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Totally Random One Time Pads

liliafan writes "Scientists in Japan have come up with a way of harnessing a truly random datasource for generating one time encryption pads: Quasars. One time encryption pads are widely accepted as being the most secure form of encryption, but this new technology from the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology makes the pads even more secure."

265 comments

  1. Dupe by TheComputerMutt.ca · · Score: 5, Informative
    1. Re:Dupe by suso · · Score: 5, Funny

      So its not truely a one time pad then.

    2. Re:Dupe by koh · · Score: 4, Funny

      This is a dupe of almost the same story from the same source.

      If you had read TFA, you would know they use Slashdot feeds as an entropy source for their one-time pads. They do report problems though, since during a recent test run they noticed 42% of their one-time pads were effectively equal...

      --
      Karma cannot be described by words alone.
    3. Re:Dupe by techno-vampire · · Score: 1

      Not only is it a dupe, the other story's still on the front page. Editors, edit thyselves!

      --
      Good, inexpensive web hosting
    4. Re:Dupe by fm6 · · Score: 1

      No it's not. The headline is different.

    5. Re:Dupe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is basically the plot of "His Master's Voice," by the late Stanislaw Lem. Guy sues a publisher of a random number book because the second volume repeats the first halfway through. Data came from a quasar, with a period of a year and half. Gov't set's up a "Manhattan Project" to decode the "message." Great book.

    6. Re:Dupe by aybiss · · Score: 0

      Not just a dupe, but its a stupid story about using natural phenomena as a truly random data source. Anyone who is even slightly interested (enough to know what a one-time-pad is) will know that this isn't even very interesting.

      Obviously the Slashdot editors are not part of this group.

      Why use a random source of information *that is available to everyone on your side of the planet*? Kind of defeats the purpose doesn't it?

      --
      It's OK Bender, there's no such thing as 2.
  2. Hmm... by fishybell · · Score: 3, Funny
    Where can I buy one of these new fangled quasars anyway?

    From what I hear, I'll probably be able to save on my heating bills too.

    --
    ><));>
    1. Re:Hmm... by ScrewMaster · · Score: 1

      The entire Solar System could save on heating bills.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    2. Re:Hmm... by atheist666 · · Score: 1

      Not in my backyard,are you going to have a Quasar.
      I heard one hypothesis of why there aren't a zillion alien civilizations out there is that every once in awhile, a Quasar toasts huge swaths of the universe.

    3. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      or a bundle on your car insurance, anyway.

    4. Re:Hmm... by MikeFM · · Score: 2, Funny

      Don't bother, they aren't truely random. Silly geeks don't realize that nature is orderly and reverse engineerable. The aliens can still read your messages!

      --
      At what price learning? At what cost wisdom? The price is a man's peace of mind, and the cost is his life.
    5. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You don't need a quasar to cut down on your heating bill- an Intel processor will work just as well.

    6. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They don't have any in stock, you have to order them, and it takes 13 billion years or so. Anything you save on heating bills you would lose on the shipping costs.

  3. One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    Women have had those forever...

    1. Re:One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes, but they also have no penis. I repeat: they have absolutely no penis. I was truly shocked when I accidentally discovered this issue at the age of 43 when ass-raping a stranger, who turned out to be one of that specific gender.

      Instead of a normal penis, he had nothing. A traumatic experience for me and my dog, indeed.

    2. Re:One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative
      No, only since the middle of the century or so.

      Before then, they used multiple-use rags. And smart women are starting to go back to them.

    3. Re:One Time Pads... by g0at · · Score: 1

      Hahahaha... +4 Insightful instead of Funny? This really is slashdot...

      -b

    4. Re:One Time Pads... by Calyth · · Score: 1

      But most of those women were pretty regular, I would assume.

    5. Re:One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But most of those women were pretty regular, I would assume.

      you must have meant periodic.

    6. Re:One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why would anyone post that as AC? You'll miss out on all the sweet karma, be it insightful, informative or even underrated.

    7. Re:One Time Pads... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      a) I figured it was more likely to get off-topic

      b) I have male friends who read /. who probably don't want to hear about what kind of menstrual products I use if they happen to look at my recent posts. :)

    8. Re:One Time Pads... by scottv67 · · Score: 1

      ...multiple-use rags.

      +1, Informative???

      How about 'Score: -1, Made me hurl at the thought of handling these on "wash day"'?

  4. Has To Be Said by Naked+Chef · · Score: 1, Funny

    I for one welcome our new one-time overlords...

    1. Re:Has To Be Said by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They look more like two-timing overlords from where I'm standing.

    2. Re:Has To Be Said by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, really, it doesn't need to be said. Stop with the stupid welcoming overlords crap.

  5. cracking this would be useful by caffeinemessiah · · Score: 2, Interesting

    if this is ever widely accepted, it seems that the inevitable deluge of security researchers trying to find predictability in the patterns would be a beneficial thing. if one ever comes close to succeeding, sure your credit card details could be stolen, but we'd understand the universe a tiny little bit better...

    --
    An old-timer with old-timey ideas.
    1. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      Way to make a pointless and obvious post in your effort to karma whore.

    2. Re:cracking this would be useful by caffeinemessiah · · Score: 1

      "karma whore"?? wow you really need to get a life...

      --
      An old-timer with old-timey ideas.
    3. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      Sure, Mr. "I have a 900K+ UID and think I'm l337"

      Begone with your faggotry, Karma Whore.

    4. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think his post was actually quite interesting as it touched on an aspect of the story one might not have thought of.

    5. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      What aspect is that? The blatant obviousness of it? Wow, that is insightful.
      Get fisted, fag.

    6. Re:cracking this would be useful by sedyn · · Score: 1

      Even worse, if a government agency, such as NASA, started monitoring and collecting vast amounts of data about every known quasar, then they could run through this history upon recieving an "encrypted" signal. (Depending on the factors, I think this could be done in polynomial time)

      Thus, even though the data is random, it still isn't secure.

      Yes, I know they want to add ciphers to it FTA, but that is snake oil on snake oil. And One time pads are very weak if the key isn't properly handled and generated.

      Good news though, I think we might have found a way for NASA to encrease funding, considering the recent NSA wiretapping.

      --
      Am I open minded towards open source, or closed minded towards closed source?
    7. Re:cracking this would be useful by et764 · · Score: 1

      I haven't read the article, but I'd be surprised if data from quasars truly had no patterns in them. I doubt this will ever be used extensively in cryptography though, because the one time pad is really difficult to implement. The key has to be as long as the message, and you can only use the key once, so in many cases you're better off just sending the message instead of the key if you have a secure way to exchange keys.

    8. Re:cracking this would be useful by masterzora · · Score: 1
      Not necessarily true, though it's becoming more and more so these days.

      What if, once a day or even week, I securely gave you a pad with maybe, 50000 randomly generated letters. That's the one time pad. Now I am free to send a multitude of messages between the time you are given the pad and the time you are given the new pad so long as the total character length is not in excess of 50000 (or however many you wish). The only thing is that we would have to be certain that you received all of them in perfect order and kept accurate count of which letters had been used. However, if some transmission is screwed up in such a way that affects the running counter of used letters, the pad is rendered effectively useless. Worse than useless, even, in that I might believe you are interpreting them correctly.

      --
      Remember, open source is free as in speech, not free as in bear.
    9. Re:cracking this would be useful by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      I have some real doubts about whether using a quasar is really more secure or desirable than using other forms of random entropy, for example, radioactive decay patterns or various aspects of quantum tunneling. Those sources are pretty much accepted as being "totally random" -- or at least, if anyone were to be able to predict a pattern in them, they'd certainly be up for a Nobel Prize or two. I can't figure out why using quasars is better than using a true RNG that doesn't rely on an external antenna that could be fed a false signal.

      It's not as though quasars are unique in having random properties; you can also get randomness from quantum phenomena, and Wikipedia suggests thermal noise from resistors and avalanche noise from reverse-biased Zener diodes can also be used. Either one of those methods would cost a lot less than using a radio-telescope and pointing it at a quasar. I don't know how many thousand of those you could build for the cost of one good radio-telescope, but I bet it's a lot. And there's always the option of using a chunk of something radioactive and pointing a phosphor-coated PMT at it, if you want something quick and dirty that you can probably make in most university labs. And if you're not quite so relentlessly paranoid as to completely abhor psuedo-RNG algorithms, you can use such a source to provide a seed, and from there generate (within reason) probably more random numbers than you'll ever want to use.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    10. Re:cracking this would be useful by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      You pretty much described the key weakness of one-time pads. If you ever re-use one, then (depending on the message length and content, plus many other factors) your security is weakened significantly, because then you become vulnerable to frequency analysis and other conventional crypt-analytic attacks.

      If I was going to use a OTP to secure a line of communication, I think the best way to use it would be to transmit a key for some other symmetric cipher, of fixed and arbitrary (and very long!) length. It's not "perfectly secure," in the same way that using a OTP for everything would, but it eliminates some of the problems. Also, it minimizes key distribution, which is always the Achilles' heel of OTP systems -- they depend entirely on having a secure method to distribute the pads to the recipients. By sending only a per-message key using them, and then following with the actual message, a book of pads could last significantly longer than if you used them for message encryption itself. (This of course demands that you have a good symmetric key cipher to use, and use keys that are long enough to prevent decryption for whatever length of time you need to protect the content, say 10,000 years.)

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    11. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      so what is going on in the american nihilist underground society these days

    12. Re:cracking this would be useful by rdoger6424 · · Score: 1

      PLEASE grant us the ignore feature for AC's

      --
      "Hello 911? I just tried to toast some bread, and the toaster grew an arm and stabbed me in the face!"
    13. Re:cracking this would be useful by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      your idea would slam into the million monkeys problem, the number of quasars and datarate emitted would result in enough pads to make the message say anything

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
    14. Re:cracking this would be useful by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      two geiger counters, one wired to every tick advance the position of the system pointer by one, the other is set to flip the bit at the sytem counter, the radioactive source is closer to the flip bit counter in order to ensure an oppurtunity for many flips and reduce the odds of a suden burst in advances resulting in a long string of nulls.

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
    15. Re:cracking this would be useful by csrster · · Score: 1

      I don't think it becomes useless if the messages are out of order. There are only 50000 possible starting positions on the pad, so just decrypt the message against each position in turn and check which of those looks like a plausible plaintext (e.g. by frequency analysis).

      I don't get the quasar thing, though. Do quasar signals have no temporal correlation? Perhaps I should just read the damn paper ...

    16. Re:cracking this would be useful by Znork · · Score: 1

      Monitoring publicly available quasars is a much simpler problem than monitoring other sources of randomness like noise on a microphone, keypress timings, heat readings, fanspeed sensors, etc, that are readily available entropy sources on a pc.

      If you were a goon, which problem would you prefer? Try to decrypt a message by matching it against a large, but limited, number of known large datastreams, or by matching it against an unknown number of unknown sources that may or may not contain some form of more or less predictable randomness?

    17. Re:cracking this would be useful by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's already there. You can assign an "Anonymous modifier" in your preferences (down to -6) and then just browse at whatever level you like. It's not really a true ignore though, as people will still be able to mod the AC posts up until they reach your chosen level, but at that point the post probably contains useful or relevant content you might want to see. Like this one, I suppose!

    18. Re:cracking this would be useful by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      That would work. Actually what I was describing would (obviously) need some extra equipment to make work, I think the easiest way is to have the pulses from the PMT cause the system to read the value of a free-running, fast counter, and the random digit is pulled from the least significant bit of the counter. Eventually though this might be prone to errors, if the counter spent more of its time in one state than the other.

      But you're right, using two sources would make sure that there wasn't anything non-random involved in the bit generation. I wonder if it would be more or less robust if you used two types of random noise: say used resistor thermal noise to flip the bits and decay noise to cause the count.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    19. Re:cracking this would be useful by Detritus · · Score: 2, Informative

      There are established procedures for handling lost or garbled messages. One simple technique is to put a unique serial number on each page of the pad, include the serial number in the message header, and start all messages on a new page.

      --
      Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
    20. Re:cracking this would be useful by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      it uses only one source, in between the two counters, just the source is closer to one than the other, and a neutron absorbing sphere around the system could protect against outside emmisions and reflections (does neutron radiation reflect?)


      no need to use multiple entropy sources, radioactive decay is completely unpredictable on the atom scale, and counters detect individual decays.

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
  6. Not random enough by isj · · Score: 0, Redundant

    I can just decrypt it using the data from http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/30/011 5216 :-)

  7. Old technology... by __aaclcg7560 · · Score: 1

    Isn't quartz technology currently being used for timing applications? :P

    1. Re:Old technology... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      http://www.phys.vt.edu/~jhs/faq/quasars.html

      If you're thinking of quartz crystals, then you're probably thinking of digital timing devices. I'm pretty sure that quasars are totally different.

