U of Wisconsin's Mac OS X Security Challenge

digitalsurgeon writes "The University of Wisconsin [ed: Go Badgers] has launched a Mac OS X Security challenge, in response to a 'woefully misleading ZDnet article'. From the site: 'The challenge is as follows: simply alter the web page on this machine, test.doit.wisc.edu. The machine is a Mac mini (PowerPC) running Mac OS X 10.4.5 with Security Update 2006-001, has two local accounts, and has ssh and http open - a lot more than most Mac OS X machines will ever have open.' Are you up to the task? Can you prove ZDNet wrong, or can you show that Mac OS X can really be hacked in less then 30 minutes? More information about the challenge is at http://test.doit.wisc.edu/ The challenge ends Fri 10 March 2006 10:00 AM CST." Update: 03/07 14:32 GMT by Z : Commentary on the contest and original claim is available at VNUNet

Comments

Prove it!

[Bromskloss]

Can you prove ZDNet wrong, or can you show that Mac OS X can really be hacked in less then 30 minutes?

So guys, what do you say? Should we all mabye prove ZDNet wrong by not breaking into that computer?

Re:Prove it!

[CheeseburgerBlue]

The poster then promptly disappeared in a puff of logic.

Re:Prove it!

[Ford Prefect]

I was appalled that someone might have hacked into this machine and thus given the impression that MacOS X was somehow ... insecure, so I hacked into it myself and patched it up with some new security features.

So to anyone wanting to compete in this challenge: sorry. :-(

Re:Prove it!

[mblase]

So guys, what do you say? Should we all mabye prove ZDNet wrong by not breaking into that computer?

Why don't we just do what Slashdot does best, and DDoS the thing instead? The way I see it, that's the best way to protect it from being hacked in the first place.

A Different Test

[Paradise Pete]

While I appreciate this test, and expect it to not be breached, it is simply not the same test. The original test was to see if a regular local user could elevate its privileges to admin. The fact that the "proof" was to be done by changing a web page is a red herring. The real story was that someone was (apparently) able to do that.

This test is of the web server, and of remote cracking without local access. Also, the explanation page says that the original article did not mention that local access was given. Well, perhaps they've updated the article, but it certainly says so now:

"Participants were given local client access to the target computer and invited to try their luck."

As I said, I appreciate this test, but I am also concerned about the apparent ability of an ordinary local user to gain admin status.

Re:A Different Test

[mekkab]

I think you can't "see the forest for the trees."

The original test was equivalent to saying "I'll let a thief into my house. Let's see if he can steal anything!" Most houses don't have everything bolted down to the floor.

But how often do you allow someone into your machine? For A desktop, not often, perhaps never.

The biggest risk to most computers is a network based attack; this is the real meat and potatoes and a better test of the security of a machine.

Re:A Different Test

[daveschroeder]

Yes, they updated the article.

And the whole point isn't that the test "isn't the same". This is how most Mac OS X machines will appear to outside entities on the internet. The original article - and definitely before it was updated - left people with the impression that a Mac OS X machine could be owned in 30 minutes just by being connected to the internet, without the user "doing" anything, and the subsequent coverage of this in most press proves it. None speak to the fact that a local account was given, or even explore the implications. What could have been a useful article was useless, vague sensationalism. I updated the bottom of the page this morning:

Update

The ZDnet article has been updated to include the sentence, "Participants were given local client access to the target computer and invited to try their luck." But might it not have been interesting to explore:

- What are the implications of local account access, and under what conditions might a computer be used in that way?

- How can such access normally be obtained? Do home users behind firewalls and with no ports open need to worry?
How can a vendor fix the claimed local privilege escalation vulnerabilities when they are not informed of the issue?

- What are the moral and ethical implications of knowing about allegedly severe vulnerabilities in products, like the "hacker" they interviewed, and actively choosing to NOT give the vendor an opportunity to fix the problem(s)?

- How might a Linux or BSD distribution, other commercial UNIXes, or Windows stand up to a similar challenge, where anyone who wishes is given local account access?

- A discussion about how since much of OS X is closed, this might make it more difficult for the community to discover - and report and fix - potential vulnerabilities in the closed pieces

...and things of that nature, instead of leaving people with the impression that any Mac OS X machine connected to the Internet can be taken over in 30 minutes?

Re:A Different Test

[Tim C]

Lots of hosting companies offer ssh access, not to mention that if an account exists on the machine with ssh access, it may be only a matter of time before someone manages to gain access to it.

Re:A Different Test

[Fahrvergnuugen]

The problem is that the media presents the original test as though Mac OSX is insecure out of the box. It's very misleading.

