Police Need 90 Days To Crack Hard Drives
Twyko64 writes "The UK police may need 90 days to hold terrorist suspects because it takes that long to crack a suspect's PC hard drive." From the article: "Combining the analysis, the translation and second stage analysis, add inter-country co-operation and interview strategy formation, and from the police point of view, the existing 14 days is inadequate and 90 days doesn't look excessive. Another factor is encryption sophistication. If 256-bit triple-DES or similar techniques are used then decryption could require supercomputer-levels of cracking."
Nothing for you to see here. Please move along.
Hmmmm. Guess I'll come back in 90 days for the dupe...
Be a real patriot: Question authority. Think for yourself. Formulate your own conclusions.
They're really going to hate it when suspects start using steganography. Imagine having to brute-force decrypt, only to then have to search for a particular piece of straw in a haystack...
Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
*I* always use at *least* 1024-bit AES!
Most times a police department cannot even ANALYZE data properly if a machine is not running some modern form of Microsoft Windows on an x86 platform.
They have automated TOOLS that go through and find Web browser histories, caches, and cookies.
On machines where users do not run Microsoft Internet Explorer and use Outlook for email, often times departments are SOL.
If you "get" pointers add me as a friend (116)!
If it's illegal to not provide the police with a key to encrypted data, why can't they just put that person in prison for that crime and decrypt the data at their leisure?
Who ordered that?
3des. 3 x des. des uses 64 bit key. Well, 56 bit if you remove the useless parity.
3 x 56 = 168. or 3 x 64 = 192. Either way, 256 is is not.
256 bit AES, then maybe.
I thought that was why the UK introduced the RIP act (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm )? Could they just demand that the person comes up with the keys -- if they don't, hold them through the RIP act and brute-force them, if they do -- then they've either got evidence or the innocent person can go free?
It seems that they are just using this as an excuse to hold someone indefinately?
Psssh. That's gotta be a worst case scenario. In my experience, even people who are paranoid enough to encrypt things tend to be careless with their keys. I found one once where the guy had encrypted the hell out of it, and left a copy of the key in the default key gen directory. Some people just throw it in the trash, and then forget to empty the trash, or forget to secure purge it afterward, so the key can be recovered.
For big corporations and places that have enough staff to be able to implement a good crypto policy, I'd be surprised if you COULD crack it in 90 days. 256 isn't anywhere near as high as you could go if you were paranoid, and storing data that you didn't need to read all the time.
ad logicam Claiming a proposition is false because it was presented as the conclusion of a fallacious argument.
Seriously, nobody, including name-your-favourite-government-agency, is brute forcing a 256-bit AES key. Not in 90 days. Not in 90 years. Think about the number 2^256 for a second, and consider the computing power required to do that many operations.
What may be possible in 90 days is brute forcing passwords, which is practical if the perp uses password-based keys. The article doesn't mention that.
It's also possible that the authorities are just exaggerating their capabilities so as to deter pedophiles and what-not. If you can't read people's mail, it's sometimes effective to pretend to be reading people's mail.
That government can crack triple DES in more than 14 but less than 90 days on their secret supercomputer. No wonder they dropped opposition to crypto exports. The question is, which algorithms/key sizes can we use that is likely still uncrackable?
The underlying objective is for the UK to adopt the US model of 'terrorist' detention. Extending the permitted period for detention of 'suspects' without charge to 90 days is a step in the desired direction for this. And as people are saying, 90 days won't be enough time to crack anything that's properly secured. In 90 days, our boys in blue, who don't really get this IT stuff very well, might perhaps be able to crack an UNENCRYPTYED drive. Not all terrorist suspects have hard drives, anyway. I guess they'll have to let the ones who don't go straight away.
It's never so bad that it can't get worse.
They can't and don't, but what the hell, it's a pretext. The police have never liked this whole deal of having to let people go if you don't have enough evidence to charge them with anything. The longer they can get to find something that will stick, the more criminals they successfully prosecute and the safer we all are.
Now, if you'll excuse me I have to open my new estate agency, pontine transit solutions a speciality...
Real Daleks don't climb stairs - they level the building.
The UK police may need 90 days to hold terrorist suspects because it takes that long to crack a suspect's PC hard drive
I write this as a 'Merkin, so forgive if I don't fully "get" UK law, but...
At the point where the police would waste 90 days of supercomputer-level CPU power on cracking an encrypted HDD, wouldn't they already have enough other evidence to charge the suspect with an actual crime, and could just ask for that 90 days as a delay before the actual trial?
The idea of the police making people dissapear for three months at a time on a whim scares the hell out of me. Suddenly sarcasm, or wearing the wrong clothes, or "driving while black" becomes punishable by three months in prison? Time to invest in prison/industrial stock...