    2. Re:Old technology... by HTL2001 · · Score: 1

      looks like you should have used the iPod volume limiter to prevent those hearing problems...

      --
      By reading this, you have given me brief control of your mind.
    3. Re:Old technology... by Mr.+Underbridge · · Score: 2, Funny
      Isn't quartz technology currently being used for timing applications? :P

      Time to check the prescription on your reading glasses there Pops.

    4. Re:Old technology... by __aaclcg7560 · · Score: 1

      What's that?! Didn't year you... the update didn't take on my iPod. :P

  8. So what? by rsw · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Getting randomness isn't interesting. Thermal noise is truly random, perfectly white, and easy to generate---it's as hard as passing a current through a resistor. Want more noise power? Avalanche breakdown, with appropriate whitening, works fine.

    Unless they've come up with an interesting way for two people in disparate locations to observe the same quasar and both independently observe the same random phenomena in a way which reliably and securely gives them access to the pad with no communication channel between them, this just isn't interesting.

    -rsw

    1. Re:So what? by hogghogg · · Score: 1

      I agree -- the article says that the signal can be transmitted "over the internet" but isn't that just the same as transmitting any white noise source over the internet, without the expense of a radio observatory?

      --
      David W. Hogg -- assoc prof, NYU Physics
    2. Re:So what? by homer_ca · · Score: 4, Informative
      Actually it's worse than that. From TFA:

      Each communicating party would only need to know which quasar to monitor and when to start in order to encrypt and decrypt a message.


      The name of the quasar and time to start monitoring are the cryptographic keys. That doesn't sound like a lot of bits in the keyspace.
    3. Re:So what? by cinnamoninja · · Score: 1

      From the article:

      Umeno and his colleagues suggest using an agreed quasar radio signal to add randomness to a stream cipher - a method of encrypting information at high speed.

      Each communicating party would only need to know which quasar to monitor and when to start in order to encrypt and decrypt a message. Without knowing the target quasar and time an eavesdropper should be unable to decrypt the message.


      Both parties having access to same source of randomness is exactly what they're talking about here. Essentially this means that the radio signal choice is their shared private key.

      Ok, this seems pretty easily brute forceable. How big can the key space of all possible radio signals be?

      Cinnamon

    4. Re:So what? by mishmash · · Score: 1

      According to Quasar there are several hundred known Quasars.

    5. Re:So what? by interiot · · Score: 5, Informative
      The name of the quasar and time to start monitoring are the cryptographic keys. That doesn't sound like a lot of bits in the keyspace.
      Yes, but it's more secure than other keys, because the only way to attack it is to steal the keys before the time that the quasar is monitored. If an attacker discovers the keys afterwards, the key is useless.

      Also, the keyspace is larger than you think... the article mentions that quasars have a very broad frequency spectrum. So, #quasars (that are visible to both) X monitoring-time-choices X monitoring-frequency-choices may result in a large-ish keyspace (or, at the very least, means that it may be physically extremely expensive to try to decrypt a message against all possible keys).

    6. Re:So what? by 8.012 · · Score: 1

      Presumably, that is what they have. It shouldn't be too hard for endpoints a few thousand kilometers apart to receive the "same" signal from a many-lightyear-distant quasar.

      The problem is that the same one-time-pad is also easily available to wiretappers - all they need to do is guess which quasar you're using, much easier than guessing which of 2^256 AES keys you're using. Adding in the additional factor of a shared start-time (i.e. record, then use) helps, but probably not enough.

      Assuming 10^9 suitable quasars, and a millisecond-resolution start time within a month-delay (1000*3600*24*30), we have only 3*10^18 possible streams, which is only about 64bits. I expect the real numbers would be much lower, and thus more breakable.

    7. Re:So what? by homer_ca · · Score: 2, Insightful

      OK, even if the keyspace is pretty large, what you have now is a symmetrical cipher. You still have to distribute that key securely.

    8. Re:So what? by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If the two communicating parties have to agee on a particular time to start observing they need to synchronize their clocks. The most practical approach is GPS. Figure 10-100 nanoseconds of timing resolution. If an adversary can guess to within three years when you started observing, there are 1E15 to 1E16 possible starting times. There's 50 bits, if there are a thousand QSO's we add 10 bits, so they've got the equivalent of a 60-bit private key.

      Worse, this scheme doesn't let you get forward secrecy. In a conventional one-time pad you destroy the keying material after you use it. What are these people going to do, destroy quasars retroactively? Copyright QSO recordings and stage DMCA raids periodically?

      Worse yet, someone pointed out (who? I want to give you credit) that an active adversary could trivially inject fake signals into your radio telescopes and control the contents of your one time pad.

    9. Re:So what? by interiot · · Score: 1
      ... So you distribute that key via assymetric encryption, very soon before you send the actual message. That narrows the keyspace a bit, but means that if the attacker doesn't have the computing power to brute-force the assymetric encryption between the time that the key is sent, and the time that the quasar is monitored, that the attacker has failed.

      In other words, it makes it exceedingly difficult to brute-force, even for well-funded governments, so dedicated attackers will almost certainly use other methods to break the encryption.

    10. Re:So what? by GlassHeart · · Score: 2, Insightful
      So you distribute that key via assymetric encryption, very soon before you send the actual message. That narrows the keyspace a bit, but means that if the attacker doesn't have the computing power to brute-force the assymetric encryption between the time that the key is sent, and the time that the quasar is monitored, that the attacker has failed.

      I start monitoring as many quasars as I can the moment I intercept the key message. That way, when I finally decode the key message I can also read the actual message. The secrecy of your message then depends on whether my choices of quasars get lucky, which is not nearly as good as a real one-time pad.

    11. Re:So what? by interiot · · Score: 1

      Though that's assuming that it's very expensive to record the wide-band transmissions of all quasars in the visible sky... is that true, or not?

    12. Re:So what? by mal0rd · · Score: 2, Informative

      This is not like other forms of encyption where the attacker to brute force by going through all the possible keys after the fact. With all the telescopes and camera on earth, we can only monitor about 2% of the visible sky. So a single cracker can't possibly record the data from every quasar all the time, or even a small percentage of them. So even though the keyspace is small, the attacker only gets to make a few gueses.

      Let's say the communicators choose the least secure method and publish the exact time they will start recording the one time pad from the quasar. And assume the attacker can only monitor 1e-9 percent of the quasars at once. Then they have a fairly good chance of remaining undetected.

      Now if they just keep recording from that quasar for the entire session, the cracker could try lots of different stars over time and see which on matches. But enryption often uses cipher-block chaining, where the unecrypted data from earlier in the session is used to encrypt the next block in addition to the shared secret. If they did this the attacker would have no hope of breaking the encryption unless he gets lucky on the first transmission.

    13. Re:So what? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      It's not truly random - it is subject to statistical analysis and the physical constraints of the resistor. Implement that avalanche breakdown wrong and that introduces a weakness. Show me or any mathematician 'appropriate whitening' - if you can appropriately whiten a random set, it's not truly random, now is it?
      All algorithmic approaches to generating true randomness are fundamentally wrongdoing.
      The question is, is a jittery thermal source in our backyard more or less random, more or less signatory, than one that occurred billions of years ago?

    14. Re:So what? by Captain+Perspicuous · · Score: 1

      Yes, but it's more secure than other keys, because the only way to attack it is to steal the keys before the time that the quasar is monitored. If an attacker discovers the keys afterwards, the key is useless.

      I don't get that. You could just record all quasars, then get a key and take a look into your archive and presto - there's the one-time pad of the other party. Right?

    15. Re:So what? by TrumpetPower! · · Score: 1

      homer_ca wrote:

      The name of the quasar and time to start monitoring are the cryptographic keys. That doesn't sound like a lot of bits in the keyspace.

      This was discussed the last time this article came 'round. You're right in your summary, but not in your assessment. The number of quasars, window of time to start monitoring, available bandwidth of random data from the quasars, etc., all make such attacks essentially impractical. Remember that shifting a one-time pad by even one bit renders the decryption unintelligible. If you're talking about gigabits per second from a random source--and, in the case of even a single quasar, we are--then simple timing becomes a formidable part of the key all unto itself.

      The real weakness in this system is that it should be pretty easy to poison the well--that is, to for an attacker to overpower the signal received at the radio dish in such a way as to force the victim to use a key chosen by the attacker. Doing so would likely be far cheaper than maintaining recordings of all quasars, or than a brute-force attempt to match those recordings to an encrypted stream.

      Worse, the proposal isn't for both ends to have their own radio telescopes, but for them to rely upon Internet broadcasts from a worldwide network of radio telescopes....

      Cheers,

      b&

      --
      All but God can prove this sentence true.
    16. Re:So what? by homer_ca · · Score: 1

      Actually I have a correction to make myself. TFA says the quasar data is used to add randomness to a stream cipher like a salt. This sounds less and less like a one-time pad.

    17. Re:So what? by wanerious · · Score: 1

      Lots more than that --- just a quick search of The Sloan Digital Sky Survey yields over 15,000. Probably even a lot more than that are known.

    18. Re:So what? by ars · · Score: 1

      "Worse yet, someone pointed out (who? I want to give you credit) that an active adversary could trivially inject fake signals into your radio telescopes and control the contents of your one time pad."

      Um, that was the article that pointed it out!

      But in any case very insightful post with the key size estimate.

      --
      -Ariel
    19. Re:So what? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Yep, pretty much.

      I actually thought that they were talking about using the data from quasars to generate one-time pads, which would then be distributed by conventional means. I didn't think they were actually proposing having two separate people observe the same quasar, to produce the "one-time" pad simultaneously. Unless you had a quasar that you knew nobody else knew about, and definitely wasn't monitoring, it seems like a pretty bad idea. Especially if the people you're trying to conceal information from have more resources than you do.

      In short, I think it's actually a pretty dumb idea; its forward security depends entirely on the assumption that somebody, someplace, wasn't out there, recording the same quasar that you used to generate your pad. And given the rather finite (to my knowledge) number of visible/recievable quasars, it seems like a poor assumption to make. Certainly I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    20. Re:So what? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 1

      Thanks for doing the math. I suspected that the keyspace here wasn't as big as what most people are already getting today with current technologies, you confirmed it.

      Although somebody mentioned that TFA may have been a bad summary of the intended application, and what they really plan on using this for is as a source for salt, which would then get included into the key of a symmetric cipher, thus increasing the keyspace, but why you'd want to go to all this work when you could just increase the key by 60 bits and not have to worry about using a radio-telescope is beyond me. (It's still a shared key, regardless of whether you're sharing the location and time of a quasar or web-stream of a quasar and the time, or a regular password. One way you have to get them the key information, from a security standpoint it doesn't matter what it is.)

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    21. Re:So what? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah. This is a great way for scientists who have access to multimillion dollar radio telescopes and who don't mind wasting a few hours of observing time to communicate with each other securely.

    22. Re:So what? by theLOUDroom · · Score: 1
      Yes, but it's more secure than other keys, because the only way to attack it is to steal the keys before the time that the quasar is monitored. If an attacker discovers the keys afterwards, the key is useless.

      In normal OTP, the keys do not exist afterwards, they are destroyed.

      There are lots of problems here:
      First, there is no fundametal restriction that prevents you from recording multiple sets of data. Second, it would be basically impossible to tell a well-designed man-made transmission from a quasar.

      Additionally, it doesn't really solve a problem. Yes, intecepting the key MIGHT be useless afterward, but that's a solution looking for a problem.
      Conside the normal OTP scenario:
      • Alice creates two matching sheets of random data
      • Alice delivers one of these matching sheets to Bob via a secure channel (also required by the quasar method).
      • Alice encodes her message and destroys her copy of the key.
      • Bob receives the message and decodes it


      So what step gets eliminated here?
      None of them.

      The key has to be transferred beforehand, (an additional requirement), and in a normal OTP procedure, you would expect both copies of the key to be destroyed as soon as possible. In the new process you STILL have two sets of data at each end that must be destroyed, and you still have information passing through a "secure channel" that can completely comprimise your secrets. The strength you're touting is not very useful.
      The ONLY additional protection you get is in a strange hypothetical situation where an attacker can only access a significantly delayed version of your secure channel and does not have sufficient resources to do any recording ahead of time. Without some guarantee that you can always communicate in this implausible manner, you get no added security.

      The only real benefit is a *possible* reduction in the amount of data that must pass though the secure channel. I say "possible" because there are real world problems like time synchronizing the receivers, and atmosperic differences between the two locations. (There are reasons why GPS has limited accuracy.)

      There's also a major DISADVANTAGE here:
      Both parties need to be able to see the same piece of the sky at the same time.


