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Can Banks Shift Phishing Losses to Customers?
1sockchuck writes to mention a Netcraft article wondering who should bear the brunt of phishing costs. A group of customers with the Bank of Ireland recently had $202,000 drained from their accounts by phishers. The bank initially resisted the request to refund their money, but allowed it after a suit was threatened. From the article: "The Bank of Ireland incident is one of the first public cases of a bank seeking to force phishing victims to accept financial responsibility for their losses, but it likely won't be the last. Phishing scams continue to proliferate, as Netcraft has blocked more than 100,000 URLs already in 2006, up from 41,000 in all of 2005. Financial institutions continue to cover most customer losses from unauthorized withdrawals. But after several years of intensive customer education efforts, the details of phishing cases are coming under closer scrutiny, and the effectiveness of anti-phishing efforts taken by both the customer and the bank are likely to become an issue in a larger number of cases." So, should a bank be forced to pay back a customer who has lost money to phishers? Or is it ultimately the customer's responsibility to make educated use of technology?
The banks with the helpful "report here" links also typically have helpful auto-responders, and their sites and form letters at least make it seem like they care about security. The banks who make it hard to hear from their customers usually don't reply at all. If I were shopping for a new bank, I'd definitely stay away from those that don't have an easy-to-find contact point near the front of their site. I get the impression they do not take security or phishing threats seriously at all. They'll probably be the ones that would fight their victims.
John
A little tough love. Hit 'em where it hurts and maybe they'll learn. If I got scammed on the web, I'd feel like such a fool I probably wouldn't bother seeking a refund.
Hacking? Yes.
ID theft? Yes.
Fraud? Yes.
Phishing? Man, I dunno -- seems to me that if you get suckered into giving someone your account information, that's kind of your own problem. It's not Paypal's fault if you actually believed that the poorly-worded email you got was actually from them because it had their logo someplace on it.
On the other hand, this sort of thing could also seriously undermine the confidence that people have in online transactions and the like, so I can't help but wonder if maybe it isn't shortsighted not to just take the hit.
Every year during my review, I just pray the words "slashdot.org" aren't mentioned.
As much as America funds other governments, I don't think Uncle Sam should pay for Ireland's banking debts. Maybe the banks in the FDIC...
God spoke to me.
Phishing is no different than other scams out there. One in my area has two men dressed as workers from the water department who enter the home to "check the water pressure." While one sets to work inside the other takes the victim outside to check the faucets leaving the first to go looking for the jewlery box.
Does the water department have to cover the cost of the missing rings? No. Then why must financial institutions?
No
If they did so, then all you'd have to do would be to set up a phishing site, be a victim of your own phishing and then be payed back by your bank.
That, and also, blah blah people blah blah stupid blah blah genetic pool blah.
You just got troll'd!
"Can Banks Shift Phishing Losses to Customers?" asks the headline.
Of course. The customers are going to pay for all losses; the correct question is, will banks make the individual who made a foolish decision pay for his mistake, or will they make all of the customers (like me) pay, in the form of reduced interest payouts, higher lender rates, increased fees, etc.?
You don't really think the bank is going to create money to pay for the losses, do you? Make no mistake about it--banks, like every other convenient, abstract legal fiction--don't pay for anything. Individuals pay for things.
Moderate drunk! It's more fun that way!
Knowing my clients, I smell a new "insurance product" ... a general "electronic age" insurance product to cover online fraud (buyer/seller problems), identity theft and now phishing. "e-Policy" or something.
meh
It isn't clear to me that you have to do anything wrong to be the victim of fraud. The banks need to come up with a method to combat financial fraud, or they need to absorb losses as the cost of doing business. Bankrupting individuals isn't the answer.
Avoid Missing Ball for High Score
The problem is that the banks aren't taking appropriate steps to identify the customer before handing over the customer's money. Banks are legislated/insured to only release money to the authorized account holder. When the customer takes reasonable steps to protect their information and follows the banks security procedures they are not responsible for loss.
By putting in place technology that doesn't sufficiently protect the reasonable person from fraud the banks bring the liabilty to themselves. The reason you put money into the bank and pay fees is to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing your money and to provide insurance against such a loss. It is the banks job to put in-place controls and cover the losses that arise from insufficient controls. It is a balancing act between what the consumer wants to put up with in security and what they want to pay for service. It is the banks job to find the equilibrium between the cost of increased controls and the cost of fraud. After all it is the bank not the consumer who is offering the service of withdrawl over the internet.
