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Stealing Data? A Sniffer Shows it's Easy
museumpeace writes "Though its not exactly a How-To of cracking into financial institutions, a few intriguing details are mentioned in a New York Times article "the Sniffer vs the Cybercrooks" (it's worth the cookie). From the article: ""Tell me the things you most want to keep secret," Mr. Seiden challenged a top executive at the bank a few years back.....A week later, Mr. Seiden again sat in this man's office in Manhattan, in possession of both supposedly guarded secrets....""
http://www.bugmenot.com/
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I hate the one hundred and twenty character limit for signatures with an all-enveloping, all-destroying, incredible pass
just takes ya back to the saying "the most secure server is one that's offline" :)
I think that it's good that we see companies more involved and interested in tightening up their security. Most companies just buy expensive firewalls and other systems to protect their data, but ignore other obvious threats like someone just walking into their offices and sitting down at a unused workstation and browsing around the companies network. Security is multi-layered and a continuous process, that means even if they went through a security audit and everything was ok, they shouldn't stop to improve their security,..there's always a fast-paced race between those who protect and those who will try to pass that protection. Hope this story gives other companies which don't care about security a real reason to make an audit in the very near future.
Has anyone from /. / OSTG ever thought about asking NYT for system like the blogger registration-free linking thing?
Just a thought
paul reinheimer
The most secure server is first locked, then secured with a Kryptonite lock. After this, some real Kryptonite is attached to it (remember, it is never secure as long as Superman can bust into it). After this, it is encased in carbonite with a scarecrow wearing a Jar Jar Binks mask. The entire assembly is left in Jabba's palace. Don't worry, no one's gonna even be thinking of approaching the thing to rescue Jar Jar.
Just in case anyone does, we have an "I Love the Bee Gees" bumper sticker on the side. Also, we've moved it to a position standing right behind Jabba's toilet. I dare you to approach it.
Don't blame Durga. I voted for Centauri.
What's cheaper in the mind of a shortsighted executive that can only see ahead to about a three to six month range?
Having you put in jail for threats of terrorism to shut you up about their secrets, or paying the IT guys overtime to fix the holes?
Job? I don't have time to get a job! Who will sit around and bitch about being broke and unemployed then?
People expect thieves to act like thieves. Act like you know what you're doing, and you can walk out with most data.
Another lesson -- put AP mines in your crawlspaces.
Paste this link into google and click through for a single page version
n ey/31hack.html?pagewanted=all
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/business/yourmo
no reg required
Even people that believe in pre-destiny look both ways before crossing the street.
During my career, I have worked as a tech break/fix. I have worked for a university, federal govt, and private sector.
;-) "Oh, ok. You look honest." He actually told me I looked honest, so it was ok! From there I found the office I wanted, no one was there. I was to swap out a couple of hard disks, so I did. Many people poked their head in, joking along the way, "Hey! You don't look like XXXXXXXX! Unless he's shrunk! hahaha!" One even to see "what does a hard disk look like?" No one questioned me from there.
Due to the nature of the job it is difficult to get passes or keys to move around immediately, especially into secure areas. So you put on your charm and off you go.
It is very easy to take things. Just look like you know what you are doing and where you are going.
Be presentable and nice, be friendly with the receptionists/secretaries/admin, and you can go anywhere.
I have been let into computer rooms that are supposedly secure, I have been assisted by security guards in loading computer gear into my car, I have had secretaries hold doors on elevators so I could get stuff in. I'm talking thousands upon thousands of $$$ worth of stuff. All of them took my word for it, never questioning or phoning to find out. I have never had to show ID.
I have actually had one employee of a major oil corporation watch me follow him in through the doors, ask me, "Where are you going? Who are you?"
This was going into their engineering areas, from which I'm sure numerous other oil companies would love to see the data.