      --
      Life is too short to proofread.
    23. Re:So what? by volpe · · Score: 1

      Unless they've come up with an interesting way for two people in disparate locations to observe the same quasar and both independently observe the same random phenomena in a way which reliably and securely gives them access to the pad with no communication channel between them, this just isn't interesting.

      And when they come up with a way for two people to do it, without a third person also being able to do it, then it will be really interesting.

    24. Re:So what? by 2short · · Score: 1

      You've forgotten the choice of what frequencies to monitior, and the rate of observations; on the other hand, there aren't that many quasars (it appears there are something like 500,000 known today; the number goes up dramatically as the date of publication becomes more recent)

      But I think the real point is that the attacker has to guess which of 2^256 AES keys you're using to send the quasar observation instructions before the start time expires. i.e., if you have a channel you think someone might be able to crack, but you think that it will take them a long time, you can use that to communicate a quasar observation time sooner than that.

      So I think the theory is considerably more sound than people give it credit for. In practice, schemes for defending communications from well-funded attackers tend to ignore the myriad of ways such an attacker might capture your message before it ever gets encrypted in the first place. No amount of encryption will help you if the attacker can afford a team capable of sneaking into you office and installing a hardware keylogger you can't detect.

    25. Re:So what? by EERac · · Score: 2, Interesting

      The time to start monitoring is key. If quasars generate random bits at a high enough rate, it become infeasible for a third party to just start recording bits from some quasar then search for a particular one time pad.

      A few years ago, I heard a talk by Micheal Rabin that explained how completely secure one time pads could be obtained from a satellite (or some other data source) that generated random numbers at a high enough rate (see New York Times Article here). It seems like a collection of quasars could play the roll of the satellite. Once again, the key to his approach was that the satellite generated too many random bits for them all to be recorded.

      In his approach, traditional cryptographic techniques can be used initally decide when two parties should start sampling random bits to generate one time pad. That pad can then be used to decide on additional pads. If a third party intercepts every communication, they could potentially generate the pads themselves, but they would have to act very quickly, because once they failed to record bits from the satellite (or quasars) those bits would be gone forever.

      Normally, if you intercept an encrypted communication, you can hold on to the message and attempt to break the decryption over time. With this approach, if you don't decrypt the intial communication right away, you've missed out on the one time pads, and thus the captured message is nothing more than random bits. It can never be decrypted.

  9. Lava Lamps by NitsujTPU · · Score: 1, Interesting

    The coolest random number generator ever.

    http://www.lavarnd.org/

    1. Re:Lava Lamps by NitsujTPU · · Score: 1

      Sorry, I thought that that was the same as this.

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavarand

    2. Re:Lava Lamps by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I read in 'When Things Start To Think' by Neil Gerschenfeld that lava lamps can't actually be used that way, since the patterns they generate turn out to have a certain level of regularity. He did say (as somebody else here just did) something about the thermal radiation of a resistor being a better generator of randomness (I think, not sure exactly what it was).

  10. Xl6oUBY by Entropy · · Score: 5, Funny

    i147 F7b AIQzC9 7kXTA8TzJ Vl LcYxkN FXkCFA Ev4Lpwjk2 A0Jy7flvj phOlaTF 3S Z0uPk kP 5RKMkQ 5U5oZPW FzA f rj4FB 4vrI ZWr dovA6W l CS6

    --
    The sea changes color, but the sea does not change.
    1. Re:Xl6oUBY by Tackhead · · Score: 2, Insightful
      > i147 F7b AIQzC9 7kXTA8TzJ Vl LcYxkN FXkCFA Ev4Lpwjk2 A0Jy7flvj phOlaTF 3S Z0uPk kP 5RKMkQ 5U5oZPW FzA f rj4FB 4vrI ZWr dovA6W l CS6

      "'Impossible to predict', my 4vrI, you insensitive CS6!"

      You forgot that the LcYxkN (who live in the disc, at a 90-degree angle from the jet of 3C273, and who escaped the blast) have developed faster-than-light communication.

    2. Re:Xl6oUBY by Guppy06 · · Score: 4, Funny

      Mom, hang up the phone! I'm trying to play VGA Planets!

    3. Re:Xl6oUBY by pilkul · · Score: 1

      You kept that username all this time just to make that post, didn't you?

    4. Re:Xl6oUBY by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's funny. I thought that was the Perl script I just finished.

    5. Re:Xl6oUBY by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Umm... what about for those of us who don't get it?

  11. Not a one time pad... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    A one time pad is supposed to be a shared secret between only the two communicating parties.

    This is a system with a given quasar, and a given start time as a cipher.

    It suffers from the same set of potential attacks that any other public datastream with an unknown origin point suffers.

    If you were going to use such a method,you could, say, choose a random digit of PI as a a starting point for your transmission, and encrypt using susequent bits that way; but that method isn't as unbreakable as a one time pad, and neither is this.

    This is just a quirky way to get attention paid to quasars.

  12. not so sure about this by argoff · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I imagine someone who wanted to could buy enough equiptment to record all known quasar emmissions and store them
    or try them against encrypted data streams. A million quasars with 5000 possible frequencies each, wouldn't be that
    much for a computer to churn thru. In a way, it almost seems like security thru obscurity.

    1. Re:not so sure about this by ZombieWomble · · Score: 1

      And of course, you need to work out the exact moment the observation starts at. An offset of even a single bit will give you nonsense, that's the idea behind the pad. The keyspace offered by a million quasars, 5000 possible frequencies, and an almost arbitrarily fine time sampling is pretty vast.

    2. Re:not so sure about this by kingkade · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The keyspace offered by a million quasars, 5000 possible frequencies, and an almost arbitrarily fine time sampling is pretty vast.

      The point is how do you get those parameters to the other party secretly? This is the same problem as giving them a one-time pad generated any random way. I think the point is that you can get randomness but the previous problem will always exist.

    3. Re:not so sure about this by a1cypher · · Score: 1

      The point is how do you get those parameters to the other party secretly?

      Pffft.... isn't it obvious? Encrpyt the parameters using a quasar. oh wait...

    4. Re:not so sure about this by julesh · · Score: 1

      The point is how do you get those parameters to the other party secretly? This is the same problem as giving them a one-time pad generated any random way.

      Not really: those parameters are smaller than the amount of random data they generate. You end each message with 'sample the next key from quaser #332527 on frequency #3321 at 13:27:03.52 GMT tomorrow afternoon and generate a 10 meg key; I'm gonna send you a large file' or the like.

      Basically, it's a compression scheme for random data. Of course, there really is no such thing and because of this the data lacks randomness, making the key potentially insecure... but it would be very difficult for a potential cracker to exploit this particular lack of randomness.

    5. Re:not so sure about this by protoshoggoth · · Score: 1
      No coffee...must...think...

      Sooo the real benefit would be, then, that if you could do the initial exchange securely (as in, hand it to them or whatever) then you'd be able to have a permanent, more-or-less unlimited size 'pad', since you could always use one transmission to say how to decrypt the next one? Interesting. As with any "actual" (i.e. "theoretical", heh) OTP, the encryption itself would be perfect, the attacker is reduced to having to obtain the pad...or a decrypted message.

      Still, you'd be limited to doing another secure hand-off if you want to ever 'change your password', in effect.

    6. Re:not so sure about this by coolGuyZak · · Score: 1
      Still, you'd be limited to doing another secure hand-off if you want to ever 'change your password', in effect.
      When you think about the problem a little deeper... You realize that it is not the spoon that bends but yourself--er, no.

      You realize that the initial key exchange is always a problem. (You can use Diffie-Hellman or a similar mechanism to exchange keys securely, but you still can't be sure that you are communicating with the right person).

    7. Re:not so sure about this by the+chao+goes+mu · · Score: 1

      In addition there are side channel hacks. As someone else mentioned I could observe where your radiotelescope was directed at what times and get an idea of what you were recording. If you record the data for any purpose other than encryption (such as research), then I may be able to socially engineer a copy of your pad as well ("I'm an astronomer working on quasars... blah blah blah"). In fact, unless you build isolated and guarded single purpose encryption radiotelscopes there are a number of inherent weaknesses that make this encryption even less strong than the quasar/time keyspace would suggest.

      --
      Boys from the City. Not yet caught by the Whirlwind of Progress. Feed soda pop to the thirsty pigs.
    8. Re:not so sure about this by julesh · · Score: 1

      You can use Diffie-Hellman or a similar mechanism to exchange keys securely, but you still can't be sure that you are communicating with the right person

      Bear in mind that Diffie Hellman et al are less secure than OTP encryption; it might be impractical to do so, but it is theoretically possible to reverse the process and determine the keys involved. OTP is theoretically unbreakable.

    9. Re:not so sure about this by coolGuyZak · · Score: 1

      Yes, I know that. I wasn't trying to say that DH was more secure or anything of the sort. I was apptempting to illustrate that the initial exchange of data (Whether it is the OTP, a PGP key, or whatever) is always a problem.

  13. Makes the pads even more secure by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    By killing everyone in an entire galaxy!?!?

    Now they only have to fix the problem of preserving the recipient.

  14. Actual advancement by flooey · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The summary for this article is a little misleading. One time pads aren't new, and good sources of natural randomness aren't new either.

    The interesting part of this article is the fact that quasars could be used as a natural source of randomness for one time pads, yet can be accessed by both parties simultaneously. The historical problem with one time pads (and the reason they're rarely used in practice) is that it's a huge pain to distibute sufficient random data to all parties involved in a communication. Being able to use a natural source of randomness that's available to everyone at once would be a major increase in the usability of one time pads.

    1. Re:Actual advancement by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      a natural source of randomness that's available to everyone as your choice of OTP would also be a very poor reason to use it as an OTP as everyone could decrypt it.

    2. Re:Actual advancement by vertinox · · Score: 1

      Being able to use a natural source of randomness that's available to everyone at once would be a major increase in the usability of one time pads.

      Including Eve ;)

      Sorry inside Alice and Bob encryption humor.

      --
      "I am the king of the Romans, and am superior to rules of grammar!"
      -Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor (1368-1437)
    3. Re:Actual advancement by tadmas · · Score: 1
      The interesting part of this article is the fact that quasars could be used as a natural source of randomness for one time pads, yet can be accessed by both parties simultaneously.

      And also by an attacker....

      The historical problem with one time pads (and the reason they're rarely used in practice) is that it's a huge pain to distibute sufficient random data to all parties involved in a communication. Being able to use a natural source of randomness that's available to everyone at once would be a major increase in the usability of one time pads.

      Actually, no it would not. You still have to distribute random data -- the quasar and time to start. One would expect that you'd want to pick random variations in start times or else a single leak / lucky guess completely blows away all the protection. With today's technology, distributing 1 GB of random data is just as easy as distributing a time + quasar; just use a flash drive or similar miniature electronic storage.

      Also, this poses another problem: since you have to start at the same time, but you also want to be able to do this at high speed, you must synchronize your clocks for this to be useful at all, probably to less than a millisecond. This is not a trivial task.

      I really think this is taking something simple and making it way too complex for no gain at all. It's certainly not more useable.

    4. Re:Actual advancement by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 0

      The gain, if any, will be using the quasar info as a session key.

      You use your 1 GB flash-drive one-time pad for the initial key-exchange communication, agreeing on (or prescribing to a silent listener) the quasar parameters. Then you use the quasar info to encrypt a message as large as you like.

      Normally a session key would be for some non-one-time-pad cryptosystem. So messages encrypted with this two step process can be broken in two ways:
        - The session cryptosystem is broken.
        - The session is recorded and later the one-time-pad (or other key-exchange cryptosystem) is compromised, allowing the decryption of the recorded message.

      With enough quasars available that it's impractical (even for NSA with its computer and disk drive inventory measured in acres) to record it all, later compromises of the key-exchange information don't let them crack recorded communications. (Perhaps there are too many for them to even record all the potential possibilities for the duration of your message when they know you're communicating.)

      Since the key-exchange protocol consumes only a small amount of your precious hand-distributed pad, you can use it for a LOT of messages before you need a new one. And you might even use it to distribute additional key-exchange pad when you're running out with negligible increase in eavesdropping risk. (Though if one side is compromised it now means you stay compromised.)

      That could lead to practical bootstrapping protocols driven from rather small initial pads - or built on other key-exchange protocols, even cracked ones, by taking advantage of the need for eve to break the initial key exchange in time to hitch her wagon to the correct star.

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    5. Re:Actual advancement by the+chao+goes+mu · · Score: 1

      One big problem. Existing radiotelescopes are research facilities. It is kind of hard to ask to get time at one, and then to ask that you be able to destroy all recorded data when you're done... I have my doubts that this could work in practice.

      --
      Boys from the City. Not yet caught by the Whirlwind of Progress. Feed soda pop to the thirsty pigs.
  15. Hack by Catskul · · Score: 2, Interesting

    It sounds like a great idea, but it might be easy to subvert. All I have to do is overwhelm the signal and get the target to use my (or null) one time pad, and I will be able to decrypt. Hell I can even make my one time pad *look* random, and they'd likely never notice. While I'm at it I can do it from a satellite and not have to get near their antenna.

