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Source Code Access Denied in Disputed Race

MrMetlHed writes "A judge ruled Friday that congressional aspirant Christine Jennings has no right to examine the source code that runs the electronic voting machines at the center of a disputed Southwest Florida congressional race. From the article: 'The ruling Friday from Judge Gary prevents for now the Jennings camp from being able to use the programming code to try to show voting machines used in Sarasota County malfunctioned. Jennings claims that an unusually large number of undervotes (ballots that didn't show a vote) recorded in the race implies the machines lost the votes.'"

59 of 310 comments (clear)

  1. Outrageous by Xeth · · Score: 5, Interesting

    This is precisely why government shouldn't be using closed-box commercial software. We have no idea whether the machines are functioning as advertised. Do people not realize that we're essentially just handing a bunch of ballots to these companies and then just accepting the verdict they hand down? It boggles the mind that any democracy-loving representative can stand for this. Maybe there just aren't any left?

    --
    If your theory is different from practice, then your theory is wrong.
    1. Re:Outrageous by wakejagr · · Score: 5, Insightful

      There are at least two reasons why there is little uproar about these machines using closed-source software.

      • most people (including judges, elected officials, and others who are in a position to directly change the situation) don't realize that having no access to the source code means votes cast using the machines are unverifiable
      • too many people (especially those who are only in a position to indirectly change the situation: voters) feel that the situation with these machines is no more broken than the rest of the system. Remember hanging chads?
      --
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    2. Re:Outrageous by secolactico · · Score: 5, Insightful

      most people (including judges, elected officials, and others who are in a position to directly change the situation) don't realize that having no access to the source code means votes cast using the machines are unverifiable

      Judges are not expected to be expert at every subject. They should, however, be able to find expert advice for the subject at hand. Both parts should have presented properly accredited expert witnesses and the court might have retained independent experts as well (IANAL).

      If the fact that the judge is not knowledgeable enough to rule accordingly in an issue indicates that the judicial system (in addition to the election system) might be broken.

      Or maybe the complainant dropped the ball somewhere in the process.

      --
      No sig
    3. Re:Outrageous by TheRaven64 · · Score: 2, Informative
      Last time I checked, over pretty much any timescale there were more exploits found in Linux than in the Windows NT kernel. If you are going to compare all of Windows, then you need to include a set of comparable applications (e.g. X.org, FireFox, much of GNOME or KDE). Take a look at this page for all of the security holes found in third party applications available for OpenBSD since 4.0 was shipped a couple of months ago.

      Most 'Windows' exploits are exploits in bundled userland software. If you compare this to the number of exploits in software bundled with, say, Fedora Core, then the numbers don't look nearly so rosy.

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    4. Re:Outrageous by leenks · · Score: 4, Interesting

      That's true, but it only shows half the picture (like most statistics). If you look at the time it took to fix the exploits and ship the fix to customers then most Open Source projects win hands down. Microsoft does occasionally do this in quite a timely manner, but most of the time it is weeks, months or even years.

      The other thing to consider is the number of holes that might be discovered if everyone had access to the Windows source code :)

    5. Re:Outrageous by schnikies79 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      So it's useless just because it's old? Sometimes low-tech solutions are the best, but this is slashdot and I'm a bit of a luddite so no one will listen.

      --
      Gone!
    6. Re:Outrageous by Holmwood · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Actually, paper and pencil are a pretty good approach. Simply because a solution is old doesn't mean it's a bad one nor does it mean that the shiniest new piece of technology is the best answer.

      Assuming a situation where there's reasonable oversight of most votes most of the time, and opportunities to be alone with ballots for more than a minute don't generally exist:

      - Electronic voting machines? An attacker can change thousands of votes in a second.
      - Punched cards? An attacker can shove a ten cent piece of steel through the hole for the preferred candidate and invalidate a hundred ballots for the opponent in a few seconds.
      - Paper? Well, an attacker can start spoiling every ballot for the opponent, but that's going to take time. Quite a bit of time. And the attacker will be leaving some forensic evidence.

      Canada -- a country geographically even larger than the US with probably even more serious geographic distribution problems -- has generally used paper ballots for a great many years. Elections are typically counted and results are in by somewhere between 10pm for local/provincial elections and maybe 2am (eastern) for Federal elections.

      Most of all, a paper ballot system is comprehensible and reasonably transparent to the ordinary voter. Not so with even open-source software (which may be transparent and comprehensible to some, but is neither to the average voter).

      If you really want something that's counted fast, use paper ballots scanned into optical scanners (and deposited in locked ballot boxes for later inspection/recounts) in front of the voter.

      Paper and pencils: A technology who's time has come.

      Holmwood.

    7. Re:Outrageous by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Interesting

      What is interesting is not how much security holes found, but:

      A) They`re usefulness in gaining inappropriate access.
      B) How many holes are left.

      Now with A), Windows with its single user administration accounts and open privileges to system by all users, makes any userland bug into an root-level access nightmare. Yes, you can have a separate admin-account. No, XP doesn`t support this fully on the file-level (I`ve done it many times, and it`s a PITA because of bugs in XP regarding running programs or installing software as administrator)
      A) will hopefully be fully solved in VISTA. How many years after UNIX solved this?

      With B), you cannot really know. Open access to the source code and the whole world watching, makes it pretty obvious you`re going to have more fixes for Linux and BSD. With closed source, you never really know how many holes are left except when someone stumbles on one in the dark, you never really know what the software does or if it contains any backdoors.

