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PGP Moving To Stronger SHA Algorithms

PGP Corp. is moving to a stronger SHA Algorithm (SHA-256 and SHA-512) as consequence of the research conducted by the team at Shandong University in China who broke the SHA-1 algorithm. (See this earlier story for more information on the SHA-1 vulnerability.)

24 of 247 comments (clear)

  1. Not a solution by Esine · · Score: 4, Insightful

    They're just trying to avoid the problem, not solve it. Moving to SHA-512 is not a solution. :/

    1. Re:Not a solution by anothergene · · Score: 5, Insightful


      They're just trying to avoid the problem, not solve it. Moving to SHA-512 is not a solution. :/


      Could also be a stop gap solution. At least it will be harder to break in the mean time until a real solution is devised.

      --
      Who's leg do I have to hump to get a dry martini around here?
    2. Re:Not a solution by Storlek · · Score: 2, Insightful

      What solution is there? Moving to a stronger hashing algorithm is surely better than doing nothing at all.

      --
      Bears don't normally eat things that talk and move backwards.
    3. Re:Not a solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      What, then, is?

      Moving to Tiger? Or Whirlpool? Or RIPEMD-160?

      The amount of effort it took to discover the weakness in SHA-1 was incredible, and SHA-256 and SHA-512 are even more complex. Tiger and Whirlpool are relatively untested, and RIPEMD-160 was put out as an update after the original RIPEMD was broken (Much like SHA-0).

      SHA-256 and SHA-512 are the most likely successors to the throne, because they're based on an algo that is STILL, despite being "broken", known to have very strong collision resistance.

    4. Re:Not a solution by uhoreg · · Score: 4, Insightful
      1. SHA-256 is not just SHA-1 with more bits; it's a different algorithm. So moving from SHA-1 to SHA-256 is not the same as moving from RSA-512 to RSA-1024. (However, moving from SHA-256 to SHA-512 would be.)
      2. RSA was never broken in the same way that SHA-1 is now (allegedly -- since the paper is not yet published) broken, or that MD5 is broken. SHA-1 is broken in the sense that the researchers were able to find a collision in much less than the expected 2^80 calculations. This indicates that the algorithm is weaker than previously believed, and may soon result in much quicker attacks. RSA-512 is broken because computing power has caught up with it, and it's possibly economical to build a computer that can crack 512-bit RSA keys. Weaknesses that are solely due to key/hash size may be fixed by switching to a larger size. Weaknesses that are inherent in the algorithm may not be able to be fixed in this way.
      --

      To get something done, a committee should consist of no more than three persons, two of them absent.

    5. Re:Not a solution by darkonc · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Sure it does, because you're talking about two different algorithms.

      Not really. SHA1+MD5 can be expressed as a singular algorithm that produces the combined signature.... thing is, you now end up with one algorithm broken in two different ways that may actually allow for an easier breakage down the road (it's a bit harder to predict, given that you're now looking at a relatively ad-hock concatonation).

      It's not that it's a known breakage -- rather that you're now looking at a very ad-hock union that hasn't been carefully designed. In some ways, it's better to go with widening the key on a well designed system with known breakage than to go with an ad-hock system with unknown properties (other than two different kinds of classes of known holes).

      --
      Sometimes boldness is in fashion. Sometimes only the brave will be bold.
  2. the problem is still there by bird603568 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    wouldn't the problem still exist but the odds of cracking it would be so huge it wouldn't be worth it?
    right? correct me if im wrong.

    1. Re:the problem is still there by pclminion · · Score: 3, Insightful
      Well, until mankind figures out a way around the pigeonhole problem -- which is NEVER -- this "problem" will always exist.

      What we should be asking ourselves is, is there a way to construct a hashing algorithm for which the OPTIMAL method for finding collisions is a brute force search? So far it hasn't been done, and it hasn't been definitely proven to be possible or impossible, either.

      I see a lot of people on these forums complaining that we should "just" make a hash algorithm that is unbreakable. It's a logical impossibility. Can you fit an infinite number of things into a finite number of holes and guarantee that each hole has at most one object in it? I hope people are capable of grasping that, at least.

    2. Re:the problem is still there by Llywelyn · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Slight clarification.

      It is a logical impossibility to make one that dodges the pigeonhole principle, i.e., one that is "collisionless."

      This is different from whether one can be "broken," i.e., a message can be found that collides in less than brute force time (2^80 for SHA1).

      --
      Integrate Keynote and LaTeX
  3. Why not move sooner? by }InFuZeD{ · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Is there a reason to wait until someone breaks the existing algorithm before moving to a stronger one?

    It seems to me that if you start working on implementing the stronger ones BEFORE your existing one is broken?

    An ounce of prevention...

  4. i'm no crypto expert... by Phil246 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    but why not take a hash of a hash ?
    if its broken once - all you get is another hash and with no way of telling if you`ve cracked it or not, its useless

    1. Re:i'm no crypto expert... by Sweetshark · · Score: 4, Insightful

      but why not take a hash of a hash ?
      Because breaking the hash means finding two documents resulting in the same hash. If the first hash ist the same for both documents all hashes of hashes will be the same too.
      What you could do is using different hash-algos, but it increases the amount of code to be managed and reviewed thoroughly (security by obscurity rarely works). And it increases the size of the digest - SHA-256 does that too but it keeps the algorithm simple.

  5. Re:Come on... by no+parity · · Score: 5, Insightful
    They did not break it. They just found a way to reduce the number of trials needed to find a collision.

    That is what's usually referred to as "breaking" a hash algorithm.