    --

    Im not here now... Im out KILLING pepperoni
    1. Re:Hack by XenoRyet · · Score: 1

      I would hope they had protections against that sort of thing. But you do have a very interesting idea there, I wonder if it could be made to work.

      --
      If forums teach us anything, it is that logic and critical thinking should be required courses in the public schools.
    2. Re:Hack by Loconut1389 · · Score: 1

      Or find out which quasar is their source and listen, then you have the same dataset and it is only a matter of figuring out where they started using it for OTP. Though transmission 'errors' or rather detection errors could skew the result. Figuring out their sample rate, and exact point to start the sample would be next to impossible I suppose.. But in theory it is a weakness. Enough social engineering or background research might turn up that kind of information (espionage?). Again, what my receiver says is a 1 may not be what your receiver says, based on power at your position, etc... So who know...

    3. Re:Hack by jspoon · · Score: 1
      "...transmission 'errors' or rather detection errors could skew the result... ...Again, what my receiver says is a 1 may not be what your receiver says, based on power at your position, etc... So who know..."

      They'd have to find a way to avoid this themselves, since the sender and receiver will most likely be in different locations and might have to use different equipment.

    4. Re:Hack by hurfy · · Score: 2, Interesting

      How about not even replacing their signal.

      Could one jam/interfer with it enough if they had a rough idea of when? Sounds MUCH easier than pegging the millisecond to inject yours.

      Interfer enough so data is unusable, then they have to resend. Repeat as much as possible. Isn't having multiple versions of secret data floating around a bad thing?

    5. Re:Hack by nacturation · · Score: 1

      Simple... just put up your own quasar, brighter and more energetic than the real one. The difference is that you control the entropy, so you can always read their messages.

      --
      Want to improve your Karma? Instead of "Post Anonymously", try the "Post Humously" option.
    6. Re:Hack by owlstead · · Score: 1

      "Interfer enough so data is unusable, then they have to resend. Repeat as much as possible. Isn't having multiple versions of secret data floating around a bad thing?"

      Not if that data is encrypted using a true one time pad.

    7. Re:Hack by Loconut1389 · · Score: 1

      I thought the OTP was recorded once and then the recorded version was handed to whoever was going to receive the data?

    8. Re:Hack by steveo777 · · Score: 1

      Or... in theory, you could watch the same quasar or monitor their watching of said quasar and gather the data and subvert all the pads. As far as they are from the Earth, I'd imagine there isn't much room for deviation in statistics if your near enough to where the data is being gathered.... eh?

      --
      This sig isn't original enough, it's time to come up with something witty...
  16. almost there by morcheeba · · Score: 1

    So, the quasar is effectively transmitting the decryption key. Great! -- Now all you need to do is prevent everyone in the world except your intended recipient from seeing it.

    1. Re:almost there by PitaBred · · Score: 2, Informative

      Naah. Just prevent everyone except the intended recipient from knowing when you're recording it for the OTP. Much easier problem.

  17. Finally! by loconet · · Score: 4, Funny

    ...harnessing a truly random datasource

    Wow, they finally managed to tap into my girlfriend's mood neurons?

    --
    [alk]
    1. Re:Finally! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Girlfriend? You must be new here.

    2. Re:Finally! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Wouldn't that generate imaginary numbers?

    3. Re:Finally! by hopethisnickisnottak · · Score: 1

      Where is the +1 Funny, No sex this year mod when you need one?

      --
      -Shaunak
    4. Re:Finally! by Rob86TA · · Score: 1
      ...they finally managed to tap into my girlfriend's mood neurons?

      Here you are being modded +5 funny, when you should be modded +5 insightful.
      Mods, this is a classic case of security through obscurity... there is no girlfriend!

  18. How is this secure? by Zadaz · · Score: 3, Insightful

    How does this increase security? It's not like quasars are private property. Anyone can look at 'em...

    1. Re:How is this secure? by starwed · · Score: 1

      Exept, no. The equipment to measure their transmissions is a little hard to come by. (You should price radio telescopes sometime. ^_^)

    2. Re:How is this secure? by Zadaz · · Score: 2, Insightful

      It seems to me if I have a spare radio telescope to encrypt with, I'm probably sending messages that other radio telescope owners would be interested in.

  19. Am I missing something? by brian0918 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    How is this more secure than one-time pads? Whereas only the two parties involved have access to one-time pads, everyone has access to quasar radiation. The two users still have to tell eachother where to look and when, and that information is all someone would need to crack the message. The only way it could be more secure is if the coordinates are only available on one-time pads, in which case you're basically saying that code breakers have to go out and buy an antenna....

    1. Re:Am I missing something? by LuminaireX · · Score: 1

      I think the intent of the article was to explain the use of quasars in generating OTP's, not replacing them.

    2. Re:Am I missing something? by flooey · · Score: 1

      How is this more secure than one-time pads?

      It's not (and it can't be, properly used one time pads are perfectly secure). What this does, though, is make it so that you could use a one time pad without predistributing huge blocks of random data. That makes one time pads quite a bit more usable in real world applications.

  20. That's not randomness at all by LuminaireX · · Score: 2, Interesting

    That's not randomness at all. It only seems random because they don't have a model currently to describe quasar behavior. Thus, they're confusing randomness with unpredictability - just because one can't predict what will happen in the next n instances doesn't make it random. What's to say some brilliant scientist won't come along in the near future with a model predicting quasar behavior?

    1. Re:That's not randomness at all by Eric+Smith · · Score: 3, Interesting
      That's not randomness at all. It only seems random
      An interesting assertion, but without any backing evidence.
      they're confusing randomness with unpredictability
      There isn't any particularly better definition of randomness than "unpredicability". Some things are more unpredicable than others. Some things can even be proven to be unpredictable; for instance, the Blum-Blum-Shub PRNG has been proven to be unpredictable if you don't have a copy of its internal state, because it is mathematically intractable to derive the state from the output.

      It seems unlikely that it will become possible to predict the behavior of quasars as you suggest; we can't even accurately predict the weather on earth, which is a much smaller system than a quasar. For that matter, we can't predict the detailed behavior of a lava lamp, making that a reasonable source of random numbers (but patented!).

    2. Re:That's not randomness at all by AlterTick · · Score: 1
      That's not randomness at all. It only seems random because they don't have a model currently to describe quasar behavior.

      You're not hungry, you just think you're hungry.

      Seriously, given an accurate model of how it's generated, nothing is random. Randomness is totally subjective. Nothing is ever truly random.

      --
      Conclusion: the Empire squashes the Federation like a bug. Accept it.
    3. Re:That's not randomness at all by slavemowgli · · Score: 1

      Some things can even be proven to be unpredictable; for instance, the Blum-Blum-Shub PRNG has been proven to be unpredictable if you don't have a copy of its internal state, because it is mathematically intractable to derive the state from the output.

      Not quite true: it's been proven that telling apart the bits output by a BBS PRNG from truly random bits is at least as difficult as integer factorisation. Of course, that's still better than most other PRNGs, and generally good enough.

      --
      quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
    4. Re:That's not randomness at all by LokiSteve · · Score: 1

      "What's to say some brilliant scientist won't come along in the near future with a model predicting quasar behavior?"

      Or a lucky idiot.

      --
      END OF LINE.
    5. Re:That's not randomness at all by statusbar · · Score: 1

      Except for Schrodinger's cat....

      --jeffk++

      --
      ipv6 is my vpn
    6. Re:That's not randomness at all by martinde · · Score: 1

      Ever heard of chaos theory? I wonder what happens when the initial conditions in a chaotic system map straight onto something governed by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. Would you call THAT random?

    7. Re:That's not randomness at all by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      Seriously, given an accurate model of how it's generated, nothing is random.

      But Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle puts limits on how accurate your model can be.

      As a result you can get truly random bits by measuring the effects of quantum-mechanical events that are below that threshold.

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    8. Re:That's not randomness at all by howlingfrog · · Score: 5, Informative

      There isn't any particularly better definition of randomness than "unpredicability".

      That's true not just as a rule of thumb, but in a more formal sense as well. The word "random" is pretty hard to come up with a mathematically formal definition for, and "pretty hard" may mean "impossible" depending on your definition of "definition" (more on that later). To make things simple, let's just talk about sequences of ones and zeros. Take for example the sequence 01101110010111011110001001101010111100110111101111 ... Definitions of randomness from statistics and probability just require a potentially random sequence to have all possible subsequences of a given length appear with the same frequency. That is, 0 appears exactly as often as 1; 00 appears exactly as often as 01, 10, and 11; 000 as often as 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111; and so on. The sequence I gave above passes those tests with flying colors. But it's not random at all. I'll put some spaces in it, and you'll see the pattern: 0 1 10 11 100 101 110 111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111... It's simply counting in binary. The longer you extend the sequence, the better it does in statistical randomness tests--the first few dozen bits have a pretty strong bias for 1 over 0, but that ends up as noise in the long run.

      The relatively young field of information theory introduces the concept of "algorithmic randomness." The randomness of a sequence of bits is defined to be the length of the shortest Universal Turing Machine program which ouputs that sequence. In pseudocode, our example sequence is output by the program:

      let i = 0
      while (true) do
      output i
      let i = i + 1
      end while

      That's a comically short program to generate an arbitrarily long sequence. So the example fails tests for algorithmic randomness miserably. The fun part is that the problem of finding the shortest UTM program to generate a given sequence is provably intractable. Thanks to the the Halting Problem, you can't always tell if a given UTM program will halt or loop infinitely. All you could ever know is whether or not the program has output the desired sequence yet--if it's still running, it may do so eventually and then halt, it may output something else and then halt, or it may keep running forever. So algorithmic randomness plugs the holes in statistical randomness by trading an unreliably solvable problem for a reliably unsolvable one. You can't ever be sure a sequence is random, but you can sometimes be sure it isn't.

      I got off on a bit of a tangent there about information theory, but my point is that algorithmic randomness captures what we mean by "random" much better than statistical randomness. And algorithmic randomness is just a mathematically formal way of saying "unpredictable."

      --
      The original Howling Frog is a fictional character and has no UID.
    9. Re:That's not randomness at all by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No I would not.
      What interactions between the self-similar chaotic input and the quantum nature of the Principle?
      What's to say periodicity will not arise in some form, destroying the unpredictability?

    10. Re:That's not randomness at all by Arkaein · · Score: 1

      Just wanted to point out that your sequence fails the conditions you've specified. Where you spell out all eight three-digit binary numbers above you include leading zeros which are not present in the whole sequence. Because every number but the first starts with 1, there are more ones than zeros. I didn't check, but there are likely more 10's than 01's, etc., for the same reason.

    11. Re:That's not randomness at all by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If I'm not mistaken, when the number of digits of the binary numbers tend to infinity, the leading 1 should be negligible.

      I'm not the GP, but just point this out. I'm not saying that you're wrong though, since I know nothing about statistical randomness, and the above observation is just from basic math concepts learnt in high school.

    12. Re:That's not randomness at all by mentaldrano · · Score: 1

      The Halting problem, and Turing's proof of its unsolvability, only says that there is no general solution to determine whether or not a given program will halt. It is still possible to prove that a particular program or a particular class of programs will indeed halt.

      Turing's "proof" of the halting problem was basically constructing a program which could not be proven to halt, nothing more. That doesn't rule out proving that MS Windows will halt, which as anyone who has ever used it can see, is a trivial problem.

    13. Re:That's not randomness at all by owlstead · · Score: 1

      "That's not randomness at all. It only seems random -> An interesting assertion, but without any backing evidence."

      No, for a cryptographer to use it they must make it very, very likely that this source generates true random numbers. This is pretty hard to do (as mentioned, randomness is hard to prove). Just saying that there is no evidence to the contrary is not enough. If there are doubts about the randomness of the source, forget any use whatsoever.

    14. Re:That's not randomness at all by Eric+Smith · · Score: 1
      for a cryptographer to use it they must make it very, very likely that this source generates true random numbers.
      If a source is unpredictable, by definition it generates "true random numbers".

      There are no physical processes which are unpredictable today AND ALSO that we can be certain will still be unpredictable tomorrow. Currently it is generally believed that the collapse of quantum wave functions is unpredictable, but this has not been proven.

      AFAICT, there's no reason to think that the quasar as a random number source is any more or less random than the thermal noise in a diode. The latter is much more commonly used as a random number source, however. We can easily manufacture more diodes, but manufacturing more quasars is somewhat problematic at the present time.

