Protecting Cities from Hijacked Planes
Kong99 writes "A group at UC-Berkeley has proposed Soft Walls to stop hijacked planes from entering a protected airspace. Interesting read especially since they claim it is 'hack' proof."
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This is a really cool idea. I'm all for it.
Just one concern...what's to stop the hijackers from busting the autopilot controls in the cockpit? I would think that it would be sensitive to bullets or repeated bashing. It's not like you need an autopilot when you're right next to a city, just point the nose and go. What kind of range should these no fly zones have, and what should be protocol for when an airport is in/next to a city?
Even if this process is hack-proof (yet to be seen), anything that forcibly takes control away from the pilot is going to be dangerous. What if the only way to avoid a mid-air collision is to bank into one of these "soft walls"?
Phoenix
Never claim anything is hack-proof if you don't want to get hacked.
Especially do not claim that safety-critical systems are hack-proof, since even people who wouldn't normally try to hack them will try.
It's like security through obscurity- in this case more like security through non-boasting. The same thing applies- it doesn't really make you more secure, but it stops a lot of people from trying.
graspee
The twin tower attack was a one-time thing; neither it nor anything like it will ever work again, especially after all the media attention and tactical commentary the attack received.
This is a solution to a problem which will never come up again in anything near the form it did. It's interesting to think about and expand our engineering knowhow with but it's worthless as a Real Solution to a Real Problem.
Peace in the middle east would also solve a good portion of the problem (from an engineering perspective) and it doesn't cost millions of dollars. AND it is immune to hacking.
-n
They propose modifying the avionics in aircraft so that the plane would fight any efforts by the pilot to fly into restricted airspace
Somehow this makes me feel a little less safe. I know that so much of flying is electronically controlled now anyway, with autopilot and more, but the there still is the ability for the pilot to actively fly the plane if it becomes necessary, without the plane "fighting" him or here.
What if the terrorist attack came in a different way, and the pilot had to make "evasive maneuvors" (sp!) or something?
[SIG] It's like putting a moose in the blender -- a recipe for disaster!
The system would include an on-board database of the GPS coordinates of the no-fly zones. If it sensed an attempt to jam GPS signals it would switch to other navigation aids such as airport beacons. Being independent of ground control means soft walls would be immune to hacking
Wishful thinking or willful ignorance?
The database would have to be updated prior to each flight, because the zones would have to be flexible. Points of entry are the main database at each airport, the central database at some government facility, and of course every single aircraft participating in this. Factor in the execptions you know the congresscritters cannot avoid putting into any sort of regulatory legislation, like exemptions from participation from non-commercial planes of a certain size or smaller, and you have a system so full of holes that it would hardly be worth the cost.
Hmm... Suppose that a plane were somehow to take off with a database of no-fly zones that listed all of the airports within a 1000-mile radius of its destination? Suppose that an updated database is released that accidentally puts O'Hare in a no-fly zone, and it isn't discovered until planes start colliding with each other over Chicago? And what can be done to save a plane that has a corrupted database once it takes off? From the story, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING! You're doomed, see ya later.
Nice system. I'll walk, thanks.
That's "Mr. Soulless Automaton" to you, Bub.
Think like a terrorist for a second, will you.
So what if you can't slam a plane into a building? Your only limits are your creativity.
If the airplane's softwall control can't be hacked, then perhaps the terorrists can make planes crash into things by guiding them with `pirate soft walls'. Or just making planes crash. I don't think terorriats are lla that picky and choosy.
This is dumb.
When will American politics wake up and address the injustices that are the real root of the terrorist problem?
Blearf. Blearf, I say.
It's just yet more knee-jerk reaction by people who get a warm fuzzy feeling from pretending they're doing something useful, when in reality they are just wasting time money and effort.
Which is why, of course, that thermonuclear devices have been launched by malicious hackers.
...
Oh, wait.
I mean, it's why the Stock Market has been compromised by evil criminal masterminds manipulating the prices via electronic subterfuge.
Oh, wait.
Oh, I mean that's why terrorists have been able to bring the air traffic control network down by hacking into it.
Oh, wait
I guess you're extrapolating from the fact that web sites are often hacked and Microsoft Outlook is vulnerable to worms to the grandiose implication that this sort of system is inherently vulnerable. I think that's a big stretch of an extrapolation.
The only thing that's not hack-proof is a system that's turned off, or broken too badly to run properly anyway. And maybe not even then.
This is a terrible idea for many reasons.
First, most cities are not "restricted airspace". There are no prohibitions against flying over all kinds of areas where just as much damage could be done as happened on 9/11. And in fact, you can't protect cities in this way, because they tend to put airports near cities. So this proposal fails to achieve its most basic security goal.
In fact, most restricted airspace is over isolated areas and is used for military training. It is restricted only so that combat pilots don't have to worry about accidentally ramming into jetliners.
Second, these days one of the main forms of security related restricted airspace is the Temporary Flight Restriction, TFR. This follows the president all over the country as he campaigns for the 2004 elections. But since the locations of the TFRs change daily and unpredictably, there would be no reliable way for the avionics to be loaded with the current TFR locations. Hence the proposal would fail to address one of the main current security concerns.
Third, there are significant safety issues involved. Every system is prone to failure. What happens when the gadget mistakenly activates and starts trying to turn the plane? The pilot will be fighting with the controls at a time when he may be distracted trying to land in bad weather. The system could easily kill many more people than it would save.
