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Rutkowska Faces 'Blue Pill' Rootkit Challenge

Controll3r writes "Three high-profile security researchers — Thomas Ptacek of Matasano Security, Nate Lawson of Root Labs and Symantec's Peter Ferrie — have issued a challenge to Joanna Rutkowska to prove that her 'Blue Pill' technology can create "100 percent undetectable" malware. The Black Hat 2007 challenge will feature two untouched laptops of the make/model of Rutkowska's choosing for her to plant Blue Pill on one. From the article: 'She picks one in secret, installs her kit, sets them up however she wants,' Lawson explained in an interview. 'We get to install our software on both and run it, [and] we point out which machine [Blue Pill] is on. If we're wrong, she keeps the laptop.' No word on whether Rutkowska will accept the challenge."

223 comments

  1. More Laptops by stinerman · · Score: 4, Interesting

    So they have a 50/50 shot of getting it right. How about something more along the lines of 10 laptops? And then they have to say what tipped them off.

    1. Re:More Laptops by jonnythan · · Score: 4, Informative

      Rutkowska already thought of that (as well as a couple of other things):

      http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/

      "First, we believe that 2 machines are definitely not enough, because the chance of correct guess, using a completely random (read: unreliable) detection method is 50%. Thus we think that the reasonable number is 5 machines."

      She then goes on to detail how at least one but no more than four of the machines are infected and that the detection method must be automatic and return only "infected" or "not infected" as output.

      There are some other details she proposes, some of which are head-scratchers such as "The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time (say > 90%) for more then, say 1 sec."

      Whole thing sounds pretty interesting though :)

    2. Re:More Laptops by jonnythan · · Score: 4, Informative

      From the comments section, Nate Lawson has posted his response to Joanna:

      http://rdist.root.org/2007/06/28/undetectable-hype rvisor-rootkit-challenge/

    3. Re:More Laptops by Billosaur · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I think this calls for a double-blind experiment with a larger sample size, say 20 laptops. 10 laptops are held out and left untouched; the other ten will either be infected with Blue Pill or not based on a random coin flip. Then it would not just be a question of detecting it, but detecting it to a sufficient degree to put it beyond chance. A 50-50 shot is just too high to be regarded as accurate.

      --
      GetOuttaMySpace - The Anti-Social Network
    4. Re:More Laptops by tqbf · · Score: 1

      If 5 laptops is what it takes to get this challenge off the ground, then we'll do 5 laptops.

      However, I don't know what the number of laptops has to do with removing luck from the challenge. If she wants to reduce our likelihood of a lucky guess to below 3%, we can use repeated trials on the same hardware (with Joanna's team stipulating how cleanup after each trial is to occur) to the exact same effect.

    5. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why not just 20 laptops? Then you get the statistical 0.05 sacrosanct p value?

      No need to repeat, you just pick the 1 in 20.

    6. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're a jerk. I would have personally put you in the "troll" category.

    7. Re:More Laptops by Smidge204 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The counter-requirements sound suspiciously lopsided to reduce the chance of detection.

      In summary:

      -Multiple machines. Fine.

      -"bluepill.exe and bluepill.sys" wil be installed on ALL machines. Okay, I guess they don't want them to just check the drive's free space to see if extra files were added?

      -ALL machines will have the driver loaded, but not necessarily be "infected". Is that a reasonable condition for a rootkit "in the wild"? If the rootkit is doing it's job you shouldn't be able to detect the driver being loaded in the first place.

      -Detector.exe must be completely autonomous and return only a single flag value to indicate infection. This sounds like a completely unreasonable requirement, since even rudamentary human review of the results is a realistic real-world scenario.

      -The detector can not cause system crash or halt the machine. I fail to see why this would be a requirement, unless you argue that whatever system that might be tested is mission critical and can't afford ANY unplanned downtime... unexpected crashes are bad, but shouldn't be an instant-lose condition.

      -The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time. Why not? If the user is scanning for a rootkit, they probably understand it's a fairly serious issue and should be willing to devote resources to it. Inconvenient? Sure, but again not a condition of failure.

      -Compensation for working on the project. I can understand this, but really... even if Blue Pill fails to stay hidden, they "win" 6 months of full employment with no repercussions for failure to deliver a working project other than bad reputation.

      Basically, it sounds to me that they aren't really claiming Blue Pill is "undetectable" - only that it is undetectable by one-click idiot-proof software that is run under conditions unlikely to be seen in the wild. I see no reason why the detection team would be prevented from using a boot CD to examine the contents of the hard drive, for example, perhaps even loading their OWN virtual machine to virtualize the malware-infected system and monitor for suspicious activity. I see it as completely fair game.
      =Smidge=

    8. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Umm... because 20 laptops are expensive? Even bare-bonesing it, you're talking $10,000+

    9. Re:More Laptops by joebok · · Score: 5, Funny

      Rutkowska should also think about the reward: "If we're wrong, she keeps the laptop." Who the hell wants a laptop infected with undetectable malware?

    10. Re:More Laptops by MythMoth · · Score: 1

      [...] some of which are head-scratchers such as "The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time (say > 90%) for more then, say 1 sec." Perhaps one way to detect the rootkit would be to perform some operations that take a known amount of time, then validate the apparent system time against some external resource to see if something (the rootkit) has stolen any of the cycles.
      --
      --- These are not words: wierd, genious, rediculous
    11. Re:More Laptops by Chandon+Seldon · · Score: 1

      I see no reason why the detection team would be prevented from using a boot CD to examine the contents of the hard drive, for example, perhaps even loading their OWN virtual machine to virtualize the malware-infected system and monitor for suspicious activity.

      It sounds like the rootkit is designed to be undetectable for stock anti-virus software - i.e. the most likely conditions to be found in the wild. Even the CPU usage requirement makes sense there - once you consider 100 detection modules for different rootkits in a piece of anti-virus software, even a whole second seems like way too much CPU time per rootkit detection.

