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White House Demands Encryption for Sensitive Data

An anonymous reader writes "Stung by a series of data losses or disclosures at federal agencies over the past month, the White House is requiring all agencies to follow new guidelines when allowing employees to carry sensitive data on laptops or access the information from afar, according to the Washington Post. From the article: 'To comply with the new policy, agencies will have to encrypt all data on laptop or handheld computers unless the data are classified as "non-sensitive" by an agency's deputy director. Agency employees also would need two-factor authentication -- a password plus a physical device such as a key card -- to reach a work database through a remote connection, which must be automatically severed after 30 minutes of inactivity. Finally, agencies would have to begin keeping detailed records of any information downloaded from databases that hold sensitive information, and verify that those records are deleted within 90 days unless their use is still required.'"

13 of 214 comments (clear)

  1. And the real question is... by Pieroxy · · Score: 4, Interesting

    And the real question is: Why wasn't all these measures mandatory before? Did noone thought of the potential problem of a user going home with his laptop before?

    1. Re:And the real question is... by jascat · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Counter-point:

      1. It sounds as though they are talking about classification here. There is a such thing as "Sensitive but Unclassified". Also, personal information gets protection under the Privacy Act of 197-something. Anyhow, it isn't as serious as you make it out. The stuff that is classified is protected at a whole different level.

      2. No, they are saying that if you're going to connect to their network, you're going to have to do it with approved systems and use their authentication and it will all probably be through an approved, encrypted VPN. I know that the DoD has made a push over the last few years to replace the ID cards with smart card IDs with PKI certs embedded on them. These tie into the PKI infrastructure that has been rolled out and although it's taken a few years to get going, we're finally seeing it become a reality...you know, where it's becoming mandatory to log on using your card, sign emails, etc etc.

      3. Well, it's all enforceable. That's the beauty of a government owned network. If they catch you not following their rules, they can fire you or even go so far as to prosecute you. Why not? You could be a terrorist! *gasp*

      4. I agree with you here. Logs are great and all, but having a great gob of logs doesn't do you much at all. I wish them luck trying to go back to find a single transaction from 89 days ago.

    2. Re:And the real question is... by me-g33k · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Actually it goes one level deeper. It's not just the access to the information but the ability to properly classify and then enforce document controls. If you think in terms of the old paper methods, there were entire sub-organizations dedicated to the publication of information and its maintenance and management. When everything started to go digital, those roles and processes seemed to have been lost in the translation. Factor in the constantly decreasing cost of storage and we see the glut of 'stuff' that exists in storage silos all over the place. Granted that Gov and Mil are usually better at classifying their information but the access vectors to this information has changed. We no longer have to walk into a public building and sign in to get paper (although a digital simulacrum pervades) it's posted and made readily available. This is in the 'finished' incarnation of the document. How about the 'in progress' work? Which is one of the locuses of the issue at hand. People taking work out of their office environments into the 'wild'. I HATE to say it but this is where DRM would be useful. Tied to roles and responsibility defined (hopefully) in a rational directory, document destruction could be automated. That leads me to another research question; Does TPM have a handshake with DRM?

    3. Re:And the real question is... by arivanov · · Score: 3, Interesting

      That part is easy.

      The hard part starts from there on.

      You have to revoke the certificate if GI Joe number 286456781 is dead or has gone missing in action. You have to revoke the certificate if GI Joe 286456781 is found to be really Major Razvedki Ivanov. You have to revoke the certificate if Gi Joe 286456781's wife is found to really be Major Li of the people revolution army and she has gotten hold of the card PIN along with the card by means of giving excellent head.

      Actually, revoking as such is not that hard either. May be a bit painfull in a multi-tier certificate hierarchy, but still possible.

      The hard bit is propagating the knowledge that the certificate is revoked across an infrastructure of a .mil or .gov size. The main reason is that some portions of the infrastructure are offline most of the time and some are mandated be able to work in offline mode. In practice - how the f*** do you send a revocation list to a submarine?

      --
      Baker's Law: Misery no longer loves company. Nowadays it insists on it
      http://www.sigsegv.cx/
  2. Oh, lookie here by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Speaking of which, you should probably get a glimpse at what Google .Gov dragged up.

  3. Not "requirements" by Black+Parrot · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Just "recommendations".

    Which means this is likely to have zip for effect.

    --
    Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
  4. Re:Yes but what do you do about... by RobotRunAmok · · Score: 4, Interesting

    As it stands, the only thing these leaks are doing is proving to your average American that, hey, Bush really is the bastard the ultra-liberals decried him as in the first place.

    Except that the "average American" is not quite as "average" as the classist ultra-liberals envision him. What it really does is cause the "NASCAR Dads" and "Soccer Moms" to get even more disgusted with the mainstream news spigots and start seeking less-biased and more representative sources. That, of course, can only hurt the bottom lines of the Old Guard.

    To successfully compete with an Internet across which one can aggregate news (and opinions) from all over the political spectrum, a traditional mainstream outlet will have to either clearly claim allegiance to one pole (e.g., Fox News) or genuinely have no political leanings or agenda (e.g., nobody right now). The days in which an outlet can pose as unbiased while actually trying to manipulate opinion with stories slanted either left or right are dwindling, or so say the accountants...

