Entire NASA Safety Board Resigns

identity0 writes "All nine members and two consultants of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have resigned today, reports CNN. The Panel was responsible for advising NASA on the safety of its spacecraft and facilities, and was set up in 1967 following the Apollo 1 fire. Recently, it had been criticized by the Congressional investigation into the Columbia accident. Here is the NASA press release, and the official home page of the ASAP."

Comments

Hmmm

[krist0]

I dont like it when people cock up and then resign....i always feel that they should stay and fix the mess they created....

well, kinda hard with the shuttle and all, but you get my drift...

Re:Hmmm

[rekkanoryo]

You have to consider something though. What if these people aren't capable of cleaning up their mess--what if they screwed it up so bad they can't possibly fix it? It's not entirely impossible to do, after all.

Re:Hmmm

[sahrss]

What if they were not *allowed* to do their job well? That's a good reason to resign as a group, if management won't let you do your job...

Re:Hmmm

[fireduck]

I see it the other way.

Their resigning makes the statement that "we failed in our mission. we take responsibility. we're now going to step aside so that you can implement new policies with a new safety board."

Re:Hmmm

[kevinank]

Reading through the accident report, it appears that the current head of the safety group did resign a couple of years ago over safety concerns after NASA decided to start outsourcing more of its basic operations without adequate secondary checks. (He had been a NASA project manager, and after his resignation in protest, he was rehired to head up the safety group.)

I'm not sure it was clear to the safety personnel that they were doing a bad job. Rather it seems from the description as though the whole internal structure of NASA was constructed so as to give the safety office as little independence and influence as possible. Within that structure it is hard to imagine anyone I know being able to perform a truly critical review of decisions. NASA culture was so steeped in the assumption that safety came first, that no one was given the opportunity to take an objective and systemic look at the integrated system risks.

No one had authority to look at the forest, everyone was forced to inspect the individual trees. By getting bogged down in detail, NASA was incorrectly convinced that the thousands of safety procedures they followed protected them from an anomaly that didn't concern the guys responsible for that subsystem.

reorganization?

[zonx lebaam]

A resignation letter that says "we have a lot of hard work in front of us"? Perhaps they aren't resigning from their jobs but merely from the board. Perhaps when the reorganization takes place they will return to doing exactly what they were doing before? This article seems to be saying something that you've got to read between the lines.

NASA: "Need Another Seven Astronauts"

[Anonymous Coward]

Shortly after the Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986, a sick "joke" started circulating. NASA was reported to mean, "Need Another Seven Astronauts."

Unfortunately, as news reports come in about disregard for safety for Shuttle Columbia, it appears that such "joke" has a major element of truth. NASA bureaucrats (and probably politicians up to and including at the White House, as well) disregarded Morton Thiokol engineers in 1986, and we're now hearing that engineers warned NASA officials and the President prior to Columbia's launch that the Shuttle system itself was prone to such a disaster as witnessed yesterday. We know that Columbia was hit with "something" ("foam" or more likely, ice) during its launch on January 16th, and apparently, officials didn't take it seriously enough (Cain slew Abel; did Leroy Cain slay Columbia?). The excuse that "Columbia's crew was doomed from the start because they couldn't make repairs" is both silly and illustrates the current "can't do" attitude of today's NASA, which is far different than the NASA which both put humans on the Moon AND safely returned a crew to Earth after Apollo 13 had a "major malfunction" way up there.

For NASA's bureaucrats (and some politicians), it appears that risking astronauts' lives, NOT for the "unknown variables," but for glamour, expediency, and selfishness, is "acceptable." Perhaps this is to be expected in today's America where "style" and "appearance" are far more valued than substance and tangibility.

The "joke" way back in 1986, "N.A.S.A. = Need Another Seven Astronauts," has tragically turned out to be 2003's reality.

Re:NASA: "Need Another Seven Astronauts"

[Anonymous Coward]

The excuse that "Columbia's crew was doomed from the start because they couldn't make repairs" is both silly and illustrates the current "can't do" attitude of today's NASA, which is far different than the NASA which both put humans on the Moon AND safely returned a crew to Earth after Apollo 13 had a "major malfunction" way up there.

Apollo 13 lost one of the spacecraft, but they were fortunate to still have the one with the heat shielding to use for reentry. The "can do" attitude would not have saved them if they lost their heat shielding like Columbia did. Unless, of course, you have a solution for the apparent silly excuse of not being able to fix the shielding on the wing edge that you have been keeping to yourself.

Remember also that the "can do" NASA lost three on the launch pad (Apollo 1: Grissom, White, and Chaffee), and six others in aircraft training accidents (Freeman, 1964; Bassett, 1966; See, 1966; and Williams, Lawrence, and Adams, 1967).

Re:NASA: "Need Another Seven Astronauts"

[applemasker]

No one knew about the foam impact in realtime during the shuttle's 8-minute ascent seqeuence. It wasn't seen until the next day when engineers were reviewing post-launch film. At that point, the shuttle was in orbit. There was no data available at the time of ascent (though some was later found in the form of sensor readings from the left wing that suggested the foam strike) warranting an abort.

Second, Columbia had two EVA suits onboard as all shuttles do. The suits are a moot point unless you can get another shuttle up there in time.