      --
      -- The act of censorship is always worse than whatever is being censored. Always.
    12. Re:More Laptops by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 2, Insightful

      It's straightforward to detect *any* malware in this setup. If the hosts of the challenge can't find it, they deserve to lose more than just a laptop.

      Step one: Pull the BIOS chips or stick a reader on them. Compare the images between the two laptops. Obviously flash them to the same revision beforehand.

      Step two: Pull the hard disks and diff them in another system.

      Step three: If the BIOS images are the same on the first two computers, put the drives in new computers of the same model and ask the rootkit to be demonstrated there. This step may be heating, since the contest was apparently only about two computers.

      Step one covers BIOS rootkits, step two covers hard disk rootkits, and step three covers the (slightly) less likely case that the contestant will pick a model of laptop or hard disk with some other easily flashable device that can be used to store the rootkit. If the hard disk controller or hard disk itself can be flashed, it would be trivial to make it return a sector from some kernel driver with a rootkit installed only when a certain sequence of other reads have occurred since poweron. Just hash each read request, and only return the rootkit sector if the hash matches a certain value when the sector is read, and then don't return the rootkit version any more. It would just require one boot (with modified firmware) to discover the hash of sectors read by the BIOS and operating system as it boots, and then set the hash in the firmware and leave it. To discover such a hack, the people running the challenge would have to do basically the same thing, patch some firmware or load their own boot sector hack that recorded the exact sequence of reads from a boot, and then hotplug the rootkitted disk to trigger a poweron event and then play the sequence of reads (and any writes) back to the disk, possibly with the same timing, in order to discover the actual rootkit. They could also just read the firmware off the disk and try to debug it, or at least compare it to the firmware of a good drive, but both approaches require a pretty deep knowledge of the hardware and software being used, which gives the contestant an advantage.

      There are almost certainly other random flashable devices laying around, especially on laptops, and any of these could be used in combination with a driver bug or some other "feature" to take over the computer. Since the contestant can pick the hardware, this is a distinct possibility. The only way to detect such a rootkit would be to load a higher level rootkit which can be prevented if the original rootkit virtualizes the entire system, but in that case it's probably quite vulerable to timing attacks to detect its presence. I think the hosts of the challenge can ultimately win, but they may spend quite a few hours on it. If they're sneaky, they'll just put their own rootkit on the laptops to begin with and record all the challenger's actions.

    13. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Well, this is all about real-world feasability.

      -"bluepill.exe and bluepill.sys" wil be installed on ALL machines. Okay, I guess they don't want them to just check the drive's free space to see if extra files were added?

      -ALL machines will have the driver loaded, but not necessarily be "infected". Is that a reasonable condition for a rootkit "in the wild"? If the rootkit is doing it's job you shouldn't be able to detect the driver being loaded in the first place.


      In the real world, you won't have an uninfected control against which you might compare your machine to see if it's infected. A detector based on free disk space or free memory is useless, because in the real world you won't know what those values "should" be (nor have a basis for comparison). A detector based on a file name or process image name is also useless, because a real rootkit won't call itself by a name you know. I'd say her requirements are reasonable counter-balances to the presence of an identical "control" in the experiment.

      -Detector.exe must be completely autonomous and return only a single flag value to indicate infection. This sounds like a completely unreasonable requirement, since even rudamentary human review of the results is a realistic real-world scenario.

      -The detector can not cause system crash or halt the machine. I fail to see why this would be a requirement, unless you argue that whatever system that might be tested is mission critical and can't afford ANY unplanned downtime... unexpected crashes are bad, but shouldn't be an instant-lose condition.

      -The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time. Why not? If the user is scanning for a rootkit, they probably understand it's a fairly serious issue and should be willing to devote resources to it. Inconvenient? Sure, but again not a condition of failure


      Again, these restrictions are about making this a "real-world" detection test. As in, I'm at home surfing the web, at any point I might visit a page that delivers malware, so I have software periodically scanning my system.

      Your average home user won't (and probably isn't qualified to) do manual inspection of results. Not even once in a while, certainly not on a routine basis as would be required to protect a real system.

      Similarly, taking up resources or crashing the machine once doesn't sound so bad, but doing it on every scan (or even on 1% of all scan attempts) is not reasonable.

      Fundamentally, the point is in the real world you wouldn't know when your system might have been infected, so you'd have to be scanning regularly -- in essence, all the time.

      So all of the technical requirements look reasonable and valid to me. Asking to be paid... especially asking to be paid an amount that overshadows the challenge prize... well, I can understand it, but I can't agree with it. Not to say that it's easy trying to get research funded, but asking those who think you're wrong to fund your effort to prove you're right is too much.

    14. Re:More Laptops by geekoid · · Score: 1

      no kidding...you would put them down for a minute and then be like "Crap, which one has undetected malware?"

      The only way it is truly undetectable is if it does nothing, and takes up cluster space that the machine has allocated, but not actually filled.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    15. Re:More Laptops by dgatwood · · Score: 4, Informative

      There's another reason for not consuming huge amounts of CPU. The reason is fairly obvious once you think about it hard enough.

      The simple test for a rootkit that puts the computer into a virtual machine (I'm assuming that's happening here) is to test for the performance impact of a VM. If you monopolize the CPU (disable interrupts to prevent anything else from being scheduled, etc.) and run some complex processing for several seconds, you would be able to easily detect the difference in time needed to complete the operation (assuming that all of the computers are otherwise configured identically).

      Such a test, while workable in theory, is not workable in real-world practical use, and thus should not be allowed. Putting a time limit on detection prevents such theory-only tests from succeeding. The same for other impractical tests like scanning the entire surface of the disk for signatures, doing comparisons of expected versus actual disk I/O performance to look for virtualized hard drives, etc.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    16. Re:More Laptops by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      More than that, even. The very act of virtualizing the OS will steal cycles even if the rootkit itself is idle.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    17. Re:More Laptops by Tatarize · · Score: 1

      If the detector used 100% cpu speed on multiple identical labtops. At the end of detection, you could simply see which one processed the most. This would result in the ones with the added blue pill having given this freaky detection manner the fewest clock cycles.