An acquaintance of mine runs a small web hosting company. His original service plan offered SSH accounts to every hosting account. Despite his best efforts to secure the box, it was still rooted by a script kiddie.

His customer's PC was compromised and the ssh password for his account on the linux server was found by the script kiddie. The shell account had access to GCC. The script kiddie logged in as the non privileged user and used gcc to compile a rootkit. The rest was a walk in the park.

The OS was Slackware linux. All of the accounts were jailed, and all of the "best practice" measures were taken to harden the box (I can't comment on every detail as I am not a linux system admin).

My point is that when a malicious user gains shell access to any *nix system, you're in deep trouble.

My friend has since stopped offering SSH access to his customers.

Re:A Different Test

[Paradise Pete]

The original test was equivalent to saying "I'll let a thief into my house. Let's see if he can steal anything!"

I don't think that analogy is quite apt. It's more like locking someone in your basement and they figure out how to gain access to your whole house.

When I run a third party program I am essentially letting them inside, but as a non-priviledged user I'm confining them to a specific area. But if this ability to elevate privileges turn out to be a fact, then any program I run can have full access.

Right now we have only this one supposed demonstration of it. What I'd really appreciate seeing is that *original* test repeated. If we can look at this as if it were an experiment, then when someone publishes a result others try to repeat it under the same conditions. They don't conduct a different test with different conditions in order to disprove the original.

Re:A Different Test

[jav1231]

Exactly. If you wanted to truly compare OS X to Windows in this scenerio, put a PC on the Net with TS opened and give out the user account information.

Re:A Different Test

[daveschroeder]

I say that on the actual site itself:

Mac OS X is not invulnerable. It, like any other operating system, has security deficiencies in various aspects of the software. Some are technical in nature, and others lend themselves to social engineering trickery. However, the general architecture and design philosophy of Mac OS X, in addition to usage of open source components for most network-accessible services that receive intense peer scrutiny from the community, make Mac OS X a very secure operating system. There have been serious vulnerabilities in Mac OS X that could be taken advantage of; however, most Mac OS X "vulnerabilities" to date have relied on typical trojan social engineering tactics, not genuine vulnerabilities. The recent Safari vulnerability was promptly addressed by Apple, as are any exploits reported to Apple. Apple does a fairly good job with regard to security, and has greatly improved its reporting processes after pressure from institutional Mac OS X users: Apple is responsive to security concerns with Mac OS X, which is one of the most important pieces of the security picture.

The "Mac OS X hacked under 30 minutes" story doesn't mention that local access was granted to the system. While local privilege escalation exploits can certainly be dangerous - and used in conjunction with things like the above Safari exploit - this isn't very informative with regard to the general security of a Mac OS X machine sitting on the Internet.

Of course, I'd have no problem with this if the original article had actually talked about it meaningfully in the context of a local privilege escalation and explored the implications; instead, they just made it sound like you could throw a patched OS X box onto the internet and it'd get owned. The average reader would leave with that *distinct* impression, and most of the subsequent coverage of it talked about it exactly in that fashion.

Mac OS X has had several local privilege escalation vulnerabilities, just as other OSes have had. Apple fixes them when they become known. (Also, and this is another discussion, but what can Apple do if the "hacker's" claims are correct, i.e., that the vulnerability is unknown to Apple? It doesn't prove that Mac OS X is "insecure"; all it "proves" is that open scrutiny is difficult with closed source pieces, and that some people intentionally and knowingly refuse to give vendors a chance to fix problems.)

Re:A Different Test

[Stalyn]

If we can look at this as if it were an experiment, then when someone publishes a result others try to repeat it under the same conditions. They don't conduct a different test with different conditions in order to disprove the original.

Science never enters the picture here, this is a religious debate.

Re:A Different Test

[ScriptedReplay]

*sigh* are you guys hopeless? The point of the original test was not to hack the machine from outside, but from inside. All the noise about Windows getting hacked 4 minutes after it was connected to the net was due to lack of firewalling and vulnerable services - turn on firewalling and the vulnerable services are no longer accessible. What does that prove? nothing - they didn't magically become secure. OSX probably has fewer vulnerable services (active or not) but that was not the point.

The point is even with proper design of user separation, local security is hard to get right. Every OS has this problem, to various degrees. And if you want a sample of what this type of problems mean, here is one: malware will not be required to ask you for a password to elevate privileges - see? all those 'this is not a virus, it asks for your password and that should set your alarm bells going' argument goes puff! in smoke. This is the same type of issue that plagued non-administrator users in Windows for a long time now. So let me put it this way:

1. Local privilege escalation is bad - and hard to prevent (see all the attempts done by other OSes - NX, canaries against stack smashing, grsecurity, PAX, load address randomization and so on)
2. Local privilege escalation to root is really bad. There are precious few places where one should have to look for things that run as root. Most of them are in the default install. And the worst that can happen is a kernel-level exploit, as that would be likely to affect OSX Server as well, which is far more likely to be used in a multiuser setup.

