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The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines
John David Funge writes "In Dr David Ellerman's book Intellectual
Trespassing as a Way of Life there are a number of interesting
essays. But there is one particular essay, entitled "The Semantics
Differentiation of Minds and Machines," that caught my attention
and which should be of interest to Slashdot readers. In that essay Dr
Ellerman claims that "after several decades of debate, a
definitive differentiation between minds and machines seems to be
emerging into view." In particular, Dr Ellerman argues that the
distinction between minds and machines is that while machines (i.e.,
computers) make excellent symbol manipulation devices, only minds have
the additional capacity to ascribe semantics to symbols." Read the rest of John's review.
Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life
author
David P. Ellerman
pages
290 pages
publisher
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
rating
7
reviewer
John David Funge
ISBN
0847679322
summary
Dramatic changes or revolutions in a field of science are often made by outsiders or "trespassers".
However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.
Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?
It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.
In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
You can purchase Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.
Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?
It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.
In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
You can purchase Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
For a review of Peter Turney's group's accomplishment see "AI Breakthrough or the Mismeasure of Machine?"
Seastead this.
Part of it comes from an animal's and a human's instinct of matrixing, or interpreting input to formulate the situation. If there is a shake in the bushes, an animal will watch and try to decipher the form of a friend or of a foe. The same goes for symbolism in society. We attribute meanings to symbols because its in our nature to do so. It allows us to understand them. The real question is whether or not computers will ever gain the ability to matrix information.
In a sort of unrelated note, one of the past SD articles (http://developers.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/ 01/20/0611209) spoke about human's mind filters, which filter down outside information to what we need for survival. The same goes for human matrixing. We see what we need to see and make sense of it.
Computers as symbol manipulators is also an idea that arose from John Searle's "Chinese Room argument". Perhaps one of the best contemporary discussions is by John Haugeland in his book "Ariticial Intelligence: The Very Idea".
Overall, a seemingly immature review of the book. Disappointing.
The AI community has suggested that what humans believe is some kind of "deep understanding" is nothing of the sort. We have just learned to push symbols around, too.
Consider the "deep understanding" of simple mathematics. But is your instant recall of 6 x 8 (assuming you can) anything deep, or just memorized, along with the symbol pushing to mechanically figure out tougher problems?
The problem lies in tying up a "symbol" in the mind (which may be more than literally a string of characters. However, it is an object) and something "out there". That's the tough issue, not the symbol pushing itself, necessarily.
(-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
"After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior."
"It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of
physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis
of behavior. "
It seems that the reviewer considers both mind and brain to both be purely physical things, and indeed synonyms - Physical devices that are thus potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Upon adopting this axiom, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is no distinction! But the lack of a distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined amind and brain into a single category in the first place.
Review translated: Trust me, I don't have any underlieing assumptions like he does, so I'm right and he's wrong, PH33R MY L33T PH1L0S0PHY SKILZ!
Who is John Cabal?
The "intelligent design" crowd is a group of people who, for religious reasons, refuse to believe that human beings and animals belong to the same category. Since it's inconceivable that humans evolved from non-human animals, the theory of evolution must be overthrown, and another theory erected in its place.
There is a similar thing going on with people who study how the human mind works. Some people, for religious reasons, refuse to believe that human beings and machines belong to the same category. Humans have souls, and machines do not. Therefore, a computer can never be programmed to have all the qualities of the human mind. It's harder to see this as a religious issue, since some of the people who hold this position are atheists who claim not to believe in souls or the supernatural. But what makes this a religious issue is that there is no amount of scientific evidence that can ever convince these people otherwise.
