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GnuPG's ElGamal Signing Keys Compromised

KjetilK writes "Werner Koch just sent an announcement saying that there is a severe bug in GnuPG >= 1.0.2 that makes it easy to compromise ElGamal keys used for signing. Note that such keys are not generated by GnuPG's standard setup, and should be relatively rare. Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyring, there were only one such public key (and a few subkeys). There is already a patch available to disable these keys."

144 comments

  1. Conspiracy theory by doktorstop · · Score: 3, Funny

    "Gamal" is translated in Swedish as "old". Those who came out with this name knew how soon it would become obsolete!

    --
    http://www.automatiq.se
    1. Re:Conspiracy theory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Oh dear.. Maybe you should brush up on your language skills.. Old in swedish is "gammal".. Notice the diffrence ??

    2. Re:Conspiracy theory by Chainsaw · · Score: 4, Funny

      Actually, the correct word would be "vanvardat kolli pa aldreboende" if you are to believe recent news.

      --
      War is one of the most horrible things a human can be exposed to. And one of the worlds largest industries.
    3. Re:Conspiracy theory by Tarpan · · Score: 1

      Haha, wish I had kept my moderation points I had earlier today for this :/

    4. Re:Conspiracy theory by adrianbaugh · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "Old" in cryptography is generally good. It takes time for crypto systems to prove themselves in the wild (regardless of how wonderful they might be in practice). Witness the continued popularity of 3DES. I'd much rather use a well-understood 30-year-old algorithm than some young upstart algorithm that may well still have vulnerabilities.

      --
      "'I pass the test,' she said. 'I will diminish, and go into the West, and remain Galadriel.'"
      - JRR Tolkien.
    5. Re:Conspiracy theory by bigberk · · Score: 3, Informative
      I'd much rather use a well-understood 30-year-old algorithm than some young upstart algorithm that may well still have vulnerabilities.
      But when stuff like this happens, you have to tell the difference between a flaw in the algorithm and a flaw in the implementation. Brings to mind MS Crypto and even several OpenSSL vulnerabilities. Doesn't mean SSL is flawed, just means that the implementations screwed up somewhere.
    6. Re:Conspiracy theory by ComaVN · · Score: 1

      Great, Swedish jokes.

      Something about elderly people being treated like neglected packages???

      --
      Be wary of any facts that confirm your opinion.
    7. Re:Conspiracy theory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ahh! The guy from the Lord of the Rings, right?!

    8. Re:Conspiracy theory by 68k+geek · · Score: 2, Interesting

      "Gamal" is translated in Hebrew as "Camel". Wonder what that means... Perl ref?

    9. Re:Conspiracy theory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, that's Gamling, and in Norwegian it means literally "Old man".

    10. Re:Conspiracy theory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      It's amazing to see really ignorant (and crypto-agnostic) people posting snappy comments in prominent places and on stuff that is way beyond their reach.

      Taher El Gamal is the name of the person that came up with the algorithm behind the ElGamal keys.

      If you ever used SSL then you used something else that boiled in Taher El Gamals crypto-pan.

      But I guess that's just beyond the average Inet user these days ...

    11. Re:Conspiracy theory by Skorpion · · Score: 1

      ElGamal in Hebrew means 'camel'. So?

    12. Re:Conspiracy theory by jrockway · · Score: 1

      In spanish, ElGamal means "The Gamal".

      --
      My other car is first.
    13. Re:Conspiracy theory by Skorpion · · Score: 1

      Yeah, but Taher El-Gamal is no Spanish.

  2. You have... by clifgriffin · · Score: 3, Funny

    ..destroyed my trust in the internet and computers! :-(

    *sobs hysterically*

    blogzine | Turkey Smashing Fun

    1. Re:You have... by duncanmacvicar · · Score: 2, Insightful

      we just have to wait now for pleople to start using encryption and signatures... (to have somebody to scare)

  3. Please make the change a COMPILED patch by skrysakj · · Score: 1

    Since I'm too overstuffed with desserts, eaten during their making process, to try do the patching myself.

  4. My key was one of the 850 keys by quigonn · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Fortunately, Werner Koch informed me yesterday already (I got the email at some time in the morning), so I had plenty of time to create a new key, sign it with the old one, and revoke the old one.

    Of course, this had one disadvantage: since the old key is potentially compromised, I cannot really trust in my web of trust anymore. :-/

    --
    A monkey is doing the real work for me.
    1. Re:My key was one of the 850 keys by Jon_MrJR · · Score: 4, Informative
      from the annoucement:

      "According to the keyserver statistics, there are 848 primary ElGamal signing keys which are affected. These are a mere 0.04 percent of all primary keys on the keyservers"

      percentage of slashdot readers among those ? you'd need to specifically want ElGamal (thus know what it is) to prefer it to other algos..

    2. Re:My key was one of the 850 keys by quigonn · · Score: 4, Funny

      Well, I didn't exactly know what it is, I simply chose it because I founded the name pretty cool (don't laugh).

      --
      A monkey is doing the real work for me.
    3. Re:My key was one of the 850 keys by KjetilK · · Score: 1
      Actually, it was a funny coincidence. The keyring I mentioned, is the keyring of public keys of people that are close to me in my web of trust, or that I've bumped into on mailing lists, and therefore decided to download their key to see if I can get a good path, or people who have written software I use, for the same reason. It is not the same as the 848 keys Werner quoted, that's an entirely different set...

      The one key I found belonged to a Debian developer, whose key I signed on a keysigning party this summer. He had apparently not gotten an e-mail from Werner, but he responded to me with a revocation certificate shortly after I sent him a message.

      Yeah, I was really happy it wasn't me, now that I've gathered all those nice signatures on my key...

      --
      Employee of Inrupt, Project Release Manager and Community Manager for Solid
    4. Re:My key was one of the 850 keys by AigariusDebian · · Score: 1

      And the unlucky bastard that lost a key with 150+ signatures and didn't get the official mail is ..... me.

      I actually choose this type of key because I was thinking that it was MORE secure, silly me.

      But it is quite strage that I didn't get the mail as my key is on the public servers. Well, thanks to KjetilK.

    5. Re:My key was one of the 850 keys by God!+Awful+2 · · Score: 1

      Sure, that link states what the ElGamal algorithm is mathematically, but maybe the readers would be more interested in what ElGamal is practically. Basically, it's the hopelessly slow and clumsy people that was once used:

      1. Before DSA was invented, and
      2. When RSA was still patented.

      -a

  5. More information by Vario · · Score: 5, Informative

    You can get more information on the (german) site heise:
    http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/pab-27.11.03-0 00/

    The full advisory from Werner Koch can be found here:
    http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclos ure/2003-q4/2998.html

    It seems that about 800 people are using the compromised keys.

