Internet Providers Band Together to Fight Evil
toadlife writes "A group of prominent Internet providers are teaming up with a security vendor Arbor Networks to form the Fingerprint Sharing Alliance. Through the use of Arbor Networks Peakflow SP internet appliance (which is an OpenBSD box with some secret sauce mixed in), members of the alliance can share internet threat information with each other in real time. It sounds a bit like Razor, doesn't it?"
How about: "It sounds a bit like SkyNet, doesn't it?"
DDOS attacks? BitTorrent traffic? Spam email? Slashdotting? Seems a bit too vague to be good.
If the cat can't experience its own death, nothing will ever kill you. (No, really!)
This all seems to vague to work, a box that could be exploitable reporting "evil" acts to others, there's something missing here
I can't see this working unless they make it more secure, and define what "evil" is
Business Voyeur
Ok when i first read this , i had images of a bunch of guys in orange suits bursting into peoples houses and Instaling firefox and anti spyware software on windows machines, then just before diving out the window shouting "All in a days work Ma'am"
. ,which has been around for a good while i have been amazed how many ISPs are actualy doing very little about it , I have my theorys why some do so little (pay per bandwidth is becoming rather popular these days) though most are not like this.
After reading the story though , i must say "About fragleing time "
As the submitter mention razor
The sooner ISPs take a proactive(shudder jargon word) stand against offenders and start to disalow the traffic or manage problems (im aware many people are victums , but this gives them an alert that they have an infected PC ), the sooner we can start to enjoy our times online without fear of Spam or fear that our servers will be DDoS'ed into the ground.,
The only things certain in war are Propaganda and Death. You can never be sure which is which though
The best example for collaborative evil fighting is www.barracudanetworks.com
This is my sig. There are thousands more, but this one is mine.
A group of prominent Internet providers :\
Not after we slashdotted them
Shouldn't these so called "Internet providers" cope with a small increase in traffic?
This could be the greatest comic book. Ever.
Initiatives such as this one are part of a move toward an internet immune system -- active systems that watch for and halt undesirable activities. But like the mammalian immune system, it will doubtless be subject to false positives. This raises the potential for auto-immune diseases such as when someone's IP is inappropriately blacklisted.
The core of the problem will be a disconnect between the fast response time required for properly halting fast-spreading malware (e.g., a compact worm that attacks even just 1% of hosts will probably double its infected base every second and saturate the entire net within a minute) and the slower response times of human-mediated due-process procedures. The need to quickly halt infections will lead to a hair-trigger system that may shutdown innocent hosts or kill legitimate activity.
Internet auto-immune diseases are potentially quite serious as that actually create a serious new vulnerability. Criminals could try to trigger an immune response on a target and trigger an immunity-DOS response on the target by using the system against itself.
Two wrongs don't make a right, but three lefts do.
Ok, Peakflow SP tracks and reports on network flows and the associated data gleaned from a flow such as src/dst IP addresses and ports, bytes transferred, duration of flow, etc. It does't capture packet data (though you can do that on a limited basis). A flow is a unique network transaction that starts with the first packet from a source to a destination and ends with either a time-out(no packet sent) or in the case of TCP, a close sequence (RST, FIN).
/. effect might trigger a DoS alert, but someone has to go investigate the cause. Besides, how many sites get /.ed on a daily basis? But in general, flash traffic would be seen.
What is interesting about this is that traffic like DoS/DDoS attacks port scans have unique network fingerprints. For example, a DDoS attack is a large amount of traffic to a single source, often without any return traffic. That is unusual. Sure, the
What this means for service providers, hopefully, is that they can more quickly respond to attacks and improve the general health of the networks they manage by locating the source of the malicious traffic more quickly.
If they would but do it this coalition could expand their concern to the detection and prevention of zombie spam (that is, abuse of systems within each provider's IP space as zombies) they could begin the process of eliminating spam. Not dealing with spam, eliminating spam. It's long past time for that.
The great unexploited opportunity for eliminting spam is at the intermediate level (that is, ahead of the destination server for the spam.) If they had been implemented in sufficient numbers at the appropriate time (with "sufficient numbers" being below 1% of all IP addresses) open relay and open proxy honeypots could have eliminated spam - before the spammers had a chance to advance to zombies.
The great anti-spam opportunity is still at the intermediate level (where distinguishing spam from valid email isn't necessary - no valid email follows the path spam takes.) At the intemediate level anti-spam actions can easily be 100% effective, 100% accurate. No spam delivered, no valid email (of which there is none using that path) wrongly stopped.
All it would take would be for ISPs and others to detect the abuse and then act against it - in all the ways they can or in all the ways they choose (some, for instance, might cling to the "only blocking is good" philospohy. OK, let them only block - it still is productive, even though it's way less so than interception, since the spammers can simply choose another abuse path when they experience blocking. For interception the spammers first need to learn that the spam is bieng intercepted. It's always good to make life harder for the spammers, to add to their burden.)