Anyway, the two camps have been arguing about this forever. It's impossible for a member of one camp to "convert" a member of the opposite camp using rational argument. So they resort to insults. People in the "strong ai" camp accuse the other camp of being Cartesian dualists, or believing in a supernatural soul. People in the "dualist" or "mysterian" camp accuse the strong ai folks of denying the existence of human consciousness and self awareness. According to the dualists, strong ai folk believe that humans are just machines, so humans can't be conscious in any real sense, don't have free will, and can't be morally responsible for their own actions. Some (stupid) strong ai folks even agree with these insults directed against them, which makes the debate more complicated, and more infuriating. The issue of moral responsibility, which is always bubbling under the surface of these debates, shows how this is really a religious issue at a deeper level.
For the record, I am a strong ai person who believes that human beings are deterministic machines who have consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility.
If you would like to read some good books that back up my position, see:
- How the brain works, by Pinker
- Freedom evolves, by Dennett
Doug Moen
I have written a truly remarkable program which this sig is too small to contain.
Talking about machine intelligence is tricky in that we generally only consider *human* intellegence (which makes sense considering that's what we are). In John Varley's "Steel Beach", he suggested The Invaders (a mysterious species of aliens) might not consider humans an intelligent species, but looked at us as just another engineering species like bees, meaning intelligence is really dependant on your point of view. What we're really talking about when most people say Artificial Intelligence is actually more an issue of Artificial Humanity.
Some bring out the best in others, some the worst. Some bring out far more.
Wrong, wrong wrong. The blank slate theory is a misguided attempt to pollute science with a bunch of feel-good egalitarian crap, and should be placed in the same category as Intelligent Design.
Ita erat quando hic adveni.
Am I the only one here with internal experiences? Eveyone else seems to readily equate the mind with a machine.
Don't get me wrong, I don't believe in mystical powers or anything. I accept the need for physical verificationism and the primacy of matter, and am a fan of Ockham's razor.[1] But there are some phenomenological properties of my experiences that sure ain't physical.
That is a term for it, and the distinction is more cultural and historical than scientific. European research into this collection of areas often is called "semiotics", and has a particular tradition. Anglosphere research into such areas has another tradition, and the term "semiotics" is rarely heard. Instead, various portions of such research take place under the aegis of "linguistics" (incl. semantics, and studying more than just traditional languages), "philosophy of language", "philosophy of mind", and "cognitive science".
10 PRINT CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 10
The problem with that theory is that computers actually *are* analog at the bottom, we just hide as much of the analog behavior as possible through clever tricks. It also ignores the fact that there are such things as analog computers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog_computer And it also ignores the possibility of quantum computers becoming viable in the not-too-distant future. Most scientists (seem to) believe that the 'mind' is emergent from the 'brain' using purely classical electrical, chemical, and physical processes. I believe that in the next 10-20 years this view will be proven incorrect and that we will uncover some (possibly subtle) quantum-level interactions going on in there that will explain, on some level, why we seem to be beings of perception that isn't sufficiently explained by purely classical physics. The 'stuff' of the universe looking back at itself. Knowing that our spark of consciousness relies on some quantum-mechanical process wouldn't really explain anything but it would give us some deeper insight into what it means to be made of the magical stuff of the universe that is energy (and the matter that it creates).
Semantics are associations between symbols.
/.) or whatever.
Semantics are actions. "Associations between symbols" is mathematics, and pure mathematics at that: a closed universe of symbols that can be manipulated according to rules. Semantics, on the other hand, is what the symbols impel us to do. Speech is, of course, action, so semantics can impel us to argue, as well as running away, juggling, seducing (well, not anyone on
What something means is what we do, how we act, when we grasp the meaning.
This is not an argument against AI. In fact, it is an argument for it: when we give our machines a range of behaviour that extends beyond pure symbol manipulation (robots) we open the door to true intelligence that is indistinguishable from carbon-based intelligence. AI work that deals purely with symbol manipulation is useful but focussing on only a tiny fraction of the problem: most of our intelligence, like most of our communication capacity, is non-verbal.
Blasphemy is a human right. Blasphemophobia kills.
Sorry, computers, and the brain, are digital at the "bottom." See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_length -- nevermind that the brain works through chemical reactions on finitely many molecules.
After all, I am strangely colored.