100 Million Victims of Data Theft
jcatcw writes "With the latest significant data breach — theft of a Boeing laptop with unencrypted personal information on 382,000 employees — the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse estimates that the total number of data breach victims has passed 100 million since they started tracking in February 2005. The director, Beth Givens, admits 'the number 100 million is largely a fictional number,' but it surely errs on the low side. Since California is still the only state with disclosure laws, incidents are difficult to analyze fully. However, Congress this week passed a bill requiring that the Department of Veterans Affairs report breaches."
I have been counted at least twice though. I am a veteran and got a letter from the VA with a previous theft, and that was just a few months after I got a letter from Boeing telling me that my info was stolen. Have not heard anything about this latest one, I do appreciate the free credit monitoring I get now, but I am not convinced it would do me any good if someone was really using my info. Plus it is only for one year, that is a relatively short period of time, the info has an unlimited life.
People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.
First off, the term "identity theft" is completely ridiculous. No one is taking away who you are. Your friends and family won't suddenly forget who you are. A better term would be "credit fraud".
This is the basic scenario: A criminal poses as you to borrow money (usually with a credit card), and then whoever lent that person the money asks you to repay it.
Then there are generally 2 consequences for you: debt and reputation damage. The debt itself is usually the lesser of the two problems, since you're not legally obligated to repay money that someone else borrowed in your name. Reputation damage, on the other hand, is incredibly hard to repair. This usually takes the form of erroneous information on your credit report.
Private agencies (Equifax, Experian and TransUnion are the majors in the USA) maintain this information of your past financial transactions, and sell it to potential lenders in the form of a credit report. Lenders then use this information to decide how risky it would be to lend you money. These credit reporting agencies err on the side of over-reporting negative information, because a defaulted loan from an under-qualified borrower costs banks and lenders much more than a qualified applicant being turned away. Additional services (like providing reportees an easy way to correct errors) would cost credit reporting agencies much more than their client lenders would be willing to pay for the increased accuracy, so they don't bother implementing them.
The short version is that banks and other lenders knowingly rely on imperfect information about potential borrowers, because it is the most economically sensible thing to do. It's not profitable for them to pay for more accurate information. If they decide not to lend you money, even based on erroneous information, it will likely be very hard to change their minds.
"In a 32-bit world, you're a 2-bit user. You've got your own newsgroup, alt.total.loser." -Weird Al
I solved this problem ages ago. Some guy, actually two of them, invented something called the Diffie-Hellman Public Key Encryption Algorithm. Since then we've had dozens of these show up and now have RSA and DSA/ElGamal out there. Pretty much, with huge (1024 byte!) challenges and hardware devices with your key in them, as well as transferable One Time Pads (so you can let someone else use your credit card once, twice, for $5, for $10...), you can make it so everyone along the way can verify your identity and nobody along the way can pretend to be you.
The system drawn out isn't that complex. It's lazy distributed too; anyone can cache your public key, so anyone can independently verify you over and over again. This means that the store can verify your card isn't a spoofer and not pester the credit card company with it if it is; and if it's not, then the credit card company can also verify your card isn't a spoofer (and that the store isn't sliding in extra charges after you've signed for the price) and not pester the national PKI network with it.
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You can enforce encryption on every file, strong passwords etc but sooner or later some smuck will print it out and forget to schred the printout when done. So it ends up on some dump available to anyone crawling around looking for something usable.
Designers of company security forget the most obvious and most dangerous threat: stupidity! My personal favorite quote used to illustrate exactly that is the following:
When the infamous "ILOVEYOU" email virus hit, I saw TV news coverage that included an interview with some bubblebrained company secretary. At one point she said, "Oh, I saw we had dozens of these emails coming in, and of course I was suspicious, but I had to open just one of them because, you know, 'I Love You!' *giggle* I had to just see what it was about, you know?" You can't foolproof a system, you simply need to get rid of the idiots. Which sadly is easier said than done...