  5. Beware, too by smittyoneeach · · Score: 4, Interesting
    the Law of Obstructive Conformity[1] which says that, given a sufficiently large ruleset, one can always locate a way to destroy any hope of mission accomplishment.

    Beset with yet another layer of Policies, Programs, and Procedures the things a bureaucracy will need are:

    feasibility studies

    staffing increases

    training

    miscellaneous budget increases

    Does anyone know the source of that quote in the Civilization IV game:

    The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of an expanding bureaucracy.

    [1] I am making this up.

    --
    Get thee glass eyes, and, like a scurvy politician, seem to see things thou dost not.--King Lear
  6. Re:They delete THEIR downloads after 90 days... by ScentCone · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...and require that ours are kept stored for months or years, or even "forever"? Is it me or is something running very wrong here? ...

    ... Not the government has to monitor its people, it is to be done the other way around.


    Come on now, it's way too hot outside for tinfoil apparel.

    We're talking about data that's copied off to laptops for mobile use. Copied. The concern is over some federal worker or contractor dumping some subset of sensitive data (say, YOUR information?) off to a laptop while working on some report or mindless budget slide show. The issue is making sure that grabbed data isn't easily read by someone who steals the laptop. Whatever big momma database the data was extracted from is still sitting right where it was, behind the scenes. This isn't about "monitoring" you, it's about making sure that sensitive data, which might include yours, is not left lying around in some field office or a hotel room. You really think the founding fathers would have preferred the opposite? The article's not even talking about back-office database/file servers, which are a totally separate firewalling-ish conversation (though TFA does discuss clamping down on dangling remote access connections and requiring two-factor IDs for that, too). Drink more coffee (or less - whatever will get you thinking more calmly) before you post, dude.

    --
    Don't disappoint your bird dog. Go to the range.
  7. Why doesn't everyone (including me!) encrypt? by dpbsmith · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Every week or so there's a news story about someone having a laptop stolen, or being lost, with thousands of customer files on it. I keep wondering why encryption isn't being used. Under Mac OS X, you click one checkbox to enable "FileVault" and everything in your home directory is encrypted. I don't know exactly what's available in the WIndows world, but I'm sure there are tools that are just as easy to use.

    Of course, I don't use FileVault.

    Why not? Well, it's one more thing to go wrong. I'm far more worried about losing my files or losing access to them, than I am about having other people look at them. And, frankly, I've never bothered to find out exactly what happens when you use a standard backup tool on a FileVault-protected Mac (presumably all the backups are UNencrypted if you are running the backup tool from within the protected account?)

    So... I dunno. I don't understand why everyone doesn't use encryption, but I don't use encryption myself. Of course, I have reasons. Probably everyone else has reasons, too?

  8. 3-foot rule by Kadin2048 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Actually the physical separation is much more important than just keeping people from sticking the media in the wrong drive. If that was the only issue, they could just color-code the computers and media and probably be OK.

    The concern has to do with radiation produced by equipment; classified systems are shielded (sometimes) or kept in shielded rooms (more commonly, because actual shielded equipment is more expensive) with RF chokes on all the lines going in and out. The idea being that you don't want somebody to be able to listen to RF signals that your monitor on your classified system is putting out, by attaching an antenna to the building's cold-water pipe.

    Where the problem gets even more complicated is that you can compromise a well-shielded system (one that doesn't radiate any information back into the power lines, etc.) if you put it close to an un-shielded (unclassified) system. The RF being produced by the shielded system will couple to the coils and whatnot in the unshielded system (which doesn't have any fancy chokes on its connections) and now you're back to radiating classified information into the building's power/water grid.

    The '3 foot rule' is definitely arbitrary, but apparently it's the distance at which the people who are paid to think about these things believe that a classified system won't interact with an unclassified system and produce any significant radiation back into the building's infrastructure. If it sounds paranoid, that's because it is -- this was all Cold War era research -- but that doesn't meant it's not still true.

    You're right though in saying that the artificial division between EMSEC and COMSEC and COMPUSEC is outdated and should be replaced with something more inclusive and relevant; however, the EMSEC precautions aren't completely outdated, and still exist for a reason where classified data is concerned.

    --
    "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
  9. As Ye Sow.... by Steve+B · · Score: 3, Interesting
    A comment from Rob Pegoraro last week:
    Yes, some of this software can be difficult to use. So is most of the junk on the average office machine, and everybody has survived that. (The selection of cryptography software might also be better if the federal government hadn't spent years trying to criminalize a free, open standard for encryption called Pretty Good Privacy. But I digress.)
    He makes a good point -- if it hadn't been for idiotic government policies in the 90s, there's a good chance data security would have been routinely and transparently built into operating systems and/or firmware as a matter of course, to the point where you'd have to consciously do something to screw it up (rather than having to consciously jump through hoops to be secure, as is the actual situation).
    --
    /. If the government wants us to respect the law, it should set a better example.
  10. Here is a stupid question - why take home data? by MikeLip · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Why in the world would you want to take home a hard disk full of sensitive information, when you can work on it while it's stored at a remote location? It's called client/server, and we handle data that way at my job, and we're not even techie IT guys - it's just more secure and even we know that. If it's not on your laptop, it ain't gonna get stolen when the laptop is! Instead it's on a server in a locked room with some security around it. You don't need to take my identity home with you so you can get some work done on the freaking beach or while boffing your mistress, OK?