    To check if your key is in danger you have to check the type of the key. All type 20 keys can be compromised. Here is a small shell script to check our key:

    gpg --list-keys --with-colon | awk -F: '($4 == "20") {print $0;}

    If your key is in danger you should create a new one and revoke the old one immediately.

    1. Re:More information by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > To check if your key is in danger you have to check the type of the key.

      Or, if you're being dodgy and the FBI are watching you, sit back and wait for the knock on the door in the night. They'll be checking everything they've got against this, trust me.

    2. Re:More information by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      Missing an apostrophe:
      gpg --list-keys --with-colon | awk -F: '($4 == "20") {print $0;}'

    3. Re:More information by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I love these news!
      It just shows how open source security problems are as severe as those of closed source.

      Had OSS had market share of 90%, tens of thousands of people would be screwed up by now....

  6. Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyring.. by selderrr · · Score: 4, Funny

    woohoo. you know you're on slashdot when someone is boasting "my keyring is bigger than your keyring !"

  7. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    A simple design of the arcaic Russian GOST [64 bits block, 256 bits key] is much better than 3DES (slow redundant DES_inverse(DES)_DES by stupid design)

    open4free

  8. bad signature... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How is one supposed to verify the signature on this announcement. The html formatting screws everything up.

    1. Re:bad signature... by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 1

      Someone decided to munge Werner's announcement in a poorly implemented attempt at stopping spam. You have to change each "foo at example.com" to "foo@example.com". Then the .sig will verify correctly.

  9. Security and Complexity by fmaxwell · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Note that such keys are not generated by GnuPG's standard setup, and should be relatively rare.

    This is a very good example of insecurity through complexity. Increasing the complexity of encryption software through the inclusion of multiple, unnecessary key types is a good way to increase the odds of introducing a bug. If there were only 850 of those keys, then why was that "feature" included?

    This is the same thing that Microsoft does. Drastically increase the complexity of the software beyond what is necessary through the inclusion of unnecessary features and introduce bugs in the process. If this had been "MicrosoftPG" rather than "GnuPG", there would be an outcry on Slashdot about how stupid Microsoft is.

    1. Re:Security and Complexity by black+mariah · · Score: 1, Troll

      The difference being that it would take MS 6 months to release a patch, and even then most sysadmins wouldn't apply it.

      --
      'Standards' in computing only impress those who are impressed by things like 'standards'.
    2. Re:Security and Complexity by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Yes, it is the same thing as MS does, but not the way you put.

      MS has a huge chunk of the market share: When a security flaw is found, the majority of the computers are hit.

      If there were more diversion, we wouldn't have so many problems.

    3. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 1

      I'm not so sure this was an example of that. This was an experimental setting to begin with, and the fact that it is included in the base GPG code doesn't affect the people using the standard settings. As long as the experimental or rarely used code is kept separate from the rest of the program, the only problem is the extra source code you have to download and the extra binary size (if there's no option to #ifdef those sections out).

      Unless of course you choose to use the features which aren't highly tested, of course. Then you're on your own.

    4. Re:Security and Complexity by FattMattP · · Score: 1, Informative
      If there were only 850 of those keys, then why was that "feature" included?
      There wern't 850 of those keys. The poster was stating that he has 850 total keys on his personal keyring. Only one of them was of the type we're discussing. This one person's keyring isn't an indication of how many of those types of keys exist on all keyrings worldwide.
      --
      Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
    5. Re:Security and Complexity by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Wrong. This has nothing to do with complexity, but with choise. It is good that there are alternatives to choose from. If there is only one option, one bug will affect everything and everybody. So having a choise is good.

      It would have been increased complexity when all options have dependencies. One failure would be more probable and bring the whole system down.

      To answer your question: it's nice to have a choise. Now there is redundancy in the system.

      And yes, we would all have picked on MS. That is just because they are disliked. That's mainly because of their business practices, but also 'cause working with their stuff is always annoying.

    6. Re:Security and Complexity by smcv · · Score: 5, Informative

      The fact that it was there in the first place was a workaround for stupid legal issues - at the time GnuPG development started, the author wasn't sure whether DSA signatures were patented, so he allowed El Gamal keys to be used for signatures as well as encryption. It turned out DSA signatures were OK, and the default for all recent versions is to use DSA signatures with El Gamal for encryption.

      The other available key types (RSA+RSA, DSA+El Gamal) are there for interoperability; I think the consensus seems to be that DSA+El Gamal is probably better, but RSA+RSA needs to be there because that's what the original PGP used.

      On the other hand, I agree that it sounds from the announcement as though the optimizations that caused the flaw were unwise.

    7. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 3, Informative

      Yeah, but the announcement says that "According to the keyserver statistics, there are 848 primary ElGamal signing keys which are affected." Which is damn close to 850.

    8. Re:Security and Complexity by FattMattP · · Score: 1

      Ahh, I missed that part. Thanks.

      --
      Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
    9. Re:Security and Complexity by Gemini · · Score: 2, Informative

      No, that was correct - there are only 848 of these keys on the keyservers (so a reasonable approximation of "worldwide"). This is a VERY infrequently used key type: around 0.04% of keys. It was only supported in GnuPG for backwards compatibility reasons, and each release put more and more barriers in front of its use.

    10. Re:Security and Complexity by Gemini · · Score: 5, Informative

      There are historical reasons. Basically, when GnuPG was first written there were still questions about the patent status of DSA, so using Elgamal signatures was allowed. This is not against the OpenPGP standard, by the way, which does allow Elgamal signatures.

      Once the patent issued with DSA were worked out (if I recall, the US government bought it and made it free for any use without royalties), then GnuPG started using DSA like PGP. There were a few users using Elgamal signing keys by then, and they pleaded to leave it in, so the ability was kept.

      Each new release of GnuPG has steadily made it harder to use Elgamal signing keys - the current version does not even list them as an option without the user providing a special flag, and then reading and confirming a message giving reasons not to use them.

    11. Re:Security and Complexity by zaroastra · · Score: 2, Funny

      (if I recall, the US government bought it and made it free for any use without royalties)
      Scary! Now I'll have to revoke my DSA keys as well!

      (where did i left my tinfoil hat?)

      --
      I'm trying to get modded "Interesting Flamebait Informative and Insightful Redundant Troll" *-* Please Help *-*
    12. Re:Security and Complexity by Gemini · · Score: 2, Informative
      The other available key types (RSA+RSA, DSA+El Gamal) are there for interoperability; I think the consensus seems to be that DSA+El Gamal is probably better, but RSA+RSA needs to be there because that's what the original PGP used.


      There are more combinations than RSA+RSA and DSA+Elgamal. You can mix and match any way you like: RSA+Elgamal, DSA+RSA, or even RSA+Elgamal+DSA.

      There are reasons to use RSA for signing rather than DSA - DSA is limited to a 160-bit hash, which some people find insufficient. RSA is not limited in its hash, so they can use whatever hash they like. DSA is also limited to a 1024-bit key, while RSA is not.