A good step in the right direction might be two factor authentication.
Wouldn't it be nice if customers and banks alike used secure email?
If you want to take away the incentive to fix the problem from the party that has the most control of the security system, the customer should pay.
The reason why phishing attacks work is that people are fooled into giving credit card information to what appears to be a legitimate website. This could have been avoided if the customer was more careful, but then again, we all get tricked from time to time.
Now, why aren't flags raised when $30,000 is taken out of a bank account electronically from an unusual location? A phone call to the account holder would be nice.
By analogy, if someone forges a check, and signs my name, and the bank cashes that check, the bank is on the hook for the cash. Also, if someone lies about their identity, and the bank doesn't verify their identity, they are also on the hook for the check. The same should be true with online transactions.
If European banks and governments wont protect customers from fraud, online purchases will be doomed.
FTFA: 1sockchuck writes to mention a Netcraft article wondering who should bear the brunt of phishing costs.
The rational answer should be that law enforcement should persue the criminals and put a freeze on their accounts and seek retribution in monetary and jailtime punishments.
Seriously, if we can find and freeze "terrorist" accounts, how hard is it to track where this money goes?
I mean Phishers have to get it from a bank or ATM somewhere.
Why don't the bank simply reverse the process and force other banks to freeze the accounts? What is preventing them?
"I am the king of the Romans, and am superior to rules of grammar!"
-Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor (1368-1437)
Won't seek a refund for $200k loss???
Bill, is that you?
It isn't clear to me that you have to do anything wrong to be the victim of fraud.
You haven't done anything wrong, neither has the bank. How are phishing emails different than, say, somebody calling you on the phone pretending to be from your bank's credit card department? If you fall for it, who should be responsible? The customer for not being more careful? The bank for not making it more difficult for people to impersonate customers (and at the same time making it more difficult for honest people to conduct their business from afar). Insurance? (fat chance)
No sig
justice must have a compassionate edge. because if justice is as brutal and swift as crime itself, it is no longer justice
so yes, the people who fall for phishing schemes are stupid. but no: they do not deserve what happened to them. the punishment they receive (losing all of their funds) is not commensurate with the mistake they made. if i get in the car with a drunk driver, i am stupid. but do i deserve to get paralyzed for life in the accident that happens for my mistake? no. so do you laugh and call me a moron or grieve at my infirmity?
whether you laugh or grieve at me is more revelatory about your own immaturity. because god forbid you ever make a little mistake in your life and suffer drastically for the consequences, right? that can never happen to you, right? yes: stupid mistakes have negative consequences. but if the negative consequences are way out of proportion to the error, you should not be so dismissive, you should demonstrate some compassion, or justice really isn't your motivation. if drastic punishment from a simple mistake happens to you, you're just going to suck it up and move on without complaining one bit, right?
well... experience teaches me that those laughing hardest at those horribly punished for simple mistakes are also those who whine the loudest when they become victimized the same way. so yes, banks should pay for phishing schemes, and everyone here shouting "you get what you deserve" are not speaking from a position of concern for justice. they are speaking from just sort of a smug hypocritical contempt for simple human fallibility. which they apparently imagine themselves immune from, out of simple ignorance at how cruel crime can be, and how fickle fate can be
intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
Given a few large lawsuits, banks will probably have to sign up for fraud insurance. But if their insurers set their rates based on an assesors' estimate of their security, it'll be in their best interests to improve security to get the cheapest policy possible.
It's how the civil court system and capitalism are supposed to work, anyway. It may just take time (and no freakin' governmental interference by passing "tort reform" limiting the banks' liability, otherwise there will be no financial incentive at all.)
John
The basic way money is stolen is this:
(1) Somebody gets your account information. (Possibly through phishing, possibly just by rummaging through your mail).
(2) They wire money out of your account.
(3) They move the money someplace where it cannot be retrieved.
The problem is in step 2. The banks make absolutely no verification that a transfer is authorized. When I walk into a branch, I can't just pull money out of my account without first verifying who I am. When I write a check, the bank (at least in theory) is supposed to verify that the signature on the check matches the one they have on file. But, there is no similar verification when my account is electronically drafted.
