Diebold Audit Released, BlackBoxVoting.Org Shut Down
Chris Soghoian writes "The State of Maryland requested an audit of the Diebold electronic voting system by SAIC, after a report released by Johns Hopkins University and Rice Researchers (disclaimer: I'm one of Dr Rubin's students) noted several security issues. A condensed, from 200 to 40 pages, and censored version of the report has been released online (PDF link). The report notes that 'SAIC has identified several high-risk vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could have significant impact upon the AccuVote-TS voting system operation.'" However, Diebold says Maryland are moving forward with installation with "new security features" included, and elsewhere, Badgerman points out "Diebold has shut down blackboxvoting.org, apparently with copyright claims made to their ISP. But you can still go to the blackboxvoting.com site."
The Supreme Court is always most willing to hear cases when they involve political speech and voting, and this involves both.
Pending: your vote is now the property of Diebold, Inc. Any attempt on your part to ascertain the disposition of your vote is hereby declared to be in violation of federal law, e.g., the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.
You have the right not to vote. Any vote you make can be used against you in a court of law. The judge presiding in such a court of law may be appointed by Diebold, Inc., and need not require a jury, but if a jury is summoned, it need not be a jury of your peers.
By acting to vote you consent to our determining whether your vote is valid, and in the event it is judged not to be valid, you consent to our voiding your vote and further voiding your right to vote in the future.
You furthermore acknowledge that owing to storage and bandwidth limitations that Diebold, Inc., may experience, your vote may be digitally compressed in a way such that your true intent in casting the vote may be lost. If such an eventuality should occur, your vote may be determined using statistical data derived from any source we deem appropriate or convenient.
You have the right to protest if your vote is cancelled, altered, or in any way modified as the result of such action on our part, however, you hereby acknowledge that in such an eventuality, Diebold, Inc. may determine that your right to vote is deleterious to democracy as implement by Diebold, Inc., and therefore may be considered to be an overt act against the national security of these United States.
You have 10 seconds to comply.
God Bless America.
Is this truly the only Earth I can live on?
Are we going to have to check the bit bucket for hanging bits?
-William
God is everything science has yet to explain.
How else can I add one option at the end of the ballot:
__X__ CowboyNeal
I don't see how anyone will accept electronic voting systems as insecure as this. Diebold should be as open in security vunerabilities as many open source projects are and support full public disclosure along with prompt patching.
This totally need to be crammed down every voting American's throat. Lather, rinse, repeat.
SAIC's independent review states, "While many of the statements made by Mr. Rubin were technically correct, it is clear that Mr. Rubin did not have a complete understanding of the State of Maryland's implementation of the AccuVote-TS voting system...The State of Maryland's procedural controls and general voting environment reduce or eliminate many of the vulnerabilities identified in the Rubin report."
SAIC's report continues, "Rubin states repeatedly that he does not know how the [Diebold] system operates in an election and he further identifies the assumptions that he used to reach his conclusions. In those cases where these assumptions concerning operational or management controls were incorrect, the resultant conclusions were, unsurprisingly, also incorrect."
if implemented properly, could revolutionise governance in general - pity it's being so badly implemented thus far. If voting were faster and cheaper it could be involved more regularly in all manner of decision making processes. I simply cannot believe that someone would implement such a critical system on any Microsoft platform, especially when there's plenty of alternatives out there. QNX comes to mind. Mind you it is no surprise to me that a company who chooses to start behind the 8 ball by making such a poor choice in platforms is subsequently found to show a disregard for security in general ('compromised' servers, serious flaws, etc.). I hope they're enjoying 'whack-a-mole' because you can bet that for every site they manage to take down, 10 others will pop up!
I think most here would agree that electronic voting systems are a waste of time without a physical audit trail, but as far as the public's concerned, hi-tech is better...as long as I have a nice GUI where I can go File>Vote>Undo I'll be happy to click and then shuffle out of the voting booth with a confident but bewildered smile on my face.
She's done a fair amount of research on electronic voting systems.
I bootleg Fizzy Lifting Drinks.
The meme for the 21st Century seems to be "if your product is faulty, abuse IP laws to squash anyone who mentions it", rather than, say, fixing the damn problem.
Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
I wonder how many precincts in CA plan to use the Diebold system, with its well-known cracks, in the upcoming Gubernatorial Recall election.