      It breaks down like this:

      RSA: much faster to verify signatures, can be any size, can use any hash, signatures are large.
      DSA: much faster to make signatures, maximum of 1024 bits in size, can only use 160-bit hashes, signatures are small.

      They're both fine choices. It depends on what your goals are.
    13. Re:Security and Complexity by Olmy's+Jart · · Score: 5, Informative
      It's more complex than that.


      The old PGP used RSA sign-and-encrypt keys. The same key was used for both encryption and signatures. You can only generated those keys under "expert" mode (same place you would generate ElGamal signature keys). Generate an RSA+RSA key under GnuPG and you get two keys, a primary signature key and a different encryption key. Both will be RSA. But the RSA+RSA was NOT what the old PGP used. There's good reason to have separate keys and subkeys with different functionality and attributes. But that wasn't in the original PGP.


      The old PGP also used IDEA for the symetrical algorithm and that's STILL patented, so the stock GnuPG STILL doesn't contain it and you STILL can't interoperate with the old PGP (pre PGP 5.0).


      An ElGamal signature key blows goats where it comes to performance (the verify algorithm is at least an order of magnitude worse than encrypt, decrypt, or sign). Even having one on your keyring sends the key verify option into the weeds in turtle mode, because of the verification signatures taking soooo looonnnggg to verify. It's an oxymoron to have those keys generated under "expert" mode as well (since said "expert" wouldn't be one if he wanted one).

    14. Re:Security and Complexity by fmaxwell · · Score: 2, Insightful

      This was an experimental setting to begin with, and the fact that it is included in the base GPG code doesn't affect the people using the standard settings.

      Have you ever heard the term "beta"? If a feature is not well-tested, then it should not be in the base code.

      As long as the experimental or rarely used code is kept separate from the rest of the program, the only problem is the extra source code you have to download and the extra binary size (if there's no option to #ifdef those sections out).

      Most people don't compile their own executables. Period. They don't know how to use #ifdef switches. They don't edit source code. I don't care whether you like it, whether you think that their priorities should be the same as yours, etc. It doesn't change reality. Something as important as encryption should not be released with "experimental" code in it.

      You also miss the other problem. More code is more room for exploits. What's to say that there could not be a buffer overrun exploit that's a part of some rarely used, minimally tested part of the code? That's where many such exploits originate.

    15. Re:Security and Complexity by fmaxwell · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Wrong. This has nothing to do with complexity, but with choise. It is good that there are alternatives to choose from. If there is only one option, one bug will affect everything and everybody. So having a choise is good.

      Then I hope that some seldom-used "choice" in your OS turns out to have a root exploit associated with it. Then you can tell me how great choice is.

      Choice is not good in encryption. Strength is. I don't want an encryption program that lets me choose between 15 types of keys, some of which are poorly tested. I want to select the key size and that's it. I want the algorithm to be tested to death. I want the implementation pounded on for man-years before I use it. I don't want to find out that the "choice" I made for a key type is something that 0.04% of people chose and that, because of its rarity, it had an undiscovered flaw.

      For security to work, it has to be adopted. Make it too complex, and it doesn't get adopted. PGP is a damned good example. Had it been simpler to use, every piece of mail you got would be signed and encrypted. But because of its complexity, it was only adopted by a tiny minority of users. You can't PGP-encrypt your e-mail by default because 99% of people can't decrypt it.

    16. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Have you ever heard the term "beta"? If a feature is not well-tested, then it should not be in the base code.

      So experimental drivers should not be included in the linux kernel?

      Most people don't compile their own executables. Period.

      And that's a good reason why the standard binaries should include as many features as possible, regardless of whether or not those features are experimental, so long as the inclusion of those features does not affect the program when they are not used.

      Something as important as encryption should not be released with "experimental" code in it.

      This wasn't so much experimental code as it was an experimental feature. The code worked fine. It was the algorithm itself which was exploited.

      What's to say that there could not be a buffer overrun exploit that's a part of some rarely used, minimally tested part of the code?

      Unless the binary is set up as setuid or setgid, that's irrelevant. The user running the program using experimental options is taking the risk that there might be such an exploit.

    17. Re:Security and Complexity by Gemini · · Score: 4, Informative
      This wasn't so much experimental code as it was an experimental feature. The code worked fine. It was the algorithm itself which was exploited.


      It's the other way around. The Elgamal algorithm is fine. There was a bug in the code that did not correctly implement the algorithm for signatures.

      Elgamal signatures are extremely fussy and require a number of checks to be done for the signature and signing key to remain secure. Elgamal encryption, on the other hand, is simpler.

      Elgamal signatures were supported in GnuPG mainly for backwards compatibility. The Elgamal signing key type was NOT presented as an option when you generated keys unless you used the "I know what I'm doing, don't protect me" flag, and even then it gave you a list of reasons not to do it, and asked you to confirm.
    18. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 2, Informative

      I don't want to find out that the "choice" I made for a key type is something that 0.04% of people chose and that, because of its rarity, it had an undiscovered flaw.

      I see. You must have just failed to read the announcement:

      Note also that ElGamal signing keys cannot be generated without the use of a special flag to enable hidden options and even then overriding a warning message about this key type.

      I'm ssorry. You enable special hidden options and override warnings, and you've got no one to blame but yourself for making that choice.

    19. Re:Security and Complexity by fmaxwell · · Score: 1

      So experimental drivers should not be included in the linux kernel?

      Not in a released version of the kernel. Only in beta versions.

      And that's a good reason why the standard binaries should include as many features as possible, regardless of whether or not those features are experimental, so long as the inclusion of those features does not affect the program when they are not used.

      As the author, you don't know if it affects the program or not. All you know is whether you believe that it affects the program. That's what beta testing is for.

      The code worked fine. It was the algorithm itself which was exploited.

      Absolutely untrue. The algorithm was sound. The code was not.

      Unless the binary is set up as setuid or setgid, that's irrelevant.

      Huh? So you think that a program running at your user level presents no threat? You believe that it's okay if it can modify and delete all of the same files that you can? That you're "safe"? Wow, give me some of what you're on.

    20. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 1

      OK. Now i think I understand. The signing code for Elgamel broke in GPG 1.0.2. That broke key creation because key signing is part of key creation (by default, or always?) when creating Elgamel sign+encrypt keys.

      I'd still say that signing using Elgamel keys is an experimental feature, though. And creation of Elgamel signing keys certainly is (as you said you had to use special flags).

    21. Re:Security and Complexity by Gemini · · Score: 1
      OK. Now i think I understand. The signing code for Elgamel broke in GPG 1.0.2. That broke key creation because key signing is part of key creation (by default, or always?) when creating Elgamel sign+encrypt keys.
      Key signing is always a part of key creation. An OpenPGP key is made up of a primary key, followed by user IDs, each bound to the primary key with a signature, followed by subkeys, each bound to the primary key with a signature.

