Debian Server Compromised
Security News writes "According to a post on the debian-devel-announce mailing list "Early this morning we discovered that someone had managed to compromise gluck.debian.org. We've taken the machine offline and are preparing to reinstall it. " gluck is a core development machine."
Oh no, now they have access to all the Debian source!
...first we had the hack into the repository severs, and we didn't know whether or not we are running exploited code when we use apt-get to update our programs. Now it seems that internal development machines are being hacked. If the debian team cannot keep their own products secure in their own environments, how can we expect to take them seriously in the enterprise? Granted this was on a development branch and development server, but how many times do you have to upgrade to an "experimental" package to get a function or feature that you need to have in your setup? I might be spreading FUD, but I think I speak for the rest of us when I speak of this vibe I feel from debian.
Sig: I stole this sig.
It's Debian... they found an old DAT tape from three years ago, restored it, and realised that nothing's changed in the source tree. *ducks*
body massage!
Aw man, that's too bad. I think we should all wish the Debian team g'luck.
Perhaps now they will spend less time griping about Ubuntu and more time working on their security.
I realise that debian stable release has packages that are very old in order to stay stable. Does this mean that they lack patches later versions of programs use? Or are patches typically backported to the stable release packages?
...but with your high UID, I'm going to assume you don't know this already. The attitude that you posses is what used to plague the old open source world to the point that no utility or tool would be used in the enterprise. After a while, the open source maturity matured and everyone came to the realization that these things need to be taken care of, and that even though the open source software is free, you need to treat the users of that software as if they are paying customers. There is reward. Donations and other things can up your credibility to the point of a serious career. Soon enough, a history in the world of open source will guarantee one a job in the enterprise, because university diplomas don't seem to be working when it comes to judging ones capabilities. Change your perspective.
Sig: I stole this sig.
...they aren't as grim as you may think. Soon enough, universities will be obsolete, and corporations will judge one based on open source contributions. If we all move aggressively toward this stance, the MCSEs will hit the road, and open source pioneers will rule the world of research, development, and jobs all funded by large corporations. All the source will be open, and the developers will work for companies like Verizon and the government as researchers. The same way that students pay universities to do the same thing for them, the difference is that the companies will pay you and you won't be paying a university. A large company that does not employ open source developers will be seen as bad in morale the same way a company is seen as bad for outsourcing manufacturing jobs to Mexico. If we take open source and ourselves seriously, all of this can happen. The old attitude of "don't use it if you don't like it" is going away, and things will be set straight if we push things forward.
Sig: I stole this sig.
and move that source repository to a more secure Windows 2003 Server platform.
I felt a great disturbance in the Force, as if millions of nerds suddenly cried out in terror and were suddenly silenced.
Does anyone know what in particular was exploited? TFA dosent give a flying fuck of information.
Well I suppose you probably know this but for the others out there who may miss the subtlety ---
Ubuntu draws sources heavily from the unstable and/or testing branches of Debian in order to devote more time and energy to testing and the important fixed-length release cycle. They also are partially reliant on the Debian project for security updates. There would be little to no forward movement of Ubuntu currently without the Debian project. Indeed this may change as time goes on, but to me there are a lot of benefits to this model and I hope they stick with it. Previously most every debian-derived distribution has perished by trying to shed their ties and reliance on the core Debian project.
Changelogs don't provide any form of security, and package changelogs have been standard in Debian since many, many years ago. (Long before Ubuntu was a gleam in Mark Shuttleworth's eye.) Changelogs should only be treated as a convenience to the user.
And apt supports GPG signing of the Release file, which contains an MD5 and SHA-1 hash of the Packages file, which contains MD5 hashes of the packages. (In other words, apt already does package integrity checking.)
To get something done, a committee should consist of no more than three persons, two of them absent.
It might be nice to include signed authentication of at least the changelog, if not the package itself, to ensure authenticity of upgrades.
Debian has been checking digital signatures on every package installed for almost a year now. See here.
Of course, I run testing, so I have no idea when this got into stable.
Dear Hackers,
If you manage to hack into the main repository, please fix this bug. A well-tested patch has been available for almost 6 months, and it is even attached to the bug report. The bug has been fixed in Ubuntu, but Debian users are still waiting, more than a year after the bug was first filed.
