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NSA Security Guide for Mac OS X
An anonymous reader writes "The National Security Agency has just released a Security Configuration Guide for Apple Mac OS X (pdf). The guide mostly contains common sense configuration information that applies to many Unix systems. It also includes specific discussion for Apple's unique features such as Keychain and FileVault. It should be useful to most Mac OS X users and will be particularly useful for US Government organisations that use Mac OS X and for commercial IT Departments that are supporting Mac OS X. A range of other NSA Security Configuration guides for other operating systems, applications, and IT kit are also available."
Step 45,328:
There is no step 45,328. There is no step 45,328...*soft weeping sounds*
Obliteracy: Words with explosions
I tell you one interesting thing. While it was working back in 2003, I updated a 68030 Mac Duo laptop 7.6's modem driver from Apple site. I even had support about how to add more ram. That machine is back from 1994 or something.
OS X updates aren't service packs, they are new OS'es. 10.3.0 is a new OS , 10.3.1 is a service pack.
About antivirus and anti adware? As its a BSD based real OS, its run by rights. As its a pain in the ass to code a spyware on linux, its much more harder on OS X. Guess why? OS X shows a user friendly window which is centralized by OS GUI whenever a program needs administrative access.
Oh there is a program on OS X, comes with it and has a unsolved security problem. Yes, it still exists. Guess what is it? INTERNET EXPLORER macintosh edition.
In Soviet russia, only old Koreans profit from pictures of Natalie Portman stored on Beowulf Clusters.
Given how entrenched Micro$oft's clutches are into the US Government, a security guide for Windows based systems would be even more useful.
(I work for NASA; almost everyone in our group has Mac OS X on our desktops and Linux in the server room. Our supervisor is the only Windows user. Yes, he's developing pointy hair.)
....actually implementing everything the NSA recommends in its guides will get you a system that is both highly secure and exceptionally inconvenient for its users. It's a useful reference, to see if you've forgotten anything that you particularly want, or anything obvious, but as always, individual admins will have to decide for themselves where they want their systems to lie on the security-usability axis...
ABSURDITY, n.: A statement or belief manifestly inconsistent with one's own opinion.
Hmm the pdf is downloading at .6 k/s and dropping. Slashdotting the NSA - this qualifies for some sort of Darwin award, doesn't it? :)
Has anyone seen this before?
The U.S. Governement's ultra-secret monitoring system 'echelon' was briefly unavailable after the NSA's web servers were Slashdotted.
Always leave an NSA auto-secure port (9999) open on your machine.
Disregard any unexplained background executables.
Always use IE when surfing.
Confine all discussing of terrorist/anti-government actions to public networks (or private ones, we don't really care)
Pick any two.
I don't need no instructions to know how to rock!!!!
Alright, we've slashdotted the NSA!!!!!
Now we can safely do, umm, whatever it is that we thought we couldn't do safely while the NSA had an active internet connection. Psst, any terrorists out there need a browser with 128-bit SSL enabled?
Quantum materiae materietur marmota monax si marmota monax materiam possit materiari?
Yikes! The replies to this story are completely screwed up. I'm starting to feel sorry I ever tried to make a joke. I figured others would have something more insightful to say. Well, since no one else will, I'll try to say something insightful.
It seems to me that most OS X users are pretty quiet on the topic because they can't find anything to say. Not because they're ashamed, but more because OS X Just Works(TM). Since the OS Just Works(TM), security guidelines like this are nothing more than hints on how to prevent users from accidentally opening security holes.
Contrast this with Windows, where everyone is always looking for the "magic solution" that will allow them to completely close of the machine from attack. Yet Windows insists on requiring various services (e.g. RPC) to be running and publicly available before it will run properly.
Some might argue that OS X is so secure because the developers had an opportunity to view OSes which came before them. This may seem like a reasonable argument, but quickly falls apart once OS X's heritage is investigated. You see, OS X is really the next major release of NeXTSTEPl an OS that pre-dates Microsoft's creation of Windows NT & 95. NeXT got it right back then. Why can't other OS makers get it right today?