    15. Re:That's not randomness at all by howlingfrog · · Score: 1

      At the beginning, this is true. But the ratio of 1's to 0's asymptotically approaches 0.5 as the length of the sequence increases. The same goes for longer subsequences. Your guess that there's an early bias for 10 over 01 is correct, too, but all biases in the sequence last only finitely long. It's really a pretty interesting sequence from a statastician's perspective.

      --
      The original Howling Frog is a fictional character and has no UID.
    16. Re:That's not randomness at all by AlterTick · · Score: 1
      But Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle puts limits on how accurate your model can be. As a result you can get truly random bits by measuring the effects of quantum-mechanical events that are below that threshold.

      Well yeah, but my point is that every effect has a cause, so nothing is by nature random. Random is simply a measure of our ability to predict the outcome.

      --
      Conclusion: the Empire squashes the Federation like a bug. Accept it.
    17. Re:That's not randomness at all by seraphiusNoctisbane · · Score: 0

      But Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle puts limits on how accurate your model can be. As a result you can get truly random bits by measuring the effects of quantum-mechanical events that are below that threshold.

      That has nothing to do with randomness. Just a flawed man made model...

      This whole thread would have about 75 less posts if every instance the word "Randomess" was replaced with "Presently Incomprehensible Complexity"

  21. Obligatory alien plot comment by behindthewall · · Score: 1

    Mothership, phaser/plasma/gamma/mind-control rays, incubating larvae, tastes good with ketchup (catsup, whatever), and all that...

    Oh, and "They've got our codes!"

    Sigh. When will Earth ever learn?

  22. Neat idea, not practical by SamMichaels · · Score: 1

    There are plenty of sources closer to us that require less bells of whistles. Thermal (amplifier) noise? Radioactive decay?

    Read.

    1. Re:Neat idea, not practical by kst · · Score: 1

      There are plenty of sources closer to us that require less bells of whistles. Thermal (amplifier) noise? Radioactive decay?

      Or a really hot cup of tea.

  23. or IPKI by gadzook33 · · Score: 3, Funny

    Intergalactic Public Key Infrastructure

  24. Duped again! by Dieppe · · Score: 0, Redundant
    This new fangled encryption is so good it's like I'm seeing double!

    http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/30/011 5216

    1. Re:Duped again! by Dieppe · · Score: 1

      It's funn that I was marked Redundant because this whole article is!

  25. Coins by mtenhagen · · Score: 1

    I've got a random number generator in my wallet.

    Just flip a coin.

    This article and research is utterly useless and therefor logicaly patented.

    --
    200GB/2TB $7.95 Coupon: SAVE90DOLLAR
    1. Re:Coins by Kyojin · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Hmmm. Generate a random integer between 1 and 3 inclusive.

      This must be done with a finite number of coin tosses.

      The probability of each integer occuring must be equal.

    2. Re:Coins by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hmmm... Flip coin 2 times. Head & Head ->1, Head & Back ->2, Back & Back 2.

      No, the real problem is that coins aren't truly random, because weight distribution isn't even. Even one drop more metal on one side, and they have a predilection to fell on one side more than other. Flip 100 coins 1,000 times each, and compare results. You'll see that you can group results into two categories, one that have predilection for "face", and one for "back".

  26. overkill by gadzook33 · · Score: 1

    Interesting that they picked OTP since you need a random source for all key generation. Anyway, this is overkill in the extreme. While generating good random numbers is tricky, it's perfectly possible with sources right here at home. If you want really good numbers, use something like thermal noise. If you want good numbers, use /dev/random. Either way it's a question of estimating the number of bits of entropy you have collected. That isn't straight-forward but it's perfectly possible. And a lot easier than trying to guarantee you get one bit of entropy per bit collected by carrying a radio telescope around with you.

    1. Re:overkill by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      The POINT is that you DON'T HAVE TO DISTRIBUTE the one time pad info. Instead you just distribute a specifier of what info to grab from the quasars' broadcast - a specifier that is from a keyspace too large for an attacker to brute-force grab it all.

      Securely distributing a small message once, in advance of the events you want to communicate about, and keeping the message secure until your later communication, is much easier than doing the same for a pile of data as big as all the messages you'll ever need to send or receive and keeping it secure FOREVER.

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    2. Re:overkill by gadzook33 · · Score: 1

      Ah, good point. I stand corrected.

    3. Re:overkill by theLOUDroom · · Score: 1

      Instead you just distribute a specifier of what info to grab from the quasars' broadcast

      ...and when to grab it. You are now adding a time synchronization requirement to the process.

      is much easier than doing the same for a pile of data as big as all the messages you'll ever need to send or receive and keeping it secure FOREVER.

      1) All the OTP's you're every going to use don't have to be distributed at once.
      2) They do not need to be kept secure forever, just until they are used and subsequently destroyed.

      See my other post on this, the only additional security here is in the strange situation where an attacker can get only delayed access to your keys. There is no good reason for saying an attacker is subject to this restriction. It's like assuming a safe-cracker can only turn the dial clockwise. It's silly.

      --
      Life is too short to proofread.
    4. Re:overkill by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      Instead you just distribute a specifier of what info to grab from the quasars' broadcast ...and when to grab it. You are now adding a time synchronization requirement to the process.

      OK, in the spirit of open source I'll telly you this rather than trying to patent it. B-)

      The synchronization can be approximate.

      Part of your key is a string to look for in the quasar data and use for a starting point. You pick its length so it occurs often enough that you don't suffer a major delay waiting for it but rarely enough that there are only a handfull of them in the interval of interest. The first speaker picks the first one that comes along, listeners start a tad early and buffer several potential key streams until they identify the correct one.

      Several countries provide redundant broadcast time services suitable for initial synchronization. while Stratum III quality clocks are inexpensive for stable rate generation and if they're not sufficiently stable while free-running several things (like GPS, its proposed EU brother, LORAN-C (which still was active last I looked), telephone carriers, cellphone networks, and television framing rates from broadcast or satellite source) can be used to stabilize the local clocks further and keep them synchronized.

      is much easier than doing the same for a pile of data as big as all the messages you'll ever need to send or receive and keeping it secure FOREVER.

              1) All the OTP's you're every going to use don't have to be distributed at once.
              2) They do not need to be kept secure forever, just until they are used and subsequently destroyed. ...

      the only additional security here is in the strange situation where an attacker can get only delayed access to your keys. There is no good reason for saying an attacker is subject to this restriction. It's like assuming safe-cracker can only turn the dial clockwise. It's silly.


      In fact, assuring that both keys get destroyed after use, so they can't be used to decrypt recorded messages, is one of the weak points of one-time-pad key administration. Failure to do so has resulted in a number of compromises high-profile enough to make the open media (and thus no doubt quite a bunch the intelligence community aren't mentioning).

      Using something like quasar noise - with an intractably large selection-key space - lets you get away with distributing only a small amount of information by your initial secure channel without limiting the amount of information you want to transmit later, while the nature of the pad source makes insuring pad destruction trivial. (Just don't keep a record of it and insure your caches are at least as flushed of key as of clear data.)

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    5. Re:overkill by theLOUDroom · · Score: 1

      The synchronization can be approximate.

      Sure. Technically, that's all it will ever be. It still remains an additional requirement on the system that didn't exist before.

      In fact, assuring that both keys get destroyed after use, so they can't be used to decrypt recorded messages, is one of the weak points of one-time-pad key administration........Using something like quasar noise - with an intractably large selection-key space - lets you get away with distributing only a small amount of information by your initial secure channel without limiting the amount of information you want to transmit later

      All this is true, but needs to be put together to illustrate the issues.
      Using Quasars, there still exist two sets of data (A&B) that must be destroyed. If you're saving the quasar data alnog with the messages, it's just like saving those paper sheets of random characters. Using this "key" creates a THIRD bit of data (C).

      So now I have to protect A, B and C. Yes, it reduces the amount of bits going through your secure channel, but the only added security (not convenience) you get is in the case where Eve is only able to access a delayed version of the secure channel. There's no justification being provided for why that is such a leap forward in terms of security.
      I submit that it's not. It's pretty much trivial to get access to high-speed data networks these days, so why is the case where an attacker can't so significant? It's like saying you're more secure because attackers who can't do long division (at all) can't compute the results necessary read your messages. Sure, there are some people who can't do it, but it's a silly constraint to place on an attacker.

      --
      Life is too short to proofread.
  27. Getting the OTP around is the hard part. by caluml · · Score: 1

    Trouble is, is if you have a secure method for getting the copy of the one time pad to the other person, you might as well have sent the thing you're encrypting. (Unless you do it in advance, and store it completely securely, and destroy it the moment it is used. And it's not much use for network traffic - a 650MB CD of random data lasts only minutes on a 10Mbit link. And you cannot reuse it without seriously compromising the security of the encryption).

    1. Re:Getting the OTP around is the hard part. by Locke2005 · · Score: 1

      You're missing the point -- it solves the OTP distribution problem, because once a specific quasar and time period is known, the OTP can be generated simultaneously by all participants. Of course, this would be possible with almost any astronomical source of random data, not just quasars. Once all the partipants know which quasar to use and how to use it, there is a virtually infinite source of OTP random bits.

      --
      I've abandoned my search for truth; now I'm just looking for some useful delusions.
    2. Re:Getting the OTP around is the hard part. by TheRaven64 · · Score: 1
      Then problem with a one time pad is that you need to transmit a phenomenal amount of data. The pad size must be equal to the length of the message multiplied by the number of different characters in your character set. One solution to this is to generate the pads algorithmically, using a true random source as your input. If you record the random source, then both parties can generate the same pads. This means that you can transmit a slightly smaller amount of data for the pads.

      The advantage of this approach is that now they don't even need to transmit the random data. Instead, they transmit the location of a quasar to use, the time at which it should be used, and the frequency. Since this amount of information is relatively small, only a small one time pad needs to be exchanged in order to permit the exchange of this information. Once both sides have the same random source, they can keep generating the same one time pads, and use these to exchange messages much larger than the amount of data they needed to securely exchange initially.

      While this is a nice idea, it is potentially vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. An attacker with the ability to record the output from all known quasars could compare a known ciphertext to a known plaintext encrypted with each potential key. The search space for this is, however, huge and I suspect it will be some time before it becomes feasible.

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    3. Re:Getting the OTP around is the hard part. by harlows_monkeys · · Score: 1
      And it's not much use for network traffic - a 650MB CD of random data lasts only minutes on a 10Mbit link

      In practice, it would last much longer, since most computers aren't saturating a 10 Mbit link. Checking the actual data counts on assorted computers I use, I find about a gigabyte a day is typical. Furthermore, a lot of that is traffic from websites or downloads, which is public information that would not need to be encrypted. If we excluded from the encryption traffic to/from port 80 on the remote side, 650 MB of random data would last quite a while.

    4. Re:Getting the OTP around is the hard part. by Lehk228 · · Score: 1

      it falls apart because if you are going to transmit quasar locations you may as well send a moderately beefy symmetric key.

      --
      Snowden and Manning are heroes.
  28. Why not use white noise? by Yartrebo · · Score: 1

    What's so bad with using the randomly fluctuating voltage in a wire or the current in a conducting loop as a source of random data. This could be implemented as part of an integrated circuit and could cost a fraction of a cent per copy.

    If you need protection against willful interference, put a faraday cage around it, which is not hard at all to do using lithography.

    An added advantage is that random bits can be generated by the billions per second, and is limited only by the sampling rate of the voltmeter.

  29. Random Duplicationist by poena.dare · · Score: 0, Redundant

    Thank the gods they aren't using /. for randomness:

    http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/30/011 5216

  30. Oh no. Not again. by hhr · · Score: 2, Insightful

    One Time Pads may be the most secure form of encryption, but they are *not* the most secure way to protect your secrets.

    Time and time again, security breaks down because of the way people treat their keys, not because the encryption algorithm is week.

    With a one time pad, you need to keep a copy of the pad with everyone who wants access to the data. Compare that to Public Key Crypto where you can keep your private key in one secure spot and distribute your public key widely.

    Or how about session keys (Diffie Hellman for example)... single use keys that only you and your partner have access to. How good is that! And you don't need to transfer and secure your OTP to use them!

    1. Re:Oh no. Not again. by Sigma+7 · · Score: 1
      With a one time pad, you need to keep a copy of the pad with everyone who wants access to the data.


      Not really - all you need is two one-time pads. One to send, and one to receive.

      The intent of One-time pads is to prevent the decoding of the message when it is intercepted. Once it reaches the destination, you can decrypt the message into a usable format and use your own security system that could be cracked more easily (but requires having better access). It is not intended to be a mass dissemmination system - only for point-to-point communication.

      And as with all encryption methods, they are all still vulnerable to rubber-hose brute force attacks.
    2. Re:Oh no. Not again. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Silly.

      1. No they are not vulnerable to brute-force attack. If the one-time pad is as long as the message, it is mathematically proven that it is impossible to decode the message without the key, because the clear message could be anything. If the message is a 5-letter long message, then it could be as well the word "music" or "brush". This is also caled the mask of Vernon, and this is the only case of undecypherable code.

