Slashdot Mirror


Microsoft Worms Crash Ohio Nuke Plant, MD Trains

stieglmant writes "For everyone who thought the 'blackout of 2003' was bad, how about this, according to an article at SecurityFocus, and another article at The Register, 'The Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours.'" Russell writes "Maryland MARC Train Service was shut down most of Wednesday morning due to what sounds like the MS-Blast worm or one of its variants. The local Baltimore news reports that the cause was a signal malfunction but CSX, whose communications system runs the tracks, has an article describing the shutdown as a result of 'a worm virus similar to those that have infected the systems of other major companies and agencies in recent days'. This indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked. Wow, taken to the extreme, the exploitation of their systems could have caused a train collision and injury or death to hundreds of Maryland and Virginia commuters."

35 of 817 comments (clear)

  1. The network administrators... by aridhol · · Score: 5, Insightful

    ...should be fired. Why was the safety monitoring system on a nuclear power plant exposed, even indirectly, to the internet?

    --
    I can't say that I don't give a fuck. I've just run out of fuck to give.
    1. Re:The network administrators... by gcaseye6677 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Better yet, why is it running Windows?

    2. Re:The network administrators... by chef_raekwon · · Score: 4, Insightful

      true, any admin that doesn't know about packet filter firewalls should be fired...
      --- but imagine when they catch the clown who spread/made the virus...he/she might be locked up for a while...

      --
      We're like rats, in some experiment! -- George Costanza
    3. Re:The network administrators... by s20451 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      true, any admin that doesn't know about packet filter firewalls should be fired...

      Sometimes that's not enough. At my university, the departmental firewall did just fine in blocking the virus, until somebody got their Windows laptop infected at home and brought it to work, behind the firewall. Once again proving that great network security can be easily defeated by poor physical security.

      --
      Toronto-area transit rider? Rate your ride.
    4. Re:The network administrators... by aridhol · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That brings up a good question. Doesn't software need to be certified before it can be used in nuclear applications? In fact, isn't one of the (many) disclaimers on most software (including Windows) "don't use this in a nuclear facility"?

      --
      I can't say that I don't give a fuck. I've just run out of fuck to give.
    5. Re:The network administrators... by aridhol · · Score: 4, Insightful
      Then why was the safety monitoring system exposed to the office network? In this case, the worm came in on a non-firewalled T-1 line from a contractor's network, and through there to the internet.

      I would have suspected that there would be multiple layers of protection in front of critical systems like that. Even more, I would expect that safety regulations require these layers of protection. Of course, that would hurt the bottom line, so we can't have that happening :(

      --
      I can't say that I don't give a fuck. I've just run out of fuck to give.
    6. Re:The network administrators... by talon77 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I didn't actually see anything in those articles that said it was MS systems that were running the safety at the nuclear plant. All I could see is that the bandwidth had dropped due to the slammer worm and that a display monitor was disabled due to multiple scan attempts. This tells me that there were MS systems that were affected on their network segment, but it never says that the safety systems themselves were MS systems.

    7. Re:The network administrators... by plague3106 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I for one DON'T want them to install patches as they are released at a nuclear power plant. I'd like them to install patches on test machines, to be sure the 'fix' doesn't break something else. Installing patches without testing them first is just as senseless (if not more so) then not patching..

    8. Re:The network administrators... by jridley · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "Doesn't encourage" is a happy dream of MS's.
      They think they want 100% market penetration, but they also think they can get away without taking on the responsibility which that implies.

      They're "encouraging" everyone to use MS products excusively, everywhere. When it gets to the point where everything is Microsoft and nobody knows anything else (which is what Microsoft is shooting for) how are they going to deny responsibility for stuff like this?

      This might be compared to a concrete manufacturer coercing the market, becoming the sole supplier of concrete, but all along saying something like "you shouldn't use our product for pre-stressed bridge segments." Once they became the sole supplier for concrete, what the hell else are people who want to build bridges supposed to do?

      Can a supplier reasonably be excused for making crappy product which kills someone because they said to use some other product, even though they themselves were the ones who drove all the other products out of the marketplace?

    9. Re:The network administrators... by lambadomy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Ridiculous. Those important systems shouldn't even be on the same network as the office, much less attached to a network that can see the internet. I'm not talking firewalls/seperate vlans/whatever either, I mean physically no kind of connection at all. If they have to be accessible from a vpn, you better have a damned good idea of who will be doing that accessing.

      When it comes to your average office network, sure, you can give the "oh they brought in an infected laptop" excuse, but this is quite a bit different.

    10. Re:The network administrators... by Monkelectric · · Score: 4, Insightful
      I agree the admin has some serious explaining to do. But have you ever worked as an administrator?