So, to come back - your test is utterly irrelevant for the type of people that would be interested in the original one. What you are trying to test is the security of the OpenSSH and Apache installs + your setup (yeah, and password strength - expect to be hit by automated dictionary attacks from scripts that couldn't care less about your test). If I had an XServe machine with several users having ssh access I would really want to know whether any of those users really can get root on the machine or not (if they can, XServe has no place in such enviroment). And I would be really worried. As it stands, I still have worries, but at least I know that I have a certain amount of protections in place against such problems (this not being OSX though - no OS names since I'm not interested in 'my OS is more secure than your OS' flames) But this is a real security concern and yet you turn around and say 'but these other things are secure.' Yeah, the article could have sounded misleading for anyone not willing to check the site and see the conditions (but few people would do that anyway) but how are you any better? All this is countering journalistic sensationalism with more of the same, since your box is neither set up as a home user's nor your setting is pertinent to the original multiuser problem.

To toss in my 2c of an analogy - the original test was to check whether a bank's employees (with access to the bank building) can empty the main safe to which they do not have the combination[*] while yours is to check whether a customer can; all this on a Sunday when the bank is closed.

And now mods feel free to mod me down - although a more rational answer would be welcome.

[*] to all those saying 'by dfault root is not even enabled in OSX': bah! 'enabled' pertains to login and privilege escalation couldn't care less about login restrictions; the account is still there. And in fact, the thing that 'get root' means is 'get uid=0 access'

Re:A Different Test

[Just Some Guy]

all of the "best practice" measures were taken to harden the box

No, they weren't. If all the filesystems that customers have write access to are mounted "noexec", then self-compiled binaries don't present a lot of exposure.

I'm not saying that it's not a good idea to remove GCC, just that its presence isn't an automatic compromise.

Logs

[Bromskloss]

Mabye logs could be published (in real-time) so that we all can see some of what possible challengers are up to. That would be interesting.

* yawn *

[Noryungi]

I am sorry, but what exactly does this prove? That ZDNet is wrong? That Mac OS X is secure?

It proves neither: every operating system on the face of this earth has been hacked, cracked, and 0wned. Numerous times. Get over it.

Instead of inane, immature competitions such as this one, I'd rather have a nice manual (RTNM -- Read The Nice Manual) on how to improve/lock down an OS X machine. Even better, make that two manuals: one for the average joe, with nice color screenshots for every step that has to be taken, and another for people like me, who manage systems for a living. THAT would be a valuable contribution to the field of computer security, instead of this stupid challenge.

Re:* yawn *

[plate_o_shrimp]

[quote]I'd rather have a nice manual ... on how to improve/lock down an OS X machine.[/quote] There's this..... http://www.nsa.gov/snac/downloads_macX.cfm

Possible Danger

[zaguar]

Email das@doit.wisc.edu if you feel you have met the requirements, along with the mechanism used. The mechanism will then be reported to Apple and/or the entities responsible for the component(s).

With virus/spyware becoming a multimillion dollar business, do you really think that the real hackers (sorry for the use of the term) will stay away from this, due to the this very condition. Do you think that the dangerous exploits and cracks that are, for the moment, unknown by Apple, and are hence, very valuable. They will not be willingly sent to Apple for some minor publicity and no material, no, they will be auctioned off in some sleazy IRC channel in Russia.

Generic smear campaign

[catwh0re]

I've noticed a significant rise in anti-macosx articles recently. To the point where I'm beginning to believe that it is staged. Each article usually has 3 points to make: Mac OSX is not *nix, Max OSX is insecure and "easy" to hack (and not a target due to small install base.) and that Apple are slow with patches to security faults.

So far each article has been based on unique situations that lack credibility to begin with, give little detail, and take focus away from the fact that it's basically a machine running a collective of industry proven software (such as apache and openssh.)

Also of note is that Mac OSX currently has an a user base of over 10 million machines. So the argument that it's too small a target is ridiculous. In fact it's a bigger target as it's untouched territory with a bonus of headline making news.

Hacked Pixel #F0F8FF

[digitaldc]

I hacked in, and in 22 minutes changed one of the pixels from #FFFFFF to #F0F8FF, but it is very hard to tell.
In fact, nobody even noticed.

