Maryland Electronic Voting Systems Found Vulnerable
snoitpo writes "My fine state (Maryland) has hired some people I can respect to hack into Diebold voting machines. The Washington Post (read it free for 2 weeks) has the details. From this story and the one on NPR, the state hired a company and set up a test voting precinct and had the group try whatever they could to break into the machines. Most of the attacks would probably be noticed by an even-half-awake poll staff, but some vulnerabilities were exposed. The net seems to be that you could really mess up individual machines, but the grail would be to get to the central collection servers and send a megavote to your favorite candidate. The last paragraph mentions problems that voting machines had in the last election in Virginia; it's interesting to note that those use wireless networking--my jaw has dropped onto my keyboard and I can't comment any further." Other readers sent in two stories in the Baltimore Sun (1, 2), and one in the NY Times.
At a minimum, electronic voting machines need to print out a paper receipt. That would allow a recount and increase accountability in the system. Without a paper receipt, you may not even be able to determine that an attack has occurred.
Bruce Schneier, author of Beyond Fear and the fantastic Applied Cryptography, has an old but good commentary on the some security issues of electronic voting machines in his Crypto-gram newsletter.
I'd like to take this opportunity to coin the phrase "War Voting". :)
"History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme." Mark Twain
Electronic counting is okay, but they need to be counting physical ballots, not bits. There needs to be a physical paper trail that leads back to clearly-marked ballots that indicate what the voters intended.
The phone-in system is also a bit nonsensical. Ideally, the local counts should be published in each locality as quickly as possible, so that news organizations can do the math on their own, and any error introduced at any step in the way would quickly be noticed when numbers that are supposed to be the same don't check.
Diebold seems to be in the business of selling solitions that are worse than the problems they claim to solve.
Paper voting works very well here, we are very wired but we use paper to vote and if a recount must be made we recount the paper. Why so much money on computer systems? Computer systems are very hard to secure. Paper has already been secured.
Great idea... cover the locks with tamper tape. So rather than rigging the election outright by going to the trouble and difficulty of changing the votes on the server, etc., criminals can do it by disqualifying voting machines by breaking the tape, disenfranchising thousands of voters at a time.
(Can they cover the software issues with tamper tape, too? That might be helpful.)
-Trick
There is a bill before the Maryland State House that would require a voter verifiable paper trail on all electronic voting machines in the state of maryland. The bill also calls for a random sampling of the paper ballots to ensure that the electronic count has not been tampered with. House Bill 53 was just read into the ways and means committee two weeks ago but with the release of the reports I hope there it can gain more support and pass the house.
Zambozay! My brain must've been eatin' a sandwich!
I don't understand why voting machines are being introduced in the first place. Is it just the stupid perception that "if it's automated, it must be better"? In fact, by introducing machines, you're just introducing a hell of a lot more problems, and possible failure points, as well as making the whole process more opaque.
In the Canadian federal elections, IIRC, as well as the Ontario provincial elections, voting and counting is still done by hand. At every stage a paper record is created, so that if any irregularities are suspected, the whole process can be audited. I believe such an inquiry was undertaken in Quebec after some tricky vote counting in Quebec after the last referendum.
What's going to happen? We'll elect someone who didn't get the most legitimate votes...?
wait..
Sorry, it's taken. "War voting" already means casting a vote for W.
My home and native land,
We use a simple paper ballot,
That all can understand.
I worked for a nameless financial institution. We had a certain number of Diebold Windows XP ATM's. 100% got infected with a virus that exploited a well-known vulnerability. We demanded Diebold agree to forfeit admin control of the systems or patch them within a short window of patch release.
Their response: "We'll put firewall software on the machines."
Since the contract was already signed we had no leverage and that ended up being the solution. Nice, eh?
akad0nric0
This sentence no verb.
I heard the NPR story on yesterday's ATC and was struck by the reporter's failure to ask some hard questions. For instance, there was a statement by a Diebold spokesdrone to the effect that "we fix any security issues that we think could be a problem." There was no followup regarding earlier reports of a Diebold built-in backdoor to the systems "for maintainence purposes.' A back-door which, IIRC, required no password or user id to gain access to the server's databases.
Also, there was no discussion of the debate between those of us that believe that the e-voting systems should be required to use Open Source software vs. folks at Diebold and other vendors, who foist off the "trust us, we know what we're doing" line on the public. There was no real discussion of the effect that questionable e-voting results could have on the American political system. There was also no mention of the fact that Diebold's president is involved with raising money for the G.W. Bush re-election campaign and has pledged, IIRC, "to do everything I can to deliver the vote to George Bush." All in all I'm afraid that NPR really dropped the ball on this particular issue.
Just my $.02,
Ron
Impeach Barack Obama for violating the Constitutional requirement to be a "natural born" citizen to hold the office of P
I'm one of the people who did this and you should take a look at the acutal report before you start ranting.
We witness not a fallen world, but falling every day - The Call.
Linda H. Lamone, the administrator of the Maryland State Board of elections, said that the group had produced "a very good report," and that the state would take its recommendations seriously.