      It is not so far-fetched to state that the more fixes you have to a system, the more secure it is. But it`s really hard to say. Are NT programmers more proficient than Linux-programmers concerning security? Experience shows that security has never been Microsoft`s priority, marketshare has.

      So IMHO Linux and BSD are very much more secure than Windows / NT / XP, maybe even BECAUSE of more fixes for the systems.. But also for the multi-user models used in UNIX which adds a layer of security with the root user, unless the user runs as root all day long of course.

      So ANY system will be insecure if the user do stupid things.

    8. Re:Outrageous by Millenniumman · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The source code wouldn't help matters. Assuming the machines were rigged, it would be simple to release the the code from a properly functioning codeline. If it was rigged, most of the people at the company wouldn't have access to that code, or someone would report it.

      Open source is only open source up to a point. There is no way to verify that what is running on a machine is the same as the code released. Anyone working on the machines can tamper with it: "./configure --all-votes-are-$(myparty) && make && make install". Maybe you could use digital signing on the official builds and restrict the machines to them, but keep in mind that violates the GPLv3, and there are no assurances it won't be hacked. On the other hand, it is very unlikely someone is going to reverse engineer closed source software while they are supposed to be setting up the machines and no one will notice.

      --
      Stupidity is like nuclear power, it can be used for good or evil. And you don't want to get any on you.
    9. Re:Outrageous by Watson+Ladd · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Open source does not equal GPLv3. You could release the code under GPLv2 and use digitally signed and restricted builds. You could use a signature on GPLv3 code that makes a big red "WARNING:DO NOT USE" sign turn on in the booth but otherwise functions normally. Or you could blow PROMS with the code at the factory and the guys sticking it into the voting machines could read out the code from the ROM to verify. With closed source software you can verify that the machines are all running the election software, but you can't verify the software.

      --
      Inventions have long since reached their limit, and I see no hope for further development.-- Frontinus, 1st cent. AD
    10. Re:Outrageous by Tony+Hoyle · · Score: 4, Insightful

      IANAL (duh), but do we know who owns the rights to the code? If the state has no legal claim on the code (I don't think paying for the code counts, it's a question of what was written in the contract), then the judge would not have the authority to open access to the code.

      For something as sensitive as a voting machine the government should have the contract, and all the rights to the source code - the state should be able to request the source from the government.

      If that isn't the case then someone should be fired. By a firing squad.

    11. Re:Outrageous by Anpheus · · Score: 2

      Eminent Domain. If there ever were a good case for using it, this would be it.

    12. Re:Outrageous by aussie_a · · Score: 2, Insightful

      What? The 1700s actually had honest elections that everyone could vote in? Oh yes, so much better to be in the 21st century.

    13. Re:Outrageous by aztracker1 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Here in Arizona, we've had scan-tron style voting for quite a while.. it works well, and has a paper trail... this last election they've started offering the "e-voting" machines... imho they suck, even more for cost and logistical reasons. They're each as expensive as one scan-tron, and each is tied up while the person is voting.. a single scan-tron style unit can handle dozens of voters to one e-voting machine... But, people are sheep.

      --
      Michael J. Ryan - tracker1.info
    14. Re:Outrageous by spisska · · Score: 3, Informative
      This is commercial code which the vendor hopes to sell in other locations. Which leads me to a separate question for all of those advocating open source code: What should be the compensation model for using the code?

      The question is irrelevant. Voting machine vendors already have to submit machines and source to certification agencies for Logic and Acciracy testing and certification. For any machine in use on election day, the source code (and/or mechanical parts) have already been disected, examined, and certified.

      This is the reason why Diebold machines were decertified in California -- not, as is often claimed, because they are insecure, but because Diebold updated certified firmware with code that had not gone through certification.

      The state already has the right to examine source code, and has already done so. What the judge decided (wrongly, IMHO) is that this right does not extend to parties involved in a disputed election where the primary claim hinges on whether or not the machines and code functioned as they were supposed to.

      NIST has recently recommended requiring the effective open-sourcing of voting machine code, but these recommendations (Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines) won't go into effect until 2009. Previously, and in the current VVSG, NIST recommends keeping certified source code in escrow so it is available for examination in case of dispute.

    15. Re:Outrageous by Jahz · · Score: 2, Interesting
      linux code - freely available. Number of linux exploits - minimal.
      windows code - closed source. Number of windows exploits - incredible.

      Well yeah, but it is misleading that you suggest Windows is less secure just because it is closed source. To disqualify that statement you just need to consider that if Linux became closed source tomorrow it would be no less secure than it is today.

      No, the problem with Windows is that M$ made some bad design choices in the early days (90's) and opted to endlessly patch problems rather than rearchitect the kernel/OS (what Vista is supposed to be). The community around linux on the other hand represents "oversight" and helps force speedy correction of underlying flaws. So basically I am saying that with Linux-like oversight on its closed source code, Windows would be really good. To bad that is not feasable.
      --
      There are 10 types of people in the world. Those who understand binary and those who do not.
    16. Re:Outrageous by MyIS · · Score: 2, Insightful
      A well secured system would be nearly impossible for an attacker to circumvent in a minute with the resources he would have available.

      The fear is that there is systematic tampering from the officials' side, not a particular voter left alone with the machine.

      Not if you let people see what their vote was read as after it read.

      Again, the point is that someone could tamper with ballots hours after the voters have left the building.

      with one tenth the population

      One tenth? At those numbers the system scales well - actual counting is done per-geographical-unit anyway, it just means that there are more of them doing concurrent work. And overall, isn't it worth to sacrifice ten hours more delay to get a trusted voting system for a country that touts itself to be the bulwark of democracy for the world?