      --

      It is no longer uncommon to be uncommon.
    18. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      She looks like Cousin It in that photo !

    19. Re:More Laptops by griffjon · · Score: 1

      I think 2 laptops is fine, as long as the detection process gives evidence of the malware, beyond proclaiming (guessing) which one is infected.

      --
      Returned Peace Corps IT Volunteer
    20. Re:More Laptops by Hoi+Polloi · · Score: 1

      Reformat?

      --
      It is by the juice of the coffee bean that thoughts acquire speed, the teeth acquire stains. The stains become a warning
    21. Re:More Laptops by Aldur42 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I was under the impression that a rootkit was only supposed to be undetectable from _within_ the system. i.e. Overwriting ls with your version that hides your secret malicious files. Pulling out hard drives and placing them inside of other systems would not be a reasonable method of rootkit detection.

      --
      A complicated error is indistinguishable from a feature.
    22. Re:More Laptops by Lobachevsky · · Score: 1

      She proposed 5 laptops but can infect 1, 2, 3, or 4 of them. The researchers have to get a PERFECT score to win. The probability of randomly being correct is low. What's the exact probability? Well, 5 bits, and 00000 and 11111 are illegal, so there are 2^5 - 2 outcomes = 30 outcomes, so randomly selecting the correct outcome is a minuscule 3.33%. Moreover, by being able to infect all but a single laptop, it makes it difficult for the researchers to calibrate what is "normal" and thus any attempt at blindly labeling deviation from the norm as a symptom of infection would be disastrous for the researchers.

    23. Re:More Laptops by Chysn · · Score: 1

      > Rutkowska should also think about the reward: "If we're wrong, she keeps the laptop." Who the hell wants a laptop infected with undetectable malware?

      The compensation appears to be the greatest sticking point for getting this contest run. She wants a staff of 2 compensated at $200/hr. for six months to get Blue Pill ready for the contest. So she's basically saying, "How about instead of doing it for a laptop if I win, I do it for $500,000 whether I win or not?"

      --
      --I'm so big, my sig has its own sig.
      -- See?
    24. Re:More Laptops by Smidge204 · · Score: 1

      I'd say her requirements are reasonable counter-balances to the presence of an identical "control" in the experiment.

      Except nowhere was it suggested that the machines would be compared to each other, or even another machine or system image, so there is no "control" in this case either.

      Your average home user won't (and probably isn't qualified to) do manual inspection of results. Not even once in a while, certainly not on a routine basis as would be required to protect a real system.

      Even so, such an "idiot light" system is unreasonable. The whole idea is not that is it difficult for John Q. Public to detect - most everyday viruses and trojans already fall into THAT cetegory - it's that the rootkit is impossible to detect.

      If their stuff is "100% undetectable" then they shouldn't have to impose all sorts of conditions to prevent an expert from examining thoroughly. These added requirements suggest that the cloaking isn't perfect after all, and could be detected if someone looks any harder than yor typical home user - which is to say, not looking at all.
      =Smidge=

    25. Re:More Laptops by maxwell+demon · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Well, it's undetectable for software not knowing what to search for. It's of course detectable by the author of the root kit, and I'm sure a requirement will be to demonstrate that the computer really is infected, otherwise she could simply infect none, and then simply decide which ones are "infected" after the fact.

      If there's no such requirement of proof, I'll happily offer a test of my completely undetectable root kit. And I'll not even demand the source of the detector program (I'll also not offer mine). :-)

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    26. Re:More Laptops by Raistlin77 · · Score: 1

      Well she's already asking for $416,000 - what's $10,000 more...

    27. Re:More Laptops by ZoneGray · · Score: 1

      I dunno.... imagine two PC's; one has a default Vista installation, and the other has undetectable malware that periodically contacts its creator. Is there really any difference between them?

    28. Re:More Laptops by AndrewHowe · · Score: 4, Funny

      I'm in ur reformat command, virtualizing ur operations

    29. Re:More Laptops by dmclap · · Score: 1

      Of course there's a difference. The Vista one is probably slower.

    30. Re:More Laptops by aethogamous · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The reason is fairly obvious once you think about it hard enough.

      I think everything is fairly obvious once you think about it hard enough ...

    31. Re:More Laptops by WoLpH · · Score: 1

      But it tells you what to look for when creating the rootkit detector.

    32. Re:More Laptops by Zeinfeld · · Score: 1
      The problem with using identical machines is that it is rather easy to use simple tests that are not practical in the general case. For example, the amount of disk space allocated. If you know that the machines are precisely identical you can simply look for the one with most disk space free.

      I think you need to have another step in place so that the detection crew don't have any more information available than would be available in a real world situation where they are faced with a random box that might or might not be infected.

      The real test here is to see if someone has a red pill.

      --
      Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
      Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
    33. Re:More Laptops by Barraketh · · Score: 1

      There are some other details she proposes, some of which are head-scratchers such as "The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time (say > 90%) for more then, say 1 sec."

      This one actually makes perfect sense - if the malware runs in some sort of VM bellow the OS, this will necessarily impact performance, so one way to detect it is to compare performance of some tasks against an expected baseline. It can be argued that this is cheating, because even though in this case it's possible to pre-benchmark the laptop, this may not be generally feasible. Or maybe this would actually become the accepted method of detecting such malware - benchmark when you buy the computer (before it gets a chance to get infected), then later compare performance.
    34. Re:More Laptops by Sancho · · Score: 1

      If Joannas time estimate is correct, its about 16 times harder to build a hypervisor rootkit than to detect it. Id say that supports our findings. What a bullshit response.

      First, they say that they are trying to debunk her claim: that it is possible to make a rootkit which is undetectable from within the system. Now they're trying to say that it's "good enough" for it to be 16 times harder to build the rootkit than to detect it.