      2. The problem with one-time pad is the exchange of the key. How do you exchange them a secure way ? Since the encryption is symmetric, you would need a secure channel for transmitting the pads, and thus you go back to the problem of transmitting somthing securely.

  31. A Cheap Soundcard ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    with poor electronics sure can be noisy and hence random, maybe it is good competition to comic noise...
    http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/geoffreyp ark/

  32. Fucking sanitary towels ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bloody hell, come on, less of these 'one time pads' stories here, there's hardly any girls, and they can sort it out themselves if they have an issue with the security.

    And Quasars? What happened to the good old lunar timing?

  33. One time pads are _NOT_ secure, asswit by Lord+Bitman · · Score: 0, Flamebait

    there's more than one level of security. One time pads are one of the least secure methods of secure communication, for obvious reasons.

    --
    -- 'The' Lord and Master Bitman On High, Master Of All
    1. Re:One time pads are _NOT_ secure, asswit by blahtree · · Score: 1

      For those that don't know, here are the rules when using one-time pads.

      1. One time pads must be random. Not "random enough", but random.
      2. Do not re-use one time pads. Ever.
      3. Since both parties that want to communicate are going to need the same one-time pad, that one-time pad must be shared securely.

      #3 is probably what Lord Bitman is refering to when he says "One time pads are one of the least secure methods of secure communication." This is a problem with many forms of encryption called the key transfer problem.

      Even despite these limitations, I wouldn't call one time pads one of the least secure methods of secure communication. DES, 3DES, and in fact any form of symmetric encryption have the same problem.

      The key transfer problem certainly isn't insurmountable.

    2. Re:One time pads are _NOT_ secure, asswit by Lord+Bitman · · Score: 1

      though not without the use of some method /other than/ one-time-pads :)

      I suppose the qualifier "by themselves" is important.

      --
      -- 'The' Lord and Master Bitman On High, Master Of All
    3. Re:One time pads are _NOT_ secure, asswit by Lord+Bitman · · Score: 1

      Okay, it's not so early/late anymore and I'm more clear-headed, so here's a better explanation:
      One-Time Pads, by their nature, have more opportunities for a breach than any other method. That is, you still need to share the exact same pad with another person, that same pad is used for both encryption and decryption. Because you _must_ only use it _once_ (otherwise it is not a one-time-pad), you must by the nature of the pad go through many exchanges of the key. Any time a key is exchanged, this is a security problem. You want to limit the number of times you expose yourself to that kind of risk, and one-time-pads are certainly not the way to do this. The more often you make an exchange, the more likely someone is to work out the human component, that is, the by-its-nature-less-secure-proccess through which you exchange the key. Most breaches occur through whatever human/logistic component is set up, not from the breach of a key.

      Again, with the qualifier "by themselves". One-time-pads are not secure, (asswit).

      --
      -- 'The' Lord and Master Bitman On High, Master Of All
  34. A common use for OTPs - Numbers Stations by ChePibe · · Score: 2, Informative
    Some here may not be familiar with the uses of an OTP, so here's a common use:

    In order for an intelligence agency to communicate with an asset overseas, spy agencies must often use methods of communication that cannot be easily traced (duh). Passing a message along via e-mail, phone, or a one-to-one meeting can easily be tracked, creating lots of problems for everyone in the loop.

    Therefore, many intelligence agencies did (and still) use OTPs and "Numbers Stations" - shortwave radio stations that blast out a seemingly senseless series of numbers at regular intervals and frequencies. This method gets messages and instructions to your assets without betraying who the recipient of the message is.

    The beauty is that the asset only needs a cheap, readily available shortwave radio and a OTP, which can be concealed in virtually anything (some were created that could even be affixed to the back of stamps, others were hidden in toothpaste tubes, etc. The agent then responds with a seemingly inocuous method, a "wrong number code", a mark on a wall near where an intelligence officer drives, etc.

    The problem, of course, rests in getting OTPs to the asset and ensuring they aren't compromised. But, assuming they are passed and handled securely, there's no problem at all.

    More information on Wikipedia

    1. Re:A common use for OTPs - Numbers Stations by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      well, if you can securely transmit the OTP, why not just securetly transmit the darn plaintext? You know that the OTP has, by definition, the same number of bits as the plaintext, right?

    2. Re:A common use for OTPs - Numbers Stations by belg4mit · · Score: 1

      Because you can give a book of one time pads to the ship captain/secret agent/etc. when he sets out from port/inserts in the field/etc. He can then use (and discard!) the pad to communicate securely at some point in the future.

      --
      Were that I say, pancakes?
  35. Keyspace by Erich · · Score: 2, Informative
    There are relatively few quasars that are observable. Probably a lot fewer that are observable at the same time by two locations, if the two locations are geographically diverse. It is possible for a third party to monitor these discrete locations. Noise would be different to the two observation locations, which could be overcome using sufficient error coding in the plaintext at of course the loss of plaintext entropy, making it easier for a third party with perhaps a noisier signal (due to being slightly out-of-bound, etc) to obtain the plaintext.

    The fundimental problem is that the data is not fully random -- it is mostly deterministic based on the key of what quasar, what frequency and bandwidth, and what time. So an outside person could recover the plaintext by obtaining the observable behavior and trying all keys, or if the outside person could somehow obtain the key.

    This is a very similar situation to a "good" pseudorandom number generator. You can transmit the seed for the pseudorandom number generator and generate a one-time pad from the pseudorandom number generator. I guess the difference is that quasar behavior is not observable after the fact, but if it is feasable for the data to be logged then they reduce to similar solutions: find all the pads within the keyspace, xor with the cipher text, and watch for the entropy to drop or visibility of known plaintext.

    --

    -- Erich

    Slashdot reader since 1997

    1. Re:Keyspace by CanSpice · · Score: 1
      There are relatively few quasars that are observable.


      I suppose you're right, if by "relatively few" you mean "200,000 and counting".
    2. Re:Keyspace by Erich · · Score: 1
      Compared to a reasonable keyspace (say, 48 bits or more) yes, 200k is relatively few.

      And, again, how many of those are observable by both sites at the same time with enough fidelity to be able to share the signal for use as a pad?

      --

      -- Erich

      Slashdot reader since 1997

  36. Do the keys narrow down the geographic space by grahamsz · · Score: 1

    It would seem that if you intercept a set of keys that specify a certain quasar and a certain start time then you could establish a geographic region that encompassed both the sender and receiver.

  37. Not so secure... by jamesivie · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If the party trying to decrypt your message knows that your "random" data comes from a quasar, they could just monitor the quasar themselves and crack the data pretty quickly (faster than brute force). Cryptography relies on the random data being secret, and this isn't secret at all unless your trying to hide your conversation from someone whose planet can't view the quasar you're using.

    --
    "O'Connor, smash the window." "Why me, Bigboote?" "It might be boobie-trapped!" "Oh!"<smash> -Buckaroo Banzai
    1. Re:Not so secure... by pclminion · · Score: 1
      Whoa. So you're saying that if the attacker can get the key, they can decrypt the data?

      Deep man. Deep.

  38. GPLed code by slashdotmsiriv · · Score: 1

    I am among the first to incorporate this solution to my software. This is released under GPL: void generateEncryptionKey(const unsigned char * key, const unsigned char* iv) { int fd; if ((fd = open ("/dev/radio_telescope_quazar1", O_RDONLY)) == -1) perror ("open error"); if ((read (fd, (char*)key, KEY_SIZE)) == -1) perror ("read key error"); if ((read (fd, (char*)iv, IV_SIZE)) == -1) perror ("read iv error"); }

    1. Re:GPLed code by Duhavid · · Score: 1

      I prefer to open my radio telescopes read/writable.

      --
      emt 377 emt 4
  39. Code already broken by Roadkills-R-Us · · Score: 1

    Man, you really need to get a secret decoder ring.

    They go by the name of "Mood Ring".

    And so I broke the code of both your girlfriend *and* the quasars.

    Next?

  40. Spiffy, but not news by Syberghost · · Score: 5, Informative

    This is a Vernam Cipher with a novel but impractical noise source. It was news when Vernam invented it in 1917, and maybe again in 1919 when he patented it, but this version solves an already-solved problem in a manner that would sound really good if Lt. Colonel Carter suggested it on SG-1, but otherwise is inferior to existing solutions to the same problem.

    Nothing to see here, folks; move along.

    1. Re:Spiffy, but not news by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Calling it "Vernam Cipher" instead of "one time pad" isn't going to get you any points in anyone's book, especially when "one time pad" is the more appropriate use here. And they already know it's a one time pad (hint: RTFHeadline) so who, exactly, are you trying to educate? Or are you just trying to gain some cheap karma by proving you can use Wikipedia?

      Like 90% of all the other Slashbot drones, you completely missed the point, which is that with quasars the randomness source is available to two parties at different physical locations at the same time. Until now, users of one time pads (including the US gov) have been using the exact same methods, except the quasars have been number stations. Number stations are risky and cost a lot to set up, aren't particularly covert, etc. Quasars solve these problems.

      God, I'm tired of the idiocy on this site.

    2. Re:Spiffy, but not news by Syberghost · · Score: 1

      Calling it "Vernam Cipher" instead of "one time pad" isn't going to get you any points in anyone's book, especially when "one time pad" is the more appropriate use here.

      Except it's not provably a one time pad, unless you can provide references that prove that quasars don't repeat. Since we don't understand how quasars work, you'll find no such proof.

      Further, one time pads are secure only because you keep the pad itself secret. With this, there are 60,000 pads, and every single person on this planet (and on any planet for light years in every direction) knows exactly where they are. The only thing being kept secret is the point in time where you started listening to the noise. Since that can be narrowed down immensely for any communication between two known entities capable of using this method, it's effectively a key with a finite range of values, and thus provably less secure.

      Until now, users of one time pads (including the US gov) have been using the exact same methods, except the quasars have been number stations.

      They might even have been using quasars as part of their noise source. But it doesn't matter, because the key to a one time pad is, you don't KNOW what they used, or from when. Even if we were to speculate that they've used nothing but quasars, they've had possibly as much as 56 years to be gathering entropy, and the output hasn't been recorded all that time for all of them, so it's much more secure.

      Quasars solve these problems.

      Yes, they do. But in a very expensive manner that sticks out like a sore thumb, and the problems were already solved. Like I said, this is spiffy, but it's solving a well-solved problem in an expensive manner with little to offer over current solutions.

      If we needed to communicate securely with Alpha Centauri it'd be excellent. If we need to communicate securely with Agent Phoenix in Budapest, it's easier and cheaper to slap a DVD-ROM full of random bits into the diplomatic pouch, at just as secure.

      Calling it "Vernam Cipher" instead of "one time pad" isn't going to get you any points in anyone's book,

      Says the anonymous poster, afraid to sign his name to his position. Gives you that special air of mystery, does it?

  41. I can just imagine a secret agent... by Expert+Determination · · Score: 1
    ...out in the field trying to point his 100ft wide dish at the right quasar while hiding behind a tree so that nobody else can see what he's pointing it at.

    I think this should get some kind of award for dumbest invention ever.

    --
    "The White House is not an intelligence-gathering agency," -- Scott McClellan, Whitehouse spokesman.
  42. most what? by eddeye · · Score: 2, Informative

    "One time encryption pads are widely accepted as being the most secure form of encryption..."

    Only for very limited definitions of secure. You have to produce the pads. You have to distribute the pads. You have to synchronize the pads. You have to dispose of the pads. All these steps are tedious and error-prone, and a chink in any of them destroys your supposed "perfect" security.

    Now if you said "OTP are the most algorithmically secure pads under ideal conditions", then I'd buy it. Otherwise, there's a reason only well-funded governments use these things. Ask the Soviets how well it worked for them.

    --
    Democracy is two wolves and a sheep voting on lunch.
    1. Re:most what? by jb.hl.com · · Score: 1

      Ask the Soviets how well it worked for them.

      I would, but they haven't existed since the early 1990s.

      --
      By summer it was all gone...now shesmovedon. --
    2. Re:most what? by Detritus · · Score: 1
      Ask the Soviets how well it worked for them.

      Very well, thank you.

      The damage caused by Venona shouldn't overshadow the huge amount of traffic, over many decades, that was never cracked. The Soviets were big fans of the OTP, and for good reason. They had many of the world's best mathematicians, and they were not stupid.

      --
      Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
  43. Key stream rationing by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 1

    > I imagine someone who wanted to could buy enough equiptment to record all known quasar emmissions and store them

    Bruce Schneier's blog is having an interesting discussion about this. The key question that's floating to the top is exactly the one you zeroed in on.