With a broad field of candidates splitting the vote, and the field-leader taking the race, small margins could easily swing the election - which means a small number of compromised precincts could swing the election.
And with no human-readable audit trail, if you thought the stink over the Florida Presidential results was bad you ain't seen NOTHING yet.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
The problem really stems from the fact that as soon as you mechanize the process, you have essentially hidden it from direct scrutiny (it's almost encapsulated). There is a layer of technical junk between you and the actual results.
And what is worse is the data is physically very sensitive (easy to destroy or tamper with). The fact that the information is drawn from many sources (all across the country), means a lot room for any sort of problem.
Unfortunately, any electronic voting system will probably never be open source. I do not think the government will show that kind of trust.
I think these voting machines may end up forcing recalls, albeit electronically, even though the Supreme Court clearly wants to prevent that kind of precedence (for good reason).
Just read this quote from a Diebold press release that is being refuted on blackboxvoiting.com:
"The thorough system assessment conducted by SAIC verifies that the Diebold voting station provides an unprecedented level of election security." (emphasis mine)
Unfortuantely, in this case, blackboxvoting is quite wrong, and Diebold press release is entirely correct. You see, the word "unprecedented" doesn't necessarily mean "good". It means "without precedent". The level of security offered by these voting machines is most certainly "without precedent".
What has *science* done?!? -- Dr. Weird (ATHF)
See, I mentioned in another post I work right next to Diebold, and its just a tiny ass little company like mine.
I work in the public safety field, we sell integrated dispatching and records systems to cops. I busted my ass working 80 hour weeks for about six months to complete a rewrite of the records system. It worked exactly like it should, it was completely intuitive and followed police procedures to a T.
Then I go out onsite to a client in california, and dipshit politically appointed top cops fuck the whole thing up. They want to book people before they arrest them. (Ie, data is imported into the arrest module from booking, not the other way like it was designed) Put people in jail, then arrest them? wha?
They want to automatically generate bills for false alarms that havent been registered. And send them where? Huh? You call 911 because your neighbours alarm went off, thats the only address I have to work with, so you get a bill.
The dispatchers want to clear calls with F1 so that they dont have to "reach off of the keyboard". They have no problem taking their hands off the keyboard to reach into a fucking bag of cheetos.
Oh and the fucking buzzwords. The bullshit bingo they play. "We want security, does this communicate to the database using RSA?" wtf?
But hey, we gotta eat. Baby gets what baby wants. One day that bungled up gang of keystone cops is going to drop the ball, and blame our systems rather than their own incompetence.
In short, government folks are idiots. I wouldnt be surprised if Diebolds system worked flawlessly before some jackass civil servants got their moronic ideas of how computers should work into it.
Anyhow, as someone who busts his ass off to make the morons in charge of government contractors happy, I cant help but side with Diebold in the end. Ensuring the elections are secure and without fraud is the governments fault, not theirs.
We are f**ked. If a political system is so broken that it can't keep this from getting through then... well...
We are f**ked.
I really am an IT Auditor for a living and this is exactly the kind of work I do (although I mostly work for Utility Companies like water or electricity) and I know how these reports are created. There is HUGE pressure to "build assurance".
What that means is that you find an risk that is not addressed by a suitible control - and try to find a control - something, anything, that you can call a control to cover that risk. That's all fine and good, but what it means is that the risks that actually make it into the report are the really big, bad, completely unaccounted for ones. Put another way, for every risk that gets in, three didn't that a normal person would have thought should have.
Long and short, I write reports like this for a living and this is way, way, way worse than it looks.
OK Dieboldt, do you really think that suing computer scientists will give you any good PR?
Look, your voting software has more holes than swiss cheese. We are willing to help you, but there are some requirements you must follow.
1) your voting machines must have a printer attached
2) the votes must be counted electronically, optically, and by humans
3) if the printout doesnt match whats on screen, then remove the machine.
4) the paper ballot is the final record.
Look let the computer science community improve your software. We all want the election to go through in an error-free way. No one wants a florida to happen again.
But, if you fight this tooth and nail, you will have no fiercer enemy. Ignore the Slashdot nation at your own peril
But you can still go to the blackboxvoting.com site.
...until the slashdot effect sets in!
--Xandu
6,000,000,000 people placed type-in votes for an independent candidat known as "I.P. Freely"
"I.C. Weener" of the Cryoget Washington Head party and "Amanda Hugenkiss" tied for second with exactly 42424242 votes apiece.
