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More Diebold E-Voting Vulnerabilities
presmike writes "ok, it looks like Diebold has more to worry about now that it is possible to change votes with a 5 line VB script. 'The vulnerabilities involve the Global Election Management System, or GEMS, software that runs on a county's server and tallies votes after they come in from Diebold touch-screen and optical-scan machines in polling places.'"
"There's 14,375 votes for Bush, 14,374 for Kerry and 2,793,036 for Mr. Magoo, let's tell the public about this 4 years after the election, OK?"
A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
After reading all these stories on Slashdot about Diebold voting machines having security holes, I did a little bit of research on my own. I believe I finally found the perfect voting tabulation and candidate selection system, impervious to cheating. Here is the website; it includes video of the machines in operation (Windows ASX format).
Perhaps some of you security experts could evaluate whether this machine is more or less accurate and secure than Diebold's machines, but I'm pretty confident in its ability to surpass Deibold's accuracy. (Note to foreign readers: To interpret the results from the videos: if the red ball 21 or less, that's a vote for Kerry; 22 or more, Bush.)
You'd think a company who's been making ATMs since their inception, would have a good understanding of cryptographic security and the "gotchas" inherent in such systems. Yet it seems that this multi-billion dollar company is utilizing nothing more than junior level Microsoft programmers. I mean, who in their right mind would write a national voting system in Microsoft Access?!?
;-) Then they could get Congress to sanction Google instead! *rolls eyes*
Maybe they should claim that all their security experts were hired by Google after they took the GLAT.
(BTW, I love the "Politics" section color scheme. Can we do something similar for IT?)
Javascript + Nintendo DSi = DSiCade
George Bush and John Kerry sign up for MSDN subscriptions.
Weaselmancer
rediculous.
This isn't new at all, just an extreme example of what we have already seen. We already know that they are stored in an insecure access database - changing votes using 'just' a VBS script is nothing new or exceptional.
it looks like Diebold has more to worry about
You mean, it looks like the American people (and the rest of the world) have more to worry about. Diebold has been incredibly resistant to being damaged, no matter how many problems arise with their software.
"Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one " -Albert Einstein
...Me. After 150,324,123 mysterious write-in votes.
-Looking for a job as a materials chemist or multivariat
GEMS runs on the Windows operating system.
Truly a Gem!
But speaking generally on the vulnerabilities Harris mentions, Diebold spokesman David Bear said by phone that no one would risk manipulating votes in an election because it's against the law and carries a heavy penalty.
I am shocked. Shocked.
He also said that election "policies and procedures dictate that no (single) person has access or is in control of a (voting) system," so it would be impossible for anyone to change votes on a machine without others noticing it. And even if someone managed to change the votes, auditing procedures would detect it.
And this just is a killer. What is this guy smoking? Auditing is not done by default anyway. I am pretty certain Cthulhu is going to be elected.
Free XBox, PS2
Microsoft Windows 2000: $200
Microsoft Access 2000: $200
PC: $500
Hiring an embezzler to put in three set of election results into your voting software controllable by a hidden combination of keys known only to you: $60,000 Changing the election results in favor of your candidate: priceless
"Of course, there are some elections that money can't buy. For everything else, there is Diebold."
Opera Watch - An Opera browser blog.
Why, it's used by the FAA to for radio communications! They wouldn't use something like Windows if it wasn't safe...
President CowboyNeal?
IOW, you don't know shit about them and you still think they are safe.
We are fscking doomed!
Diebold obviously has nothing to worry about - they're getting away with their demolition of democracy, despite the incontrovertible evidence pouring in for the past several years. It is we who have a lot to worry about. Not only are they destroying the vote, but getting away with it means that those running the system are benefitting, or they'd stop it. The stolen election nightmare in America is getting worse, even when it was already unacceptably bad.
--
make install -not war
Any representatives reading this?
If you make a reference to Guybrush Threepwood in your comment I always mod it up. Go Monkey Island!
So what you're saying is, we should elect Guybrush Threepwood for president? Viva la Threepwood!!!
If you'd like some more in-depth knowledge about voting machines, Scientific American is running a great article in their 10/2004 issue.
I'm in the hole of the broadband donut.
For those interested, the current issue of The Economist has an article on voting technology. It does not, of course, discuss this latest development, but gives a good overview of the area, with a great deal of attention given to the issue of paper, paper trails, and making the whole system more transparent.
