Remote Root Exploit In lsh
skookum writes "After last week's OpenSSH patch-fest, a lot of people suggested GNU lsh as a replacement. Unfortunately, it seems that the lsh team has recently discovered a heap overflow bug of their own that can lead to compromise. An exploit was posted to BugTraq two days ago. Happy patching."
I find it entertaining that the GNU zealot hippies suggest lsh as a replacement. That's like suggesting that the HURD is a replacement for the Linux kernel. Always trying to one-up the *BSD people by making something "more free", but never living up to the hype.
BTW, *who* uses lsh????
Nothing is 100% secure, nothing is flawless, all operating systems are imperfect pieces of junk we're lucky to have running in the first place.
"Sufferin' succotash."
I am switching to a vendor, who takes security seriously. Enough of this patching crap.
Between MS worms, SSH, and this I am throwing down my keyboard...
Oh wait is that a new slashdot article?
I might be able to get first post...
We have a GNU ordained version of the SSH protocols when OpenSSH is doing a fantastic job?
Even if you are going to argue the BSD vs. GPL license issue, the lsh devs could have just taken the OpenSSH code, made some slight changes, and re-released it under the GPL.
So again I ask: Why?
I was going to repeat "switch to Telnet joke" that I made last time, but I just can't get up will this time. These bugs are killing us. I seriously think that we need to take some time to consider how Open Source projects do security. The "more eyes" mantra doesn't cut it. We need security models, standards, testing, and god knows what else. We need to look at which projects have been successful, and which have been miserable security failures. I know the open source community can do a lot better.
All the people that were saying that the lsh code just 'looked' better than the OpenSSH code, a word of advice: looks don't mean jack or shit.
I don't know much about the development process of lsh, but I'm betting it doesn't do any security audits like OpenSSH does.
Okay, there's a hole here, that's definitely bad. Still it would be nice if lsh could manage to gain some share of the ssh market. It has worried me for a while that OpenSSH has become the standard, which, unfortunately, creates a monoculture. A monoculture of ssh implementations is as vulnerable to massive infection as a monculture of windows boxes (okay, maybe windows has more holes, but its the massive part I'm concerned with).
If the market on ssh implementations was a little more split, it would be a little more difficult to write a worm that could wreak utter havoc. Repeat after me: Monoculture is bad.
Jedidiah.
Craft Beer Programming T-shirts
But unfortunately we don't seem to have made that much progress, despite the reasonably large number of development tools we have that address such issues (including anything from memory debuggers to string libraries). I mean, really ... people are still writing these things in C ... in the 21st century! I'm a big fan of picking the right tool for the job, but I think it should be clear by now that C isn't the right tool for writing secure software. There are simply too many ways to screw up.
I think it's time we started writing system software (that is, software which provides services but which runs as a process under the OS) in a language which doesn't have these problems. And if a suitable language is unavailable, that argues strongly for creating that language.
You might still have to worry about buffer overflow exploits against the kernel, but that's a much more manageable problem.
Use 'slashdot stuff' in the subject line in any email you send me if you want to get past the spam filter.
Does there exist a good replacement for C? Obviously, things aren't getting any better even though most programmers are aware of and try to avoid various types of typical C problems like buffer overflows, "off by one" errors, "double free" errors, fmt string vulnerabilities, etc. This language should be reserved for low level programming tasks like OS and compiler development only. For other tasks we need an efficient, portable language with automatic memory management, easy string handling, and object oriented facilities. For efficiency reasons, I think that Java or scripting languages like Pythnon are not a good replacement for C. What other alternatives are out there?
I am even more glad than ever that I use telnet!
"Smoking helps you lose weight - one lung at a time" -- A. E. Neumann
I remember reading the alert for the OpenSSH bug, where one of the options listed was to upgrade to lsh - not "change to", "try using", or anything of the sort, but "upgrade" - and I thought then that that demonstrated an unnecessarily... high-horse-y attitude. I'll bet they regret saying that now... . Humility really IS the best policy.
Warning. The preceeding has been detected by Slashdot to contain sarcasm. OpenBSD is, of course, wonderful. Unlike those commies using FreeBSD.
--The Management
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity." -- Hanlon's Razor
The number of users of lsh today is immaterial to the question of justification for the lsh team's efforts, really. Ssh is critical stuff to have.. we have alternatives in mail transport servers, ftp servers and clients, web servers, programming languages.. why in the world not for free ssh implementations?