You can't judge a book by the way it wears its hair.
These techies just trying to make living wouldn't happen to have a few sales people just trying to make a living as well?
These sales people wouldn't, perhaps, have represented the machines as somewhat better than "substandard," now would they?
No, the states aren't forced to buy them, but "just trying to make a living" don't cut it.
How else is the same sentiment sometimes phrased? Oh, yeah.
"A girl's got to make living."
KFG
With all the problems with electronic voting, punch-card voting, hanging chads etc, why even use machines for vote counting? Why not just have paper and pencil and hand-count?
Federal elections in Australia with a population of 20 million are run this way with no problem.
Before you say, "but America has many more voters", well, they can also have many more vote counters.
...we're screwed. I mean all kinds of screwed.
Not just "they messed up my vote" screwed, but entire-election-results-legitimately-contested screwed.
The problem is that they're raising the margin of error by an unknowable amount. No matter which party wins in the 2004 Presidential election, the loser will easily be able to argue that the voting system was highly flawed and vulnerable to foul play. It will be a replay of 2000, except worse.
Using a system that's known to be insecure for national elections... it's just a guaranteed disaster. We'll have another election settled in court, and the populace of the U.S. will become even more polarized.
Yeah, you could have...just before this article went up!
For the elections to be so obviously and openly rigged is to make sure that there is no dissenting opinion available. The Communists and Facists regularly skewed and falsified election results to prevent anyone from actually challenging their methods and agendas. Which, I might remind you all, was mass murder, wholesale pilliaging of national treasuries and imprisonment of dissedents. Fact is, Americans already have accepted the Fascist philosophy now being touted as "patriotism". Call me a nut, but thats what we are looking at. If Bush wins, I will consider this to be the end of the United States, and I will make serious efforts to leave the country. It would no longer be worth my time, effort or loyalty if the Fascists win another election.
And these men ARE fascists people, in every sense of the word. You think there would be any "open source" after that? This administration has already made little noises about Linux and BSD being "hackers" operating systems, there have been several years worth of propaganda about "freeware" being something only criminals use to steal and sabotage. You can damn well bet that it would be outlawed, or at least, brought under private control of some sort where it would be rigidly controlled.
Can you say heil SCO? Whether or not they actually have a claim, which they don't, it would only take a few lines of obscure law written into some other peice of legislation to change all that. It would be nothing for the fascists to declare something to be criminal or subversive and use that as an excuse for a major crackdown on the information industry.
But nobody really cares, as long as they can have their Hummers and Porches and Rolex watches.
Stupid Humans.....
The idea of EVM2003 is to create Free Software voting machine, and to implement machines that also produce voter-verifiable paper trails (i.e. visually readable printed ballots). We will do a number of security things right, where the commercial companies have done them wrong... they have aimed for "security through obscurity" or "just trust us." As well, part of our requirement is to have fully blind-accessible voting that maintains complete anonymity.
Anyway, I (David Mertz) have taken over as Developer Lead recently, and am trying to move the development of the demo along.
Feel free to contact me--the standard ballot system (in the demo version at least) is being done in wxPython; but conceivably we would choose other languages/technologies for bar-code reading, printing, blind-voting, etc. (my preference is to use Python though, for consistency and rapid development).
Buy Text Processing in Python
I've been researching this stuff for three years now.
.htm
VERY scary shit.
About Diebold:
http://www.bartcop.com/diebold.htm
About ES&S:
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0131-01.htm
A Diebold machine is hacked, step-by-step and an election rigged here:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00064
Congressman Rush Holt's bill:
http://holt.house.gov/display2.cfm?id=6282&type=Ho me
Contact your Congressman here:
http://action.eff.org/action/index.asp?step=2&item =2754
A personal letter from Bev Harris I just received:
I like what I'm hearing. I'm not decided on what to do, but as far as mobilizing thousands, we need mirrors on the memos, and here is an update you may find interesting.
Please, send, tell or distribute this as widely as possible, including to blogs, your email list, and the media:
An update from Bev at Black Box Voting: Diebold, of course, demanded shut down of http://www.blackboxvoting.org (see London Inquirer article, "Diebold takes down blackboxvoting.org" http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=11743 ) because we published a link to another web site. More on this here http://www.blackboxvoting.com , and you'll find the letter from the Diebold attorney http://www.thoughtcrimes.org here -- and for a small hoot, please notice that the letter, which is not copyrighted, INCLUDES THE LINK (three times) which they object to, and therefore republishing the letter telling people not to publish the link actually serves to publish the link. We're working on replacing the site.