      --
      http://zero-to-enterprise.blogspot.com/
    17. Re:Outrageous by Bob3141592 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      There's no reason this code should ever be closed. In the computers that run casino games, the government regulatory agencies requires all source code be provided for scrutiny, as well as mandating registered CRCs and digital signatures to prove that the code executing is the code that was inspected. There's all sorts of inspections and reliability tests done on initial submittal and also throughout the lifetime of the computer's use. They do this because those computers affect money, and everyone knows money is important.

      If the public/government doesn't require similar validation and reliability for electronic voting machines, it's because your votes aren't considered important or valuable. I don't see any way to escape that conclusion, given the way things are.

      --
      In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.
    18. Re:Outrageous by canajin56 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I happen to agree that a completely secure system can be established fairly easily. Give the voter a touch screen for all of their choices, they push buttons, it says "Person/Initiative/Proposal/Whatever X are you sure?" and you confirm it, once all things you are voting on are done with, you get a final summary page to confirm, then it records that information and says have a nice day, and also prints out a human readable slip that contains all your votes. You fold it in half just like a normal paper ballot, the person running things seals it and plops it in the ballot box like always. There you have it. Instant the polls close, you have your numbers, and the number can be verified by hand counting of the printouts. In fact, have the electronic number the "Tentative" count, and only the hand count is official. You get instant preliminary results and trusted final results.

      That being said voting regardless of system boils down to trust. I will use trust in the same sense the parent has used it as, severely scrutinized. The problem with pure electronic voting is that, while it requires utmost trust, as do all methods of voting, this trust cannot be given. The machine has a tally in it, and the master machine tallies all of the tallies and gives the final result. A person wrote the code and a person assembled the machine. Let us say the code is fully open and completely trusted. How trusted is the fact that the machine is running THAT code? How hard is it to switch out a rom chip? Was the machine fully inspected to make sure the code is identical in all ways to that which is trusted? Its just not possible to trust this machines numbers. Trust is an issue because there is nothing to prevent this machine from being designed to randomly, with chance 1/5, reassign votes from person X to person Y when writing them down. Where is the log? The log may be 10000% fool proof but the vote was logged normally, everything was normal. All it takes is one tiny piece of code to switch how the vote is recorded. Its displayed for the user as normal, but a single line of code randomly flips it over when its recorded. How can this sort of thing be stopped? Hopefully such tampering would be obvious in the code with enough eyes looking for it. As I said however, how hard is the code to change? If its just on a disk of a windows box as some of these voting stations are...well its trivial to swap the code out at any point. If its on a ROM as it should be, how hard is it to switch out the ROM? Is there only one ROM? It ended up that in many of the voting terminals used in previous elections, there were actually TWO ROM chips, and a hidden switch in the back to switch between them. With such a device, it would be trivial to have your trusted code on one, and your malfeasant code on the other. No amount of auditing the code and verifying the correct code is running will save you from this, you would have to fully verify the hardware too. But what if it wasn't a switch, what if the hidden rom is selected by a timer, only active when its actually the election, and switching back to the trusted ROM the second the polls close? Well, then you could set the system clock to whenever the election is supposed to be and always test under those conditions. Unless of course there is a second clock elsewhere that is not changed when the admin adjusts the system clock.

      That was a lot of text. What it boils down to is its possible to build a very devious voting machine that to the user appears fully functional and seems to record their votes correctly, but does not actually record them correctly. A software audit will not protect you, and machine audit will not protect you, and a detailed examination of the device will not protect you. You would have to crack them open and verify every circuit in there, every IC chip, every single ROM. How could you do this? A full verification would, I imagine, destroy the machine beyond all hope of repair. It would be impossible to verify the actual machines used in vot

      --
      ASCII stupid question, get a stupid ANSI
  2. unfuckingbelivable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The source code for such nasty machines should by definition be publicly available. Who the fuck trusts those devices when its source code is unavailable??

    1. Re:unfuckingbelivable by A+beautiful+mind · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I would mod up parent if I could, as it perfectly catches the gist of the problem. The profanity is there to hilight the seriousness of what people who believe in democracy face. Anyone who belittles the problem by political correct weaselwords does a disservice and does not contribute to the/a solution.

      Not knowing the source code for a voting machine is the equivalent to saying "a miracle happens here" at a critical part in a mathematical proof. Completely utterly unnaceptable.

      --
      It takes a man to suffer ignorance and smile
      Be yourself no matter what they say
    2. Re:unfuckingbelivable by Architect_sasyr · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Indeed, despite their choice of language, they have it in one.

      Just because, in this case, the judge won't understand it, or the company thinks they stand to lose money from letting it be seen, doesn't mean we shouldn't be able to see it... my latest GPS device (a TomTom) has an Open Source system on it, runs on Linux. Thankfully, I don't understand it, and I don't want to, its not my field. BUT WHEN IT COMES DOWN TO IT, if for a second I didn't trust the machine, I could take a look and know exactly what it was doing.

      With a voting machine this should be an integral part of the trust process... we know how the box where we slip our voting slips works... why should we not know how the machine we punch our answers into work the same way?

      --
      Me failed English...
      FreeBSD over Linux. If my comments seem odd, this may explain...
    3. Re:unfuckingbelivable by TheRaven64 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Not knowing the source code for a voting machine is the equivalent to saying "a miracle happens here" at a critical part in a mathematical proof. Completely utterly unnaceptable. Having any kind of electronic voting machine is unacceptable in a democracy. Do you have the skill to audit the source code and say with 100% certainty that there are no exploitable bugs? I could with maybe 40-60% certainty. Is that enough for democracy? I would say that less than 1% of the population is more qualified than me to perform the audit (assuming access to the source code). Is it good enough that 1% of the population can say 'I am fairly confident that this doesn't have any holes.