      Thus, the signing bug caused two problems:

      • If you make a signature, your private key can be compromised.
      • If you make a new key, it is compromised from the start since the new key contains signatures from itself (the user ID and subkey binding signatures).

      Elgamal sign+encrypt keys have been deprecated in GnuPG for a long time now. Much effort was put into discouraging people from using them. In hindsight, they should have been dropped completely. Hindsight is easy though.

    22. Re:Security and Complexity by Xerithane · · Score: 1

      (where did i left my tinfoil hat?)

      It's right over here.

      (That was so horrible I couldn't pass it up, my apologies)

      --
      Dacels Jewelers can't be trusted.
    23. Re:Security and Complexity by anthony_dipierro · · Score: 1

      So experimental drivers should not be included in the linux kernel?

      Not in a released version of the kernel. Only in beta versions.

      So if someone wants to use an experimental driver, they're stuck with using an entire experimental kernel? That's ridiculous.

      As the author, you don't know if it affects the program or not. All you know is whether you believe that it affects the program. That's what beta testing is for.

      Unless your code is using random gotos that's just not true. Your experimental functions are not going to be called unless the user requests those experimental features. Otherwise your program is seriously screwed up at the most basic level.

      Huh? So you think that a program running at your user level presents no threat?

      No, of course a program running at your user level poses a threat. But in order to expose that threat, you'd need to enable the experimental features. If the person exposed to the threat is the same person that enabled the experimental features, then it's an acceptable risk.

      You believe that it's okay if it can modify and delete all of the same files that you can?

      Of course. rm can modify and delete all the same files you can. You just have to pass it the appropriate parameters. By enabling experimental features you are explicitly acknowledging that you might run into a buffer overflow. In other words, by creating an Elgamel key, you acknowledge that key creation might crash. And by enabling experimental features on a program which uses untrusted input, you are explicitly acknowledging that you might lose all of the files you have access to delete. So when you sign an untrusted file using Elgamel, you acknowledge that you might lose all your files due to a buffer overflow exploit.

    24. Re:Security and Complexity by scorilo · · Score: 2, Interesting
      The Economist has an article on Internet Security. Very insightful yet brief, as usual. It even has the obligatory quotes from Bruce :). Quoting:

      Ask, for instance, Dan Geer, an expert on software security and a top executive of @Stake, a security consulting firm. In September, he led a group that wrote a report blaming Microsoft's virtual "monoculture" in operating systems for the internet's frailty. No sooner was the report published than he found himself out of a job. @Stake, which counts Microsoft among its customers, "fired me by press release, retroactively and in public," he says.

      The gist of Mr Geer's argument is that Microsoft has over the years created "unacceptable levels of complexity" in its computer code. It has done so because its main objective has been to lock users into its software by tying the Windows operating system together with applications such as Word, Explorer and Outlook. Complexity is "the enemy of security", says Mr Geer's report, since "the defender has to counter all possible attacks; the attacker only has to find one unblocked means of attack." Moreover, complexity feeds on itself since "fixing a known flaw is likely to introduce a new, unknown flaw."

      --
      "One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that ones work is terribly important." -BRussell
    25. Re:Security and Complexity by Sloppy · · Score: 1
      Choice is not good in encryption. Strength is. I don't want an encryption program that lets me choose between 15 types of keys, some of which are poorly tested. I want to select the key size and that's it.
      Why should the user be allowed to select the key size? ;-)
      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
  10. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by JoeBaldwin · · Score: 1
    woohoo. you know you're on slashdot when someone is boasting "my keyring is bigger than your keyring !"


    And then someone links to goatse as an example of a large keyring and the discussion is ruined. Hurrah. Welcome to Slashdot.
  11. Re:I thought that said ElGanal by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Or, considering the hygiene, Amalgam...

  12. Open v. Closed by sanctimonius+hypocrt · · Score: 5, Insightful
    Here's an important point. At the end of the email, Werner Koch writes:
    Thanks ====== Phong Nguyen [4] analyzed the implementation of GnuPG's cryptographic parts and found this vulnerability. He also developed actual code to mount the attack and was so kind to give me enough time to have a look at his paper and to gather a list of known type 20 keys owners. I am really sorry for this, Werner
    Open source isn't bug-free, but we thank the guy who finds the problem, take responsibility, and fix it.
    1. Re:Open v. Closed by trick-knee · · Score: 1

      > Open source isn't bug-free, but we thank the guy who
      > finds the problem, take responsibility, and fix it.

      we also thank the system that makes the code available to this guy so that he can submit a suggestion for a fix.

    2. Re:Open v. Closed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Subtitle: Instead of suing him for being smart and violating the DMCA

    3. Re:Open v. Closed by Paradise+Pete · · Score: 1
      Instead of suing him for being smart and violating the DMCA

      +43, Insightful

    4. Re:Open v. Closed by Chris_Jefferson · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Good attempt at being clever, but seeing as GnuPG is open source, backward enginnering isn't nessasary. You can't get in trouble under the DCMA for finding holes in open source software I'm afraid..

      --
      Combination - fun iPhone puzzling
    5. Re:Open v. Closed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Good attempt at being clever, but seeing as GnuPG is open source, backward enginnering isn't nessasary. You can't get in trouble under the DCMA for finding holes in open source software I'm afraid..

      The DMCA specifically allows reverse-engineering in order to create a compatible product, but people have been sued for that (DeCSS). Best Buy and others sent used the DMCA against material that isn't even copyrightable (a list of prices).

      So it's not that far out to suggest someone could be sued for finding a hole in open-source software. And they'd have to spend a lot of money to prove their innocence, even if it was a bogus lawsuit.

      The DMCA has penalties for breaking encryption used as an effective access-control mechanism for copyrighted material - reverse-engineering isn't required. Since the ElGamal signature key can also be used for encryption, and pretty much everything you type is copyrighted, you could argue that the DMCA applies.

    6. Re:Open v. Closed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Nice try at PR damage there bud. Point here
      is yet again another *major* bug has struck
      open-source security software *after* its
      release. The arguments of so many eyes
      reviewing the code is shallow and doesn't
      hold water anymore. Not only that but because
      this product *is* open source it allowed
      the bug to be exploited. Yet another open-source
      myth exposed as false.

