Private Data Sold From Indian Call Center
Matt Freman writes to mention a ZDNet article on reports that private data is being sold out of an Indian call center. A U.K. television programme, 'Dispatches', follows a 12-month investigative report on illegal privacy-related activities. During the taping of the show thousands of U.K. bank customers had their personal information sold by the staff of a call center. From the article: "Indian IT trade organization Nasscom criticized Channel 4 for refusing to show it any of the footage before it was broadcast on Thursday evening. It urged the program makers to cooperate in rooting out and prosecuting any 'corrupt' call center workers. 'The whole issue of data security is a global problem,' said Sunil Mehta, a vice president at Nasscom. 'There are bad apples in every industry around the world, and these incidents happen in India and the U.K. This is not a widespread problem in India. Security measures and practices that Indian companies have are the best in the world.'"
Also, I always wondered why companies that outsource are assured their trade secrets are not sold too.
Thus, the people who know they are making a great deal less than people in the UK or US feel that they are doing this to equalize themselves. It is a psychological phenomenon. People don't just want to do well, they want to do better than others.
Of course, there isn't any reason to believe that private data couldn't be illegally sold in the UK... or in the U.S., or France, or Canada, or Germany, or Japan, or whereever. In fact, data theft has most certainly happened in all those countries!
But you are going to have a salvo of posts demonizing India as a place to do buisness. People with either a xenophobic agenda, or a protectionist agenda will jump on this with the whole "India is evil! Don't outsource to India" paranoia and hysteria, when in fact there is no reason to believe your data is more secure anywhere else.
While I'm no fan of offshoring, in all fairness, it is true that data theft as described is not a problem unique to India. The real question is, how are these things handled by the courts and laws of the countries in which they occur? If there is some assurance that perpetrators will be brought to justice and things put to rights, as much as possible, then it may not be as big a deal. However, if the courts or laws are weak/corrupt and the penalties associated with data theft are laughable compared to the benefits, then you have a big problem. Many companies have been attracted to India and other countries by relatively cheap labor, but they really need to look at the rule and culture of law in any country they plan to do business in as well. This of course assumes that they are truly interested in benefitting the customer and haven't just added in data theft as a cost of doing business.
To the making of books there is no end, so let's get started
A related atricle on BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5405438.stm
Not every Indian is necessarily corrupt. However, even an handful can ruin the reputation of the entire bunch. The Indian Govt. has to crack down really hard on the people caught seeling the data.
PS: I am an Indian too...
It's that it is beyond the reach of local law enforcement which complicates things.
Let's say that the same crime happpens locally. Local laws are applied against local criminals. If I recall correctly, the last time this issue was discussed, "identity theft" and related fraud weren't necessarily a crime in India or at least they didn't have the same level of urgency out there. Whatever the case, there is no guarantee that the handling of these problems would reflect the same level of justice as it would locally due to disparity of law enforcement priority, communications among law enforcement, etc.
On the other hand, if we had some sort of international treaty regarding these matters, that might balance out the problem. For example, all employees of these call centers should be made to operate under the laws of the city, state and nation of the company they are representing and if they are suspected of being in criminal violation of such laws, they should be extradited to the city, state or nation for criminal prosecution.
But in my opinion, that wouldn't really be enough. These people are simply too far out of reach to be held accountable. I just feel like we're at risk having some rather critical information exported to other countries for processing where our laws and regulations do not necessarily apply. It's bad enough when it happens here on our own soil, but at least we can take SOME action against it. Internationally, it's just all the more complicated.
last night, people were selling amazing amounts of information. One person claimed (and showed a recording as proof) to have actual voice recordings of people handing over credit card and security numbers...
Whilst this might be just a few bad apples it does make the whole sector look bad, and I'm not sure I want to be giving my card numbers to compainies who outsource so readily without checking fully what staff are up to.
Interestingly though was the response from the banks, which amounted to "so what". They really don't care. Whenever someone is a victim of fraud through these, or other, means they simply pay up and give the customer their money back, which apparently is cheaper than making sure that it doesn't happen - besides not everyone will notice, and they profit from the people who are scammed and don't notice
*''I can't believe it's not a hyperlink.''
Amen. We just recently had an esoteric problem with Windows and roaming profiles where in about 1% of the logons, the user's perms to their user hive in the registry would be removed, preventing any GPOs from applying. After two weeks of debugging and not being able to faithfully reproduce it, we called microsoft and paid for an advanced support call to troubleshoot mission critical issues. This is one where "senior management" is allegedly notified of your issue.