      Why should Joe Public have to rely on someone like me saying 'trust me, it's secure?' Would you be willing to have a ballot paper written in Kanji and an expert tell you which set of symbols corresponded to your candidate? I certainly wouldn't, so why should the rest of the population have to place the same faith in experts?

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    4. Re:unfuckingbelivable by TheGratefulNet · · Score: 2, Informative

      Not knowing the source code for a voting machine is the equivalent to saying "a miracle happens here" at a critical part in a mathematical proof. Completely utterly unnaceptable.

      are you aware of the fact that when it comes to belief in evolution, the USA is 2nd to the last, worldwide, in our ability to think logically and rationally and believe in science and not the boogeyman?

      (if you can trust penn/teller's numbers, we're the worst only second to turkey, I believe, in evolution disbelief!)

      so you say 'a miracle happens' and we're not supposed to just trust that.

      I agree.

      but then again, why is there SO much religion present in the USA? and why is it crippling to rational thought, to the extent that we've become a laughing stock of the world?

      people here seem to believe in magic and spirits and coming back from the dead in 3 days and all that. its not a stretch to understand that we don't NEED logic and reason here. so the idea of 'just trust the machine' works well in jesusland^H^HUSA.

      seriously. when we lose our ability to detect BS and simply trust our leaders (WHO attacked us on 9/11? oh really!) then we get what we deserve.

      welcome to the machine. or so it seems.

      (its alright, we told you what to dream...)

      --

      --
      "It is now safe to switch off your computer."
    5. Re:unfuckingbelivable by TheRaven64 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Anyone can check the proof just by checking that the proper axioms and lemmas are used at each step. Anyone? I think you live in an interesting world where even 50% of the population even knows what an axiom or lemma is, let alone how to check a mathematical proof. In a democratic state, everyone gets to vote, therefore, everyone should be able to validate the electoral procedure, not just the mathematicians and computer scientists. Here's an example I provided in another post:

      By having an electronic voting system, you are asking the majority of the population to trust that it is carried out correctly, with no way of checking it themselves. Would you[1] be willing to use a paper vote where all of the candidates names were in Kanji, and trust an expert to tell you in the polling booth which candidate name was the one you wanted to vote for?


      [1] Assuming you can't read Kanji. If you can, substitute Egyptian Hieroglyphics in here.

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    6. Re:unfuckingbelivable by hey! · · Score: 3, Insightful

        Having any kind of electronic voting machine is unacceptable in a democracy.


      I disagree.

      Having an electronic machine that prints a human readable, machine tabulatable paper ballot could be a good thing,if the user interface was designed reasonably. For one thing it would assist blind voters, and provide assistance for voters in the language they're most comfortable in.
      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
  3. At least it's just "for now"... by NewToNix · · Score: 5, Insightful
    This will surely be appealed, it's a bad decision on the Judge's part. And here's the obligatory IANAL bit.

    But I am able to call bull shit when I see it. And refusing them, or at least a mutually agreed on qualified party, to review the code in question is asinine.

    And proof positive that these things, if allowed at all, MUST be open source.

  4. Nothing tests code like the real world by RodgerDodger · · Score: 2, Insightful

    There's definitely something screwy going on. From the article, about 18000 votes were accepted that didn't actually vote for anything. Now, if I was designing an e-voting package, there's no way I'd mark a vote as accepted if it didn't vote for something, especially in a country like the US where voting is not mandatory. After all, if they've bothered to turn up at the voting booth, you can assume they actually intended to vote.

    (The situation is a little different in my home country of Australia - mandatory voting means that we might get something out of having a "none-of-the-above" option)

    I also wouldn't put much faith in the "two parallel tests" done by the state. Absolutely nothing tests code like the real world, and the fact that both tests revealed "100 percent accuracy" when errors were detected on all models of e-voting machines during the US Congressional elections just means that the tests weren't very good. I doubt very much that the tests involved as many as 18000 voters in the first place, not to mention underpaid and overworked electoral officials trying to help a horde of undereducated and over-opinionated voters, with only a couple of hours training conducted a couple of months before.

    The court ruled that the "conjecture" of lost votes didn't warrant over-riding the trade secret status of the e-voting machine code. This is a mistake - an expert review could easily conducted under a NDA, thus protecting the trade secret status. Not to mention that the tools of democracy shouldn't have trade secret status in the first place... without examining the code, how does anyone know that there isn't a little switch saying "On Super Tuesday, switch into rig-the-election mode"? (Not that I think there is - it's just that there's no way to disprove it). Nor do you need to go the full open-source route for this - just like the expert review, a panel of experts could easily be responsible for certifying e-voting machines without any risk of the code being exposed.\

    --
    "Software is too expensive to build cheaply"
    1. Re:Nothing tests code like the real world by DRJlaw · · Score: 5, Informative

      There's definitely something screwy going on. From the article, about 18000 votes were accepted that didn't actually vote for anything. Now, if I was designing an e-voting package, there's no way I'd mark a vote as accepted if it didn't vote for something, especially in a country like the US where voting is not mandatory. After all, if they've bothered to turn up at the voting booth, you can assume they actually intended to vote.

      You're misreading the article.

      "Some 18,000 Sarasota County electronic ballots did not register a vote in the race, a much higher undervote rate _ nearly 15 percent _ than in others such as those for governor or U.S. Senate. Jennings contends the machines lost the votes. Buchanan backers and the company say that if there was an unusually large undervote it was likely because of bad ballot design."

