Slashdot Mirror
Diebold Fails Again in San Diego
ptudor writes "An article in today's San Diego Union Tribune reveals nearly 3000 absentee ballots in the San Diego primary one month ago were miscounted. 'The miscounts occurred because multiple scanners simultaneously fed the absentee ballot data into the computer tabulation system. The large number of ballots and candidates on them overwhelmed the system. Diebold spokesman David Bear said the company has provided a software fix to the county for the new problem.' The irregularities were found in a routine post-election review." You can also read more about the problems on election day.
They really ARE using Microsoft Access ;)
Let's take a vote on who pays for all these mishaps, the taxpayers or the company!... no, wait...
I don't know about everyone else but we try to fully test our software before moving it to production. Seems like they should do the same... "During the March 2 election, one of the pieces of equipment used at polling sites was not fully tested, and it failed."
Have you seen the "secret" video? Go here and take a look. I love how these things can't be trusted to add correctly.
Pen and paper: the only way to vote. Say no to machines.
Until there is a way to have two or three safety checks that are electronic, we are always going to see these problems. Have an electronic machine from one company send the vote to its database, and print a "receipt" for the vote out. Then, have they receipt scanned into a system built by a different company, and check the results. The voter can also look at the receipt and verify that is who they voted for, as well, as being double checked to veryify there are no "programming" errors.
-- johntracy.com, because everybody else is wrong.
But they don't always do it well (164 %)
flossie
Write now. Defend liberty
"The irregularities were found in a routine post-election review."
Oh, so that's what they're calling it...
If California government spent $32 million on this system that has been so controversial, I have just one question:
Why wasn't there more quality assurance involved?
Stupid people piss me off, stupid bureaucrats piss me off even more
if ( voter != white )
discard(vote);
I still don't see why we can't stick to paper...
My area usues well labled and hard to screw up fill in the circle sheets that you feed into the scanner yourself. It's reliable paper and offers very quick counting.
Usually I'm all for using technology to make life easier, but this is one area where I think reliable is more important than easy.
Yup.
-Derick
Jon Stewart: "But these things can't be that insecure..."
Some security researcher: "We broke into the board of elections and completely changed the result, erasing all of our traces and got back out"
Stewart: "...um, but sure, you give a guy a day and..."
S.S.R.: "We did it in 5 minutes."
[Paraphrased, but the idea is here... Also, it's possible that the last statement by the SSR was not referring to the entire operation; the Daily Show appearso to have a habit of making deceptive cuts. But who knows...]
In all this talk about electronic voting machine failures, I still don't comprehend how the process can be so complicated that it has so many failures, requires full featured OS (i.e. Windows), etc... I mean all voting is a position, list of names, select 1 or more (depending on the type of election). Couldn't this all be done with code small enough to fit on a ROM or something that would be almost impossible to tamper with? Even votes could be somehow "burned" into a write-once type of memory. Simple network adapter to transfer the results.
I can't remember there ever being the kind of nonsense that Diebold has regularly caused.
I used to write mission critical software (as in, you-screw-up-and-your-user-can-die) for the US Army (Artillery Control). We had to pass internal unit test, integration test, system test, FQT, fielded IOT&E. At each point (past developer level integration), if an anomaly occurred, a trouble report was generated. All priority 1 and 2 reports HAD to be addressed and resolved. Priority 3 needed to be resolved or have a formal waiver.
1 - Failure to perform, user at risk
2 - Failure to perform, no workaround
3 - Failure to perform, workaround available
4 - Irritating/annoyance
5 - other
In the voting arena, I would say that problems with inaccurate counts would be priority 2 (since nobody dies directly). There should be NO WAY any fielded system should have those sorts of trouble.
The only reason we have the rights we have is that people just like us died to gain those rights. -- Cheerio Boy
Secondly, just use paper ballots and be done with it. If you need to see how it's done, come to Canada.
Fiat Homos et Pereat Theos
No - the UK has almost exactly the same system as Canada (where do you think they got it from?) and likewise has seen no problems with it over the last century or so. However the UK has about twice the population density of the US (~60 million people in less than 10% of the area) and it still works (well, it did elect Blair but that can't really be blamed on the system :-)
So no excuses - you could fix it with a system that works if you wanted to!
The receipt doesn't have to be given to anyone or even leave the machine. This has been discussed many, many, many, many, many times.
Run the printout under a plexiglass window and have the voter look at it and verify that the information is correct. Then run it through a second printer that gives it a confirmation or rejection code depending on how the voter responded to the "is this right?" querry. After that, it gets run into the takeup reel. The entire printing mechanism can be sealed in a tamper-proof box that can't be opened by anyone on the premesis, reducing the chance of tampering at the polling place by volunteers.