- jon
Ganymede, a GPL'ed metadirectory for UNIX
Serves those smug bastards right who were gloating the other day about how they use lsh and how it is so much better than OpenSSH. Hoist by their own petard, so it seems.
I _never_ gloat about running different software to $COMPROMISED_SW of the day. Just because I run exim, I don't think I'm magically more secure than a sendmail user. Exim users must keep up with the patches as well. Same goes for qmail. If you sit there smugly saying how superior your piece of software is, you're going to get bitten in the ass sooner or later, or at least end up looking very silly after all the gloating to find you're vulnerable too.
Dudes, doesn't matter what you run: don't gloat about it - be paranoid about the security of what you run, and keep up with the patches.
Oolite: Elite-like game. For Mac, Linux and Windows
When lsh was started, OpenSSH didn't exist. The original SSH was free till version 1.2.12, but was then put under a more restrictive licence. The licence on ssh version 2 was more restrictive still (I think it wasn't even free-as-in-beer). lsh was intended to be a Free, Open-Source replacement to ssh.
Then the OpenBSD people took the old, free 1.2.12 version of ssh, fixed all the known bugs which had accumulated since that release and updated it with the new features in the SSH protocol. This is OpenSSH.
perl -e 'fork||print for split//,"hahahaha"'
Thought this is rather old news I never thought that anyone else could do an ssh application better then the one the openbsd team could bring out. I'm confident that they do their best and look thru the code very carefully and still this kind of things happen.
I find it strange that there never seems to be an end of the openssh, apache, php, sendmail and mysql vulnerabilities. I suppose it's just damn hard to write secure code all the time. I blame the C language a little for this, should you really have to be this careful all the time? Do you really have to reinvent the wheel every single time?
Imho c is just something you should use because the application you are editing already uses it or the teacher has told you so. There are lots of better languages out there. Can't understand all the complains on java for example.
Does anyone have some suggestions about libraries, special functions, compiler mods and so on which make C programs a little more secure? Any suggestions of other languages which is available for different platforms but more secure and with less reinventing of the wheel all the time? The ones which come to my mind are as I said java and scripting languages like python, ruby and so on. But there got to be atleast one which isn't interpreted?
Suggestions are more than welcome.
You can easily find information on how to avoid buffer overflows, such as in this article.
However, the developers in the lsh project (for example) do not appear to have given this subject much thought. In the lsh manual, the chapter on Threats silently assumes the software works as designed. It does not mention protection against exploits such as buffer overflows.
And the coding standards outlined in the lsh hacking guide are targeted at avoiding breakage by the programmers, not by outside attackers.
Projects developing exploit-sensitive software should implement proper measures to avoid buffer overflows. As long as this is done, C may still be the appropriate language for such projects.
It is interesting to see the types of holes that have been found in OpenSSH to date - these are *far* beyond typical buffer overrun problems that some other software projects suffer. Because of its popularity, it has become an attractive target and thus something of proving ground for new attack methods - int overflows, malloc corruption / free() exploits. OpenSSH is getting the bugs slowly beaten out of it.
Nobody ever claimed it would be.
However I've personally experienced that many systems are more secure than others. Almost all security problems on Unix didn't affect me (like this, BTW. This is actually the first time I've ever heard about lsh) and often were hyped up. In the meantime I get tens of Windows-Virus-mails and attemted IIS infections per day.
The true conclusion:
Windows is like a 50 year old car without safety belts, Unix is like a modern Volvo with safety belts and airbags.
Neither car is "flawless" and you can die in the Volvo too.
Do you honestly think that the kind of people that would want to use such an exploit would actually learn about it from slashdot? Don't you think they'd know how to find the BugTraq archives themselves?
Do you honestly think that by pretending that an exploit doesn't exist you're any safer? Do you think you will patch your systems (and urge your supervisors to grant you the priority to patch those systems) faster knowing that an exploit is easily available? Do you not agree that it doesn't matter whether you feel good or bad about the situation, what matters is how fast and to what extent all vulnerable systems are patched? Do you not think that knowing of an exploit helps that goal?
There's always Dropbear, which seems fairly small and useful, and does SSH2.
Mmmmm. monoculturelicious.