      Nope.

      If Joanna is right, and Blue Pill is undetectable through automated processes, then it could take 3 years to develop--the results would still be devestating once it was released.

      Also, I imagine that there are many more people writing rootkits than there are people writing rootkit detection software. That means that the overall resources are skewed. Even if it is harder, with more resources, the gap closes.
    35. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, it's undetectable for software not knowing what to search for. It's of course detectable by the author of the root kit, and I'm sure a requirement will be to demonstrate that the computer really is infected, otherwise she could simply infect none, and then simply decide which ones are "infected" after the fact.

      Or she could have to activate the rootkit and make it actually do something. It's not much of a rootkit that does nothing at all.

    36. Re:More Laptops by Sancho · · Score: 1

      Except nowhere was it suggested that the machines would be compared to each other, or even another machine or system image, so there is no "control" in this case either. Nowhere was it suggested that they wouldn't be compared to each other. In fact, for the purposes of the challenge, the challenger didn't even say that the software itself would detect bluepill--he said, "We get to install our software on both and run it, [and] we point out which machine [Blue Pill] is on." My first reaction to that sentence was that there would be human interpretation as to the results--for example, they could drive up the CPU and then watch how many context switches each computer can perform in a given period of time.

      I don't believe that Joanna ever claimed that her rootkit was undetectable from the outside--just that it was undetectable from the inside.
    37. Re:More Laptops by jp10558 · · Score: 1

      Well, I would think booting a liveCD would be though - similar result - use a flash drive for tripwire results... and scans ...

      --
      Opera, Proxomitron-Grypen,GPG 0x0A1C6EE3
    38. Re:More Laptops by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      I was under the impression that a rootkit was only supposed to be undetectable from _within_ the system.

      Why would anyone arbitrarily limit themselves to online forensic tools? If you really think you have a rootkit, at least boot with a rescue CD or something to scan the system.

      I wonder how many root kits are vulnerable to simple timing analysis? Unless they are very carefully written, the extra functions they perform will affect the exact timing of system calls, and this would be one of the most reliable ways to test for rootkits. Take baseline timings on all the system calls with the time stamp counter (in Intel architectures at least), and then compare it with the timings from the affected system. Are rootkits written to avoid timing attacks? It's doable, but would require a lot of sophistication that could eventually be detected. Assume that the rootkit executes more instructions than the operating system would otherwise, this means that running one process at 100% CPU while also timing the system calls would give differing results for one or both of the tests if the system has a rootkit. Only if the rootkit was written so that it actually optimized the operating system to cover for its own processing could it go undetected.

    39. Re:More Laptops by maztuhblastah · · Score: 1

      There are some other details she proposes, some of which are head-scratchers such as "The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time (say > 90%) for more then, say 1 sec."

      I know it makes me a nerd to say this, but she just got sexier for pointing that out. Seriously, that's a really good observation on her part -- comparing the timing of a system call to see if it might be intercepted by a rootkit is a damn good idea, and might stand a chance at busting even the sneakiest kits.

    40. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      the claim she makes is stupid.

      its impossible to make a perfect emulation of the entire architecture.

      but thats not even important. you can use timing attacks to find it. you could just use outside source: internet, usb, serial, GPU (yes, the video card is basically a high performance simd processor that also has a clock!)

      hell, basically any of the devices in the computer could be pottentially used as a timing source. the more sources we have in there, the more things he'd have to emulate in the VM. emulating everything is just not feasible.

      the claim she makes is something like this: if nobody was fighting in the world, the earth would be a peaceful place. sure, but it will never happen.

      move along, there is nothing to see here.

    41. Re:More Laptops by rtb61 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      That test model is still not correct. What has to happen is that every laptop has to have the contents of it's hard disk drive changed after the test has commenced. It should reflect the real world, there are not identical laptops in real world usage. I mean anybody can do the check they are talking about, simply pull out the hard drives and do a bit by bit comparison, big deal. A real world test reflects that the laptops are running different software and different configurations and have different data stored. Ideally it should be done on PCs where you also have different hardware and drivers.

      --
      Chaos - everything, everywhere, everywhen
    42. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      How do you figure that monopolizing the CPU for several seconds is unreasonable in the real-world? While you certainly wouldn't do that 'on-access' ie, all the time, you could certainly do this on a scheduled basis. After all, you may not be aware of the malware all the time, but being aware once in a while certainly has a high degree of value to an anti-malware solution.

      It's either 100% undetectable or not. You can't start limiting the methods they are using for detection.

    43. Re:More Laptops by LS · · Score: 1

      Why would monopolizing the CPU for a bit be unreasonable? I could easily visualize a scenario where the installed antivirus software brings up a status dialog, which informs the user that the system will be undergoing a test for a period of time, and to please wait a moment. Uhhh, haven't applications been making users wait since the dawn of computers? Have you never seen an application utilize most of the CPU? Of course you have, why would AV software be exempt from this?

      LS

      --
      There is a fine line between being a cultivated citizen and being someone else's crop. - A. J. Patrick Liszkie
    44. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Just use those 100 dollar laptops. Or is she gonna go all whiney over that?

    45. Re:More Laptops by tqbf · · Score: 1

      Without conceding anything about "how" we're doing detection (there are a lot of "how"s), can I ask you to explain why timing tests are "impractical" in real-world settings? I can tell when McNortafee starts running because the box slows to a crawl. I lose compute and IO for a solid minute.

      Joanna already stipulated: we can't hang the CPU for more than a second. While we don't agree that this is a reasonable requirement (I feel like virtually all commercial AV software violates it routinely --- and they're doing it just to look for viruses!), we concede it freely.

      We keep seeing words like "in a lab setting" and "in theory" and "commercial-grade" thrown around. If Joanna chooses to make those words precise by attaching stipulations to them, we are likely to agree, as we have with all her other stipulations (apart from arranging her to get paid $416,000 by McAfee, EMC, or Kaspersky; first we'll arrange to get us paid $416,000, but that will take awhile). But in a free-form argument, I find the words themselves utterly unconvincing.