I replied that I am a computer tech and visting XXXXXXX. "Who? Are they on this floor?" "Yeah, they are, around the corner." (I really only had an office number
Many, too many to count, I have just knocked on the door and asked for Mr. S.A.S. "Oh, I'm here to take a look at his computer, he said it wasn't working. Can I see it?" Then they lead me to the office, in which Mr. S.A.S. isn't there. "Well, I'll just start and he'll come back and I'll let him know. Thanks." Then they leave.
It doesn't matter how secure it is, like the article points out, being sociable gets you lots of open doors.
Crazy part is that I pride myself on this "talent." It's much simpler to talk your way through than to have to run all over getting ok's and escorts into areas.
...act as if you know what you're doing and you can walk out with the computers, too.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
The key to this is that knowing what he thinks is secret is half the battle to finding it out.
Once the executive told him where to target, that made it much easier. If you're talking about sniffing the entire network output of a company looking for important stuff... that's a much harder task.
I would have been impressed if the CEO didn't tell him what data he thought was most important and he was able to both figure it out and acquire it.
There are sniffer detectors out there, but I'd not want to use SATAN for it.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
In practice, almost no organization is going to install all of the above. Even the US Government, which is not short of ready cash, is getting far poorer grades on their network security audits than they should.
However, if you define the "target" or "ideal" security schema, then you have something you can compare against. IMHO, the above description is the "ideal", in that it is unlikely that anyone would be able to break in using technological methods.
The remaining problem - social engineering - is not something you can program against. The description I outlined, if implemented in full, would provide enough checks and counter-checks to require someone using social engineering to get past several people, which raises the bar a little but does not make it hard enough.
("Hard Enough" is defined here as making it an impractical method for typical IT situations.)
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
One of the main reasons that approaches like social engineering work is because of the overwhelming emphasis a lot of companies put on "customer service".
I worked for several years in corporate security (good money/awful job), and it was the cardinal sin to piss someone off. On one occasion, a white guy showed up on a weekend with a pass card with a Vietnamese woman's name on it that wasn't cleared for access to the floor he wanted to get onto, which was the executive floor of a bank nonetheless.
The ten minutes it took to verify this guy's identity were the cause of a major spat between him (he turned out to be a VP of some sort) and my employer (the building management) that took days to blow over.
Some of my colleagues would simply give in if someone was pushy enough. No one wants to be the person who said "No" to the wrong person, no matter what the circumstances.
That's right: I'm gumby dammit.
That reminds me of the graphing calculator story:
http://www.pacifict.com/Story/
that says a lot about corporate security.
At any rate, the main point of the article is that there is a cost/benefit to security (security is expensive and can hamper productivity), but that most of the time people/corporations don't even bother looking for simple effective measures that would reduce the risk for little or no extra cost.
Tell me the things you most want to keep secret
That, right ther, was the single biggest security breach. By far, the amount of data that is out there is simply too much for a random hacker to grab some data and make a profit from it. He needs to know what data he can use. Professionally data thiefs already know what they want to steal, but they are not the types to simply be stopped by security measures of any kind. If worse comes to worse, he can always just get a job as a janitor, or better yet, a security guard at the place he wants to steal from and flount ALL security measures.
root@somebox# cat rename.patch
/usr/sbin/satan /usr/sbin/santa
#!/bin/sh
# Idiots getting their panties in a bunch of a friggin' program name!
# Fine, here:
mv
echo "Happy now?!"
Big Corps only bother about security if a major shareholder gets upset by a security breach. The chances of a major shareholder getting wind of a security breach are minimal, unless it gets in the media.
Hence most security in Big Corps is to prevent media people getting notice of security breachs.
HTH.
threadeds blog
I'm sick of these assholes submitting stories and not posting regfree NYT links.
Seriously, why NOT post a regfree link? You KNOW damn well they exist, so what the hell is the problem?
Instead of wasting our fucking time by either registering or logging in, you should spend an extra 2 minutes finding the regfree link.
Be a bit more courteous.
We have secretly replaced these Slashdot mods' sense of humor with a rusty nail. Let's see if they notice!!