      There were 18,000 people who did not vote for either Jennings or Buchanan (or another option, if any). People routinely vote for "none of the above" when they dislike each of the candidates, when they have little information about the candidates, etc. You cannot refuse to accept the voter's selections once the voter has showed up at the polls and voted in even one race, because that may very well be the voter's intent. Arguably, you cannot refuse to accept a submission that contains no selections, because that too may be the voter's intent.

      You are at best arguing about the sufficiency of the selection review prior to a submission. There is not enough information in the article to discuss this information, and it does not support the candidate's allegations of fraud, so that it is essentially irrelevant to the legal case taking place after the election. You're free to argue against the ballot presentation selected/entered by the various Boards of Election, but you can hardly argue based solely on the undervote that this was a programming "feature" or design defect.

    2. Re:Nothing tests code like the real world by theonetruekeebler · · Score: 4, Informative

      From the article, about 18000 votes were accepted that didn't actually vote for anything What the article actually said was:

      18,000 Sarasota County electronic ballots did not register a vote in the race (emphasis added) It further says this means about fifteen percent of the ballots cast did not have a selection in this race.

      The loser says this happened because the software went all wonky. The winner says it probably happened because of poor layout -- voters didn't even find the race, or they found and misunderstood the race, or they fat-fingered the ballot.

      The loser, of course, can't challenge on the misunderstood-ballot theory, because it implies that her support base is statistically more likely do do something stupid than her opponent's.

      That said, I find this ruling intolerable. When the government is formed by the counting of ballots, the method of the counting must be open and available. I think it was Boss Tweed who said it best: "As long as I get to count the votes, what are you going to do about it?"

      --
      This is not my sandwich.
    3. Re:Nothing tests code like the real world by Tony+Hoyle · · Score: 3, Interesting

      A 'None of the above would be great'. IMO we already have that though.... people who stayed at home.

      I have this continual argument with a friend who believes that voting should be compulsory and the spoiling the paper should be a crime - forcing you to vote for *someone*.

      I argue the other way - that actually the way the voting turnout is dropping is actually healthy. People should vote for what they believe in... ideally policies, but 'he has a nice suit', although not something I'd encourage as a voting decision, is at least a positive vote.

      People stay home for 4 reasons:

      1. They don't believe in the system
      2. They believe in the system, but are not in a marginal so believe it doesn't work for them (similar to (1)).
      3. They don't like any candidate
      4. They don't give a flying fuck.

      I don't *want* people in 3. and 4. to vote. They'll vote randomly, introducing noise into the results. If the purpose of democracy is to elect good government (debatable in itself, probably) then making them vote is against that purpose. 1. and 2. can be sorted out by things like politicians getting off their butts and actually canvasing (thus involving the people.. I haven't seen a politician around here ever), some education, and maybe reform (smaller voting regions perhaps, making them more representative to counter 2.).

      Me, I'm a 3. so a 'none of the above' answer would be great. If a politician actually bothered to even ask for my vote, or *gasp* try to tell me why I should vote for them (and party policies don't count - I don't vote for parties I vote for people) then I probably would vote positively.

  5. Incomplete article by Somnus · · Score: 4, Insightful

    What the article doesn't discuss is the quarantining of machines from the actual election and reproducing their inputs in the "independent test." Anything less is uncertified evidence.

    OTOH, should voting results have a presumption of validity? The problem is that voting bureaucracies are not designed for validation by authenticating ballots or statistical checks, but only on prompt decisiveness and the appearance of not having irregularities in the balloting or counting.

    Wouldn't all this be solved by encrypted online voting, where you could check your own votes by a profile tied to an anonymous registration key issued by the DMV? Then make the data public for verification by the media?

    1. Re:Incomplete article by amaiman · · Score: 3, Informative

      No. Ability to check your own vote means that if you give the key to someone else, they can verify your vote as well, this will lead to people selling their votes.

    2. Re:Incomplete article by JackHoffman · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Wouldn't all this be solved by encrypted online voting, where you could check your own votes by a profile tied to an anonymous registration key issued by the DMV?

      The problem with most "verified" voting mechanisms is that they allow voters to prove a vote for a certain party, which in turn makes buying votes feasible. You have to create a pretty elaborate system to prevent this kind of abuse and most of the proposed systems which look like they could solve this still don't prevent ballot stuffing.

      Classic paper ballot voting solves these problems by using an observable and public process. The only secret act is the casting of the vote and there is practically nothing a voter can do in that secret phase to change the outcome beyond his normal participation in the poll. All other steps in an election are, at least theoretically, public: You can watch the sealing of the empty ballot boxes, you can watch the admission of the voters and you can observe the counting. Nobody has to trust someone else. If people take an interest in the process, they can see for themselves that it is done right.

      Electronic voting always has the problem that you can't observe the code execution. Sure, you can verify that the code in the PROM is correct, but you can't verify that the code is what actually gets executed on election day. You can't verify the contents of the memory modules beyond what another unverifiable machine tells you. IMHO, the problems with electronic voting are unsolvable without giving up at least one of the democratic principles of a secret ballot. The central problem is that there is secret information involved which cannot be verifiable to the point that you can verify the whole process.

    3. Re:Incomplete article by carpeweb · · Score: 2, Insightful

      simply to have the voting machine print human- and machine-readable ballots

      This is essentially what reasonable (non-Florida) balloting looked like before "e-voting". Except that the voter was part of the "voting machine" and filled in little circles. Those are machine-readable, and there's no need to compare the machine readable ballot to the human-readable ballot, because they are the same ballot.

