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The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines
John David Funge writes "In Dr David Ellerman's book Intellectual
Trespassing as a Way of Life there are a number of interesting
essays. But there is one particular essay, entitled "The Semantics
Differentiation of Minds and Machines," that caught my attention
and which should be of interest to Slashdot readers. In that essay Dr
Ellerman claims that "after several decades of debate, a
definitive differentiation between minds and machines seems to be
emerging into view." In particular, Dr Ellerman argues that the
distinction between minds and machines is that while machines (i.e.,
computers) make excellent symbol manipulation devices, only minds have
the additional capacity to ascribe semantics to symbols." Read the rest of John's review.
Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life
author
David P. Ellerman
pages
290 pages
publisher
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
rating
7
reviewer
John David Funge
ISBN
0847679322
summary
Dramatic changes or revolutions in a field of science are often made by outsiders or "trespassers".
However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.
Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?
It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.
In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
You can purchase Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.
Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?
It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.
In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
You can purchase Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
What?! Does this mean no Sky-Net?!
When a human makes a mistake, it immediately pours massive processing power into either formulating arguments about why it's not a mistake or finding someone else to blame for it.
Machines tend not to do this.
That's "Mr. Soulless Automaton" to you, Bub.
It may be time to move beyond the Turing test as the rule for artificial intelligence.
Especially since there is a considerable number of humans that would not pass the Turing Test.
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