Seriously, nobody, including name-your-favourite-government-agency, is brute forcing a 256-bit AES key. Not in 90 days. Not in 90 years.
0x00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00003039? That's the kind of encryption key an idiot would have on his luggage!
Ouch. Technobabble at its worst.
a) Triple DES is 112-bit encryption.
b) If you are using strong encryption, like a 256-bit AES cypher, no number of supercomputers are going to 'crack' it, whether it's 14 or 90 or 900 days, unless it's a really bad implementation.
c) One would HOPE that the police would have evidence before they start impounding things. But this is about 'fishing' for evidence for 'suspected' terrorists. "You look like a terrorist, so we'll impound your things in the hope that we'll find something". So much for presumption of evidence (which I believe holds true in the UK as well.
Things like this make me sad. Just another way for the authorities to 'protect' it's citizens by making that sure they can see all and know all. Welcome to the Panopticon.
Comment removed based on user account deletion
You think that they can afford to hire some lunix rocket surgeon as a computer forensics expert on what the local PD pays?
the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pssst, like the NSA doesn't have quantum computers behind that triple fence that can brute force 256bit keys in an instant.
Now, shut up and help me find my tinfoil hat.
I think the key to this article is not the piece on encryption, but the piece on inter-county cooperation. In the states, it takes a long time for evidence to be approved by the proper authorities for analysis, just because the people doing the analysis don't want to screw up and have the evidence thrown out in court.
And as easy as it is to make fun of the police's analysis methods, my guess is most slashdotter's don't even know what it's like to process evidence for a case. It's not just "running automated tools" on some suspect's hard drive. It's getting to know the case, knowing what you're looking for and where to look for it. Many times it's the police themselves that are writing these "automated tools", which only present the evidence in a way less technical minded officers assigned to the case can understand. And what happens once you get that evidence? You have to try to fit it into the puzzle of the case. It isn't CSI, where you find some email detailing the crime that's digitially signed and the suspect confesses to writing it. Often times its finding some random piece of partially-overwritten text and having to see if it fits into the overall case.
And yes, most digital forensic labs can analyze your precious reiserfs/ext2/ext3/whatever file systems. In fact, I've never run across a lab that couldn't. So don't think you're 1337 linux system will be safe if it's ever involved in a crime. And if they don't have the tools to analyze them, they'll contact a department that does. That's how the real world of forensics works.
Next time you want to talk about a subject you blatently don't understand, do us all a favor and don't hit the submit button.
Computer evidence is next to useless. It is infinitely easier to fake a word doc than it is someones handwriting, DNA and fingerprints that one might find on a piece of paper. I predict that in 10 years, once new forensic techniques for IT data analysis become available, a whole slew of "terrorists" will have their convictions quashed as the polices simply created a few fake emails. This is not tin-foil hat territory, this has happened numerous times in the past.
When will the public wake up? These "detention without trial" laws are something that the authorities have been seeking for decades. Only now do they feel they have the inertia to get them passed.
The definition of terrorism is "using fear to achieve a politcal goal". I wonder who the REAL terrorists are here...?
You could be locked up forever!
Test 1 2 3 4
Shami Chakrabati from Liberty made a very valid point. Holding someone for the equivalent of a typical 6 month jail sentence with no charge is a very good way to alienate that person and his/her community. How would we feel about losing 3 months of our lives, and after that, being released with "no charge". What would our employers think? What would happen to our houses, mortgages during that time? It's easy to think "90 days isn't so much", but think about what it actually means. Shami is great.
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Ok what about with rainbow tables, vast stores of precomputed hashes? They say that with a 64GB table, it'll take a few minutes to crack any Windows lanmanager password up to 14 characters in size using "all possbile characters on a standard keyboard (not including those alt+xxx characters)" on a standard 666 MHz system. Some individual table sets have been known to reach 600+GB in size. How do the likes of 3DES and AES stand up to that? I'm an encryption noob.
So then you need a method of being able to hide precisely what is encrypted and what is not. Look around and you'll find systems for filling a file system with chaff files to make finding the real data more interesting. One I looked at ended up with a filesystem with all the files apparently the same size, with constantly changing timestamps and all apparently contain random data. This system then allowed you to apply keys to make certain files readable while leaving the rest as noise. The point of this is that even the empty file system is full of rubbish files. It is impossible to tell (without the complete set of keys) precisely what is really data and what is just generated chaff. This gives you a lever of plausible deniability - if you are asked for the keys to the repository, you can hand over the keys and let them at it. It would be difficult (never say never) to correctly identify encrypted files amongst the chaff which were not covered by the keys provided.
Cheers,
Toby Haynes
Anything I post is strictly my own thoughts and doesn't necessarily have anything to do with the opinions of IBM.