      The "typical" administration job is exactly what you'd expect -- you're understaffed, underpaid, your budget is abysmal, and you have a gaggle of retarded secretaries calling you up asking the *same questions* constantly because they're too lazy to use the help system!

      Most of your day is spent putting out fires. Fixing critical systems before all hell breaks loose, keeping your web/nfs/mail/compute servers running when they have a load average of *5*, fixing viruses, fixing shitty HP machines because your boss wouldn't listen to you and buy a cheaper machine made of quality parts.

      Luxuries like patching systems, and preemptive security measures are things there aren't time for.

      So my question would be ... is their IT department critically underfunded and that CAUSED the problem, or was someone just lazy?

      --

      Religion is a gateway psychosis. -- Dave Foley

    11. Re:The network administrators... by pmz · · Score: 5, Insightful

      This tells me that there were MS systems that were affected on their network segment, but it never says that the safety systems themselves were MS systems.

      The systems shouldn't even have been allowed to mix even on a shared Ethernet. Microsoft belongs nowhere inside the perimeter of a nuclear facility. Period.

    12. Re:The network administrators... by Cyno · · Score: 4, Insightful

      No firewall will save you from a manager with a laptop.

    13. Re:The network administrators... by zumajim · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I've often wondered why ANY military branch would continue to have a presence on the internet, with the exception of recruitment sites. Back in the days before public/commercial internet access, I was a network contractor for the Navy, working at Point Mugu naval air station. The installation of a "command LAN" was a top priority, but the mere mention of a link to the internet was greeted with open hostility. (Wasn't my suggestion, either, thank God.) Made 100% sense to me then, even more so now.

  2. Software Disclaimer by jocks · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I think the fault here is with the moron that managed and accepted the software in the first place. One of the first disclaimers all software companies make is that they do not gauruntee that they are suitable for life threatening situations. Who accepted this software? Who speced it? Who supervised their work and ensured that they were competent people to manage this type of work?

    1. Re:Software Disclaimer by david614 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I agree with this. Given the EULA claim that software is *not* certified for use in applications such as life-threatening situations, why did due-diligence not prevent this application from being approved. I also think, however, that this is not a network administrator problem. It is a legal counsel problem, and a CEO problem. How, after all, did a nuclear powerplant escape segregating its key security functions from a publically connected network. Have they never heard of air-gaps?! These are the same people who never want regulations telling them what to do. No, voluntarism is always to be preferred. How about penalties for dumb mistakes like this one. Fines and public ridicule have a wonderful way of concentrating stubborn minds. D

      --
      ELITISM: It's always lonely at the top. Uninvited company is rarely welcome.
  3. What I don't get by Trailer+Trash · · Score: 4, Insightful

    is why anybody still thinks that Windows is suitable for a production control environment. I can understand the pretty gui for someone's desktop, but (and I'm serious when I ask this) what kind of utter cretin would think to put Windows, or any Microsoft product, in a fucking nuclear power plant, completely un-fucking-protected from this sort of stuff?

    It doesn't make sense. Use a Unix/Linux machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

    Why is this rocket science? Why do people who are building nuke plants and rail lines not know any better?

    Sorry for going off on a rant, but damn it, somebody needs to say it.

    1. Re:What I don't get by GoofyBoy · · Score: 5, Insightful

      >Use a Unix/Linux machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

      How is this any different from;

      Use a Windows 2000 machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd or something similar running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

      If there was a Linux/Unix worm running around, couldn't the exact same situation happen?

      --
      The surprise isn't how often we make bad choices; the surprise is how seldom they defeat us.
    2. Re:What I don't get by BigGar' · · Score: 4, Insightful

      is why the control computers for a nuke plant are even hooked up to the same network. I can understand the need for the systems to communicate, but for them to have a physical connection to the outside world, firewalled & patched or not, is just plain stupid.

      --


      Shop smart, Shop S-Mart.
  4. No firewall? Probably not. by IvyMike · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked.

    Actually, I suspect that someone unwittingly plugged an infected laptop into the network inside of the firewall.

  5. more info by blamanj · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I just submitted the same story, it will probably get rejected, so here's some more links:
    The Washington Post is reporting that the Slammer worm crashed the computerized display panel which monitors the most crucial safety indicators (coolant systems, core temperature sensors, and external radiation sensors) at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January. No serious problems occured, primarily because the plant has been offline for more than 1-1/2 years.
    Davis-Besse is run by FirstEnergy, which many people feel may bear much of the responsibility for last weeks power blackout.

  6. Don't overreact by stratjakt · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Wow, taken to the extreme, the exploitation of their systems could have caused a train collision and injury or death to hundreds of Maryland and Virginia commuters.