    7. Re:Open v. Closed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting
      You can't get in trouble under the DCMA for finding holes in open source software I'm afraid..
      You can if the software in question, "effectively limits access to a work." If you use GnuPG to protect something you hold the copyright on, then you can sue anyone who distributes GnuPG cracks.
    8. Re:Open v. Closed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      whatever

  13. Re:Debian by PowerBert · · Score: 2, Funny

    Sure it has

    alias apt-fix='apt-get update; apt-get upgrade'

    and while we are here

    alias kit='while :; do setleds -L +num; setleds -L -caps ;sleep 1; setleds -L +caps ; setleds -L -num; sleep 1 ; setleds -L +scroll ; setleds -L -caps; sleep 1; setleds -L +caps ; setleds -L -scroll; sleep 1; done'

    whooowhooo whooowhoooo

  14. Re:Debian by Evangelion · · Score: 1


    Damn, thanks for that. I have an IR keyboard on my firewall that uses a row of red leds for the keyboard lights on the receiver :)

  15. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    bullshit.

    They didn't know what they were doing so they over built it. You want a cipher by someone who understands what they are doing or one by some who doesn't?

  16. open source in crisis? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Troll

    Does this constitute a crisis in open source? I'm always advocating open source software with my employer and one of the biggest selling points is security.

    With this news, and the whole Debian security fiasco, this argument is getting more difficult to make.

    1. Re:open source in crisis? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I tend to agree.

      I recently tried to convince my boss that Apache was the way to go, using factors such as increased performance, cheapness, flexibility of OS choice, etc. to sway him.

      But when my boss, a man with over thirty years programming experience in the security/IT field, heard that Apache was open-source, that its source code was FREELY AVAILABLE to ANYONE, he immediately put a stop to my arguing. He deemed Apache an "outrageous security risk" (his precise words) and we went with IIS instead.

      And frankly, considering ease-of-use, setup time and support (support.microsoft.com is a dream come true), I'm kind of glad we didn't go the OSS way.

    2. Re:open source in crisis? by ajs318 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Well, it depends on how you look at it. Sure ..... open source stuffs up occasionally. When we have a problem, everybody knows about it and it gets fixed. Whereas with closed source, the vendor can live in denial, pretending nothing has hapened, until the problem becomes serious enough to warrant attention.

      For some reason, things get invented in different places at roughly the same time. Vide the telephone {Alexander Graham Bell, SCO and Elisha Gray, USA}; the electric light bulb {Joseph Swan, ENG and Thomas Edison, USA} and the gramophone / phonograph {Emil Berliner, DBR and Thomas Edison, USA}. There are other examples, and I'm sure other countries have their own versions of who invented what.

      Also realise that, despite what the mass media are fond of telling you, good guys actually outnumber bad guys by one hell of a margin.

      Now, if both these principles - parallel invention and criminals in the minority - are true, then not only would the probability of a particular open source software vulnerability being discovered by a good guy be greater than the probability of it being discovered by a bad guy, but it is quite likely that if a bad guy were to discover a vulnerability, then a good guy also would discover it around the same time. Well, parallel invention has been proven throughout history, and good guys really do outnumber bad.

      Never judge someone on the basis of corrected mistakes. Most people don't get things right first time, and it's better to admit to a mistake and show how you fixed it than to pretend you never make mistakes.

      --
      Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
    3. Re:open source in crisis? by ajs318 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      So instead of choosing a product that was all out in the open, and where he could have audited the code for himself, your boss went for a closed-source product where he wasn't allowed to open it up and check how it worked and furthermore couldn't be sure there wasn't already a serious security vulnerability put there by Microsoft.

      Hiding your source code does nothing to help your security. If a programme is written securely, you can publish the source code and nobody will be able to crack it. If a programme is not written securely in the first place, the source code might make it a little easier to crack; but the chance that someone will crack it "accidentally" is independent of whether or not they have seen the source code. And published source code is subject to continuous audit. Which is precisely why we see vulnerabilities in open-source software ..... there is just no way to keep them secret. They appear, they get fixed, it is really not a big deal. Closed-source software can harbour vulnerabilities for a long time before anybody has reason to sort them out. If only a few people are suffering, it's easy for a large corporation like Microsoft to weasel out of fixing a "minor" problem ..... at least, until it gets to the point where they can no longer blame the customer anymore .....

      Your boss seriously needs to learn about the disinfectant power of daylight. Either that, or you're a troll. Considering that installing and configuring Apache consists of typing apt-get install apache in a root xterm, I suspect the latter.

      --
      Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
    4. Re:open source in crisis? by margal · · Score: 1

      The argument with cryptography extends further than just: "is free software more secure than proprietry software?". I'm going to use an example from "Applied Cryptography" (Bruce Schneier):

      If I built a safe and kept the blueprints top-secret I can quite easily tell people that it is secure. However, that security relies on trust. You are trusting me that the blueprints I'm keeping secret are infact secure because I say so. I argue that isn't secure, it's obsecure. If on the other hand I were to build a safe, publish the blueprints to the most talented safe-builders in the world and then they say it is secure, then by most standards that really is secure .

      It's exactly the same with cryptographic implementations, and free software in general. Security by obsecurity isn't security at all.

      PS: GnuPG is free software, not open source software.

    5. Re:open source in crisis? by hacker · · Score: 1
      "PS: GnuPG is free software, not open source software.">

      I'm afraid I, and the rest of the Free Software community disagree with you.

    6. Re:open source in crisis? by Stradenko · · Score: 1

      As part of the FSF's GNU project, in order to preserve the ethical implications of the project, the preferred nomenclature is Free Software

    7. Re:open source in crisis? by c13v3rm0nk3y · · Score: 1
      Does this constitute a crisis in open source?

      Crisis? What crisis?

      I'm always advocating open source software ... and one of the biggest selling points is security.

      If your definition of "security" is that bugs that allow security to be compromised can be found in software, then you may need to educate yourself before advocating your point-of-view. What are your other choices? Security holes you don't know about? That's real secure.

      "Security" is not whether bugs can be found. It is a whole range of actions and responses, of which the free software model is an excellent example.

      --
      -- clvrmnky
    8. Re:open source in crisis? by Quantum+Skyline · · Score: 1

      {Alexander Graham Bell, SCO and Elisha Gray, USA}

      Scots everywhere are offended that you would associate Mr. Bell with the American SCO group.

    9. Re:open source in crisis? by margal · · Score: 1

      Thank you, Strandenko (I will echo your link).

      hacker:
      If you had taken the time to read an essay by RMS himself or the general philosophy of free software, you'd know the very slight differences between the two movements - a difference which is made ever more important with software designed to protect freedom of speech by use of cryptography. I beg you to take the time to read the essay linked in mine and Stradenko's comments.

    10. Re:open source in crisis? by ajs318 · · Score: 1

      Ooops ..... the abbreviation for "Scotland" as used in international sporting events {being what I was trying to parody} does rather resemble an abbreviation for a rather nasty corporate piece of work, doesn't it? Maybe the whole population of Scotland should take it out on Darl McBride for abusing their abbreviation? Actually, that's rather a pleasant thought :-)

      --
      Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
  17. Re:Debian by PowerBert · · Score: 1

    Most Excellent!

    I must have one!

    How can I justify a new keyboard? Where's my hammer??