Re:the original post

[daveschroeder]

Yes, this is approved. But it's getting moved to its own /29 today...unfortunately, that didn't happen before slashdot got to it. ;-)

There is an identical clone of that Mac mini waiting to go on the new network, and our DNS TTL is currently set to 5 minutes, so when the cutover happens, it should be pretty transparent.

The IP

[zaguar]

The IP of the server under the test. Saves you a ping of the site.

128.104.16.150

Hint

[spike2131]

One of the user names is "das".... as in http://test.doit.wisc.edu/~das/

So run that against a dictionary and see if you can get in....

Your wish has been granted:

[daveschroeder]

Corsaire - Securing Mac OS X Tiger

NSA - Mac OS X Security Configuration Guide (not yet updated for Mac OS X 10.4)

Apple - Common Criteria configuration guide

And for the "average joe"?

- Keep your machine patched
- Don't randomly open ports for services you don't use
- Have a personal firewall/router
- Don't run software you don't trust

And this doesn't "prove" anything, except that the initial ZDnet article was totally vague and sensationalistic, making it seem to an average person reading that article that a Mac OS X box could just be "hacked" by being on the internet. That is wrong, and I'm showing that. Simple. It's all explained on http://test.doit.wisc.edu/

Re:I'm not sure what the value of this is.....

[emerrill]

The point of this is to see how secure the OS is w/o hardening, and in a more typical networked situation. For that matter they are softening it to attack compared to the stock configuration.

The ZDnet article simply was not reported correctly, and gave the wrong implications. Even with the added sentence, the article tries to make it sound like its vulnerable to remote exploits and you have to be worried about having your machine on the internet.

Easy, To Do

[LifesABeach]

The process is pretty simple, "It's too expensive to compromise the Hardware, but the Humanware; That's cheap, and easy. First your dog/pet/loved is shoot, dead, in front of you. The next comes easier. The gun is pointed at you, and you are given 2 minutes to change the web page to some off topic theme. If you are given an extra 5 minutes, you'll learn Photoshop so that you can put an image of you doing it to a male Shetland pony in front of the members of the supreme court, all looking down on you and smiling in that knowing fashion." The D.O.D. Security Instructor that said this to me didn't even bat an eye; That's the chilling part.

Re:Easy, To Do

[SEWilco]

"...dog/pet/loved is shoot, dead"

• We're talking about a nerd. In Wisconsin.
• You can't hack your own web page in 2 minutes after your computer has been shot dead.

No, you're still wrong about the REAL problem

[xiphoris]

The real problem is that tests like this are garbage in the first place.

In fact, Bruce Schneier (a respected cryptographer, responsible for Blowfish) addressed the topic thoroughly almost 8 years ago in his column Crypto-Gram. Here's a relevant snippet:

You see them all the time: "Company X offers $1,000,000 to anyone who can break through their firewall/crack their algorithm/make a fraudulent transaction using their protocol/do whatever." These are cracking contests, and they're supposed to show how strong and secure the target of the contests are. The logic goes something like this: We offered a prize to break the target, and no one did. This means that the target is secure.

It doesn't.

Contests are a terrible way to demonstrate security. A product/system/protocol/algorithm that has survived a contest unbroken is not obviously more trustworthy than one that has not been the subject of a contest. The best products/systems/protocols/algorithms available today have not been the subjects of any contests, and probably never will be. Contests generally don't produce useful data. There are three basic reasons why this is so.

You can read the original here.

Fink could have contributed to the original "hack"

[Been on TV]

One of the unusual things about the "hacked" machine was that Fink was installed. This most likely means that the Apple developer tools were installed (although Fink can install precompiled binaries), making it possible for the hacker to bring his own code and compile on the system. Although Apple ships the developer tools on the OS X client install DVD, it is not installed by default, nor is X11.

Fink lists a catalog of 6359 open source projectsthat can be installed, many of which are tools that could help a hacker exploit a machine or that are exploitable in themselves. Fink is a Debian style package manager for Mac OS X.

Much better analogy!

[mekkab]

I don't think that analogy is quite apt. It's more like locking someone in your basement and they figure out how to gain access to your whole house.

Okay- I like that analogy better. I've got deep deadbolts on my outside doors; the door between my basement and house has a cheap handle lock that can be popped with a long, thin screw driver.

Not to get lost in the analogy details, but I think you'll find most security skews the same way.


When I run a third party program I am essentially letting them inside, but as a non-priviledged user I'm confining them to a specific area. But if this ability to elevate privileges turn out to be a fact, then any program I run can have full access.