As pointed out in the CAIB report, if NASA had concluded early in the mission that Columbia was mortally damaged, there was a possibility that Atlantis (which had already been mated to its ET/SRB stack in anticipation of an upcoming mission) could be launched before consumables aboard Columbia ran out. Once in proximity, the Columbia crew, using the two EVA suits and others brought by Atlantis, could have been transferred to Atlantis. Columbia would have (presumably) been de-orbited ito the ocean or brought down on autopilot (unlikely).

Also as CAIB noted, there was PLENTY that could have been done, aside from as one engineer said, "crossing our fingers and hoping for the best." None of it was ever done, however, becuase NASA managers failed to appreciate the possibility of damage to the thermal protection system. Even if it was detected and Atlantis couldn't be launched in time, there were ideas to stuff all sorts of junk (like water-filled bags which would freeze prior to reentry) into the breach in an attempt to fortify the structure just enough to allow for re-entry and bailout (the shuttle needs to be subsonic and in level flight for bailout), even if a landing would be impossible.

As it is, the wing held together (rather impressively) through most of re-entry and the computers worked like mad to compensate for the asymmetrical drag. Eventually, however, the wing's deformity induced yaw forces that the control surfaces and steering rockets could not compensate for - when Columbia lost this tug of war, the left wing dropped, the nose swung hard to the left (relative to the path of travel) in a "skid" -all adding up to a very bad day at hypersonic speeds.

To say that there was "nothing" NASA could have done (had they appreciated the extent of the damage) is just not true.

Looks Like NASA Admin. O'Keefe Engineered This

[Anonymous Coward]

Reading between the lines, it looks like NASA Chief Administrator Sean O'Keefe fired the safety board because it was ineffective at stopping him and his management team from crushing attempts by engineers to put safety first, amd now he's making the safety board the fall guys in the Columbia Tragedy.

This from the guy who, barely hours after the accident, with astronauts' bodies still smoldering in half a dozen states, announced that he was forming an "independent" review board, under his terms, subject to his time frame, and under his budget control.

When Congress talks about the "NASA Culture", the finger is clearly pointing in his direction. O'Keefe should have resigned ages ago.

Re:Looks Like NASA Admin. O'Keefe Engineered This

[DerekLyons]

When Congress talks about the "NASA Culture", the finger is clearly pointing in his direction. O'Keefe should have resigned ages ago.

Right. A guy that's barely been in office two years is responsible for things whose roots stretch back over a decade.

Can you 'knee-jerk'?

Will it do any good ?

[Crashmarik]

Safety officers in general are expected to make hard decisions and take hard and unpopular stands, theyre not supposed to coast through their tenure hoping nothing bad happens. That said you have to ask will this do any good.

The report on the shuttle disaster cited cultural problems at NASA. I don't see how changing 9 faces at the top will change the culture. What NASA could probably use isn't just a few sacrificial lambs at the top but someone to go through the agency and decimate its ranks. This is a life and death matter for the people that ride pillars of fire into the sky, it should be for those on the ground as well.

challenger statistics

[morcheeba]

The Morton Thiokol presentations regarding the O-rings were utter crap. Edward Tufte has an excellent deconstruction of their major slides, and shows how little information they contiained. He redrew the graphs, and showed that it was almost certain that the rings would fail at the Challenger's launch temperature.

The link I gave is just a summary & leaves out some parts - the original graph was organized by serial number, not launch temperature, and is filled with cutesy pictures of rockets (chartjunk in Tufte terminology). The new graph shows temperature vs. problems-found-on-recovered-orings. The Challengetr's launch temperature, 40 degrees F, is highlighted at the left of the graph, showing how different this one was versus all others.

The book has a much better presentation, and it's an excellent excellent book. This example is something that I think back to when I make any presentation ... a good chart could have saved lives.

Pass the parcel

[Nyphur]

NASA have been playing pass the parcel with the blame for a while, referring accident reports and probability assessments of things going wrong from one committee, to a sub-committee to the next committee and to independant researchers in order to try to prove that their incompetance was not the cause of any wrongdoings. So far, their attempts to blame the government of the USA for causing safety problems by underfunding the project and pressing for results too soon, just so that they could have something to their name (much like the first man on the moon thing) have failed. The US Government will never accept that they were the cause of any safety issues, directly or indirectly, and I can say with complete certainty that the citizens of that huge country won't see how underfunding and budget cuts can lead to problems with safety.

"Safety First, as it seems," applies only when it's affordable to do so.

They need to make sure that word gets around that a certain believable group of people to take the blame, and of course, having exhausted all other options and O'Keefe wanting to keep his nice highly paid job, there was but one option... Go back and admit that it was their Safety Advisory Council's incompetance which caused the problems in safety. The Council would obviously be reluctant to admit that it was their fault and as such never have, but I belive O'Keefe has used this opportunity to bolster the group into resignation, hinting at the possiblity of them having been the cause. This is further indicated by the fact that strong review is going into the old council's contract and practices.

Of course, the press release only says that they are resigning, not what from. They mya still be employees of NASA but be resigning from their post on the Council in order that after review, perhaps another be set up that is mroe to O'Keefe's liking. Motives, I am unsure of, but it seems that the council did have problems in putting safety before cost consideration of the dafety procedure implementation. Perhaps a new council who are more willing to conisder the issue of safety as of the utmost importance could help, but only after stringent review of the practices, methods and objectives of the old Council.