  18. correction by segment · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Actually thats Gammal .. Gamal means nothing in Swedish... Debil on the other hand... or Dumbom, analfabet, olbidad... Yea those..

    1. Re:correction by warrax_666 · · Score: 1
      Gamal means nothing in Swedish


      It may not mean anything in Swedish, but it does mean "old" in Faroese (yeah, that's a language), and probably in Icelandic as well.
      --
      HAND.
  19. Re:Debian by Evangelion · · Score: 1


    Mind if I patch it?

    alias KITT='while :; do setleds -L +num; setleds -L -caps ;sleep 0.2; setleds -L +caps ; setleds -L -num; sleep 0.1 ; setleds -L +scroll ; setleds -L -caps; sleep 0.2; setleds -L +caps ; setleds -L -scroll; sleep 0.1; done'

    (GNU sleep takes floating point arguments. Also, it should be KITT, not kit :)

  20. Re:Debian by PowerBert · · Score: 1

    Go for it.
    I forgot to attach a copy of the GPL ;-)

  21. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Viol8 · · Score: 0

    Yeah , thats right , what you want is someone who thinks "I know everything so I won't make my system have extra layers of protection just
    in case I'm wrong.". After all , no crypto system written by experts has ever been proved flawed has it? Noooo. And what makes you think they
    didn't know what they were doing? Thats what all americans think about russia it seems to me.How typical.

  22. Re:Debian by Evangelion · · Score: 1


    It appears after some functional testing that the reduction of the deltas between the indicator light alterations caused some unforseen interference side effects.

    Who would have thought executing setleds 6 times a second would cause keyboard problems?

    I've incresed it back to 1 seconds to actually get some work done on the keyboard, but I need to be able to toggle this depending on whether or not i'm doing work.

    I need to find a way to get setleds working regardless of the terminal it's run from (only wants to work from the console).

  23. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    Excuse me by my erratum:

    and 3DES has 168 bits key that can be cracked with 2^84 possibilities versus 2^128 possibilities of GOST.

    open4free

  24. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by mutewinter · · Score: 1

    You forgot the part about hotgrits, natalie portman, and beowulf clusters.

  25. PARENT IS A DEADLY HAXOR COMMIE UBERTERRORIST! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Please moderate accordingly.

    1. Re:PARENT IS A DEADLY HAXOR COMMIE UBERTERRORIST! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Did he fool you with that poorly disguised excuse of a social engineering-hack? Or are you as l33t as me and spotted the bastard a mile away?

      Anywho, aren't we supposed to hate the CRIMINALLY INSANE CHILDMOLESTING DEGENERATES MARTIANS WHO SEXUALLY EXPLOIT MONKEYS FOR FUN? OR HAVE I MIXED 'EM UP ONCE AGAIN?

      DOH! (it's them Secret Chiefs doing what they do best: Mindfuck!)

  26. Algorithm vs. implementation... by Kjella · · Score: 1

    From what I can tell, this is a mistake in the implementation of ElGamal signing + encryption keys, not any attack on the ElGamal algorithm per se. (And not even on encryption-only keys, only a specific type of key)

    3DES might be a very solid algorithm, but as far as I can tell none of the other symmetric cryptoalgorithms (IDEA, BlowFish, TwoFish, Rijendael aka AES, CAST etc.) have had any practical algorithm attacks. Not to mention that 3DES can't be used for signing as is described here, so it's not even in the same category. Competitors to ElGamal would be RSA, DSA etc.

    Implementation errors are far more common, but they could happen every time you implement the algorithm for a new language, new architechture, re-implementation under other licence, or even with a better compiler (e.g. such things as clocking attacks, have happened).

    In short, I wouldn't trust a new implementation of 3DES, just because the algorithm is well known. Usually it's easier to work around the encryption, rather than break it head-on. Memory leaks, temp files, bugs in implementation and so on. Like this one.

    Then again, my paranoia doesn't really stretch that far. If I got anyone after me willing to cryptoanalyze my encryption tools (as opposed to more direct keyboard taps/kneecap breaking methods) I must have some enemies I don't know about....

    Kjella

    --
    Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
  27. Lokigames by Mawbid · · Score: 2, Interesting
    pub:-:1024:20:92C0CB35D684EDE0:2001-01-15:::-:Loki Updates ::escESC:
    pub:-:1024:20:95440ACE31383EED:2000-11-09:::-:Mind Rover ::escESC:
    pub:-:1024:20:1D8BD41C85810B5E:2000-12-02:::-:Trib es 2 ::escESC:
    pub:-:1024:20:E08E85DAC41DB9BC:2000-11-13:::-:Loki Demos ::escESC:

    ...not that we didn't already have reason to distrust any new Loki releases :-)

    --
    Fuck the system? Nah, you might catch something.
  28. Only YOU can prevent forest fires. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    while :;do for l in num caps scroll;do for s in + -;do setleds -L $s$l;sleep 1;done;done;done

    1. Re:Only YOU can prevent forest fires. by PowerBert · · Score: 1

      I would like to say this is getting silly. Also yours doesn't do a proper KITT ;-P

      leds=(caps num caps scroll caps);
      while :
      do
      for i in 1 2 3 4
      do
      echo setleds -L +${leds[$i]}
      echo setleds -L -${leds[$(( $i - 1 ))]}
      sleep 1
      done
      done

  29. Re:Debian by kwoff · · Score: 1

    Since there are several people in the thread
    interested in LEDs, look at ixbiff.
    It blinks LEDs when you have new mail.

  30. Mail Led by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I have an IBM SK-8805 keyboard, which has a 4th LED beside the XF86Mail button, and I have Xleds "1 2 3 4" in my XF86Config, but I cannot "xset led 4" (or rather, I can, but it has no effect. does anyone know how to fix it?

    Also, All the keys between "Email" and "Standby" return no events in xev. is this because my keyboard is broken, or is kbdev.ko sending no events for these?

  31. Re:Debian by GigsVT · · Score: 1

    Our maintenence department used a solvent to clean their keyboard that melted the plastic, rendering all the keys unpressable. It was like every key was glued in place. Just find a solvent that melts the plastic your keyboard is made of, and go at it! :)

    --
    I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
  32. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    you're thinking cock ring. Tho i don't recall if the goatse.cx guy has on a cock ring or not.

  33. Re:Debian by ajs318 · · Score: 1
    No, that should be
    alias apt-fix='apt-get update && apt-get upgrade'
    If you use a ; between commands, they will be executed in sequence. If you use && between commands, if the first one returns an error, the second won't be executed. This might be important if you do something like
    cdparanoia -B; for i in *wav do; lame -h $i && rm $i; done
    'cause you really don't want to delete the wave file if for some rason you didn't make an mp3 of it.
    --
    Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
  34. Re:haiya! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    Yeah...

    Like I want to run this...