If you hack, do it for the right reasons.
...Anybody who didn't understand the real meaning of "compromise" needs to re-read the article, substituting "compromised" with "rooted." The attackers didn't kill the server or knock out a service. They rooted the box, and the Debian devs are trying to cover themselves somewhat by ambiguating the exact nature of the attack.
~ C.
Your sarcasm is a bit silly. I don't believe the article even mentions that this was an OS leval attack. Most likely, and from the fact that they pulled all these services offline, the attack happened on a piece of software running on the OS and wasn't a problem with the OS itself. So the didn't hack Linux. They hacked a service. Probably.
Anthony Papillion
Advanced Data Concepts, Inc.
"Quality Custom Software and IT Services"
Hey I'm sure that everyone working on Debian's dev servers have lower uids than most of us, and I find the flak to really be undeserved. It's Linux not OpenBSD; the focus of the operating system favors usability over security. If you don't like it, move to a bsd or commercial *nix platform. Also, any machine that maintains services will eventually obtain some sort of vulnerability even with heavy-handed administration and monitoring. I think the speed at which the compromise was detected in addition to the service being taken offline immediately is cause for thanks to the security team!
To get something done, a committee should consist of no more than three persons, two of them absent.
Note that the security features will only be noticeable when a check fails. If all the checks pass, then you'll never notice the features at all (unless you notice that it downloads the Release.gpg files, if Ubuntu shows what files it downloads).
To get something done, a committee should consist of no more than three persons, two of them absent.
DSA = Debian Systems Administration (team)
/* FUCK - The F-word is here so that you can grep for it */
That which does not kill you, makes you stronger
--Friedrich Nietzsche
It happened once in 2003, but I can't recall any other incidents. That time it was a previously unkown Linux kernel hole which was used to gain root along with a sniffed password.
This time it looks like another kernel hole - but we've not had public confirmation. Could have been been an exploit for CVE-2006-2451...
Gluck is not a "core" machine, not even a special development system. It has been abandoned as CVS server by most subprojects since they moved to the Alioth service. The most important task was the homepage server.
Oh boy... Low UIDs hardly instill authority!
;-)
Take it from someone with a waaaaaaayyyyy lower UID as yours!
But to your original point - I'm not too sure you can rule out future break-ins at all. It would only be REALLY stupid, if both breakins happened through the same setup fault.
But I don't think debian has a full time security admin who constantly and ACTIVELY monitors every debian.org box, like other big name companies might be able to afford to.
Secondly, the sheer multitude of packages, and frequent updates/upgrades of packages will make it fairly impossible to keep a machine 100% break-in proof.
Of course, I don't like break-ins - especially on servers of a distribution I'm actively using; but I think it's wrong to panic about it either.
More importantly - while I see the need to reinstall quickly, has anyone there found out HOW the break-in occured? Has the hole been located? (...and is it known how to fix this particular one, before the same guy just uses the same "back door" again?)
I have a physical airgap between my wireless router and laptop. Does that mean I'm safe?
Maybe we need WikiDebian? "The free operating system that anyone can edit."
I'm not joking. If it works for Wikipedia, why not Debian??
http://www.debian.org/News/2003/20031121
The vulnerability they were hit by was a previously unknown vulnerability in the kernel.
apt-get archives are now signed too. In Etch (testing) and Sid (unstable) apt will check the integrity of the packages for you, but the entire archive is signed. Just look at woody or sarge,
http://http.us.debian.org/debian/dists/woody/
http://http.us.debian.org/debian/dists/sarge/
Then locate the file Release.gpg. That is the signature for the release file.
For anyone still following this story all these hours later, there's a new post on debian-news with a bit more detail about what happened here.
The short version is, it was a privilege-escalation exploit triggered from a compromised user account, the server in question is now restored, but several others are locked down pending inspection. Also, it says the regular and security archives were not in danger. The exploit was a known issue in the 2.6.16.18 kernel running on gluck at the time of the exploit.
Interestingly, the window between the compromise and the lockdown was less than two hours.
2*3*3*3*3*11*251