The banks are basically betting that they'll lose less money through fraud than it would cost them to implement security on the back end. It's a calculated risk on their end. If their customers had to pay for the fraud, there would be NO incentive for them to improve security.
Incidently, the comment that "the customers pay for it anyway" is only partially right -- customers pay for part of it through reduced interest rates and so on, but some of it also comes out of the bank's profits. Banks are generally in a competitive market and as long as there are alternatives for savings (e.g. brokerage houses), the market dictates the interest rates paid by the bank.
I'm an account holder with Bank of Ireland, and have had several accounts with Dutch banks. ALL Dutch banks use two-factor authentication when making payments, either with a digital "calculator" device or a list of passwords, where for every payment a different password is requested, and the list renewed when it has been used up.
Bank of Ireland, on the other hand, uses just a lame 6-digit password, your contact phone number and a 6-digit account number. Very lousy security there. I definitely don't feel safe using their internet banking facilities. Even 8 years ago my Dutch bank modem service already used 2-factor auth.
So, yes, I feel that in this case BOI is completely to blame for this.
Phishing seems to be good advertising for banks. I'd never heard of Fifth Third Bank until I was suddenly getting 5 phishing e-mails a day for it.
Oh, say does that Star-Spangled Banner entwine / The myrtle of Venus with Bacchus's vine?
If someone forged your driver's license and went to the bank to withdraw your money in person, it's the bank's fault for giving it to them. Same principle should hold for online transactions. If the bank gives the wrong person your money, it's not your problem.
If the liability moves to customers, the banks won't have any incentive to improve security. Worse, the bank will start blaming you for breeches that are completely their fault. The bank will claim you didn't protect your password when their systems are comprised and your account is drained.
The bank has motivation and resources to implement a solution, whereas individual customers do not. This is because banks control the technologies that phishers emulate in order to con their targets.
For example, the company I work for is concerned about phishers stealing user accounts, by emailing links to pages that look like our corporate signin page (used for many properties in many locations, so commonly encountered on various sites by our employees.) As individual users, it was extremely difficult to tell whether the page being logged into was legitimate or not; so, the company now uses a cookie to identify you as an employee, and embed your picture (from the company's internal records) into the login page. If there's no picture of you, it's not legitimate.
Is that foolproof? No, because other employees could get your photo and fake the login page. It certainly narrows it down to internal employees and contractors, however, and it's a step that individual employees could never have taken on their own.
Similarly, imagine if ATM cards didn't have PINs, and possession of the card was enough to withdraw money from remote locations. Individual users couldn't do much about this, other than hold onto their card for dear life, but the banks could easily implement PIN codes so that theft of the card did not automatically enable theft of account monies.
Again, is that foolproof? No, because some people write their PINs on their cards (duh) and some people manage to set up "fake" ATMs to collect card swipes and PINs. However, banks now use the unique identifier on the card to access the customer's name and display it before the PIN is punched -- no name means you probably shouldn't use the machine. Again, another step (still not foolproof) that individual users couldn't enact on their own.
If a bank makes a service available, they are the ones in good position to improve the security of that service, and at some point the bank actually hands over the money based on their own assurance that the person using the service is who they say they are, using whatever method the bank provides. All of this is up to the bank, not the user, and so they should carry the liability -- if not, they can always opt to avoid providing those services that they cannot successfully protect.
Does this absolve the users of all responsibility? No, but there are still lots of stupid things users can do -- and shouldn't -- that cause them to lose money that the bank doesn't -- and shouldn't -- have to reimburse.
I guess you can think of it like this: if a bank's machine gives out money to the wrong person, it's the bank's fault -- and if the bank's machine gives out money to the right person, who is then mugged within half a second of the transaction, it's the user's fault.
Well, I can think of some. For example, a friend of mine got his debit card copied. He couldn't have prevented it, Arco got their computer systems compromised and all the debit-card numbers and PINs used at their at-the-pump readers stolen, and he happened to have used his card at an affected Arco station. But the bank could've easily stopped his account from being emptied. He'd made a card-present, ID-presented, signature-obtained transaction in San Jose, CA. 4 hours later, his card was used at an ATM in Thailand and his account emptied in $100-200 increments, it took quite a few transactions to completely drain his account. Now, any basic security profiling should've raised red flags: he's never used his card outside the US, these are cash withdrawals in a country that's known as a source of financial fraud, and it's physically not possible for a person to have gotten from San Jose to Thailand in 4 hours. All the bank would've had to do is refuse that first ATM withdrawal with a message to contact his bank and that would've been the end of the theft before it began. But they allowed all those transactions without questioning them. That's definitely not reasonable care on the part of the bank.