    46. Re:More Laptops by nospam007 · · Score: 1

      ... If you really think you have a rootkit, at least boot with a rescue CD or something to scan the system.
      --
      It's for people who think they have one every 5 minutes and want to be reassured.....fast!

    47. Re:More Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I thought about that for a while and agree - that your statement is fairly obvious.

    48. Re:More Laptops by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      Taking up a second of CPU time (or even several seconds) isn't unreasonable (though freezing everything on the user's machine including the mouse for a whole second might be). Having a humongous table of every possible hardware configuration with every possible CPU/RAM/HD/chipset combination so that you can do this on an arbitrary machine, however, would not be practical.

      However, the only reason such a test is practical is because there are multiple identical machine configurations so that the only variable is the presence of this VM/rootkit. Without an identical machine (or at least test results from running the test on an identical machine), that becomes a false positive or negative waiting to happen. The timing calculations are too precise to leave in any real "fudge factor" on the numbers. You'd have to have a table containing results for a particular CPU model with a particular amount of RAM with particular RAM timings running on a particular chipset. You'd probably end up with a couple of terabytes of sample data.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    49. Re:More Laptops by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      An utterly unworkable balance between avoiding false positives and false negatives. I can screw up any performance calculation just by using a BIOS that slows down access speeds on RAM that seems a little shady---and I know with certainty that at least one manufacturer does exactly that for certain RAM---so that your software sees the hardware's latency numbers, the CPU, and the chipset, then matches it against a table of how quickly the CPU should perform those operations, and suddenly you're off by a few thousand cycles but there's no rootkit installed.

      That's not even counting the fact that you'd automatically have a false postive if you ran such a testing tool in Windows running on a legitimate virtual machine (e.g. VMWare on Linux or Parallels on Mac OS X). I guess if you could guarantee that you had the stats for every possible combination of hardware (or would build a machine to test every time somebody requested stats for an unlisted configuration), you might come close, but only up until they modified the VM to lie to your software and fake the network data from your server so the expected results matched... or detected your abuse of the CPU and adjusted the computer's clock to fool you into thinking the results were correct... or slammed down the new version of the expected data into the RAM location occupied by your application... or... or....

      Once you truly own the machine and can virtualize the hardware, it is very unlikely that it will be possible to detect this condtion. That is, after all, the entire point of virtualization. If you can detect it, the virtualization technology is defective.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    50. Re:More Laptops by tqbf · · Score: 1

      I think you're grossly underestimating how good computers are at counting stuff. We're not profiling the whole system; we're profiling (when we profile; there's more up our sleeves than that) microarchitectural details changing between trivially tight groups of instructions.

      The point of virtualization is to provide enough of an illusion for any given program to run correctly, not to defeat an adversary attempting to fingerprint the platform. It's not hard to make a compelling case for this: detecting VMWare is trivial, and VMWare is far and away the most popular virtualization platform.

      I don't know why you assume we're using network servers to perform measurements. You don't need an external reference to detect the fact that thousands of CISC-level X86 instructions are running on a chip any time you invoke CPUID. You also don't need the TSC to do it.

  2. c'mon... by cosmocain · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...a 50 percent chance? do that with about 30 laptops to rule out that the infected laptop is picked by pure luck. ;)

    1. Re:c'mon... by PrescriptionWarning · · Score: 1

      Ahhh but what if she install on both, and they say only one has it....

      or what if she installs on non, and they say one or both has it....

      kinda makes me feel like watching Princess Bride again :)

    2. Re:c'mon... by anagama · · Score: 1

      Stick w/ 2 laptops but require X number of consecutive right answers. For example, there's a 1/32 chance they get 5 consecutive right answers by chance. Or get 5 laptops and go three rounds -- 1/125 chance. Obviously this wouldn't eliminate luck, but it would make it much less a part of the equation. Be a lot cheaper than 50 laptops too.

      --
      What changed under Obama? Nothing Good
    3. Re:c'mon... by cosmocain · · Score: 1

      Ahhh but what if she install on both, and they say only one has it....

      or what if she installs on non, and they say one or both has it.... or what if she takes both to her secret room for installing...

      ...and uses the fire escape to flee, running like hell?
    4. Re:c'mon... by PrescriptionWarning · · Score: 1

      no.... ... they'd be expecting that.

  3. Tripwire? [nt] by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    [nt]

  4. 1/2 odds by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hm ... 1 in 2 odds. Not bad.

    Now if they could repeat this 20 times...

  5. Cunning Plan by sam_paris · · Score: 5, Funny

    She should say she installed it when in actual fact she didn't...
     
    Then snigger while these guys spend hours scratching their huge domed craniums wondering how she did it.

    1. Re:Cunning Plan by Lockejaw · · Score: 1

      I assume they have some plan for making her show that her rootkit really is on one of them after the guess is made.

      --
      (IANAL)
    2. Re:Cunning Plan by halcyon1234 · · Score: 1

      Simple enough. Insist on videotaping the install or something similar.

      Of course, if she still wanted to cheat, just install this:

      rm -rf $ARGV[0]

      Detect that!

  6. How to win the challenge by pickyouupatnine · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Don't install root-kit on either one! ;) No seriously now, if all she was allowed to do was touch one of them.. and both laptops had the same exact everything else, then it should be simple to find ANYTHING that was added to either one. But maybe I'm being naive.

    --
    _Vishal www.squad9.com
    1. Re:How to win the challenge by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You are being naive.

      It's possible to install the kit into the bios of the machine and forge the image size and checksum.

    2. Re:How to win the challenge by Overzeetop · · Score: 4, Interesting

      That was my thought, too.

      I think they should have her set it up, then give the two laptops to a pair of teenage girls for 3 weeks with $300 to spend on any software they choose and an unencumbered internet connection. Then have them search the two. Think of it as two decks of cards, but shuffling them before you try to find the differences.

