New Online MD5 Hash Database
Gravix writes with a shameless plug for his new site "Sporting over 12 million entries, project GDataOnline is one of the largest non-RainbowTable based MD5 crackers on the internet. The database spans over 7 languages, 35 topics, and contains common mutations to words that include numbers and capitalization. Average crack time for 5 hashes: .04 seconds. No more waiting weeks for your results!" Shameless plug aside, the site still seems worth a closer look.
Quick! everybody go test your password security by sending it to a random web site
Snowden and Manning are heroes.
6436a55a08760c5b94dbed4476f83fcd
Does anyone know how to get a hold of a database such as this? As part of our IT auditing I'd like to be able to do a join of our md5-encoded user passwords (no salts or anything) with this to see whose password is insecure... yeah, that's it...
Apart from the fact that this site is somewhat morally questionable, it doesn't seem to work very well. I inserted a number of hashes for common first names and dictionary words, and none of them returned a hit. If the database doesn't even cover common stuff such as this, what is it really good for? Really, 12 million hashes out of a space of 2^128 is truly miniscule.
Any system using plain md5 to hash passwords is broken anyway. Include a salt - and any database over hashes will become useless. Besides if people choose good passwords, they are most likely not in the database. That is already two reasons why people should be protected, do we need anymore?
For many other uses of cryptographic hashes the input is much more than a single word, and typically you don't really worry about keeping the input a secret anyway.
Do you care about the security of your wireless mouse?
What would be really nice is to see this grow past a simple MD5 database. If you're going to get traffic, you really should get an NTLM database up and start populating it as soon as possible.
A few other places have these, in differing amounts. Rainbowcrack has tons of them, but require you to submit some before being allowed to query the system. I did submit a few NTLM hash tables, but it took the better part of a week to get my query back (it's supposed to be a lot faster than that).
There's also Ophcrack which uses tables similar to rainbow tables. It has a web interface to query NTLM hashes for simple passwords.
With these pre-computed hash tables, basic password security is starting to take a hit and it's becoming more and more worthwhile to use a simple but long password rather than a short and complex one. If you're on Windows, it's also VERY worthwhile to read about forcing Windows to store only the NTLM hash and drop the LM hash. It breaks old compatibility with Win 9x but is very worth it if you don't need that. This helps against precomputed attackes but has an even bigger impact agains brute-force attacks.
"What do you despise? By this are you truly known." --Princess Irulan, Manual of Muad'Dib
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What advantages does this database have over say a Cray supercomputer, which I could also afford.
"I'm going to f***ing bury that guy, I have done it before, and I will do it again. I'm going to f***ing kill Google"
To call LM weak would be an understatement. LM takes passwords up to 14 charackets in length, fine you think until you realise that the way tey did it is to hash 2 7-character strings. This means for any password, you have to crack a max of 7 characters. Oh, and did I meantion it's case insensitive?
There are existing ranbowtables covering basically the entire LM space but, really, you don't need it. A fast dual core chip will crack it in less than a day.
The parent is correct in that in all cases you can you should set Windows to only use NTLM, or better yet NTLMv2. We are (finally) getting to do that at work as we purged the last NT and 98 systems from the domain.
Actually I have seen many applications that fail to salt passwords before hashing them; it's depressing. Salt should be long enough to be globally unique when randomly generated. Old-style Unix passwords used a 12-bit salt, which was pathetic; 128 bits would be plenty.
In addition, it's best to iterate the hash many times, which slows down dictionary attacks. See Kelsey, Schneier et al, "Secure Applications of Low-Entropy Keys":
http://www.schneier.com/paper-low-entropy.html
The proofs in that paper are based on the assumption that the hash function is collision free, which of course MD5 isn't; another hash function might be preferable.
Xenu loves you!
Visiting this site (md5 one) resulted in pop-ups which were loaded with the StartPage Trojan which fortunately F-Secure spotted.
Hm, why did I never try this before :-) ?
echo -n "trustno1" | md5sum
5fcfd41e547a12215b173ff47fdd3739
Google for it, nice vector there.
Disturbing, to say the least.