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Windows ATMs by 2005
An anonymous reader writes "O'Reilly Developer News is running a brief on how the banking industry will be running a stripped down version of windows on 65% of its ATM machines by 2005. On a morning when I'm receiving the latest windows virus in my inbox every five minutes I feel very comfortable with this."
We have them in the UK already - the sight of ATMs showing an NT4 logon screen is not uncommon...
Um.... a good number of ATM's issued by a large bank I used to code for run NT 4.0. This isn't late breaking news.
Saying Android is a family of phones is akin to saying Linux is a family of PCs.
Take your pick:
http://zem.squidly.org/bsod/
http://www.piemaster.co.uk/gallery/BSOD
There is no "-1 offended" or "-1 you don't agree with me" mod options for a reason.
Sorry, but you obviously do not work in banking as a lot of new ATM's do have a TCPIP stack on them. That was the big push from finance institutions in order to play along with current network configurations. I am looking at a diebold ATM right now that is based on TCPIP.
Reylas
Trust me when I say that you have no clue what you're talking about. I work for a bank. We communicate with our ATMs over a dedicated line. Having an extremely stripped down version of Windows on an ATM really isn't going to make it a whole lot less secure. It'll still be the same way its always been: The easiest way to get money from an ATM is just to take the ATM. (No, I'm not kidding. We've had that happen a couple of times.)
Maintenance staff does not have 'root' access to the system. They have the ability to open the safe to place more money in, as well as to restock the paper feed for receipts. Thats it. If they're going to take money they're going to do it from the safe, then they'll get caught by doing so. We have one ATM technician and even he doesn't have 'root' access to the boxes.
Please do a little research before opening your mouth.
I am a leaf on the wind. Watch how I soar.
The latter scheme seemed dubious; the chain-letter like WARNING on the machine, and the insertion sensors on card slots I can't see allowing something jammed that far into them. Plus this was at a gas station deep in suburbia where hanging around the ATM would be suspicious, and where the ATM was in a corner making its use a complete screen of the keyboard.
This scam is called the lebanese loop, and involves installing a thin bit of wire into the card slot, which jams the card in there. This of course stops the ATM from actually doing anything, but a kind gentleman behind you suggests that maybe you should input your PIN a second time. While he is shoulder surfing. This of course doesnt work, and the ATM refuses to give your card back, mainly because it actually cant :)
Then you give up, wander into the bank to complain, and he has extracted your card (easy if you know how with these things) and run off to another ATM in the locality to quickly drain your account of everything he can get.
This scam has been ran a number of times in my town, and people keep getting caught out, even tho there are now massive warnings on the ATMs.
I have seen the pressure to go COTS first-hand myself in an application where it really wasn't a good engineering decision. But the price and functionality of the COTS system exerted tremendous pressure on the selection process.
And again, Enron was a financial services company, as were the New York investement houses that served it, but that didn't make them immune from doing stupid things.
sPh
They already run off the shelf software and have for quite some time. At least one major national bank runs NT on their ATMs, while most other ATMs in the country run OS/2.
I have had the recent pleasure of watching the V-Com ATM machines being installed in our local convenience stores. They are PC's controlling the system, using Internet connections over TCP/IP to communicate, running Windows NT Workstation 4.0 SP6a. They have a custom keyboard missing the CTRL, ALT, and other state keys, and a touch screen interface to boot. And they can be crashed so easily it goes beyond funny to just plain sad.
The tech doing updates opens the bay, plugs in a regular keyboard, logs on to an e-mail account, and runs the patches distributed that way.
Not something I really would trust with my money!
You can have it fast, accurate, or pretty. Pick any 2.
Ummm... You're the optimist aren't you.
I worked in the EFT industry for about 5 years as an engineer and I can say that you are so wrong it's not even funny. The people that make decisions are worried most about how much it's going to cost. If it wasn't for cost, every bank would be processing transactions in real time rather than relying on batch processing on IBM's that are as old as I am.
When a "new" technology comes along in the industry, it's usually applied to the old technology model. For example, when the processor I worked for started using TCP/IP as a transport between datacenters, they didn't encrypt the data end to end. Instead they just replaced some older dedicated link and relied on the same weak ass pin block encryption they always did, paying no mind to the fact that someone with a notebook and a network card could easily yeild 40-50 complete cards per second.
And if you think because it's financial that everything has to be balanced to the penny, you're so wrong. To start with the legacy systems that some networks have to deal with ensure that reconcilliation will NEVER be 100%. Then add to it that if the money is right, a processor will further bastardize their code to accomodate someone else's improper implementation. You end up with a legacy system that often produces unexpected results when something out of the ordinary occurs (I remember one morning when people were being credited several billion dollars to their account after returning something to a store).
As far as auditors or regulators plugging the holes, fat chance. Regulators are more concerned about transaction fees being present on the front of ATMs and the taxability of the transactions that occur. The auditors only know what the engineers tell them since they are usually not engineers or marginal ones at best. The auditors are primarily interested in the paperwork trail left behind from production code installs. If the paperwork looks good they're happy. Mind you that as far as the auditors are concerned, good looking paper work means that it exists. They do not look for proof of testing other than a signature, in other words no supporting documentation showing the before and after effects of the change are required to be documented. Furthermore no regression test is required to show that nobody piggybacked malicious code on the issue. In otherwords the auditors just smile nicely if you hand them a big stack of papers.
Ultimately, the EFT idustry is filled with dinosaurs, people that talk about how funny it was when they used punch cards or learned some obscure language in college that hasn't been used in decades. When I left the industry 4-5 years ago, there were people that still used their PCs as dumb terminals because they didn't understand the whole personal computer thing (I'm REALLY not joking).
So as far as Windows being used on ATMs, they are going to do as they've done in the past. They will build the machine but instead of putting OS/2 on it, they'll install windows on it. They will rely on the same security they always have, and why shouldn't they? It's served them well for 30 years.
-- Button up, your ignorance is showing
Device Estonian folks used was actually quite sophisticated. I saw short clip of it on YLE News on TV back then. From later news transmission that part where electronics and construction of device were shown was removed and on the one time they showed it some police came and moved device away from cameras. Guess cops said you're not allowed to show that on TV.
These are facts:
Device had card reader. It was placed on front of real card slot so when you inserted card magnetic stripe was read.
People who's cards got copied said it was difficult to get card out from ATM machine. This was because after transaction ejected card was partially blocked by extra reader device those guys installed.
Keypad had kinda sticks on bottom so when you pushed number on spying keyboard it pushed real button under it at the same time. Electronics connected to fake keyboard recorded your PIN and saved it to NVRAM among content of magnetic stripe it just read as well.
Card reader was connected to keypad module that had most of electronics using cable. Cable was covered with square plastic housing to keep it less obvious what was going on.
Since you got your money from ATM no-one suspected anything fishy until day or two later when your bank account was empty.
Crooks were waiting on nearby car. After some
time they went to ATM and removed their device.
Ok, those were facts. There were some claims that device had also WLAN or some other wireless connectivity so card numbers and PIN codes would have been transferred to crooks realtime. However I think that's just rumour.
Device had factory made looking PCB inside. Probably some SBC development thingy.
If there's someone with Helsingin Sanomat archive access you could probably find more details from there. HS is Finnish newspaper so that part was for finnish readers.