      As I've said before, e-voting is a bad solution to a problem that didn't really exist.

  6. Beautiful system we have here. by ponderance · · Score: 2, Interesting

    This is exactly why I didn't vote. I didn't want to use the electronic machines. All we had around here, all I had available was either electronic machines. They gave me the runaround for weeks concerning absentee ballots. I tried several times and just threw my hands up.

    How I understand it, the only way the machines can put votes where malicious programs want (IF they're infected) is if someone votes. If I don't vote, my vote can't be misused. And I surely don't trust this technology, especially how fast and secretive it was implemented.

    I could be wrong. I hope this isn't the *future of voting.



    *less and less trust. less accountability and verifiability. easier to rig an election.

  7. Whaddya mean "there is no conflict"? by Dachannien · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I don't get it. In this case, the plaintiff isn't allowed to view presumably proprietary/copyrighted source code for a voting machine to go on a fishing expedition to see whether it caused her to lose.

    On the other hand, the RIAA gets not only to view the contents of a woman's hard drive to go on a fishing expedition to see whether she was sharing music files, but they get to make their own copy of it, including all that stuff they don't hold the copyright on (Windows, the woman's e-mails, etc.).

    It seems to me that what's good for the turkeys oughta be good for us chickens. Or something.

  8. logic and reason by bnf · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The inability to assess the logic of casting votes defies reason.

    How long must we sing this song? A democracy without transparent practices for the transfer of power is not a democracy. All the way down to the ones and zeroes. Every question with regard to voting should be able to be answered.

    It seems so primitive that it baffles me how someone could arrive at any other conclusion than "the process of voting is sacred and should, in fact *must*, bear great scrutiny".

    --

    this space intentionally left blank (oops)

    1. Re:logic and reason by cluckshot · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Having actually reviewed the software (Yes the source code) for 7 major voting machine systems....,. I might have something to say on the topic. First!!!!! a verified voting machine software package means exactly nothing! The verification is if there are enough comments in the code and if all case statements have a default exit and things like that. It has nothing what so ever to do with if the system correctly handles an election. I got paid for this people so I know the facts here!

      Out of the 7 major packages I reviewed I found only one I felt was secure enough to consider it worthy of use. I did look at the software. Major flaws included the ES&S systems have flash drives! They could have their data and their "brains" completely changed at will during an election and they never would tell! Other flaws included Internet hookups to the machines where data files could be addressed remotely... .... ....

      I am not telling the name of the supplier I felt was good but let it assure you that their system had paper read and their system had several other safeguards of the voting tally.

      Why do public officials want such systems. Simple. They can steal elections and they can prevent absolutely any record of the event. Why should voters get mad and demand open source software on such systems. The reasons are many They include prevention of defalcation on the election. They include being hardware independent so that users are not locked into a system for buying their supplies. They include KNOWING what is going on. They include voter oversight. Take your pick folks.

      --
      Never Politically Correct ~ I prefer the facts If you don't like what I say, get a life, or comment yourself.
  9. Judge's credentials? by Monoman · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I would really like to know the judge's credentials for this kind of case. He may have a law background but what does he know about computers and technology (and related laws)?

    IIRC there were cases in the early 80s where judges made bad rulings because they simply had little or no understanding of computers/technology.

    --
    Keep the Classic Slashdot.
  10. A little Stalin seems fitting... by SpectreHiro · · Score: 5, Insightful

    "The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything."

    Please don't be confused... I don't think Joseph Stalin was a great man. I consider him a despicable and cold blooded tyrant. At the same time, I also happen to think he was a pretty sharp thinker, and a successful tyrant because he understood how political systems function. A democratic system cannot work unless there is absolute transparency in the voting process.

    I'm an open source supporter but not a zealot. I don't have any problem with the existence of closed-source commercial software and I believe it has a right to exist. That being said, there's simply no place for closed-source software in our voting process. Voting is the foundation of our political system, and we can't settle for any ambiguity in its implementation. It's not as if vote counting is a technically demanding job, and there's no argument for keeping secret the process by which it's done.

    This strikes me as a clear judicial mistake (not that I've read the article... too drunk and tired, frankly). In general, our judges don't seem to understand information technology well enough to make informed decisions. They don't understand that changing the results of an election is elementary for any programmer. Isn't that concept terrifying?

    Our society is enamored with the labor saving possibilities made possible by the past century's technological advances, but thus far, the understanding of these technologies in government has not matched their application. This trend must not continue if we value our republic. In the strictest sense, our system is no longer a democracy if it has no educated oversight.

    Our government needs an elected body of IT experts -- some kind of technically proficient oversight body that can rule on information technology as it applies to our system of government. Without any such educated oversight, our freedom and sovereignty is bit by bit diminished, and can be turned against our people. The possibility alone demands action.

    Our founding fathers certainly didn't foresee the coming of mechanical information processing, but I firmly believe they would have wanted it to be open to review by the common man. What we need now are are IT patriots willing and motivated to take up the cause.

    --
    You can't win, Darth. If you mod me down, I shall become more powerful than you could possibly imagine.
    1. Re:A little Stalin seems fitting... by frdmfghtr · · Score: 2, Insightful
      It's not as if vote counting is a technically demanding job, and there's no argument for keeping secret the process by which it's done.


      This is true, and yet it seems impossible to develop vote-counting software to do it accurately. I'm not referring to the 18,000 undervotes here, I'm referring to election reports in times past where it was reported that machines were counting several thousand more votes than voters in the particular precincts; while not voting in a particular race COULD result in the aforementioned undervotes, it is IMPOSSIBLE (or at least should be) for more votes than voters to be registered. It is the occurrence of the "impossible" that should have the public up in arms.