That takeup reel can even be OCR'd for 100% verification checks by a third party. None of this "spot checking" crap. Again, this reader can be built into the printing mechanism. If everything passes, toss the recipts in a cave somewhere for long-term storage. If they don't match then it's time to crack the seal and check by hand.
... I don't know you tell me. In the last general elections, we were the first state to go all computerised voting, diebold machines. We had all the normal pre elction poll numbers. We also had the real time election day poll numbers. What we got was an "upset" election that defied all the poll numbers, and put an R in the governors seat for the -> first time since the civil war -, along with some other interesting race "upsets". In the morning,election day, there were a boatload of news flashes about people reporting irregularities with the machines, by mid afternoon most of those stories not only stopped coming, they disappeared from places that were initially reporting them, drudge report being one of them, because I know I checked his page before leaving to vote, when I got back around an hour later, it was gone, and that just do not happen on his page all too often. At least I never saw it happen before, they scroll away, but don't get actually removed. Local news on the TV downplayed the heck out of it, and by the next day it wasn't talked about. The term is "spiked" the stories got spiked.
coincidence?
The ramifications are, they can be programmed to give any results they want, and you can't tell. They can be reprogrammed on the spot with a card, or done over a modem. You tell me if you think they are secure, accurate and unbiased, because there's no way anyone who doesn't work for diebold can tell. Before, we had paper ballots, you could eyeball the results, anyone who could see and count could verify a result at the end of the day, now... the machine spits out whatever, there is zero, repeat zero way to verify what the real numbers are. And tell ya, it only takes alteration of a few numbers to REALLY change things.
but it's NEW and SHINY, so it must be better, right?
Tell me, what is the worth, in dollars, a guess, of CONTROLLING a state office like a governorship or a national office like a Rep, Senator or a Presidency? Really, what's the worth, then think on what people do for much, much, much less potential "reward", how far human beings will go for just a few thou? Criminals do a very poor risk/reward ratio when they do a crime. But, what are the risks of getting caught if BY LAW AND DESIGN only a few people really know what's going on with some black box, when your naked eyeballs aren't enough to verify a tally, when no paper trail exists, when the black box has several ways to access it, and when the potential rewards for any criminality can run into sums of figures that are planet earth mind boggling large? When the power that can be accrued by skewing a tally includes literally the getting handed the power of life or death over entire other nations? What is the risk/potential reward ratio then?
Lotta questions, so far the only answers we have point to A-serious incompetence or delibarate malfeasance with voting computers, and B the people involved are connected to extremely radical elements in the political military industrial complex within a single political party, an extreme faction of that party.
I know what my analysis of that tells me
I live and vote in San Diego. I used the touchscreen devices; my wife used an absentee ballot. After using the Diebold boxes, I thought my wife had found a way to evade their problems. From today's article, it looks like I was wrong.
When I went to vote in the morning, at about 8:30 AM (well after the polls were scheduled to open), the machines were still non-functional (you've no doubt already heard the details) and the polling workers couldn't say when the help they requested would arrive. They suggested waiting or going to another polling location to submit a provisional ballot. (At this point, feel free to ponder why these were not tested by the vendor beforehand. Isn't that what YOU would have done?)
Nothing makes democracy feel real to you like being turned away from a voting booth.
When I returned in the evening, the missing cables were provided, instructions corrected and the devices functional. But not well.
In California, each voter receives a balllot information booklet before the election. With the old punch-card paper ballots, the booklet and the ballot were laid out in exactly the same way. You could transfer your decisions from booklet to ballot trivially. The touchscreen display, on the other hand, had the same visual look as the booklet, and the screen was laid out in pages, but page layouts did not correspond to the booklet. Candidates were in different locations on the touchscreen and the booklet. Matching up the two were a pain, and it took a very careful attention to detail to avoid error! Considering that the visual cues implied that that they should correspond, and that they did correspond in the old punchcard system, and I'd be very surprised if it didn't contribute to incorrect selections. (It was at least as bad, probably much worse, than the Florida butterfly ballots.)
Now, if you are replacing an existing system, isn't Rule #1 finding out how the existing system works, so that you know which functionality needs to be replicated?
The last page of the ballot is a vote summary. (Good idea.) It was multi-column on a virtual page that was one screen wide but much, much longer vertically than the physical screen. This is an atrocious user interface. (Imaging reading a PDF of a three-column, 8-1/2" x 11" page on a normal portrait monitor.) Prior to this summary page, the entire previous program was logical page = physical screen, with a horizontal prev page/next page paradigm. So, a bad user interface that's inconsistent with the rest of the application's UI.
Is that how you like to design YOUR software?
Finally, there's the fact that there's no paper record or physical trail of the votes. I can't begin to imagine how this passed Day One of requirements review!
All in all, it did not feel like the polished, professional effort that I want democracy and the control of our nation to depend on.