Many of them now say something to the effect of the customer having take "reasonable care" to protect themselves from identity theft / being hacked. If you don't, then no money back for you.
"I'd rather be a lightning rod than a seismometer." -Ken Kesey
How are phishing emails different than, say, somebody calling you on the phone pretending to be from your bank's credit card department? If you fall for it, who should be responsible?
Not much. When a bank calls, Caller ID should show bank's name rather than "Private Caller" from some call center in India. When a bank sends an e-mail it should be digitally signed. My credit card should generate (say, with a keypad and LCD) one time use authorization numbers based on the charge amount. As long as the bank doesn't give users a way to distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent communication, they should be responsible for the results.
Financial institutions have the responsibility to protect us from unauthorized access to our accounts. It should then be the burden of the institution to show that the account holder was at fault.
However, We ALL have to take responsibility
As a consumer,
1) never enter personal information in response to e-mail initiated requests, etc. 2) report suspicious emails, websites, etc. 3) Use common sense (nevermind, that'll never work)
As for the banks,
1) Provide security measures to reduce chances of phising losses; while authentication is not perfect, it's a decent start (althoug I find it pretty annoying) 2) Educate their customers 3) Need to offer an easy, user-friendly way to report phishing (PayPal does a good job of this) 4) Make their policies clear; if they won't cover losses due to phishing attacks, we should know before putting our money in their hands 5) If they can't sustain the losses, then they need a new business model; what do banks do with those $30 fees that they love to ambush everyone with
Now the Government,
1) NEEDS TO PROSECUTE OFFENDERS by enforcing existing laws; it's amazing how apathetic the authorities are towards identity theft, etc. 2) Ensure laws are adequate for protecting consumers and prosecuting offenders 3) Educate the people
The bank has done plenty wrong - they've allowed an unauthorized party to access your account and withdraw funds. They've cultivated a business model where financial transactions can be conducted over and insecure network without adequate identity verification and they've done so knowing full well that the network is rife with phishing scams which capitalize on those weaknesses. If they can now shift any loses back to the customer, there will be no incentive for the banks to improve security.
This is not a security issue, so the banks can't improve it.
Of course it's a security issue. All I need to do to is get your account number and the banks routing number and I can initial an ACH electronic funds transfer against your account. There is no sort of security in place where you can whitelist banks/accounts for initiating an ACH against your account.
Now you might say it's the customers job to better protect their info. Well guess what. You're in line at the grocery store writing out your check. See me behind you in line talking on the cell phone? Guess what...I'm not actually on the phone. I just used my camera phone to snap a photo of your check, which contains ALL of the information I'd need to get the bank to do an ACH transfer out of your account.
Now tell me...does that still not sound like a security issue?
It's unfortunate, but unless the phishers can be found (which is pretty much never) the customer has to be the one to bear responsibility. They need to keep track of who they give their information to, and while they don't deserve to lose all their money, others who didn't make the mistake shouldn't have to take responsibility for it. It sucks, but that's life.
"What is Internet Explorer 7? Are you saying we can't access the normal internet?" - I love tech support. Really.
In a Wired article from last year, Bruce Schneier said some very sensible things on this subject:
I think this is absolutely right. Faced with the financial losses of phishing, banks will simply institute procedures, technologies and processes to protect against fraudulent financial TRANSACTIONS. Doubtless, banks will gripe and complain about their new liability. But it was exactly this same liability that made personal credit cards viable - and gave birth to a multi-billion dollar industry.
-Sean
Two factor would make phishing harder, but what we really need is better built-in browser support for two factor auth as an extension to the HTTPS protocol.
In an ideal world, the browser supports two factor auth for access to the website via http auth, but would put up a warning that says "WARNING: Your password is being sent insecurely. (Send Anyway) ((Cancel))" if the connection is not encrypted with a properly signed cert. This authentication should require you to key in your account name, pin number, and password in separate fields and should be displayed by the browser, not as a web page that can be faked. By so doing, you basically eliminate the possibility of a phishing attack using an unencrypted channel that looks like the encrypted channel enough to fool someone into giving up the needed information.