Here's what I've been doing for two days now:
REPORTER: Why is Diebold sending cease and desists?
ME: Because they don't want anyone to see their memos
REPORTER: Oh. What is in the memos?
ME: Oh, admissions by their top programmers about security flaws and using uncertified software and using cell phones to intercept and transfer votes and discussions of how to fake things...
REPORTER: Wow. Where can I download these?
ME: At this web site http://211.117.160.48:8000/s/lists/index.html or this web site
http://www.smashthetrifecta.com/diebold-memos-1.ht m
REPORTER: Okay I'm going there now, okay, it's downloading, when I'm done will you give me a guided tour?
ME: Sure. And also, go to this article for an easy-to-read primer: http://salon.com/tech/feature/2003/09/23/bev_harri s/index.html and also, here is a neat little web page
http://new.globalfreepress.com/mnogosearch/search. cgi
where you just enter any search term and it instantly searches and find you the Diebold memos that match
REPORTER: What search terms should I start with?
ME: Try "boogie man" and also "hack" "cel phone" "broken" "fake" "vaporware" and one of my personal favorites, "King County is famous for it" (I live in King County)
REPORTER: Here's one: "What good are rules" -- Gosh, what is he doing? Is that legal?
ME: No. And so it goes. Excellent plan, Diebold. Yes, shut down a web site, that'll help. Besides reporters, the memos have now been downloaded by the U.S. House of Representatives.
Postscript: Today, the SAIC report came out evaluating Diebold. It summarizes: FAILURE TO MEET THE MINIMUM STANDARDS SET FORTH BY THE STATE OF MARYLAND Information Security Policy and Standards indicates that the system is vulnerable to exploitation. The results of a successful attack could result in voting results being released too soon, altered, or destroyed. The impact of exploitation could lead to a failure of the elections process by failing to elect to office, or decide in a ballot measure, according to the will of the people. The impact could be a loss of voter confidence, embarrassment to the State, or release of incomplete or inaccurate election results
That's what the lack of a human-readable audit trail avoids: those pesky "ballots" that people might want to recheck for accuracy. The Diebold systems might not be any better than hanging chads, but you can be sure they'll seem better because there won't be any way to remeasure the results and get a different number.
The postal service has to deal with incomprehensible writing thousands of times every day and seems to do a pretty good job of it. With a little practice, unless you're perhaps a doctor in a hurry, it's not an issue. This is because we have good pattern recognition algorithms in our brains and can usually decipher poor handwriting to get the point. More so if we have lots of experience doing it.
Er, well, you used to be able to. Not anymore, now that Slashdot got its teeth into it.
"Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one " -Albert Einstein
Let's say we got a secure electronic voting system working that people could use over the internet, maybe it mapped to your social or something. Well, now you don't have to wait till election day to vote on stuff. Should we go to war? Let's vote on it. Should we raise taxes? Let's vote on it. It could pave the way for something that has never happened before in history -- a true rule by the people.
c-hack.com |
In Oklahoma, they use paper cards. There is a broken line with each of the canidate choices. You complete the line to make your selection. THe ink is magnetic, and you put it in the reader and it counts it electronically. It works quite well, is nearly fail safe, and is fast. I don't know why more states don't do something similar. Its kinda like best of both..
And the report itself continues:
A system where votes were printed to a machine-readable piece of paper, verified by the voter, then deposited in a secure box, would be simple and secure. By printing votes you create a self-verifying system -- voters can check their vote is correct, and an audit can easily verify that votes were recorded as voters intended. Management of the printed records would be just like the ballots we already are using, but without the reliability problems of punch-card systems. Tallying could be done mechanically, as a barcode could accompany the printed text.
The whole system is very simple. Even if they just used an ATM style of security (printing to an internal paper log) they would be far superior to Diebold. But using logic is difficult in this case, because Diebold is clearly making absurd claims, and it's difficult to refute absurdity.
EVM 2003 is trying to create a complete open source voting system (not just machine). I wish them the best of luck. This is more than just philosophy about copyright and IP, it's the defense of democracy from those that want very much to take away even the slight accountability that currently exists. They've already made it into office with one fraudulent election (2000), and very possibly kept control of congress with another (2002, with many states being won with unverifiable votes that didn't match up with predicted results).