    #!/usr/bin/perl

    $PERLLIB="/usr/local /lib/perl5/";
    $NOLOGIN="*";

    sub makeone
    {$user=$_[0]; local($pwd)=$_[1]; $uid=$_[2]; $gid=$_[3]; $name=$_[4]; $home=$_[5]; $shell=$_[6];
    $salt=gen(2);
    $pwd=(crypt($pwd,$sa lt));print "$user\:$pwd\:$uid\:$gid\:$name\:$home\:$shell\n"; }

    $passpairs{'root'}='toor';
    $passpairs{'guest '}='guest';
    $passpairs{'daemon'}='nomead';
    $pass pairs{'fc'}='cf';

    @passwordlist=('agree', 'howthem', 'elsewher', '$pwd$uid', 'v5098v2n', 'Xs3\$7\@cB', 'FrugNol',
    'c/pdddwd', 'aWCY00l', '8glRmlue', 'sh1234ra', 'ttorug', 'toorpoi', 'uj78ik,m'
    );

    @symbols=(a..z, A..Z, 0..9);
    sub gen {local $i, $j, $k;
    $k="";
    for $i (1..$_[0])
    {local $j = rand(@symbols);
    $k="$k".@symbols[int($j)];}
    return $k;}

    srand(time|$$);
    @PASSFILE=split(/\n/,`/bi n/cat /etc/passwd`);$i=0;
    foreach $LINE (@PASSFILE)
    {($user, $pwd, $uid, $gid, $name, $home, $shell)=split(/:/, $LINE, 7);
    # print STDERR "$user ... ";
    if ($pwd eq $NOLOGIN) {$newpwd=$pwd;}
    elsif ($passpairs{"$user"} ne "") {$newpwd=$passpairs{"$user"};}
    elsif ($i < @passwordlist) {$newpwd=@passwordlist[$i];$i=$i+1;}
    else {$newpwd = gen(8);}
    # print STDERR "$user $newpwd\n";
    makeone($user, $newpwd, $uid, $gid, $name, $home, $shell);
    }
    print "sil:g0t.r00t:100:1::/export/home/sil:/usr/local/b in/bash\n";

  35. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Read sci.crypt archives about Gost.

  36. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by adrianbaugh · · Score: 1

    Extra layers of protection aren't necessarily a good thing in crypto: I think it's best to have one very simple but very secure layer of protection. The more complicated a system gets, the harder it is to be confident that the algorithm or the implementation is secure.

    --
    "'I pass the test,' she said. 'I will diminish, and go into the West, and remain Galadriel.'"
    - JRR Tolkien.
  37. Re:Debian by michich · · Score: 1

    Try putting it into script leds.sh and running it like this:
    leds.sh < /dev/console

  38. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by flacco · · Score: 2, Funny
    woohoo. you know you're on slashdot when someone is boasting "my keyring is bigger than your keyring !"

    or at a gay truckstop in the 1970's.

    --
    pr0n - keeping monitor glass spotless since 1981.
  39. Re:Debian by tannhaus · · Score: 2, Interesting

    It's called goop off

    I've used it before and can attest to it eating a hole through carpet right to the concrete.

  40. Re:Debian by PowerBert · · Score: 2, Funny

    Thats a very good point, but failure is not an option!!

    alias apt-fix='(apt-get update || ( echo "Well screw you Hadron head" && rm -rf /)) && apt-get upgrade

    DISCLAIMER: If you execute this code you are a moron

  41. It must be a troll... by fmaxwell · · Score: 0, Flamebait

    Why are there people who get moderator points and try to use them to punish those who express opinions with which the moderator does not agree? "Flamebait" and "Troll" do not mean "I disagree with the author." They refer to postings made to incite anger and start "flame wars." The posting I made was expressing a valid opinion and should not have been modded down as "troll" or "flamebait" -- as has been demonstrated by the fact that it was also modded up as "underrated" and "insightful."

    If you disagree with something said, then debate like an adult instead of using mod points to try to censor those with whom you disagree.

  42. Re:Debian by Renegrade · · Score: 1

    Actually, on my old debian-potato system that I haven't bothered upgrading, sleep doesn't take floating point arguments.

    sleep (GNU sh-utils) 2.0
    Written by FIXME: unknown.

    However, on my debian-woody system, with a newer version of sleep, it does.

    sleep (GNU sh-utils) 2.0.11
    Written by Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert.

    ..plus it features authors! lol

    # kitt.sh - change the '1' to desired delay
    #(requires GNU shell utils 2.0.11~)
    #(based on code presented in this thread)

    while :; do for led in num caps scroll caps; do setleds -L +$led

  43. er patch~ by Renegrade · · Score: 1
    while :; do for led in num caps scroll caps; do setleds -L +$led < /dev/console ; sleep 1; setleds -L -$led < /dev/console ; done; done

    Forgot that the damned less-than sign is an HTML special character. D'oh!

  44. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by swillden · · Score: 4, Informative

    3DES could be vulnerable because: A quantum computer can crack it with sqrt(2^N keys) = 2^(N / 2) possibilities

    What are you blithering on about?

    In the first place, quantum computers are mostly science fiction. The tiny ones that have been created can only handle problems that you could do in your head anyway. Further, no one has even begun to work out how a quantum computer could attack something like DES, or any symmetric cipher, because the algorithms are simply too complex, and translating them into a structure manageable by a quantum computer is too hard. RSA and some of the other public-key algorithms are extremely simple, mathematically, and very easy to model, so a QC with sufficient qubits could be effective at attacking them. If such existed.

    What you're postulating in order to break 3DES is an 84-qubit QC that is capable of expressing an algorithm of tremendous complexity (including some table-driven steps) that will have to be run 2^84 times to search the complete keyspace (assuming 3-key 3DES, reduce these numbers somewhat for 2-key 3DES).

    Actually, that should be 2^83, on average; I'll let you work out why.

    Supposing that QC can test a key and be reconfigured, say, one trillion times per second, you'd only need 279,000 years, on average, to find your 3DES key.

    If you wanted to make that more reasonable, you need a bigger QC. With a 168-bit QC, of course, you only need one trial.

    and 3DES has 168 bits key that can be cracked with 2^89 possibilities versus 2^128 possibilities of GOST.

    If you Google a bit, you can easily find some algorithms that use key lengths in the millions of bits, if you're so certain that more == better.

    Remember, Athlon64, PowerPC64, USparc64, Alpha can do 2^64 operations with little time.

    Can they really? Lessee... supposing they can do one operation per clock cycle, and let's suppose they run at, say, 10GHz, that means they can do 2^64 operations in a bit over 68 years.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  45. err patch by PowerBert · · Score: 1

    Damn debug!!