    Thats why trains have human engineers and brakes. It's why people should use good judgement and observation. If you approach an intersection, and see that the traffic lights in all directions are green, use your head and stop, because something's wrong. Of course this is impossible, theres a mechanical failsafe that will make all lights blink red if that happened - making a 4 way stop, similar mechanical fallbacks are employed in the railroads. This is all besides the point.

    Techies tend to overestimate the role of technology in day to day life. MARC was shut down more because the clerks were having a hard time selling tickets, since they cant do simple math in their heads.

    --
    I don't need no instructions to know how to rock!!!!
  7. paranoia time by ed.han · · Score: 5, Insightful

    in an environment like a nuclear power plant, why aren't there firewalls on all clients? i mean, network security in such an installation is about as important as it gets.

    it's possible the vulnerability arose through someone accessing internet e-mail. but wall street firms regularly blacklist internet e-mail sites. they do that b/c they're regulated to ensure that proprieties are kept and people aren't defrauded. a nuke though--we're talking more than just dollars and cents here.

    it may not be fully the fault of the admins.

    ed

  8. That was a bad conclusion by dbarclay10 · · Score: 5, Insightful
    his indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked.

    That is a silly conclusion to come to. Presumably they're also implying the same about the power grid.

    I have first-hand experience with Ontario Hydro's IT nework (now Hydro One's IT network ;) and I gotta say - they have firewalls up the wazoo. And this is the problem. They rely on border security. However, on networks as large as the ones being discussed, border security doesn't cut it. There are too many entry vectors. People reading email, people browsing the web, and oh my god people with laptops - the pain the pain.

    So before you go thinking "they aren't even taking precautions that would have saved them! Fire them!" understand that it's *exactly* that attitude which caused the networks to go down in the first place - the common misconception the a firewall is a magic wand that will solve all their ills.

    Border security does NOT cut it when you run insecure software on the inside, boys and girls. And you can take that to the bank.

    --

    Barclay family motto:
    Aut agere aut mori.
    (Either action or death.)
  9. Re:Is it going to take deaths to make MS liable? by InterruptDescriptorT · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I'd love to see what the Linux community would say if some intravenous drug pump running an embedded version of Linux had a bug that caused it to fail and kill a patient?

    They'd probably cry, 'But we already released a fix! They didn't install this patch, and this patch, and this patch, and then recompiled.'

    Don't blame the software companies for the "sh*t quality" of their software, as you say--blame the system administrator who didn't install the already-available fixes or patches. That by far is your guilty party right there.

    --
    Karma: Excellent Birds (mostly as a result of listening to Laurie Anderson)
  10. Exactly by kiwimate · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Perhaps the silliest quote from the article:

    CSXT has confronted increasingly sophisticated computer viruses, like ones that have penetrated some of the most secure sites in the country in recent days.

    Sorry, but they're obviously not "some of the most secure sites in the country". If they were, they wouldn't have been penetrated like this. How can I say this? Because my company didn't get penetrated.

    I'm afraid of sounding like a broken record here, because if anyone looks at my past posting history they'll see I've said exactly the same thing. However, the fact is we have mission-critical 24/7/365 servers running Windows (as well as Linux) that simply can not be vulnerable. So we secure them, and we protect them, and put in safeguards, and work together as a team if there is a particularly nasty threat out there...and we keep running. Funny, that.

    Sod it; plenty of other posters will argue the point about patching, firewalling, etc., and a myriad of rabid MS-bashers will refute and insult. Let my small voice add merely this to the fray -- it doesn't have to be this way, even if you use Windows. All that is required is people who know what they're doing.

  11. For train control, Fail Safe == Stop Working by shoppa · · Score: 4, Insightful
    Train Control and Signalling systems are universally designed for Fail Safe == Stop Working. The low-level, safety critical systems are controlled with very low-tech Vital Relays which which will stop train movement and/or make all the signals present a Red Aspect in case of computer failure, and that's what they did.

    Train control has this luxury. Computer systems onboard airplanes do not... simply turning off jet engines in case of computer failure is not an appealing possibility.

  12. Security is transitive by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 5, Insightful

    You're not just connecting to your business partners, you're connecting to everyone they've ever connected to.

    The Register article says "It began by penetrating the unsecured network of an unnamed Davis-Besse contractor, then squirmed through a T1 line bridging that network and Davis-Besse's corporate network. The T1 line, investigators later found, was one of multiple ingresses into Davis-Besse's business network that completely bypassed the plant's firewall, which was programmed to block the port Slammer used to spread".

    I'd never let a client do that. From a business risk management point of view, you *might* allow a direct connection by a vendor, *if* you had a good contract requiring them to keep good security and be responsible for breaches, and *if* you had secured everything sensitive in your internal network. From a theoretical or technical point of view, you should never trust something you don't control.