So is that how you explain your Republican governor?
I know this because Tyler knows this.
In that case, they may as well make an amandment:
We the corporations of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Profit, establish monopoly, insure domestic compliance, provide for the common interest, promote our welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
[it's a joke people]
--
Error 500: Internal sig error
A number of CA counties use the touch screen machines, but the big holes are on the servers, not the voting machines. Those who use OCR ballots are also just as vulnerable because the back-end servers are the same.
There was an article on the Blackboxvoting.com site about how time stamps on files found on the Diebold FTP site indicate that Diebold downloaded vote counts DURING an election in Santa Barbara (??) county. For those who are unaware, it is against the law to count votes before the polls close.
So... part of the evidence suggests that employees of Diebold BROKE THE LAW by counting votes before the polls closed. No wonder Diebold wants to keep things secret.
So... this brings up a question. If I obtain a document indicating that a company broke the law, can that document be suppressed by saying it's copy righted? If so, that's a BIG problem.
What's amusing is that these companies could make more money selling voting machines with printers attached than they do with their current line.
Printers are cheap and totally NOT the issue. How much does a couple of thousand printers cost? A million bucks with a fat markup? Chicken feed for these people.
They will make a heck of a lot more money by rigging elections and putting people in office who will perpetuate the scam. Diebold also sells a lot more things to the government than voting machines.
The president of Diebold has personally promised to deliver the state of Ohio to Bush in 2004. If that's not conflict of interest, I don't know what is...
Oh... and the other voting machine company -- partly owned by Sen. Chuck Hagel, another prominent Republican.
Conflict of interest? Noooooo....
Great, I live in Alameda County, CA where I remember Diebold machines being used in the last election. Now we have the recall coming up, so I guess we will just have to have some kind of blind faith that our votes are counting. I suppose if the results are other than to be expected from this more liberal area, it will raise some eyebrows.
The horrible thing is, that this is really far below the general public's radar. I find it extremely amusing that we had a court battle over how reliable punch cards are, when electronic voting may be far worse.
The problem is that the general public is very computer illiterate, and have been pretty much been conditioned to accept bugs and viruses as normal. At the same time, strangely, computers seem to be viewed as infallible.
It is very importaint for Democracy that people are able to be able to see and verify that their votes are counted.
My previous experience with the Diebold machines left me more puzzled than anything. Where was my vote counted, on the card that I put in the machine, in the machine itself, or both? Were the votes transmitted via phone, wireless, or physically transported to a centeral location? I don't know for sure, and I'm sure regular people off the street were more puzzled. Then again, maybe the thought never crossed their mind.
Now hackers can use this to get rid of Bush and put in whoever is willing to part ways with the DMCA and the Patriot act.
Faux News election night:
"And the results are in for the popular election, Jane"
"75 million votes for..wait.. who the fuck is Lawrence Lessig?"
"I would say he's our new President, Steve."
Diebold makes (at least) two systems: AccuVote-TS (touch screen) and AccuVote-OS (Optical Scan).
I live in Boston, where we had a City Council primary yesterday. Boston has just switched to the AccuVote-OS system. Here's how that system worked:
I voted on a PAPER BALLOT by shading an oval with a black marker (any color but red will do). Then I fed my ballot into a box about the size of a personal laser printer, which (presumably) scanned it immediately and kept it. The box had what looked like a modem cord hanging out of one side.
I am NOT comfortable having my vote disappear into a system driven by code that is not available for public scrutiny. But I feel better about this than about the touch-screen Diebold system being discussed by most of these posts, because it uses paper ballots that could be re-counted if necessary.
The memos were sent to me by an insider, and I just got them 2 1/2 weeks ago.
This is important, because one is similar to software piracy (though debatable, because they are under some obligation to protect things if they want to call them trade secrets, and no one in their right mind would want to pirate this system, called "junk shit" by their own technicians, to resell it.
The memos, though, are just internal communications that were leaked, and once leaked and public, which they certainly are by now, when used only for fair use reasons in the public interest, the legal issues are quite different.
and you'll be happy to know they can do this by land line modem, wireless modem or cell phone.