Still, she noted that tampering with voting equipment is a felony. "I'm not sure how many people would be willing to get a felony conviction and risk going to jail over an election," she said. Citing the problem of easily opened locks on the machines, she said an attempt to unlock a machine "would be very unlikely to succeed, because it would have to occur in a public place."
This woman should be fired from her job. She basically states that because some act would be a crime that no one would do it!!!
Did that stop Richard Nixon?
Did that stop whoever blew valerie Plame's cover?
Did that stop the authors of MyDoom from writing the virus?
Did that stop all the people in the US who committed crimes last year?
Did that stop Ken Lay and the fine folk at Enron?
Did that stop Halliburton from overcharging the Army?
What a fucking joke. It could have been a Microsoft security advisory for all the good it will do.
My premontion: There will be massive irregularities in the 2004 elections and guess who will win again?
hacking into the voting computers. It's the insiders with an agenda that I am concerned about. The ONLY way to get around this is with a voter-verifiable paper trail AND taking the vote counting away from corporations that create the machines and putting the counting where it belongs: citizen groups.
Diebold and ALL the other commercial vote machine vendors are heavy Republican donors and, particularly in the case of Diebold, run by individuals devoted to getting Republicans elected and Bush elected (I can't say "re-elected" as he didn't get elected in the first place). THESE criminals have the means and motive to taint the vote...in secret! They are in control of the machines and the vote tallies. They cannot be trusted, given how openly partisan they are.
It is NOT the random outside hacker we need to worry about that much (sure, protect against it), it is the machine makers and vote counters themselves that have to be protected against. Ask yourself this: Why is it that EVERY vendor of voting machines are so adamantly opposed to any paper trail possibility? Why are they so strenous in their arguments against it? Because it would queer their ability to tamper with the vote tallies.
Voter-verifiable paper trail. It's the only way to be sure.
In Bushworld, they struggle to keep church and state separate in Iraq as they increasingly merge the two in America.
Would you like to steal an election? Here's a quick survey of how to do it. I'm absolutely serious: I've been involved in political campaigns for years, and have held elected public office. And one of the reasons I'm no longer actively involved in party politics (per se) is that I caught one of my committee people doing some of the shenanigans I mention below.
First--don't waste your time trying to cheat inside the polling place.
You would think the obvious place to steal votes would be in the voting booth, right? After all, bank robbers rob banks--so election crooks would gravitate toward polling places. Right?
Wrong. The place to steal elections is in absentee ballots.
Absentee ballots: the mother lode of vote fraud
Let's suppose that you learn that you've been scheduled for a trip out of state that will keep you from voting. You can call your county courthouse and ask for an absentee ballot application. They'll send you a form, which you fill out and return, and then you'll get an absentee ballot in the mail. You fill out the ballot and send it back to the courthouse by the due date--congratulations! You have voted absentee, and your vote has made the nation stronger. In a perfect world, that's how absentee ballots are supposed to work.
Over the past twenty or twenty-five years the absentee ballot process has, um, changed. In a blowout absentee ballots are meaningless--but in a closely-contested race a handful of absentee ballots can be the difference between a "moral" victory and the real thing. (As a college student I functioned as an "absentee ballot captain"--identifying college students in the Philadelphia area who lived in the 10th congressional district in Illinois. I got them registered to vote at home, and made sure they voted absentee. I put in scores of hours of work--and turned in something like a dozen votes. In 1978 we lost the election by 6 votes--in a special election in 1979 we won by something like 120.) As the value of absentee ballots has become more apparent, people have started to cheat. (The rules for absentee ballots, and the opportunity to cheat, really expanded dramatically with the "Motor Voter" bills that got jammed through state legislatures in the early 1990s.)
How to steal absentee ballots
The simplest way to steal absentee votes is to work your way through nursing homes. The ideal method is to have a dedicated party worker who is a resident of the nursing home--but you can also send in a "volunteer." Nursing homes love volunteers who come to visit--so it's easy to plant somebody. However you do it, your party worker announces that she (or he) wants to help everybody participate in the election. Nothing wrong with that, right? So she distributes voter registration cards (perhaps with your party already checked), and promises to make sure that all the cards get turned in to the courthouse. When election time rolls around, she points out that senior citizens can get absentee ballots without question, and without anything like a doctor's note. All you have to do is ask. So Helpful Sally signs up everybody for absentee ballots. And since the absentee ballot is a bit confusing, Helpful Sally helps everybody fill out their ballot. As a general rule, Helpful Sally is going to get in trouble if she tries to buffalo people into voting for her candidate for governor--but practically nobody knows the names and/or positions of candidates for judge, for district magistrate, for local races--even for state legislative positions. All Helpful Sally has to do is say, "if you don't know the candidates, just leave the ballot blank." Oh, how helpful Sally really is. And to be really helpful, Helpful Sally offers to save the voter the cost of the stamp: she'll take the ballot to the courthouse herself, so your vote won't get lost in the mail.
Once the ballot is done, Helpful Sally can do two things. If the voter picked the wrong office, Helpful Sally can simply "lose" the ballot. Unless the senior citiz