      The excuse of "it's not significant to affect the results" doesn't work; if this is one easily detectable anomaly, what about the undetected anomalies? The overcount (is that a word?) shows that there is a problem, and the machines cannot be presumed accurate. It's that simple.

      Votes recorded on paper. Public access to the counting process. It really is THAT simple.
      --
      Government's idea of a balanced budget: take money from the right pocket to balance...oh who am I kidding?
  11. 15% undervote by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    15% of people who voted on the rest of the ticket, mysteriously didn't vote for their Congressman. Even funnier, it was very very strongly biased in favor of Democrat voters, 18% of people who voted Democrat on the remainder of the ticket didn't vote for a Congressman. Even stranger still, it was Florida the former seat of Katherine Harris, even stranger still other neighboring districts showed more typical errors of 3% or so with no political bias.

    Fix the vote, make it verifiable, even now when you think the last vote was fair, you don't know it was, nobody can show it was, and there's so much money and power at stake, the vote must be totally trusted.

    Florida has a Democrat voter majority, yet elects Republicans and it is more than gerrymandering.

  12. Score "Zip" Democracy "One" Business by erroneus · · Score: 3, Insightful

    When a judge makes the determination that the interests of a single business over those of a democratic process such as an election, then this judge's leanings are clear and obvious. I don't think the issue could be more complicated than that.

    1. Re:Score "Zip" Democracy "One" Business by bigbigbison · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Exactly. This isn't about open vs. closed source. THis is about the fact that the judge has mad a decision which in effect states that "trade secrets" and business trumps democracy. That is just wrong.

      --
      http://www.popularculturegaming.com -- my blog about the culture of videogame players
  13. Transparency by AlHunt · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Elections are supposed to be transparent.

    Sticking some software in the middle that nobody can see is akin to counting paper ballots in secret.

    I don't mind voting machines, electronic or not. But transparency is a *must*, either way.

    --
    1 in 4 Maine children in struggle with hunger.
  14. finally, a black box democracy machine by musakko · · Score: 3, Funny

    Instructions: 1. Vote 2. ? 3. Democracy! (oh, alright: and the winner PROFITS!)

  15. Judge Gary and the butterfly ballot .. by rs232 · · Score: 2, Interesting

    "Testifying on behalf of Democrat Christine Jennings, MIT political scientist Charles Stewart said Jennings would have won the race by as many as 3,100 votes if there had not been an "excessive" undervote in the Nov. 7 election"

    "Without the source code, it would be very difficult or impossible for me to determine how the software behaved," Dan Wallach, Rice University

    was Re:Nothing tests code like the real world

    --
    davecb5620@gmail.com
  16. Democracy! by slmdmd · · Score: 3, Insightful

    There is no democracy in USA, it was lost decades ago. It is a two party dictatorship. (Not exactly - It is actually the Corporate rule)
    Proof: Try finding answers to the following on internet. (Rest of the media is a PR tool of the dictators)
    1. Why no independent wins any seats.
    2. Why is it always a very close battle. (e.g. 250-251)
    3. What is the percentage of members that get re-elected in a communist country(say former russia) and what is the percentage in USA.
    Internet is the only remaining free media but not for long. No matter what we do, it is just a matter of time before the internet is also governed by the corporate. Ways to control are already in the works.
    About half of the world knows who is responsible for the 11 towers, but only a handful in usa.
    The answer is on the internet. Do your own research.

  17. Bad Ballot Design by richwmn · · Score: 2, Informative

    From the article
    Buchanan backers and the company say that if there was an unusually large undervote it was likely because of bad ballot design.
    It seems to me that admitting "bad ballot design" is worse than blaming the machines. Anyone who has taken statistics or marketing knows how easy it is to sway polls and sales by such methods as order in the phone book or on the ballot. IMHO bad design could just be effective design for the eventual winner.

  18. Re: Malicious inserted code by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 2, Funny

    70 If Vote=Jennings then Vote=Null

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
  19. Don't dodge the issue by drig · · Score: 2, Insightful

    No one cares what the democrats did forty or a hundred and fifty years ago. Heck, the Republicans will claim that Bush's State of the Union address in 2003, where he claimed that Iraq was trying to buy Uranium, is old news and no longer relevant. That was 4 years ago! So, 40 years or 150 years is definitely old news!

    Besides, that's dodging the issue. Bringing up old history doesn't help anyone. What we want to know is when our votes will start counting again. Bush has now won the Presidency twice, both times under extremely questionable circumstances. Republican Secretary of States, missing ballots, voters illegally purged from the voting lists, voting machines made by Republican operatives. This isn't some interesting sidenote in a history book that includes references to the book of Genesis. It's real life, it's happening now, and this kind of mealy-mouthed dismissal of American freedoms is either ignorant to the point of criminality, or is a bald-face destruction of the American process.

    --
    Citizens Against Plate Tectonics
  20. Even if you could "verify" source code ... by carpeweb · · Score: 2, Interesting
    ... what would that prove?