      --
      Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
    3. Re:How to win the challenge by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      man, how i'd hate to be the judge that had to go through that garbage. an IT workers worst nightmare.

    4. Re:How to win the challenge by megaditto · · Score: 1

      That's why she needs to 'touch' both in some way, yet activate the exploit on only one of them, then ask them which one it is.

      It is trivial to figure out if something has changed, but it's much harder to determine if the change is malicious.

      --
      Obama likes poor people so much, he wants to make more of them.
    5. Re:How to win the challenge by Bandman · · Score: 1

      Like they wouldn't have to reinstall the OS after THAT.

    6. Re:How to win the challenge by ikioi · · Score: 2, Informative

      "...it should be simple to find ANYTHING that was added to either one."

      While it might not always have been simple, it was at least in theory possible to find anything installed on a computer prior to hardware virtualization technologies being introduced. The crux of this new challenge is that the newer chips from Intel and AMD have support for cpu-based virtualization. In other words, they implemeted some of the hard parts of VMWare in the processor itself.

      With one of these newer processors, the host operating system on a machine can prepare one of the CPU for a guest operating system to run in a virtual session. When the guest operating system issues an interrupt to interact with hardware, say to read a block off of the hard drive, then the processor would let the host operating system handle the request transparently to the guest operating system rather than letting the hardware itself process the request. This means that if someone could install a malicious virus in the place of the host operating system and have it run your OS as the guest operating system, then it should, in theory, be impossible for your guest operating system to detect the virus.

      Perhaps another way of stating it is that the virus isn't actually added to the "machine" that the operating system runs in; the virus is actually added to a host machine outside of the one the operating system runs in. This is why this type of attack is referred to as a "blue pill" attack. That name references the premise of the Matrix movies where the world that people thought they lived in was just a virtual world being hosted by a malicious "host world" in which other entities were taking advantage of the humans in the virtual world without their knowledge.

    7. Re:How to win the challenge by Hoi+Polloi · · Score: 5, Funny

      Make sure it is girls though. If you give it to a pair of teenage boys by the end it'll be full of porn and chat logs filled with "FAG!" comments.

      --
      It is by the juice of the coffee bean that thoughts acquire speed, the teeth acquire stains. The stains become a warning
    8. Re:How to win the challenge by suv4x4 · · Score: 1

      I think they should have her set it up, then give the two laptops to a pair of teenage girls for 3 weeks with $300 to spend on any software they choose and an unencumbered internet connection.

      If you do that, you can bet at the end both laptops would have the Rutkowska's rootkit.

      Never mind it's not in the wild, never mind it's not infectious: trust a teenage girl with 3 weeks and unencumbered internet access, and she'll find a way to get infected with it.

  7. Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by Col.+Blackwolf · · Score: 2, Informative

    She installs Blue Pill, and if they detect it, great. If not, she has to show them it's there to prove they missed it, and they get a clue how to find it.

    Either way, they can come out ahead here...

    1. Re:Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If not, she has to show them it's there to prove they missed it, and they get a clue how to find it.
      Uh? She can have the rootkit reveal itself if she types a password on the keyboard. That code can be removed from Blue Pill after the contest.
    2. Re:Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by Timesprout · · Score: 1

      Not really. In this scenario they are looking for it specifically and thats more than half the battle. I'm pretty sure if they just took their standard approach they may well find nothing amis with the Blue Pill machine. As they point out there are many possible tell tales for Blue Pill but does their standard tooling already include these checks? With the 2 machine test they are proposing it would be almost impossible not to find the tainted machine through sheer trial and error if nothing else.

      --
      Do not try to read the dupe, thats impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth
      What truth?
      There is no dupe
    3. Re:Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by Punto · · Score: 1

      not really.. all she has to do is remotelly open a window with some horse porn

      --

      --
      Stay tuned for some shock and awe coming right up after this messages!

    4. Re:Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by cp.tar · · Score: 1

      Didn't she offer to open-source the code anyway? With the code, they can get a whole bunch of clues.

      --
      Ignore this signature. By order.
    5. Re:Actually, this is good for the white hats..... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But as people have said, she still ends up with an infected laptop. How could she ever be sure she was at the top level of the hypervisor?

  8. Obvious Request I Can Think Of by eldavojohn · · Score: 5, Interesting

    "If she has any particular requests, we'll almost certainly grant them," he added. To be successful, I can think of a couple requests. One would just be to have more than one other non-infected computer. I could do nothing to the computers and randomly pick one, thus being right. I suppose that's obvious though. Maybe have several trial runs.

    Another obvious thing I would request is that different services software be installed (and running) on the laptops. Like maybe put MySql on one running as a service and PostGres on the other. That way they can't do something as ridiculously simple like a memory or CPU profiler to find out which one is using up (all beit small) more CPU resources & memory. That seems to be the strategy of the challenging team:

    Matasano's Ptacek, who has spent a lot of time studying Rutkowska's work, said the challenge team will compare the behavior of the system to known norms to find the presence of Blue Pill. But how many times do you approach a computer that's infected & have all the behaviors of that machine mapped out? I think the real world answer to that is never. So perhaps the name of the "100% undetectable rootkit" will have to be "100% undetectable in the wild rootkit" since most of us have software on our machines (hell, even World of Warcraft did this) and not even us (the people who installed it) can adequately predict what its going to do. I guess one could always make a rootkit that (given the priviledges) targets a host process deep within a host tree and inserts itself into it. You CPU scheduler would simply be running a thread of a trusted set of processes but unless you had a behavior/benchmark for each process of that tree, you'd be hard pressed to figure out it is host to a virus. That said, I think it's entirely possible to create a nearly 100% undetectable rootkit as long as there are unknown & unprofiled processes running on that machine at the time. Just one more reason to only use open source, I guess!
    --
    My work here is dung.
    1. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by inKubus · · Score: 1

      If it works, she should install the Blue Pill on both boxes, but a dormant version on one. Because they will probably try to use some trickery like a whole drive checksum or something to see which box was "more modified" using statistical analysis.