The reports deal strictly with the flaws in the current electronic voting system. I know for a fact that there is no operating system that cannot be hacked in one way or another. With that in mind, one needs to remember that there are external systems that can help secure. Examples of these are using firewalls and access lists on standard computer networks. There are several things that need to be taken into account when it comes to security. 1. Security at the user interface. (sitting at the machine) 2. Ability to access the machine remotely. 3. Transmission medium. 4. Level of encryption used. Security at the user interface should be a relative easy fix. Ability to access the machines remotely can also be fixed easily. All it takes is using a dedicated fiber backbone, or using encrypted channels. Transmission medium must be considered in conjuntion with the second and fourth point of consideration. The last is where my personal expierence comes into play. I know of no cellular phones that use 128bit encryption. I also know that it takes a long time for a very strong computer (read a beowulf cluster) to crack a good encryption algorithim. Using something like double encryption with different size keys goes a long way. Pair that with using multiplexed signals and you have gone further. You can label me a troll all you wish. Hell I don't care. I do know that I can use proper security measures and secure any os from the outside. I could even do this over wifi (wouldnt want to do to bandwidth considerations though). I agree that a paper print out would be a good additional step, but you can rest assured that if someone really wants to protect this data, it can and will be no matter what the limitations of the actual voting machines limitations are. Dont believe me, email me. Alan.Dike@us.army.mil
Stop signs are only Suggestions
"in August, the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that Walden O'Dell, the CEO of Diebold, is a major fundraiser for President Bush. In a letter to fellow Republicans, O'Dell said that he was "COMMITTED TO HELPING OHIO DELIVER ITS ELECTORAL VOTES TO THE PRESIDENT NEXT YEAR."
The internal memos from Diebold (they get referred to from Salon) show a shockingly cavalier chief engineer 'managing' the security concerns of various clients, steadily resisting the idea of even password protecting the .mdb file (.mdb file!?!) so that just anyone couldn't overwrite audit logs. Nothing overtly political in those memos, though, thank God.
Still -- how does it affect the credibility of any (new, or old) voting system for the people overseeing it to be acknowledged partisans? Imagine a Florida 2000 in which there were no physical records, and in which the systems that counted votes were frighteningly insecure and had been programmed by a company headed by a partisan figure. We already had more than enough partisan elements there -- the brother who happens to be governor, the Supreme Court justice who has a wife on Bush's transition team, the different standards for counting absentee ballots in different counties, and so on.
The thing about those memos is, they really show the states to be one more relatively uninformed client of an IT company. They'll buy the FUD of the Diebold person as long as he sounds assured enough, you know? Even when it comes to something as obvious as "I double-clicked the file of votes and it opened with no password, is that bad?" Which is all the more reason to be sure you're dealing with someone who has no conflict of interest, right?
"Fundamentalism" isn't about divine morality. It's about human authority.
I find it very interesting that the State of Maryland redacted almost anything of value from the report that it released. In contrast, the Department of Justice redacted only 1 line from the Carnivore report. The voting report as posted tells very little about what was really found. Perhaps there should be some public call for the unredacted version. Maybe the Baltimore Sun can do a FOIA request.
The SAIC team specifically excluded the procedures for voter identification, registratoin, etc., from their report. That is unfortunate. One of the biggest problems in Maryland is that you can vote without providing any kind of identification. No driver's license, voter registration card, or anything else.
Let's suppose you are a pollster for one of the major parties. You get a list of the registered voters for the other party. You call and ask questions like, "Do you plan to vote?" and "Whom do you plan to vote for?", just like any other poll. However, what you are doing is compiling a list of those that don't plan on voting. You then get a bunch of people to go to the various precincts and vote as those people. If you do it early enough, even if the real person does actually show up, it won't be until after the fakes have already voted for them. You can cast lots of illegal ballots that way. If the real person does show up and is told they have already voted, they can prove their identity and cast a provisional ballot, subject to investigation. If there are only a few of those, it probably won't affect the outcome and there won't be any investigation. If for some reason, there are a lot of those, it will throw the election results into chaos and probably force a new election. The liklihood of anyone getting caught is almost nil because of the lack of identification, surveillence cameras, or anything else that could be used to ensure that only those leagally registered can vote, and then can only vote as themselves.
Hi. My boyfriend (from Rio) told me about the computer voting system they used in Brazil's recent presidential election. Portable machines (with no internet connection) that compliled results & burned to a CD. These CDs were carted (by heavy security) to a central location where the totals were all tallied. (Don't know what software or OS they used for the machines.) From most accounts, the system worked extremely smoothly and was very accurate.