And fourth, there are occasions when there is a legitimate need to enter restricted airspace, such as during an emergency. A dumb gadget like this cannot be expected to understand that an engine is failing or that the control surfaces are damaged, and the pilot needs to get the plane on the ground pronto! Military bases, with their ultra-long runways and isolation from civilians, are ideal locations for emergency landings; but they are generally in restricted airspace. Again, imagine the scenario of trying to land a crippled airliner while battling a robot which insists that you don't have the right to land there!
All in all this is such a bad idea that it's clear that no one involved has any experience with the aviation business and what the real security issues are.
It's not going to happen again. The reason why three of the the four hijacked planes hit the attackers' targets is this: no one on the planes, not the pilots, not the passengers, not the attendents, had an inkling that the hijackers were intent on crashing the planes. It had never happened before.
Standard procedure for a hijacking is to cooperate with the hijackers to minimize harm to the people on the plane.
If the people on a hijacked plane know that they are on a doomed aircraft, the attackers have no leverage. The Pennsylvania flight was different from the other three in that the passengers ignored the-plane-will-crash-if-we-use-cellphones rule, called their families, got the lowdown, and then attacked the terrorists. The terrorists lost. The mission failed.
Mr. Shoe-Bomb also failed because the passengers gang-beat his ass. Mission failed.
Every plane hijacked in the future will have passengers that will not cooperate. The pilots won't cooperate. Missions to use airliners as bombs are now useless: any sane attacker will of course now use other methods.
Creating softwalls and turning our country into a AA-covered bunker is idiotic. Attacks via planes can't succeed. At the very least, the pilots will slam the plane into a field to save the lives of thousands.
I worry at the irrationality of the actions of the people of the U.S. Shutdown of the Constitution. Illegal attacks against non-threatening countries. Concentration camp in Cuba, complete with execution chamber (coming soon). Cameras everywhere. Reading everyone's mail.
You know, the attackers communicated face-to-face, so NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE STOPPED THEM.
We're turning the U.S. into an prison populated by people constantly agitated by their warden into a state of hysterical paranoia.
Listen, the people who really, really wanted to blow us up died in the planes. They are dead. They aren't in Iraq. They aren't everyone who speaks Arabic. They aren't being tortured in little white jail cells across the U.S.
Any future attack will come from a different front. And frankly, these men aren't that bright: they're cultists to begin with, so 9/10 of their brain cells are useless anyway.
The few loonies who want to attack us will do so no matter how many cameras are over our beds. Now, on the other hand, by attacking non-combatants all over the world, Bush Inc. has converted infinite good will into an implacable wall of resistance, not because of what we are, or the insanity of our enemies, but because of what we have done to people who had nothing to do with the 911 attackers. 2,000-10,000 dead in Iraq: Perle and Wolfowitz refuse to give an accounting. Bush has insulted and alienated the entire world when previously he had them firmly on our side. He's like John Adams wandering into Paris in the 1770's, who insulted and patronized the very people Franklin had so carefully cultivated into supporting the U.S. Adams, like Bush, nearly lost the war by his gross incompentency in diplomacy, his raw moral fanaticism, his ignorance of other nation's cultures, and his blind nationalism.
Soft walls won't save us from Bush's stupidlity in dealing with, well, ANYTHING.
Just because the global news media machines haven't reported these things, doesn't mean they haven't happened. Let me put it another way, if these things ever could happen, there's no guarantee that the public would be informed. Odd things happen all the time and people are always a little too willing to accept "official" explanations from sources entangled in conflicts of interest.
" The Islamic terrorists don't attack because we treat them like trash (which we really don't). They attack because we aren't muslims. Simple as that."
Like most simple ideas about peoples motives, thats almost entirely wrong. There are lots of reasons, one of the primary being the presence of US soldiers in their holy land.
Two words: circuit breaker. Every avionics system has to have one, or you run the risk of an overloaded circuit causing a fire onboard, with disasterous results. And every circuit breaker must be accessible in-flight, so that they can be reset if necessary, or manually popped if there's smoke but not enough current to pop it normally.
Pull the breaker, bye-bye soft wall.
Technology is not always the answer (ooo, can I say that here?)
This is an absolutely dangerous idea.
The concept of "pilot in command" is extremely important in the FAA's rulebook, and is hard set in aviation culture. It's very simple; one person in the cockpit is the pilot in command (PIC), and he or she is directly, completely, and personally responsible for anything that happens to that plane while it is in the air.
The FAA's rules also clearly state that, in an emergency, the PIC is authorized to do anything necessary to take care of the emergency, even if it breaks every other rule in the book. For instance, if my engine failed and there was no civilian airport in range, I could legally land on a city street or a military airstrip, fly through restricted airspace, override ATC commands, etc.
So what happens if my engine fails, I need to get to an airport on the other side of a major city, and that city is "protected"? Suppose I have just enough altitude to get there at my best glide rate. Will the airplane override my inputs and resist my approach over the city?
What happens if "soft barriers" prevents the pilot from safely responding to a systems malfunction? A lot of flight does occur over dense urban areas (the final approach to Santa Monica airport passes just a few hundred feet over some downtown towers). Who is responsible for the non-optimal response: the pilot in command, or the soft barriers system?
"Oh, but that'll never happen," one might respond. Go to the NTSB's aircraft accident report site and read some reports. Aircraft are complex mechanical devices, and they can and do fail all the time, often in subtle and bizarre ways.
As a pilot, I won't get anywhere near a plane with "soft barriers", even as a passenger.
-John