      --
      Cool! Amazing Toys.
    2. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by steelfood · · Score: 1

      Technically, I think she can install anything she wants on either machine, so she needs only to randomize the software she installs.

      But yeah, there should definitely be more than two machines, perhaps one out of five or ten machines. And each machine should have different hardware configurations as well.

      Or...she could load both of them up with so much malware that they'll throw their arms up in disgust and quit, which is the same behavior I've seen from some of the malware scanning products out there.

      --
      "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
    3. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Another obvious thing I would request is that different services software be installed (and running) on the laptops. Like maybe put MySql on one running as a service and PostGres on the other.

      Better yet: Let each laptop (out of maybe 20 or so, instead of just two) be used by someone for maybe a few days or a week leading up to the test. Rutkowska is the only one allowed to (deliberately) install a rootkit, or any kind of malware, but everyone else is allowed to do pretty much whatever they want. Then, let them sort out which ones have rootkits, and specifically, which one was Blue Pill.

      But how many times do you approach a computer that's infected & have all the behaviors of that machine mapped out? I think the real world answer to that is never.

      At least, not completely. I suspect they might still be able to figure it out, but the test could at least be made fair.

      Then again, I suspect that this test was created more because many people, myself included, find that "100%" anything in security leaves a bad taste in our mouths. I admit that there's pretty much no chance anyone would be able to detect her rootkit. However, a completely unfair test (in which you can simply do a full-drive checksum from a boot CD) is all that's needed to prove it's not "100%".

      Just one more reason to only use open source, I guess!

      While I agree, sort of, this doesn't really make sense for the reasons you said. Unless you have a behavior/benchmark for each process on ANY system, you can't know that there isn't some infected process somewhere -- this has nothing to do with it being proprietary. I tend to suspect that open source would make it less likely for malware to get on the system in the first place, and less likely for it to get elevated to a level where a really good rootkit is possible (although I admit, most of us would probably be fooled by any rootkit), but that is only because I tend to suspect that open source is generally more secure overall.

      And sendmail proves that it isn't, always.

      The availability of source code, if anything, probably increases the vulnerability of the system to a really, really hard-to-detect rootkit. After all, the rootkit could recompile your kernel.

      I do think you should use open source, and I do think malware is a reason, but I don't think rootkits are any less likely to happen than any other kind of malware on an open source system. Don't forget, "rootkit" is a term from the UNIX world.

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    4. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      However, a completely unfair test (in which you can simply do a full-drive checksum from a boot CD) is all that's needed to prove it's not "100%". Who says it has to alter the drive? Why can't you load a rootkit into main memory from a disc and remove the disc? I mean, if you start the process and its roll isn't to alter anything on the drive unless it counter alters it to match the checksum would be an easy way around your 100% proof detectable.

      It's a cat and mouse game just like all other security.
    5. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by Alchemar · · Score: 1

      Turn off the firewall and surf several known malware sites with both computers. They said she is allowed to configure them the way she wants. If they run their scanners and find 100+ hits on both laptops, it will be very difficult to detect which one has the rootkit based on resource consumption.

    6. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Stop. Think.

      How would a whole drive checksum work? repeated calls to read() on /dev/xyz? What If those read() calls lied? The whole point of this research is that you cant trust anything, everything is emulated to make it look like there is no rootkit.

      (Even if it is technically possible, I dont believe its feasible to write an undetectable rootkit, but your attack is trivially defeated)

    7. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 1

      Why can't you load a rootkit into main memory from a disc and remove the disc?

      I guess you could. I think that defeats the point of the exercise, though. Many Windows computers get rebooted daily; even my Kubuntu box does, to save power, and so I don't have to mess with hibernation. The point of a rootkit is to stay there, undetected, probably for a long time, in order to do something permanent.

      It's a cat and mouse game just like all other security.

      That's the point. I'm not trying to prove that any rootkit is 100% detectable by one particular method, but rather that anyone claiming "100% undetectability" is either exaggerating or actually being dishonest. I know it's cliche'd and somewhat wrong in the real world, but just as the only secure computer is one that's not plugged into the Internet and preferably turned off, the only undetectable rootkit is one that does absolutely nothing at all, including actually install itself (as in, it doesn't really exist). Obviously, a rootkit is detectable by the rootkit author, otherwise what's the point?

      --
      Don't thank God, thank a doctor!
    8. Re:Obvious Request I Can Think Of by jcuervo · · Score: 1

      What If those read() calls lied? How would they lie if you plugged it into my laptop with a USB drive enclosure?

      Unless I'm already infected. OH MY GOD, IT'S LIKE SUPER-AIDS!

      --
      Assume I was drunk when I posted this.
  9. uh what's the point? by TheLink · · Score: 1

    Most malware nowadays is so obvious (after all they're there to do something - mail spam, click spam, DoS etc) and still most people hardly notice them.

    Also any such rootkit wouldn't work if the O/S starts off virtualized in the first place so that the rootkit would be "trapped". Then you can scan for the rootkit from "outside".

    Of course this assumes no bugs in the virtualization stuff. But as we know there are tons of bugs in CPUs ;).

    --
    1. Re:uh what's the point? by zarkill · · Score: 1

      after all they're there to do something I was thinking the same thing... if there's malware on your system that is 100% undetectable, then it can't really be doing much of anything, can it? so in that case is it really malware?

      if it's phoning home or sending data anywhere, surely that must be detectable, right?
    2. Re:uh what's the point? by megaditto · · Score: 1

      What if you reverse the roles, the rootkit starts up first and loads a virtualized OS? Like a windows box with a keylogger running another OS in vmware?

      I think that's what this blue pill is supposed to do: emulate all of the hardware to match a normal system so that the OS is none the wiser.