I think this ability to elevate privs should be analyzed on a case by case basis for all programs; as such if you are concerned about what applications a user can and can't run, remove the ability to run those applications from the machine.

However with most desktop machines your biggest worry isn't normally* an attack from within; its usually from without.

*)people on slashdot aren't normal and typically have needs that extended beyond normal users. Feel free to contribute some examples that counter this assertion.

Original Test Was More Interesting

[adam1101]

Actually, I think the original test was more interesting than this one. For years we've read countless +5 Insightful posts that OS X is more secure than Windows because normal users run in restricted accounts by default. That trojans can't do anything to the system unless you're "stupid enough to type in your password". If the original hack was indeed an exploit of an undisclosed buffer overflow, it means that this argument is pretty much moot. There have already been lots of posts in this and the previous article that amounted to saying "a local exploit is no big deal, everybody has them, if you have local (restricted) access you should be expected to be compromised anyway". Are these posters saying that the supposed advantages of restricted user accounts on OS X are very overrated? Are they saying it's no big deal if the next social engineering attack is combined with a buffer overflow exploit, meaning no popups asking for your password?

If the original hacker Gwerdna (Andrew G?) was right that there are many undisclosed priviledge escalation bugs, that is a case for concern, not something to be dismissed as a mere "local" vulnerability. BSD, Linux and even Windows already have patches for NX to contain buffer offerflows, where is Apple on this?

I think that, especially if you're an Apple user, it is very important to test the claim that the OS is rifle with local priviledge escalation issues. And that's why I think the first test was much better than this one. I don't expect this U of W box to be hacked anytime soon. But this proves very little. You can even setup a Windows SP2 ISS+Remote Desktop box like this, and I don't think it will be hacked anytime soon either. But if you redo something like the original box (give normal user ssh accounts to anyone) and get hacked very quickly again, it proofs a lot. Namely that the local security measures of OS X that many have come to thrust amount to very little.

Re:Our tax dollars at work

[daveschroeder]

No, my position is not funded or "rewarded" by Apple.

Also, I can't say I've *ever* gotten a "freebie" anything from Apple in 22 years other than a couple of T-shirts. Oh, and a nice pen once. I've also never heard of anyone in enterprise or education getting free flat panels and iPods from Apple (except for the free iPod promotions they've had when people buy certain laptops).

Also, since Mac OS X is used *heavily* in education, particularly at large research universities, and diversity of computing platforms is important to avail faculty, staff, and students of the best resources to do their jobs, I'm sure many are interested in the general security of a typical Mac OS X machine with a couple of typical services running on the internet, especially in the wake of such misleading press coverage of the same. The only interests I represent are those of the University of Wisconsin - Madison.

And yes, this challenge is sanctioned. I'm glad that the University of Wisconsin supports the genuine interests of its faculty, staff, and students, and encourages individual thought, research, discovery, and exploration. That's why it's a great place to be!

Still no comparison

[massysett]

Lots of hosting companies offer ssh access, not to mention that if an account exists on the machine with ssh access, it may be only a matter of time before someone manages to gain access to it.

True, but this test still does not compare to what hosting companies are doing. Web hosting companies are (hopefully) run by professionals who secure the boxes. Web hosting companies run operating systems like RHEL that were designed for server use--Mac OS X on a Mac Mini was designed for home use.

Most importantly though, hosting companies are not giving ssh to any anonymous joe off the street, which is exactly what happened in this contest. At a minimum, web hosting companies have your credit card number before they offer you ssh. Some will demand additional information, such as a faxed copy of a driver's license. Of course a crook can get a drivers' license and a stolen credit card, but these are additional hoops to jump through that make the process of cracking the machine that much more trouble. Plus, if someone does crack the machine despite his lack of anonymity, the hosting company might be able to track him down.

This contest as reported on ZDNet was a joke. The guy gave ssh accounts to anyone who asked for them, without demanding any proof of identification. He ran it on an OS that was not designed to be run with untrusted users logged in. Furthermore, the crack was done by an anonymous person using an "undocumented" security hole, which to me calls the credibility of the whole episode into question. In what real-world situtation does anyone allow ssh login to any random, anonymous Joe?

Re:Doubtful...

[MirrororriM]

So... Anyone up for breaking into the U of Wisc password database?

Why try brute force when you can pull a social engineering attempt:

Daer DAvid Schroeoedir,

I am A NIGERIAN PRINCE WHO HACE RECENTLY MOVED TO WISCONCIIN And AM Vary INTERISTED IN OBtaining AN ACCOUINT ON TEST.DOIT.WISC.EDU...i CUULD WIRE YUO 1 MILLION DOLLARS...