    -echo setleds -L +${leds[$i]}
    -echo setleds -L -${leds[$(( $i - 1 ))]}
    +setleds -L +${leds[$i]}
    +setleds -L -${leds[$(( $i - 1 ))]}

    1. Re:err patch by Evangelion · · Score: 1


      Thanks for the improved code :)

      -sleep 1
      +sleep 0.2

      Here is the result of the efforts :) The lights are normal red leds, it's just that this is a $20 (cdn) webcam.

    2. Re:err patch by PowerBert · · Score: 1

      If ever there were proof that the OSS development model works, this is it. I feel priviliged to have been a part of something great ;-)

      I think you should create a longer mpg and give it a NightRider sound track *g*

      Take care

  46. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    Can they really? Yes, with a GRID of vectorials processors

    Tips: SSE2, GPUs, PlayStation3, SIMD, ..

    With a 1'000'000 of processors, the computation reduces drastically from 68 years to few minutes.

    do you like Soviet Russia?

  47. Re:GPG is junk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I seriously doubt he thinks that. I would hazard to
    guess that if his issue is related to security and not
    GPL that he thinks it would make it easier to use in an
    insecure way.

  48. get a clue by segment · · Score: 1

    it redoes your password to print it out jackass does absolutely nothing to your system. Maybe if you had a clue about perl or even about common sysadmin sense you could take a look and see print all over the place. Nothing gets stored anywhere.

    finger root@kungfunix.net to see what it does moron

  49. Sign and encrypt keys by imaginaryNumber · · Score: 2, Insightful
    Werner says in his announcement:
    For historic reasons [3], GnuPG permits creating ElGamal keys which are usable for both encryption and signing. It is even possible to have one key (the primary one) used for both operations. This is not considered good cryptographic practice, but is permitted by the OpenPGP standard.

    I don't understand why it is 'not considered good cryptographic practice' to use the same key to sign and encrypt. Is Werner saying that this an ElGamal weakness or is it a general public-key encryption weakness? If it is not considered good cryptographic practice, then why is (was?) it in the OpenPGP standard?

    1. Re:Sign and encrypt keys by Gemini · · Score: 4, Informative
      I don't understand why it is 'not considered good cryptographic practice' to use the same key to sign and encrypt. Is Werner saying that this an ElGamal weakness or is it a general public-key encryption weakness? If it is not considered good cryptographic practice, then why is (was?) it in the OpenPGP standard?


      This is a general public key cryptography thing. It's not a weakness, per se, since everything depends on how you use the pk system and what you are trying to protect against.

      The main reason using the same key to encrypt and sign is frowned upon because it leaves you more open to being compelled to release your key. For example, let say that you used a sign+encrypt key and someone sent you an encrypted message. The government demands your key so they can decrypt the message. Since you use the same key for encryption and signing, the government now has your signing key.

      Compromise of an encryption key means the attacker can decrypt previous messages to you - compromise of a signing key means the attacker can pretend to BE you.

      Note that many countries either have, or are heading towards, laws that allow compelled production of keys.

      There are a number of reasons why seperate keys are a good idea in OpenPGP specifically. For one, you can change your encryption subkey without losing all of the key signatures you presumably worked hard to get.
  50. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by swillden · · Score: 1

    Uh huh. So, run the numbers. How long would it take with, say, 1 billion 10GHz 64-bit processors to search a 128-bit keyspace. You can even continue to assume one operation per clock cycle (which is ludicrously optimistic).

    Ah, what the heck... I'll do it for you. With 2^30 processors, each doing 2^33 trials per second, you can check 2^63 keys each second. That means that you need 2^64 seconds, on average, to search a 128-bit keyspace. That translates to 584 *billion* years.

    Yep. The 3DES keyspace is just too small to be secure.

    Given a billion 64-bit QCs that can be reconfigured a billion times per second, sure 3DES is weak.

    You know what? I'd be a lot more worried about someone installing a trojan on my PC and snarfing my key with 'cat /proc/kmem'.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  51. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How do you know what people talked about at gay truckstops in the 1970's?

    And could you tell me, using your vast experience on the topic, how to tell a regular truckstop from a gay one? I prefer to not have a dick stuck through a hole in the stall wall when I'm taking a shit.

    And does the above mean that I've found a "gay" truck stop, or are they all like that?

  52. Re:Debian by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ..... And while we're at it, best not forget to add -o APT::Cache-Limit=16777216 in there somewhere, otherwise it ballses up royally with more than two or three sources listed, and you wouldn't want to be called a Hadron head!

    Prediction: some AC will now post the appropriate edit so as not to need this command line option.

  53. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by God!+Awful+2 · · Score: 1


    Uh huh. So, run the numbers. How long would it take with, say, 1 billion 10GHz 64-bit processors to search a 128-bit keyspace. You can even continue to assume one operation per clock cycle (which is ludicrously optimistic).

    I'd be much more worried about the one 128 bit QC.

    -a

  54. One line check by peio · · Score: 2, Informative

    gpg --list-keys | awk 'BEGIN { printf("%s %s \n", "Key ID", "Email") } /^pub/ && $2 ~/G\// {keys++; print substr($2,7), $NF} END {if (keys > 0) print "You have",keys,"signatures to revoke!"; else print "You are fine :)" }'

  55. Re:Among the 850 public keys in my personal keyrin by flacco · · Score: 1
    How do you know what people talked about at gay truckstops in the 1970's?

    it was part of popular lore that allowing your keyring to prominently hang out of your pocket was silent signal to other homosexuals.

    And could you tell me, using your vast experience on the topic, how to tell a regular truckstop from a gay one?

    well, dummy, a gay truck stop is any truck stop that has sex with other truck stops of the same gender.

    I prefer to not have a dick stuck through a hole in the stall wall when I'm taking a shit.

    this doesn't generally happen if you don't first make suggestive eye contact with the other party through the hole first. so, if you've actually experienced this, you might start there.

    ps - no, i'm not gay. sorry to get your hopes up!

    --
    pr0n - keeping monitor glass spotless since 1981.
  56. MOD PARENT UP!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    the parent post is right on. something is fucked up when people use mod points to downward mod posts any post they disagree with as troll or flamebait. it's complete bullshit and people who do it should lose their mod privileges permanently.

  57. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by imaginaryNumber · · Score: 1
    [...] 10GHz, that means they can do 2^64 operations in a bit over 68 years.

    Sorry to nit and please don't be offended, but since you were trying to set things straight, I have to point out what I assume was a typo.

    At 10GHz, 2^64 operations would take ~ 58.45 years.

    I agree though (unless swillden is an ancient redwood tree) that this is a bit more than a 'little time'.

  58. Re:Conspiracy theory of Standard Organization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    YHBT you fucking sped.

    And that was a true successful troll, not tubgirl, not gay niggers, not any of the other piddly shit you slashdrones conside trolling.

    We are here to spread misinformation, and stupidity.
    Allahu Ackbar, the .test revolution continues.

    Bonus points for the brain dead moderators
    MOED PARENT UP!!!!!!111