    I'm not saying it's a bad idea to know the source code. I'm just saying that wouldn't eliminate most of the problem.
    1. Who can look at source code and certify that it cannot be hacked?
    2. Even if (1) were possible, who can certify that the exact source code was (the only code) resident on every machine at the time of the voting?
    Furthermore, because ballots are anonymous, what do we have to tie people to votes on a one-to-one basis? Granted, the tie-in is imperfect in the paper world, but the potential for abuse seems higher in the electronic world. As I think about how a "vote hacker" might operate, it seems pretty likely to me that such a person would be motivated to cover tracks. For instance s/he would replace the source code with the evil code before the voting but would also switch it back to the source code after the voting. That's a pretty simplistic scenario. I envision that "good" e-voting security would require polling stations to begin looking like secure server rooms. That would give civil libertarians (and maybe even the rest of us) the creeps, even if it were feasible to issue every voter a security badge, etc.

    I'm no security expert, but is it not generally accepted that simple systems are easier to secure, all other things being equal? Pencil and paper are pretty simple, right?
  21. Trade secrets in a voting machine?? by stox · · Score: 2, Funny

    What trade secrets could possibly be in a voting machine? There should be NO secrets in voting.

    --
    "To those who are overly cautious, everything is impossible. "
  22. Trade Secrets override Democracy? by openright · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It is quite a low point when Information Monopoly "rights" can override the right to open, free and fair elections.

    There is really no alternative but to make this software public.

    The voting software does not need to be free-software/open-source (though it would be best), but it does need to be public.
    It is still possible for a company to hold and enforce copyrights on publicly available software.

    Any complex compuations that are performed (that they claim to be trade secrets) cannot be trade secrets in a free democracy. These compuations, if wrong comprimise elections.

  23. time to sort out the mess now by ajs318 · · Score: 3, Funny

    So, have I got this right -- the Courts of the USA have ruled that a corporation's secrets are more important than the processes of democracy?

    I'm really glad I live in a country that still uses pencil-and-paper votes counted by hand.

    --
    Je fume. Tu fumes. Nous fûmes!
  24. Re:The Premise is Wrong by laird · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "Ms. Jennings assumes because there is an undervote that all those undervotes went for her"

    This is incorrect. Ms. Jennings believes that there were abnormally high undervotes in some counties, but not others, which changed the outcome of the race. This position was supported by ES&S, the vendor of the machines, in court testimony. This didn't require all of the undervotes to be case for her, just for the undervotes to be cast consistently with the votes counted in the same counties.

    To quote the local papers (http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/articl e?AID=/20061109/NEWS/611090343):

    "More than 18,000 voters who showed up at the polls voted in other races but not the Buchanan-Jennings race.

    That means nearly 13 percent of voters did not vote for either candidate -- a massive undercount compared with other counties, including Manatee, which reported a 2 percent undervote.

    If the missing votes had broken for Jennings by the same percentage as the counted votes in Sarasota County, the Democrat would have won the race by about 600 votes instead of losing by 368, according to a Herald-Tribune review. Even if the undervote had been 8 percent -- more than three times what it was in Manatee -- Jennings would have won by one vote."

    Given that voters generally go to vote for the most important election, and then occasionally vote for the other races, undervoting is generally considered the error rate of the voting system. Thus, you consistently see very low undervotes reported by accurate voting mechanisms (e.g. precinct count optical scan typically reports 1% undervotes, probably a measure of voters actually intending to undervote) and very high undervotes by inaccurate voting mechanisms (e.g. punch card ballots typically report 7% undervotes, indicating that they probably fail to record 6% of votes cast). This pattern has been observed consistently across numerous elections for decades - bad voting systems create high undervote counts, and good voting systems don't, even when both systems are used in parallel by the same voters in the same place in the same election. Undervotes are considered such a problem in voting that the best argument for electronic voting systems is to reduce undervotes. Based on historical data, a 13% undervote rate is nearly unheard of, indicating that there was something seriously wrong with the way that the voting was conducted. Since DRE's (direct recording electronic votnig systems, meaning no paper ballots) are by definition impossible to audit, the only indication of a systemic failure would be based on the results looking implausible, such as two neighboring counties in the same election reporting wildly different undervote rates"

    "SARASOTA
    Total votes cast = 142,283
    Undervote = 18,382
    Difference = 12.92%

    MANATEE
    Total votes cast = 96,705
    Undervote = 2,312
    Difference = 2.39%

    The odds of these two counties randomly having such a range of undervotes is 1:5,000,000.

    Keeping in mind that DRE's by design can't be audited, you have to decide whether (1) it's impossible to challenge the results of an election run on DRE's, no matter what happens, or (2) you can challenge the results of an election run on DRE's if the results appear implausible.

    I'm with NIST on this one. All DRE's should be decertified. Voting is too important to treat this way.

  25. Casinos are just rooms full of voting machines by systemeng · · Score: 2, Funny

    In that voting is basically a statistical game of chance between two candidates, we ought to be studying gambling machine standards to see the level of security to which voting machines need to be raised. They may call Los Vegas Sin City, but those Nevadans may have written the document that saves our country. Since there is more money made in Vegas yearly (daily?) than is spent in a U.S. national political campaign, voting machines ought to be held to the same standards as the Nevada Gaming Commission's Technical Standards For Gaming Devices and On-Line Slot Systems http://www.gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/techstds_04 dec16_adopted.pdf

    I sincerely doubt any of the voting systems I have heard about come even close! If there is a way to change the program in the machine in the field, a voting machine has already failed this test. They also require the system to detect and record the last 10 changes to its configuration, absorb an ungodly amount of static electricity without malfunctioning and require all unused ROM to be zeroed. . .

    A run of the mill slot machine is likely infinitely more secure than a Diebold voting machine and probably a lot more secure than most voting machines.

  26. Re:first post by alshithead · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Hold your fax up tight to the screen and press your foot pedal.

    --
    I reserve the right to think for myself. Others' opinions are optional. Puppy on lap = typos...not illiteracy.