    What if there aren't enough radio telescopes in the world to tape all the quasars in the sky? In that case, the "quasar encryption" scheme may actually be workable. Then even an opponent with infinite computing resources is stuck. Eve the eavesdropper might eventually guess that you recorded quasar Q at time T but wouldn't be able to use the information because nobody else in the world was listening to Q at and after time T.

    1. Re:Key stream rationing by Black+Copter+Control · · Score: 1
      The USA counterespionage group was happy to decode just a small percentage of soviet OTP transmissions in project venona. The fact that the source of your OTP is public is a huge hole in the presumption of the OTP system actually being secure. Even if your enemy can only intercept 1% of your quasar transmissions, you could be in trouble -- especially if you presume that the OTP is secure enough to tell your other half the time and location of the quasar to listen to for the next pad... At that point your system is seriously broken.

      Granted, it's novel and interesting, but this is far from the kind of theoretical security that One Time Pads are supposed to provide.

      --
      OS Software is like love: The best way to make it grow is to give it away.
  44. Future communications by ChePibe · · Score: 1

    The whole point of the OTP is to be able to communicate in the future rather than just one message. If you need to communicate to an asset that he or she is in danger, or to pick up a package at a certain dead drop, it's easier to zap off a message over shortwave than trust that the message will get to him in a few weeks/days via mail. Giving the asset an OTP once allows him/her to receive dozens or hundreds of messages in the future that cannot presently be anticipated.

    1. Re:Future communications by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

      Actually, for danger/warning/do something right now type signals, it's much better to have prearranged indicators somewhere that the agent sees every day; blinds in a certain apartment up or down, chalk mark on a curb, guy on the subway wearing a certain type of hat and reading a specific newspaper in a specific way, stuff like that.

      OTPs are good for docs left in dead drops, and to encrypt sensitive traffic between installations, and other similar things.

      --
      Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
  45. Quasars? by saltydogdesign · · Score: 1

    I'll be damned. Who'd have thunk that those crappy old TVs would be of use for anything anymore?

    --
    // This is not a sig.
  46. Totally Random One Time Pads by wideBlueSkies · · Score: 2, Funny

    So you get to go home to a different apartment each night?

    Cool! But how do you move all your stuff from place to place?

    wbs.

    --
    Huh?
    1. Re: Totally Random One Time Pads by doppelf · · Score: 1

      Quantum furniture?

    2. Re: Totally Random One Time Pads by the+chao+goes+mu · · Score: 1

      I hate my quantum chair. Never know if it's really there until I actually try to sit in it.

      --
      Boys from the City. Not yet caught by the Whirlwind of Progress. Feed soda pop to the thirsty pigs.
  47. I have a better idea... by syukton · · Score: 1

    One that doesn't require a telescope: http://www.lavarnd.org/

    --
    Reinvent the wheel only at either a lower cost, greater effectiveness, or your own personal enrichment and satisfaction.
  48. Nice dupe shitheads by 55555+Manbabies! · · Score: 0

    n/t

  49. No. You get dumbest post ever. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It will be the same as using atmospheric scintillation. You *record* the data. You don't use it live. How would that even work? Sender and receiver would not be using the same data. My god, you're stupid.

    1. Re:No. You get dumbest post ever. by Expert+Determination · · Score: 1

      Who said anything about using this live? You must be really thick or something.

      --
      "The White House is not an intelligence-gathering agency," -- Scott McClellan, Whitehouse spokesman.
  50. Eh... by Quiet_Desperation · · Score: 1

    Using the quasars live seems a little flakey. If you're even *one* bit off... That's sort of the point with a good random pattern. It won't correlate with anything but itself. But I can seem them using quasars to generate the typical tapes or digital pad files.

  51. Here's what's bad... by Gorimek · · Score: 1

    There is only one problem with that, but it is fundamental and fatal.

    To be useful for communication, the data source needs to be observable by both the sender and the reciever. And if the spy on continent A is to be able to use it to send data to their employer on continent B, the wire would have to be span both continents, and have to be pretty conspicous to work...

    Astronomical observations is a clever way to find a shared data source visible from anywhere on the planet.

  52. i did not know they shrank quasars onto chips yet

    one would think there are plenty of other random noise sources, but hey, why not go for the most exotic possible source imaginable?

    --
    intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
  53. BUZZZ! Wrong! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Agencies like the NSA will just monitor all quasars all the time. Given that the NSA already monitors (and records) communications transmissions (wireless mostly) 24/7/365.25, matching a quasar from the database with the appropriate signal start and stop would not be difficult to do. I'd say, not very secure a system really, because if the data is coming to or going from the U.S. the quasar would have to be visible in the same hemisphere as it's destination. You could not use this scheme to transmit data to the other side of the world either, as you would need the quasar to be visible by both parties. I'm still not that impressed. It's nice, but I really don't think it's more secure than much of what is out there already for crypto techniques.

  54. If pirates knew about quasars... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    the gold in this classic poe short story would not have been so easily found!

    http://www.poedecoder.com/Qrisse/works/goldbug.php

  55. What's wrong with by dazlari · · Score: 1

    ... 52 pick up? In Soviet Russia, Quasars find you random.

  56. sounds weak to me by harlows_monkeys · · Score: 1

    This sounds like a horrible way to generate a one time pad to me. A quick Googling indicates that there are about 12000 quasars. You need to pick a quasar obersvable at the same time by both parties, so that will cut the number down to around 6000, best case. Given a message, an attacker who merely knows what day the message was sent on only has to consider 86400 seconds/day * 1000000 possible_start_times/second * 6000 possible_keys/possible_start_time, which is less than 2^49 possible_keys/day. So, with microsecond synchronization, and the attacker only knowing what day the key is from, this scheme is only worth about 49 bits. Cryptographers consider that to be pathetic.

  57. Slight Problem by Wes+Janson · · Score: 1

    Maybe I'm stupid here, but if both parties have to be looking at the quasar at the same time, what happens if Party A is located in North America while Party B is located in India, and they attempt to communicate at 12PM? Only one party is going to have the quasar in their sky at a time!

  58. it's not the password or key by SethJohnson · · Score: 1



    Just to repeat several other posts beneath this topic, the quasar data doesn't provide the key or password for the encryption. It provides randomness in the salt added to the encrypted data. So, even if you tracked down all known values for the quasar data, you still would have to figure out that Professor Falken's son was named 'Jerome' which was the password he used to encrypt the whole shebang. This is really just a sensationalized and impractical solution to an easy problem. You could get just as messy a salt for your encryption algorithm by having the end-user point a webcam at a randomly-selected page from an old Sears catalog and then use image recognition algorithms to gather highlight data from the image. Since there is a LOT of variability in how the image is sized and what portion of what page was selected, this could provide a much more practical source for salting encryption.

    But then, that wouldn't be as flashy and dumb VC's would be less likely to invest in a solution based on old Sears Roebuck catalogs.

    Seth

    1. Re:it's not the password or key by wertarbyte · · Score: 1

      you still would have to figure out that Professor Falken's son was named 'Jerome'

      But he was called "Joshua".

      --
      Life is just nature's way of keeping meat fresh.
  59. Very 1980s by Wyatt+Earp · · Score: 1

    Tom Clancy talked about using cosmic radiation emissions/noise as a one time pad in Cardinal of the Kremlin in 1988. I don't remember what exactly the source was, as it's been a long time since I read it. I do know there was a subplot about this system, which would record the noise to CDs and there was another random hardware bit vs. a math based system from NSA, the NSA plan was approved and the Soviets broke it and were reading the NSA/State's "mail".

    1. Re:Very 1980s by stunt_penguin · · Score: 1

      ^ this is exactly what I thought when I read the headline- again it's been 2-3 years since I read it, but TC goes into great detail about how the pad was created using random cosmic background noise. Not sure how this compares though, though again it is a cosmic source.

      --
      When the posters fear their moderators, there is tyranny; when the moderators fears the posters, there is liberty.
    2. Re:Very 1980s by SuiteSisterMary · · Score: 1

      I believe it was 'atomspheric noise hashed with different atmospheric noise.'

      --
      Vintage computer games and RPG books available. Email me if you're interested.
  60. Seems doomed by mattr · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The idea of making a one time pad out of a universally available information resource just seems real silly. It may be the easiest, highest volume, highest quality source of random data, but we have already in the past see ideas like large key space and computational complexity fall to one advance or another. It strikes me that even if there are 80,000 sources in the sky, that can be narrowed down quite a bit if you just look at the direction they are pointing their radio telescopes. Or are they using some secret hidden radio telescopes to capture quasar data? There may be some small ones but I think most are really, really big. You could probably tell the angle they are pointed at from a satellite. Also, if this encryption method gets used a lot you have to expect that more information about the route the data takes gets known. It seems to me there are a more limited number of radio telescopes with this system installed than there are say labs with a more traditional random data generator.

  61. #6 ... by Schraegstrichpunkt · · Score: 2, Informative
    1. Re:#6 ... by owlstead · · Score: 1

      Yes, because this, of all things, is not a one time pad. It's more in the line of choosing a book and encrypt the data with that. Age old, quite effective, but unnecessary in this day and age where you have AES-256 (or even Serpent-256 if you are really conservative).

  62. My One Time Pad by Gorimek · · Score: 1

    The global availibility of pop music CDs seems to provide an inexhaustable source of one time pads, without reaching into outer space.

    What if you just used whatever CD was at number X on some internet published sales list the previous week as your keypad?

  63. Re:FIRST POST by mnemonic_ · · Score: 1

    Hmm, I've waited for the return of the "gay linux" trolls for quite some time...

  64. I know an easier source, available to everyone. by SETIGuy · · Score: 1
    A seti@home work unit is a typically a 2097152 bit random number with nearly that many bits of entropy. At any time there are a about a million available. The setiathome data recorder records 5 million random bits every second.

    Of course you can do nearly the same thing with a sound card and a microphone. Actually theres a good bet you don't need the microphone.

    % dd if=/dev/audio ibs=512 count=128 | gzip -9 | tail --bytes=+16 | head --bytes=-10 >my_one_time_pad

    Recording at 8k samples per second without a microphone I get about 2 kbps of randomness out of my sound card. I mean really, is there any news here? It's not like there aren't any sources for random numbers out there that don't require use of a radio telescope.

  65. One Time Pads Are... by Temujin_12 · · Score: 1
    ...an example of a theoretically optimal situation that has no practicality. Its like the "spherical chickens in a frictionless vacuum at absolute zero" scenarios in physics. They simply don't pan out in the real world. One the reasons is that,

    "it doesn't solve the security problem. One way to look at encryption is that it takes very long secrets--the message--and turns them into very short secrets: the key. With a one-time pad, you haven't shrunk the secret any. It's just as hard to courier the pad to the recipient as it is to courier the message itself...Any product that claims to use a one-time pad is almost certainly lying. And if they're not, the product is almost certainly unusable and/or insecure." --Secrets and Lies
    --
    Faith is a willingness to accept something w/o complete proof and to act on it. Reason allows you to correct that faith.
  66. One time pads by Omega+Blue · · Score: 1

    One time pads are completely secure because the key is different each time. Dice work well to generate the random numbers. The only trouble with one time pads is the pad, i.e. the recording medium where you have the list of random numbers. This must be communicated to the receiving party through a secure channel beforehand.

  67. So I guess by hyperbotfly · · Score: 1

    It's sort of like the totally random dick in yo' mouf nigga

    1. Re:So I guess by Toreo+asesino · · Score: 1

      What the shuddering fuck are you talking about?!

      No really?! This is a local site for local people (geeks); we'll have no trouble here!

      --
      throw new NoSignatureException();
  68. Feasability of this Crypto System by GretaGarbo · · Score: 1

    The article that first suggested this approach to one time pads can be found at:

    http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/maurer92conditionallyp erfect.html

    The basic idea is that is infeasible to store all of the random bits being broadcast, hence even once you learn what the two parties are sampling, the random bits they recorded are already long gone.

  69. That's silly by m.dillon · · Score: 1

    There are plenty of ways to generate truely random numbers.
    Using Johnson noise or, even better, ANY radiation source, and doing a simple statistical calculation can trivially yield a stream of random 1's and 0's. The military has been using johnson noise sources since at least the 40's, in fact. A quantum two-slit setup could also be used, a quantum state changes, or tunneling, or a billion other things, to generate truely random numbers. Why use a Quasar that is observable by everyone with all of these isolatable sources available?

    -Matt

    1. Re:That's silly by veeoh · · Score: 1

      >>Why use a Quasar that is observable by everyone with all of these isolatable sources available?

      Yeh I know what you mean - you can't move for Quasar's in this neighbourhood - just /anyone/ could spoof your Quasar....

  70. Or you could pay someone. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I know a way to generate random numbers. Put someone in front of a keyboard, tell him/her to type as randomly as possible, blindfold the person and move the keyboard around as the person keeps on hammering the keyboard.