  6. Re:Come on... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    They did not break it. They just found a way to reduce the number of trials needed to find a collision.

    And what exactly would you consider broken? Since when was "it don't work as we thought" not good enough?

    Let me give you an example. You sign your Last Will and Testament digitally. You can do that; the courts will uphold it. Now, these fine researchers can concoct a new Will that says something different, but still appears to be signed by you.

    Of course you already knew they could do that, but you thought it would take 20 million or so years. As it turns out, your estimate was several orders of magnitude too high. That's what these researchers have proven.

    Is SHA-1 broken yet?

  7. Re:Come on... by slavemowgli · · Score: 2, Insightful

    From a cryptography point of view, that *is* breaking it.

    --
    quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
  8. Re:I'm all for encyrption by Storlek · · Score: 2, Insightful

    (PHPBBQ? *mentally runs sed s/PHP/PGP/g on post*)

    I would still rather see people encrypt all their data than to send (even potentially) sensitive data in plain text. Sure, the best option would be educating people on what is really important, and thus worth encrypting, but a lot of people can't seem to grasp the concept of privacy/security. I know people who would submit a credit card number to some shady website over plain HTTP, without even looking on the page for a privacy policy.

    Granted, it is borderline ridiculous to encrypt anything and everything, but it's better than not encrypting anything at all and hoping nobody's looking.

    --
    Bears don't normally eat things that talk and move backwards.
  9. Re:Come on... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Okay, even if you can find a collision in, say, a day... Great. You can find a collision in a day. But how many collisions will you have to sort through before you find one that even resembles a will, especially one that, say, gives all your property to me?

    Oh, sure, lots. But if the SHA-1 is being used for, say, passwords - where all that's stored and checked is the hash - then ANY collision will do. So if you can find a collision in a day, you can break into any system using SHA-1 for password authentication in a day.

    That's broken.

  10. Meanwhile, in the real world.... by CastrTroy · · Score: 1, Insightful

    I realize that this means that 2 messages can be generated with the same hash. However, does this really signify such a big weakness. The person generating the hashes has no control over the content of either of the messages, nor do they have control over what the resulting hash will be. So, you can, in a reasonable amount of time, generate 2 arbitrary messages with the same, yet still arbitrary hash. So what. Unless you can generate meaningful messages with identical hashes, you don't really accomplish anything through using this technique.

    --

    Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
  11. Re:Come on... by CastrTroy · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Didn't they already prove this broken by creating a database of all hashes possible for all alpha-numeric passwords up to a certain length. I think it was for a different hash though. Anyway, if you're going to spend all the computation power to break passwords, you might as well just make a reverse hash database, it will be much more useful to you.

    --

    Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
  12. Phones tapped? by theLOUDroom · · Score: 3, Insightful

    So what do you guys wanna bet that at least a few of these researchers have their phones tapped at this point?

    I can't think of any intelligence agency that that wouldn't like a few days head start with any more findings these guys come up with.

    I'm not really headed anywhere specfic with this comment, other than getting this thought out there. People have been bugged to gain access to much less exciting information than this.

    --
    Life is too short to proofread.
  13. Missing details to complete the perspective by mukund · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Adding to what you've said, if the cumbled SHA-1 wall is 4.9 cm (1.9 in) tall, our current average reach of scaling the wall is still a few nano metres.

    It appears as if that 4.9 cm wall is very scalable, but it still isn't easily scalable.

    Quoting Bruce Schneier's quote of what Jon Callas, PGP's CTO said: "It's time to walk, but not run, to the fire exits. You don't see smoke, but the fire alarms have gone off."

    --
    Banu
  14. Re:Come on... by uhoreg · · Score: 2, Insightful

    What you are describing is a different type of attack from what the Chinese researchers discovered. Their attack allows them to generate two messages that have the same hash; it doesn't allow them to generate a message that hashes to a fixed value. So password hashing is still safe -- AFAIK, there are no known attacks against it other than brute force (or rubber hose).

    --

    To get something done, a committee should consist of no more than three persons, two of them absent.

  15. Re:Collisions by theLOUDroom · · Score: 2, Insightful
    Why not use two hashes? It's exponentially harder to find a collision that fits for two hashes, isn't it?

    Two reasons:

    1. The first is implementation specfic. Say you're using this hash function for a typical /etc/passwd file. By using two hashes you've just made yourself even weaker than if you had only used one hash. (It's like having two doors with one lock each, not two locks on one door.)
      Note that there are circumstances where you don't care about this, because the original data is public and you just want to be sure it wasn't fiddled with.
    2. The second lies in that fact that yes, you are making it hard to tamper with a file by using two algorithms, but unless you have two algorithms that are exactly equally secure, you would be better off just applying those extra bits to make the hash from the stronger algorithm longer.
    --
    Life is too short to proofread.
  16. Re:I'm all for encyrption by ArbitraryConstant · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "Since then, the USA's encyrption policy has been undermined from so-called allies such as Canada and Mexico such that these technologies are in the public domain and commonly used in communicating things that threaten our national security."

    The US's encryption policy has been undermined because it's stupid. Canada and Mexico are only two of the dozens of countries that agree with my assessment.

    Even if the USA were the only source of strong crypto (Not the case. Rijndael aka AES comes from Belgium.) or every other country agreed with the American position (ha!), it only takes one leak for the bad guys to get the good cyphers.

    One leak. When every computer has a binary implementation that can be reverse engineered. When open source software has the source code available for all to see. Even if nobody sold/distributed the good versions outside of the US, it would still be trivial to get a good version out.

    --
    I rarely criticize things I don't care about.