Javascript + Nintendo DSi = DSiCade
Since it's a security site, I'd expect it to display a warning and disable the site if you are clueless enough to accept the cookie!
You gotta start with the fundamentals...
I finally found something about OS X that I absolutely hate and is making me question the entire OS. OS X has its own digital certificate/private key cache (which also stores passwords, but that is irrelevant), which is convenient for applications that use certificates and private keys for identity (like safari and mail.app). It also has a nice utility for managing this environment (Keychain Access).
HOWEVER, Apple (for reasons I cannot fathom) has decided to not allow keys and certs to be exported from this cache. This is totally unacceptable and horribly wrong. In this email, which confirms my worst fears, Peter Sagerson says it best:
In Jaguar, private keys are never exportable. This seems kind of silly, since my digital identity should be linked to me, not the platform, the machine or that particular (and transient) installation of the OS. In Panther, Keychain Access has an Export command, but it's never enabled. I don't see a Keychain-level API for key export and the CSSM API doesn't seem to work. So it's hard to tell what the intention is.
The intention seems to be the very incorrect idea that the digital identity belongs to the computer, and not the person. I have figured out how to move my cert and key to another Mac, that is simple creating a new keychain, copying certs to it, and moving the new keychain file to another machine. However, I still cannot get them out of Apple's proprietary format to move them to any non-OSX platform. I have posted this question to Apple's usually helpful discussion forum, but have received no answer.
This is most disturbing and calls into question both Apple's competency with regard to security in general, and their intentions with regard to what the user can do with their own data (or in this case, their own identity)
Step 1: Pack Windows system in appropriate shipping container
Step 2:Mark container "Target"
Step 3: Have courier deliver container to nearest FBI shooting range
Several people have already called the slashdotting. They're still alive and kicking! Gotta give em credit for trying. "Mr. President, we're giving her all we can! She just doesn't have enough bandwidth!" "Well, why not just use one of the other Internets?"
Corsaire Ltd has an excellent practical OS X security whitepaper in this same vein.
Apple is most certainly not tying digital identity to the computer.
Your Keychain, in ~/Library/Keychains, is perfectly portable, and designed to be moved from computer to computer, or stored on a device for storing such tokens, such as a USB flash drive.
Further, that certificates are even in your keychain at all implies that you should have access to the original source certificate files, which clearly remain portable.
And finally, rumor has it that Tiger will include much more advanced features for managing, importing, and exporting certificates and CAs.
Attacks on MacOS X will be driven by user interaction.
.
/Library/StartupItems.
The biggest problem for malware writers in MacOS X is that it's hard to remotely attack the box.
Mac OS 9 and its ilk were pretty much impossible to compromise remotely, because, well, they were designed as single-user OSs with no network services (no network daemons) installed by default.
Mac OS X isn't quite like that, but it's close. The downside is all those bsd-level things probably have holes of one sort or another. Has anyone actually checked the robustness of Apple's X-11 implementation?
OTOH, it's must easier to get the user to click and download something. The "prompt for your admin password" thing is great, but everyone does it without thinking these days, giving any installer root access.
Once that happens, you can install anything, anywhere, and given the structure of MacOS X you can hide your stuff in places a normal user won't be able to find. The "Opener" guys (see www.macintouch.com) should have edited the rc scripts, not stuck their stuff in
Luckily, the web/email based attacks haven't worked so far (unlike on Windows), so you really do need to get someone to run an app. These days that isn't as hard as it used to be.
Apple could protect against that by doing a system restore/diff after every installer run. It would be useful after-the-fact, and most users may not understand any of it, but it would be nice to have. Or (assuming the metadata stuff works in tiger) you could stash metadata info on the installed files somewhere, then search across your filesystem for matching stuff?
Ideally (and this is what MS tried) each publisher would sign all their files, and that sig would be part of the file metadata. So you could list, see, and search across it. Malware would bypass that, though, but you never know.