We never got out of India, as evidenced by the emails that went back and forth and their origin (you can't always judge by accent because there are Indian citizens working domestically). However, as you stated, the ability to understand what they were saying was enough to drag each call out to twice as long as it should have been.
Then there's the quality of the "support." We were treated as if we were Grandma with a PC problem. We provided clear userenv logs and asked specific questions like "What causes migratent4tont5 process to invoked? What exactly is it checking for since we have no nt4 machines left?" No answers to our specific questions. Instead we got "advice" like.
After a while the case person stopped returning our calls and their email started bouncing. Emailing the manager on record for this also bounced. Seemed like their email server was having problems.
They never followed-up on the call. After another week we found out what the problem was. If the ProfileList HKLM key didn't match what local cached profiles of roaming profiles exist on any given machine, it *sometimes* triggered this process that ended up changing the ACLs on the user hive preventing GPOs from being set. Solution was a machine startup script to check that list and remove any entries that conflicted.
They never even hinted to us where to look. We just found it through a heck of a lot of trial, errors, and observations. As far as I know, over a month later, the case is still open with them. They have never bothered to follow up. Then again, they probably closed the call with some lame excuse like "Customer refused to cooperate" (yes, we refused to remove anti-virus from all 2000 of our desktops. It was a stupid suggestion and had nothing to do with the problem at all)
Fired? That's it? I'm curious of the economics of the crime then. Is it possible that one can earn enough coin by selling information where they never have to work again, and hence firing is worth it?
If the company designed its security and auditing correctly, call center employees should never have the ability to do this in the first place. Why are they trusting call center employees with wholesale access to customers' private data? Competent companies will require the employees to provide an explanation every time they access a record, and these will be tied to their phone records to make sure they are only accessing information relevant to their current task. A good audit trail, flagging unusual access behavior, combined with limiting access only to individual records at a time would have stopped these breaches.
Yes, some of these outsourced call centers are inexpensive because they don't do things like this. But you get what you pay for, right?
And the saddest part of this tale is that since the problem was solved (by the customer) after having dealt with the crack MS support staff, I imagine it will appear as a successful resolution for that support center, further legitimizing their use. While in actuality, the customer is completely dissatisfied.
They can not even prosecute clear cut cases of murder, when there is ample proof.
Just a somwhat current example: the murder of Jessica Lal.
The victim, an attractive model, worked at the bar at a friend's party in a fancy restaurant. A son of a powerful politician comes in with his entourage and asks for a drink. She refuses to give him one, because the bar is already closed. The man - offended beeing refused in front of his friends - pulls a gun and shoots her direct in the face.
Numerous witnesses. Ample evidence. OJ Simpson was a mystery compared to that. And yet, after seven years of judical wrangling, the man walks away free (not that he ever spent a day in jail). Witnesses who can not remember anything, a police that just happens to destroy or devalue all evidence - the case stinks of corruption.
Its been a major scandal in India half a year ago. But only because the victim was well known and had many influential friends of her own. Had she been a simple rural woman, we wouldn't even know. Local observers note that affairs like that are standard practice - if you are rich enough in India, there is no law that applies to you, because everybody is corrupt and can be bought.
Don't believe me ? Just google for Jessica Lal, and read the whole sordid story.
The difference between India and the UK was the manner in which this data was marketed. Outside Hyderabad, which had G.Bush visiting and high security at the time of the investigation, the personal information was being dealt as any other commoditiy. That is, openly traded. The makers of the programme weren't able to gain access to data as readily within the UK. The speculation, as it was untested, as to why this was the case was down to jurisdictional issues.
A large number of UK companies have taken advantage of the services supplied by Indian call centres. The security of data is a genuine concern. The numbers being talked about were in the 50,000 - 100,000 new leads per month. This is fraud on a large scale even if its only being carried out by a relatively small number of people. Some of the sample data, which when challenged was said to be made up, was used to track one person down that was prepared to appear on camera and confirm it as true. Interestingly this data was obtained because the person had a credit check done in a UK shop which happened to go through to an Indian call centre.
Incidentally the programme did say that the information was garnered not from banking call centres but mostly from ones used by mobile phone companies. The implication being that the banking call centres had a higher level of security.
You may think me a tired, old, cynic. I'd have to disagree about the tired bit.