  71. No need to look at Quasars by Clueless+Nick · · Score: 1

    You can just collect raindrop data on a 1m x 1m touch sensitive grid for a few hours every year. This is an easier, more accessible way.

    How would an average person go about collecting Quasar data? How would he be able to trust the source?

    -clueless

    --
    Chat with other atheists http://secularchat.org
    1. Re:No need to look at Quasars by catman · · Score: 1

      Exactly!

      So what's the news in TFA? One-time cipher TTY tapes have been made since at least the middle of last century using radioactive sources as random number generators. Yes, there is a definite distribution[0] of the intervals between decays in a piece of radioactive rock, but it's still random.

      [0] it's been too long, let me guess Poisson-distribution?

  72. nothing new, nothing improved by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    one time pads are already secure. that's why they call them one time pads.
    time to read up on crypto, kids.

  73. OTP means you have TWO secrets to transmit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Now instead of transmitting a secret message, you have to transmit a secret key the same size as the secret message. Simultaneous quasar viewing is clever, but... Why bother? There are simpler ways to get a "secure enough for now" message to the back of beyond. If you needn't insist on OTP, why not just initialize the relatively small internal table of Mersenne Twister (the "cryptographically secure" way to use MT, as documented), then use MT as a token generator to encrypt each block of your plaintext using AES (or even TEA) in CTC mode? The "secret" is the relatively short random table, which you can transmit using El Gamal. Generating a small random table is also easy: Digital cameras work fine. E.g., shoot a hundred snapshots of cherry blossoms (Tokyo or Washington, D.C.), archive them in zip format, encrypt using AES. Voila! Small random data file.

  74. Priceless by hckrdave · · Score: 0

    Radio Telescope: 100 million dollars RSA Token Sync'd: 50 dolloars RSA Token Sync'd: to your favorite quasar--- Priceless Step 4 Profit?

  75. Another good source by Toreo+asesino · · Score: 1

    I'd suggest the truest random data source would currently be Microsoft product release dates.

    --
    throw new NoSignatureException();
  76. Wow by Poromenos1 · · Score: 1

    Sadly, people at /. understand that this is just technobabble (in CTC mode) :/

    --
    Send email from the afterlife! Write your e-will at Dead Man's Switch.
  77. Hard to keep secret. by ArsenneLupin · · Score: 1

    Couldn't an attacker find out at least parts of the key by observing in which direction the sender or receiver's radio telescope happens to be pointing?

  78. Nice if you have a radio antenna on your roof... by jgoemat · · Score: 1
    If you don't, then the security goes out the window... The article specifically mentions:
    He adds that the method does not require a large radio antenna or that the communicating parties be located in the same hemisphere, as radio signals can be broadcast over the internet at high speed.
    If you are getting your random data over the internet, that is a huge security hole. Also you have to have the key agreed upone PRIOR to encrypting the message. You then have to both point your rooftop dishes at the same quasar and set your receivers to the right settings to get the same data. Then you have to hope there's not radio interference or a plane passing over one of your buildings. Granted, enough error correction will take care of those problems...

    The only real benefit would be if you both had your own dishes and you would throw the random data away after decrypting. Still then it would take a while to orient the dishes. If someone was able to see either party's dish, they may be able to tell with sophisticated equipment the exact quasar you were pointing to and relay that to others so they can listen in to the quasar as well.

  79. So, g-d is a quasar? by karlandtanya · · Score: 1

    You are not logged in. You can log in now using the convenient form below, or Create an Account, or post as Anonymous Coward.

    --
    "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, it doesn't go away." - Philip K. Dick
  80. Sounds mighty ridiculous... by Ancient_Hacker · · Score: 1
    A few objections:
    • So are both parties going to build 30-foot dishes to listen to quasars?
    • And they're going to have receivers with EXACTLY the same noise level, amplitude flatness, and phase shift?
    • AND they're somehow going to get the exact same random variations in amplitude and phase?
    • AND there's going to be absolutely NO extra man-made or natural background noise at either locale?
    • And nobody's going to notice this guy who's an undercover spy has a 30-foot dish in his backyard?
    • AND both ends don't have access to some much simpler security, like e-mail and PGP?

    The mind boggles....

  81. bullshit by juraj · · Score: 1

    This is bullshit. First -- one time pads are _universally unbreakable_ without knowing the key. This was mathematically proved by Claude Shannon in Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems in 1949. Contrast this with other ciphers, which we believe are not easily breakable.

    One of the assumptions (or maybe the most important assumption) is, that plain text does not hold more information than key. Which is not true for quasars -- as stated in other comments, you would only need to know the source, frequency and start of encoding, which is by all means at most the same amount of information (see information enthropy, also defined by Shannon), but never more.

    So in short -- this is worse than one time pads.

  82. Man in the middle by bigattichouse · · Score: 1

    Man in the middle attacks can be quite literal.

    --
    meh
  83. Another pseudo-smart approach... by porkchop_d_clown · · Score: 1

    This doesn't solve anything; distributing randomness over an internet communications channel is stupid - people could either eavesdrop on your randomizer or, worse, replace the random data stream with something else.

    Worse, you still have the problem of distributing the final one time pads - I can't believe anyone would be stupid enough to think that all they had to do was agree on a time to start listening to the random data on the internet to do their encoding....

  84. Entirely incorrect understanding of OTPs by billstewart · · Score: 1
    If you've got a copy of a one-time pad and don't know the starting point, you can drag through it until you find the right starting point - various spy agencies were doing that in the 1950s mostly by hand, for instance in the NSA's Venona intercepts of Soviet traffic. It's a bit more complex here, because the signals are analog, so the digitization has some parameters to it that need to be determined, but it does actually get used digitally, so it's searchable.

    The reason OTPs work is that if each bit in the pad is independently a 50% probability of being 0 or 1 and you don't have access to the pad, there's no way to tell if the message was 0 or 1. But if you've got a copy of the pad, then the bits are no longer independent - from any given starting point, they're deterministic.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  85. clarifications by rocketman768 · · Score: 1

    First, let me clear up some things: 1) Making information look like random static is the whole point of encryption. 2) Trying to break a one-time-pad-encoded-message made from these quasars would be extremely difficult if you do not know the PRECISE (perhaps down to milliseconds) time to start recording or which quasar. 3) This quasar scheme pretty much sucks because it STILL requires a channel of communication between the two parties. They must each know which quasar and what time to start recording. So, either they have a communication line encrypted by some other scheme (stupid btw), or they are physically together. Being physically together makes the whole idea pointless. They might as well generate a one-time pad from something easier than quasars (thermal noise for example) and exchange the pads while they are together. This article just seems like something a dumb reporter stumbled onto and thought was cool.

  86. I stand corrected by ChePibe · · Score: 1

    Yup, you're right. I shouldn't have included the "danger" message in my post. Don't know what I was thinking.

    Other favorites include - leaving a window open, a certain light on, etc.

  87. The meaning of random by TeatimeofSoul · · Score: 1

    but my point is that algorithmic randomness captures what we mean by "random" much better than statistical randomness. And algorithmic randomness is just a mathematically formal way of saying "unpredictable."

    That depends on who 'we' are. I, coming from the natural sciences, would never use the word random of numerical sequences. It is the origin of those number that can be random. E.g., throwing a dice is a random event, since I cannot predict the outcome. Throwing the dice six times might yield the result {1,2,3,4,5,6}, and it is not meaningful to say that this is less random than any other result. (In fact, it's not even less probable.)

    Now, people are often faced with equations with no known solutions (or known not to have solutions in a closed form) and resort to computer simulations. This means, essentially, that they compute a sequence of f(x) from a sequence of x. They then generalise their results to all x (and publish). If f(x) exhibit some pattern, it might be a genuine result, or it might be because of a pattern in x. Unfortunately, one cannot beforehand (and usually not afterhand either) know which patterns to avoid in x.

    The best bet is the wrap-towel-around-head-and-the-bugblatter-beast-wo n't-eat-you strategy; to use sequences with as little pattern as possible. Sequences with high 'algorithmic randomness', in your terminology.
    Note that, using numbers from a random source is no guarantee, see above, (though low-pattern sequences are much less likely with a sensible setup). It would also not be a problem if the numbers are known from the outset. So, it is not the randomness we seek, but the patternlessness. The name pseudo-random pops up here, and it misses the point entirely. They are not the least bit random, and if they were we wouldn't necessarily be better off.

    One source of confusion is that the situation being studied is usually random itself. In fact, what is calculated are various distribution functions - these assign probabilities to outcomes - and they are perfectly deterministic.

  88. NOT random enough! by TheTranceFan · · Score: 1
    I have some information, that if known to God, would have a severe negative impact on my potential Salvation. I need an encryption mechanism that is so secure that not even GOD can crack it.

    When I saw this article I was really excited - I thought this might finally solve my problem! Then I read that it's based on "random" emissions by quasars. Dammit! That's not random! God controls those emissions...too predictable!

    So I'm still searching. My current line of research is the creation of pads based on the behavior of women.

  89. Other simultaniously-observable noise sources by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Call it one-time-pad plus "security"-through-obscurity:

    Your local music or video store is filled with simultaniously-observable random-enough noise sources:

    Take any music CD, rip it with a known algorithm, and take the low-order (i.e. most likely to be random) bits of each sound, string them together, and wa-la, a fairly random bit of noise.

    Need more randomness? Take two CD's worth of data and XOR them together.

    Need to alert your co-consipirator of your key? Just give him the ISBN numbers for the CDs and the ripping algorithm and let him obtain him from his local music store.

    The only real differences between this and quasars are:
    1) it's not 100% random, but close enough for most purposes
    2) it's a lot cheaper than monitoring quasars
    3) FOR NOW, the quasar data isn't universally available. If quasars become popular as a tool for encryption, then someone will record every quasar out there.

  90. How secure does it really need to be. by tacocat · · Score: 1

    I spent last weekend putting together my own prototype of a one-time-pad authentication system for logging into websites. I guess the concept is similar to S/Key some 10 years ago, but the passwords are generated on the fly and sent to your SMS phone. Reference: One Time Authentication

    But I fail to see why they need to this secure. Sure, randomness is good, but if you are trying to type in a painfully obscured 32 character password, you'll probably get a bit frustrated. I found using pseudo-random characters that followed some phonetic pattern to be much more suitable, even for a one time use. At least they were easy to remember on short term basis and weren't difficult to type in.

    I mean, if you really want to find out if they can be useful on the internet for authentication to websites, try out my link and get some practical application experience on the matter. Sorry if this sounds like a plug but I'm not selling anything. But I would be interested in useful feedback on what works and what doesn't about the overall concept.

    1. Re:How secure does it really need to be. by Griffin62 · · Score: 1

      Who said that people who want truly random numbers were using it for Web-based communications? While there are governments there will be a desire (if not a need) for secure communications. The need for stronger encryption algorithms and keys is governed by the value of the information being secured - and how long it needs to stay secure (before its value drops to zero for other reasons). Consider banks transferring millions of dollars electronically (I suspect they actually use private leased lines - but even those go through some Telco...) - I'd want that to be highly secure. Or - how about information about a business's designs that could be used by competitors?

  91. Quasars, eh? by thethibs · · Score: 1

    "makes the pads even more secure."

    Now that is funny. "Which Quasar and at what time" is an absurdedly short key.

    The pad may be random, but it isn't all that unpredictable. In cryptography, unpredictability is more important than randomness.

    --
    I'm a Programmer. That's one level above Software Engineer and one level below Engineer.
  92. Synchronizing with Alpha Centauri time by alienmole · · Score: 1
    If we needed to communicate securely with Alpha Centauri it'd be excellent.
    I'm not so sure about that. First, you've got the time difference between here and Alpha Centauri (AC) to worry about, plus the issue of identifying the quasar to be used, which will have a different relative position in the sky from AC. Once we've resolved that - which needs to be done secretly, to avoid giving away the one-time pad - then when AC receives the message, the "pad" it was encrypted was transmitted from the quasar four years ago, so they better have been keeping good records. Finally, the mechanism for translating quasar radio bursts into data would have to be designed so as not to be affected by any change in the relativistic red- or blueshift caused by the differences between our respective velocity vectors and that of the quasar. In short, "excellent" might be an overstatement.
  93. The easier way to do it. by Bryan+Bytehead · · Score: 1

    Why not run an NNTP server subscribed to a few alt.binaries groups, take the raw feed and write a few giga/terabytes to the hard drive, and then run your choice of compression program on that random data, while stripping out the headers (you really don't want a ZIP header to truly announce that you ran ZIP) and you've got your one time pad. If you want more granularity than the alt.binaries, other high volume newsgroups might be substituted, and salting it with some smaller and more arcane newsgroups would probably be a good idea as well.

    --
    Bryan
  94. OMG!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    OMG!!! quasars!!!