With that single change, you have a solution that will dramatically reduce phishing attacks, as it requires the phishers to have a legitimate signed SSL cert, which means there is (in theory) a solid paper trail leading back to them. Phishing expeditions that involve SSL are very, very rare by comparison to the unsecured versions, require a much greater financial investment, are much more likely to result in a successful arrest and prosecution (because of the paper trail from obtaining the cert and the requirement that such certs are tied to a valid domain name, both of which make it harder to use hijacked machines as servers).
Unfortunately, it's a chicken and egg problem. The browser vendors probably won't add such authentication mechanisms into the browsers unless sites want it, and banking sites aren't willing to spend money on two-factor devices unless they provide a tangible benefit (and without such browser support, they really don't).
Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
So the Bank of Ireland hasn't a clue about forged From: addresses, encourages customers to involve innocent ISP's abuse departments, and takes no interest in pursuing malicious emails involving its own name. It suggests the police might care more about the Bank's security than the bank itself.
IMHO the BOI has no business berating its own customers for not having a clue/care, especially when they demonstrate so little themselves.
Huh ?
Should it really be possible to drain somebody's account using only their account number & routing number ? Both of those pieces of information are available to anybody you give a check to for a start. Now tell me this isn't a security issue.
Agreed, but this article is in the context of phishing scams. I would argue that there's a difference between someone impersonating an individual to the bank (like the example you gave), and impersonating the bank to the individual (phishing). In the case of you describe, the individual, is being impersonated, and the bank is the one involved in the transaction. I would agree that they need superior authentication systems in that case. In the case of phishing, however, the bank, through no fault of theirs, is being impersonated. A gullible individual will likely provide any information required for a bank transfer, including the information to change the whitelist. The same gullible individual would likely not even set up such a whitelist. Since the bank isn't a party to any of this communication, I think that the individual, rather than the bank, should be held accountable in this scenario.
I'm sure they would love to. But we must not let them. We put our money in banks because it's supposed to be more secure than keeping it under the mattress. If they don't secure our money, then we have no reason to let them keep and profit from it. Phishing is a problem because the banks are too loose, lazy, cheap, etc. etc. etc. And it's way too easy for them to simply write off the losses. And we accept anything they tell us too easily. We presently have the same problem with the government. If they shift the problem to the customer, then it will get much worse. Make it their problem, and don't allow undue inconvenience to the customer, and it will decrease dramatically. Put your money back under the mattress until they fix it. For a really quick fix, burn your credit cards.
By now, I'm sure this is all very redundant, but it doesn't make it any less important. You have the power to change things. Use it or lose it.
What?
Now, why aren't flags raised when $30,000 is taken out of a bank account electronically from an unusual location? A phone call to the account holder would be nice.
I actually know someone who fell for a phishing email. The bank called him up the next day, and asked if he had authorized two $700.00 transfers to out-of-country accounts. He said "no." and they dutifully marked it as fraud. So apparently (some) banks do monitor transactions and flag anything that looks strange.
Similarly I've often had my credit card company call me to confirm transactions that appeared dubious. Often within hours of making an unusual purchase, they'll respond. The response time makes me suspect that they have computers watching transactions using heuristics to pick out unusual transactions.
So at least anecdotally, some banks are proactive enough to prevent phishing from generating losses for customers or themselves.
There's ways involving using VOIP gateways, and also a few that just involve routing your call through so many third parties that an operator just comes on and asks "What's your number?". Also, I believe anyone with a PBX (PBX? Is that correct? I should know this.) can set their CID to whatever they want. There's another level of identification-- ANI-- that's much more difficult to spoof, but you generally have to be on the recieving end of a toll-free number to be get that info.
Information wants to be free.
Entertainment wants to be paid.
You just want to be cheap.
ANY suspicious mail that falls into my hotmail box (usually paypal, or ebay) I immediately go to the official sites and send them as much as I can. Usually, within an hour or so, the site in question has been taken down. If more people like us (hard core computer users) would take the lead in reporting phishers as quickly as possible, instead of deleting the junk mail, maybe it would help cut down on phishers. It only takes a minute or two to report them. Also, if we could do what we can with our relatives (we all know they call US when something goes haywire), to explain and show them what not to do, maybe it would go away. My dad has gotten in the habit of calling me on the phone before clicking on a linked website if he isn't sure. He even called me one time when he was going to buy something online, and he didn't see "the padlock" or the https in firefox. If we can get others in the habit of what to look for, phishing could be reduced. I'd much rather take a call from a friend or family member asking if a site is legit, then have them get scammed, or their computer hosed.