    Monitoring systems are just as safety-critical as control systems. After all, the feedback loop is part of a control system. Imagine an intruder changing the readings to show that reactivity was decreasing, core temperature was dropping, and coolant pressure was so high that relief valves should be opened. You'd have a Three Mile Island rerun. That system should never, NEVER have been exposed even indirectly to the Internet.

    But then, Davis-Besse is the plant where someone thought the way to check for an air leak was to poke around with a lit candle near flammable insulation wrapping critical control cables (1975).

  13. Welcome to the new Federally mandated Palladium by McFly777 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Next thing you know, the Dept. of Homeland Sec. will issue a regulation requiring the use of Palladium or similar tech. on all computers. After all it is for our 'safety.'

    --

    McFly777
    - - -
    "What do people mean when they say the computer went down on them?" -Marilyn Pittman
  14. More Spin about patches by SgtChaireBourne · · Score: 4, Insightful
    These were inexcusable mistakes: using Windows for mission critical equipment and connecting to the Internet, especially Windows.

    With MS systems it's not just a matter of loading a patch, quite often they break something especially third party apps, fail to fix the problem they claim to fix, or open a new vulnerability.

    If a model of car were found to be so defective -- bolts breaking, carbonmonixide in the passenger compartment, split drive shaft when you change gears, works with only one brand of gas, plays only approved radio stations, etc. -- no one would think to blame the user.

    --
    Beta is broken and the link to classic doesn't work. Stop wasting our time or there won't be anybody left here.
  15. Re:It's only a matter of time... by CommandNotFound · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Sure, one could argue that they should have applied patches and that it isn't M$'s fault but tell that to the jury. When surviving relatives see the potential for a profitable liability suit they are going to go after the biggest pockets and that is M$.

    Yes, and then software liability will be mandated by legislation and then everyone in the software industry will be trouble. Be careful what you wish for. If MS goes down for something like this, the whole software industry is in trouble. We don't make as much as doctors in this business, so we can't afford the malpractice/liability insurance.

    Again, the question should be asked why were mission-critical systems connected directly to any network, other than connections to other mission-critical boxes?

  16. Freight trains are to fear the most by pease1 · · Score: 4, Insightful
    The idea of a MARC train with a few hundred people getting into an accident because CSX's dispatching center is down, is nothing compared to a freight train with hazardous material wrecking in a large city (since railroads grew up at the same time most large cities did... they run THROUGH the cities, not around them). Fire, gas, explosion, you name it, it could have happened.

    And it's not MARC's problem... they only run on CSX's tracks.

  17. Time for a change. by pair-a-noyd · · Score: 5, Insightful

    This will probably get me flamed to no end but think about it..

    One life and death critical systems they should use proprietary hardware, OS and software.

    Not any version of Windows, not any version of Linux, not Intel, not AMD, but something totally alien. Something that is designed from the ground up to be DIFFERENT and CLOSED that can not communicate with the outside world and the system that the outside world run on.

    I'm talking about Air Traffic Control systems, Nuke plant controls, railroad traffic systems, hospitial systems, military systems, power systems, public utilities.

    I mean NEW CPU's and a NEW OS and NEW software that is so different and so tightly closed that nothing can communicate with it but other systems of the same design.

    With every other little dickweed with a Wally World emachine typing "1337" into google and downloading DIY virus labs, and these same little punks having access to the same networks that all the above mission critical systems communicate on, well, it's a disaster waiting to happen.

    And when some script kiddie crashes a 747 full of people from his Wally World emachine on his mommies AOL account, what then? Or the same kiddie opens the floodgates on a dam and kills 200,000 people. Or a million people. Or makes a nuke plant go Chernobyl?

    When burglars keep breaking into your safe every week and robbing you blind you would assume that it's time to get a better safe..

    Before the world went insane and computerized every friggin thing from toasters to pay toilets to the power grid, this sort of thing was IMPOSSIBLE. Time to fix it folks..

    Flame away..

  18. new headline by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Dumbasses at nuclear power plant allow systems to be brought down by a bug microsoft and the IT security industry warned people about weeks ago. Management unaccountable for making their lazy IT employees do their job.

  19. Idiots by Dalcius · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Rules of IT:
    1) Do not place a vulnerable system on a critical network unless absolutely necessary.
    2) When configuring a computer/server, always assume that you are hooking up to a hostile, unfiltered network.

    If they'd applied these two rules to their network, routers, servers, etc., this likely wouldn't have happened. These are pretty basic ideas, folks. If you have a Windows box on the same network as a computer controlling nuclear saftey checks, you better have a damn good reason and you better check for patches weekly.

    --
    ~Dalcius
    Rome wasn't burnt in a day.