I've finally got around to changing my sig
Yeah, that's why there's never been any vote fraud in this country...I gotta remember to keep my shotgun loaded this November, that's when the dead people come out to vote in Chicago...
...we just put an "X" in a "box" on something called a piece of paper. On this piece of paper, which we call a "ballot", there is a list of perhaps 4 or 5 names depending on the number of candidates running. You mark an "X" beside the name of the person you wish to vote for... then you take this "ballot" and place it in a cardboard-box.
It may be a little high-tech but this method could catch on in developing democracies like the U.S.
black box voting has 5 (!) different demonstrations on how easy it is to hack these things. There is also an online book (in PDF format) all about how bad the situation really is.
.mdb by hitting a certain key on the touch screen and manipulating at will. Are we living in crazy world?
This is serious. Not only are they using a microsoft access (!!) database to store your vote, they are using a non-password protected access database.
Not only are they using a non-password protected access database, you can gain access to the
'When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.' -HST
What's the big deal about voting machine fraud? If you see any fraud being commited, just write an NEGATIVE SCRIPT to offset those fraudulent votes. That way we'll keep the election nice and balanced.
Their solution: A dual-method system. First, the person fills out a card with their choices. Then they put the card into a slot which reads it, so they get a chance to review their choices. If they want to make changes, the old ballot is stamped with "Void" and shredded, and a new one pops out, ready to use. If they accept the choices, the ballot is placed in a bin *and* recorded electronically.
I'm in the hole of the broadband donut.
I was trained to fix those here in Georgia. Sad thing I find out bout this thru /. not them.
SimonTek
Then it goes "de da da da," and finally it tells you, "is all I want to say to you."
I submitted this in April, crack mods rejected it.
Two brothers will count 80% of the vote.
In a country where no-bid contracts and the VP's corporate relationships aren't questioned, this is worrying.
London's finest organic fairtrade coffee
I don't want my tax dollars bankrolling OSS dev efforts. If you wan't such a system, go ahead and create it. Put a paypal link on your sourceforge page, maybe someone will send you a buck.
Do you want to pay for buggy, easily exploitable software then? I can understand your desire not to waste money on "fantasy vapor product that doesn't exist..", but you are paying for Diebold's mess. And you are paying for paper voting, recounts, and all the supporting infrastructure. Personally, since money is being spent regardless, I'd like to see it go towards a rock solid solution that will last awhile. It seems that OSS would be an excellent candidate.
HA! I just wasted some of your bandwidth with a frivolous sig!
WTF?!? Murder is against the law and carries a heavy penalty and people still do it, numbnuts.
Diebold is saying essentially what the Bush administration and, really, all NeoCons. "Trust us, we'll do what's right. Why shouldn't you trust us? We're respected people in power."
Hell, that was an argument a White House attorney made in front of the Supreme Court! When asked whether a chief executive could falsify documents he said something to the effect of "Yes, but *this* chief executive wouldn't do that."
Why not create a system with ways to keep people from doing things that we don't like, instead of *trusting* people you *don't know* to do the right thing. We could call it something like "checks and balances."
I'm in the hole of the broadband donut.
I've worked with banks on other security systems, and in my experience they often "know what they want" but fail to ask the right questions. Of course, as soon as they start losing money, they get the point quickly. :)
(Okay, laziness over, I think this may be the paper I'm thinking of: Why Cryptosystems Fail)
You want an OSS voting system, write one. Then lobby the government to use it. You've got it all backwards. The government does not fund software projects to reinvent the wheel (at least it shouldn't, not with my money).
"Reinventing the wheel" is a bad analogy in this case. The priority here isn't to save money, it's to correctly count votes. Saving money is a secondary consideration. (This is why we don't fire judges and outsource our courts to India, even though that would save money too.) On a national scale, the amounts of money involved with Diebold are relatively miniscule- they probably wouldn't fund the Iraq War for more than a few hours. (And it isn't even clear that buying Diebold saves money over an in-house solution.) But there is simply no way to know that the votes are being counted if you can't SEE how they are being counted.
DieBold already had a system when the government went looking, the OSS community didn't. Their choices were DieBold, a couple other vendors, or "fantasy vapor product that doesn't exist and even if they funded it's development there's no guarantee the thing will exist by election time".
You are making an assumption without realizing it here- that the Diebold system will be automatically superior to the card-based system that was in place in Florida's 2000 election. Which actually performed remarkably well under the extreme condition of a tie. There is no reason why these new systems have to be in place by 2004 when they may actually compromise the election compared to the system we had before.