You underestimate the problem. Phishing is actually a two-pronged attack -- or at least this is my experience in Australia. (Not that I've fallen victim, but I've conversed quite a bit with those that have.) The first prong of the attack is the fake bank message and website that we all know and loathe. The second prong doesn't even look remotely related: it's usually an employment scam, like the Norway Consulting Employment Scam which is arriving in my inbox with tedious regularity.
This is how it works. Phisher P (probably located in Russia, or nearby) obtains access to online bank account of victim V. At the same time, P also runs a job scam like the "Norway Consulting" job scam and ropes in "employee" E, who happens to have an account at the same bank. E is told that their job involves accepting payments from customers and forwarding the money via Western Union or Money Gram. (The exact pretext may change, but the money transfer part remains steadfastly constant.) So P then transfers funds from V to E, then contacts E and has him quickly withdraw the money and go make a Western Union transfer. By the time anyone realises that they've been had, P has his money and has vanished. The remaining question is whether the loss is to be borne by V for being a sucker, E for being a dupe, or all the bank's customers generally.
proof, n. A demonstration that a conclusion is implied by certain premises and axioms.
As someone who does work in the systems of a top-10 US card issuer, I can tell you we lose over 3 million USD to fraud every MONTH. And the company I work for is nowhere close to being the biggest! (The top couple of banks are separated by a decimal place worth of volume from the rest)
As most of you probably know, banks make money by earning a small amount of money on each of a lot of transactions. $3 million worth of loss takes a LOT of transactions.
Every time some fraud scheme comes up on Slashdot, everyone bitches that the banks don't do enough.
Do you really, truly think that banks aren't interested in plugging a $3 million/month leak?
The problem is that, a lot like hackers vs. DRM - or spammers vs. every geek on Earth - the people looking to break the system are always one step ahead.
Phishing will die off on the same day we geeks manage to stop the last spammer. They have similar tactics, and do at some points overlap. And, since we are much better equipped than banks to fight that battle, and we have yet to win, you can assume that day is far off.
Remember, banks are in the business of making transactions, not software. Keep in mind what you're asking them to be good at is in no way how they make money. Find/invent a solution yourself and sell it to them. I guarantee they'll be interested, so long as your answer costs less than $3 million USD/year.
I don't agree.
The online banking security is too weak if it is based just on a piece of information (username+password). There's already been cases of viruses that do keylogging to gather online banking information for criminals.
The security needs to be based on a combination of something that you know (username+password), plus something you have (e.g. ATM card). No virus can steal your ATM card, and if your wallet gets stolen your PIN code is hopefully unknown to the thief
I've used online banking both in Sweden and in the US.
In the US, the online bank security seems to be about par with Slashdot's. Once someone has your username+password, they can get your money.
In Sweden most (all?) banks don't let you transfer money from your online account with just a username+password. You also need a one-time code for each transfer. These are either generated by a small device, or sent out on credit-card sized cards with ~100 codes. This is a little bit more cumbersome, but it sure feels more safe, especially when using public terminals that may have keyloggers on them.
I mean, seriously, how useful/safe is online banking if you can only use it on your own computer (because of possible keyloggers on public terminals), and even at home you have to make damn sure that you didn't get a keylogging virus through the latest security exploit???
Freevo - Linux Multimedia Jukebox
TFA isn't talking about an all or nothing situation though - it's talking about banks trying to refuse to cover losses where the customer has definately been negligent.
Take an extreme example. If I posted my online banking details here, and someone used them to drain my account, should I really be able to turn round to the bank and tell them they should refund me since it's a cost of doing business?
Obvioulsy real cases are much more of a grey area, and to be honest I'm not to sure where I stand or where I'd draw the line, but I do think there is at least a hypothetical level of idiocy which the banks shouldn't be obliged to compensate.
This sig all sigs devours
You're in line at the grocery store writing out your check[sic].
.....
In this case, 'sic' must stand for "spelling is correct". From Merriam-Webster:
Main Entry: 1check
Pronunciation: 'chek
Function: noun
7 : a written order directing a bank to pay money as instructed : DRAFT
Main Entry: cheque
Pronunciation: 'chek
chiefly British variant of 1CHECK 7