wheel bay began to increase rapidly. I worked for many years for a leading aircraft wheel and brake manufacturer and have seen these fuse plugs melt during qualification testing in the dynomometer lab many many times. I have also witnessed aircraft tires exploding (DC-10, A340) during controlled tests with solid fuse plugs. Extremely violent energy release to say the least. You normally only have fuse plug release during a rejected take off stop (RTO) or if there is a mechanical drag on the brake which generates to much heat. I'm going to bet my dollar that there was a loss of tiles on Columbia that resulted in a burn through somewhere close to to the main wheel bays. BF Goodrich was the original contractor for the wheel and brake assemblies on the shuttle fleet (not that this matters).
http://www.business.uab.edu/cache/ssb.htm
"The heat-shield tiles also added a lot of weight to the orbiter. The new military grade shuttle concept became too heavy to fly, so designers had to start eliminating some of the original features. The crew escape system that could have saved the Challenger crew by pulling the crew cabin away from the disintegrating shuttle stack was eliminated. The jet engines that would have allowed the shuttle to make a powered landing and "go around" in the event of an errant approach was eliminated. Without jet engines, the shuttle had to make a perfect high angle of attack, high speed dead stick landing every time it returned to earth. No second chance landings were allowed. The net effect was that safety itself was largely eliminated from the original shuttle design. The dangerous take off and landing maneuvers had to be executed with split second precision and near perfect systems performance or the entire vehicle and crew would be lost."