I don't want my tax dollars bankrolling OSS dev efforts.
Maybe not GPL software (I'd agree with you that far) but if we're going to use a voting system we should all be allowed to see the code, even if we can't modify or distribute it. Otherwise only Diebold knows who really won, and in fact Diebold is put in a position where they can choose the next president. The key concept is transparency.
Counting votes isn't even a hard problem. Diebold (and the rest of the software industry) has succeeded in convincing the government that
numVotes++
is some ingenious discovery like penicillin. So you aren't allowed to see the code, which might really look like
if (vote equals BUSH || (vote equals KERRY && rnd() < 0.9))
numVotes++
Diebold's right to its "intellectual property" has superceded your right to know your vote was counted. Ironic, considering these mounting revelations that Diebold's intellectual property isn't very "intellectual" to begin with.
Why not simply license Brazil's Voting System? I am working as a volunteer in Brazil's city elections this years. The machines are simple and reliable, here are the specs. CPU: Geode National - 200 MHz. RAM: 64mb on board. 2 USB and 1 parallel on board. IDE and Floppy interface. 2 30mb flash disks - one for program and the other for the results. 1 floppy disk drive - sadly that's how we deliver the votes... but its quite error free because the votes are also printed. and theres also the flash disk. 9,4" LCD Here's the new model http://www.procomp.com.br/projesp.asp The only real bug in Brazil's votting system is the elector heehe... We elected a drunk last election for president... well... better than Bush... but still a drunk... ehehee
Essential: Build the machine and software from the ground up starting with the proposition that you will have to recount the votes. All other considerations are secondary.
Parallel testing. On the day of election, randomly select a machine, pull it out, and run a simulated voting process on it. Compare the results with what they should be. Video the entire process. If the results are wrong, go back and investigate the video tape. It should be done for each polling place. This is expensive. The machines cost $3,000-$5,000.
Test before, during, and after elections.
California requires mandatory recounting for a random 1% sample of all ballots. This was introduced after optical scan ballots. This should be a national law.
New Hamphire allows any candidate to demand a recount for up to a 3% margin. Experts know how to count.
Florida did not know how to count votes correctly like many other states.
Issues like blind access are important to the blind, but remember our priorities! Recounts are the essential priority!
Ways to Cheat
Don't activate the cheating until after the election starts.
Only cheat with a few machines. Only a margin is required to swing a close election.
No verifiable audit trial. Design a paperless machine that counts votes and is not voter verifiable.
Get access to the machine before or after the election. The machines are almost always kept in insecure storage and shipped via insecure delivery.
Randomly change a number of votes each way each time you check the results. Change some votes for Kerry and some votes for Bush. Just weigh the cheating for your candidate. This way, you can't tell whether the cheating is a bug or malicious code.
My voting precinct has recently began using an optical scan voting system in which you blacken in little circles on the paper ballot for your choice and then feed your ballot into the vote scanning machine which then tallies the results and records them electronically. At the end of the day, the results get sent electronically to some central point where they are supposedly tallied. Anyway, I voted last Tuesday in a statewide primary and when I arrived about 20 minutes after the polls opened, there was already a long line of people waiting to feed their ballots into the vote scanner machine which was refusing to accept any of them. The voting supervisor guy was a gentleman in his 80s who obviously did not have a clue about what to do to either fix the machine or report the problem. People kept arriving, filling out their votes, and then lining up until the place was jammed. (There were 6 precincts using one vote scanning machine). Finally, one of the poll workers got a cardboard box, wrote 'votes' on the side, and said we could just leave our ballots in the box and they would feed them into the vote scanning machine later when it was 'fixed.' So...that's what everyone did since people had to get on to work and such. My conclusion was that this e-voting system was extremely vulnerable to any sort of problem, easily circumvented with fraud, and, in this case, didn't preserve ballot secrecy. This stuff never even got a mention in a newspaper which reported instead how well the voting went.
I call bullshit!
I'm sure the Diebold people do understand security, very well. Security is their main business. Clearly, the absense of security in the voting systems is not a result of accident, oversight, or incompetence. I am sure the absense of security is absolutely intentional.
These machines are designed, from the start, to rig elections.
California has a whistleblower statute that would allow them to collect up to 30% of any reimbursement paid to the state.
It makes sense, the state is awarding people for bringing things to their attention which save them money. A lot of employers engage in the same practice.
What?