      --
      Obama likes poor people so much, he wants to make more of them.
    3. Re:uh what's the point? by cynyr · · Score: 1

      I would think that the point would not be to make it undetectable, but to make it so damn hard to remove with out data loss, that there is no long incentive to remove it. Take this situation;

      The machine is infected say the 1st of June, now it does nothing visible other than slowly search out other machines to infect, or say send it's self out in one e-mail per week at no more frequently than 1 every 100. it also inserts it's self in the right spots to wreak all burned CD's and jumpdrives, as well as make all network drives very very slow. Now it's mid December, and it starts flooding you with spam and popups, opps you mean you didn't back up since june when you got it? well you can a) Reformat loosing all data, b) live with and keep your data or c) use a clunky livecd to boot assuming it didn't play games with the bios.

      --
      All of the above was encrypted with a Quad ROT-13 method. Unauthorized decryption is in violation of the DMCA.
    4. Re:uh what's the point? by TheLink · · Score: 1

      Not possible unless there are bugs or holes (intentional or not) in the virtualization technology.

      If you create the "Matrix" first and run everything in it, the rootkit can create it's own "Matrix" and re-execute things in it but it'll always be stuck in the _first_ "Matrix" IF you do it right. There is no way out, there is no "waking up".

      For example: if I run an Amiga emulator on my Windows/Linux desktop, an Amiga rootkit can do whatever it like and take over the Amiga, it could even run it's own Amiga emulator and relaunch the O/S in it, but unless there's a bug in my emulator, it's not going to be able to take over my desktop. I could shut it down at will, I could even pause it and change the memory, registers, NOP the rootkit etc. I could restore a pristine image from a snapshot.

      So barring any bugs or "strange NSA/Neo features" ;), there is NO way the rootkit is going to "start up first".

      But of course, most people don't do things right, and probably (and probably partly because) current x86 VT is still primitive and buggy.

      --
    5. Re:uh what's the point? by TheLink · · Score: 1

      Unless it transparently encrypts your data (like some viruses used to), you can just take the drive out, attach it to another machine and copy your data out.

      And even if it did encrypt your stuff, if your machine+malware wasn't doing any TPM stuff, you should be able to get the key.

      Anyway, unless the hacker is part of a megacorp like Sony, they wouldn't do such stuff - because they'd go to jail. It's easier for a small corp to wiggle out of installing adware, but only megacorps get to hold people's data ransom.

      --
  10. I hope she accepts the challenge by OscarGunther · · Score: 1

    It would either put paid to the security software vendors who may claim more than they can deliver or it will serve as a caution to overly-ambitious columnists. Can't-miss proposition in terms of its entertainment value.

  11. If she wins, she gets to keep a Toshiba laptop by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    If she loses, she gets to keep both Toshiba laptops.

    1. Re:If she wins, she gets to keep a Toshiba laptop by DeAxes · · Score: 0

      Wait - its toshibas? Nowhere in the article does it mention the type of computers. I don't think a toshiba laptop is worth it's circuit boards. (you try coming up with something witty with 2 hrs sleep) At my school (college) they sold toshiba's until they wised up and finally brought in Lenovo (IBMs). Most of my friends have problems. Mostly it has to do with the fact that Toshiba don't know how to do cooling/heat dispersement within laptops. Couple that with parts that fail all the time and a warranty that makes one pay for things already covered... I'm really glad I ignored their offer of on-site support and got my IBM Thinkpad T42 (had to convince my mother, as it was my highschool graduating present). Oh, and for those who want to know what toshiba model I'm talking about, its the tecra m3 series.

  12. Easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    grep -i "blue pill"

    Duh...

    1. Re:Easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Good luck with that n00b, `grep -ir` is clearly the better way to find it...

    2. Re:Easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ah, the humble helping of the Linux crowd. Humiliate the newbie and wonder why they don't call to ask you for help.

    3. Re:Easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      `grep -ir` is clearly the better way to find it...
      But WHAT are you grepping? I would think that not specifying a place to start a search is AT LEAST as bad as not specifying a recursive search.
    4. Re:Easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's not much better when your help comes with a foreign, impenetrable accent :)

      Actually, all the [professional] people I ran into while playing with OSS were much nicer and more helpful than the proprietary types. And no, I haven't met Theo yet.

  13. Only 2 laptops? by Braino420 · · Score: 1

    Why not use more laptops so they have a smaller chance of GUESSING the right one? Or do they have to prove why they think its one over the other? In that case why use more than one?

    --
    They call me the wookie man, I guess that's what I am
    1. Re:Only 2 laptops? by Kijori · · Score: 1

      As has been pointed out, they have already posted a response to this criticism. They are now going to provide 5 laptops, but it looks like this was never a problem anyway; the 2 laptops was just a cost-cutting measure, they wanted to run the test multiple times.

  14. not a fair test by waspleg · · Score: 4, Insightful

    this is clearly not a fair test, no one installs rootkits on virgin installs, also giving a small set of laptops means they have a much larger chance of just guessing which one even if they're wrong from their analysis, and if the rootkit is the only thing that is on it besides an OS how hard would that be to find? look at the file access dates? with no other software installed this should be trivially easy to find.

    now if they wanted to test on an E-machine .. which already comes pre-loaded with malware to wehre they'd have to actually look for blue pill code.. that might be a little more balanced and realistic since virtually all consumer pc's have some form of virus or malware as people have no clue what it is or what it does and they like their animated mouse icon even if it's stealing their CC#'s for african nationals.

    1. Re:not a fair test by tqbf · · Score: 2, Interesting

      If Joanna wants to stipulate that we pick Blue Pill out of a morass of pre-installed kernel and userland rootkits, we would of course agree to that term. Neither Joanna's team nor ours seems to think that's a meaningful addition to the test. Like the Vitriol rootkit Dino Dai Zovi wrote for Matasano last year, Joanna's rootkit lives in a special slice of memory inside of a special execution context carved out by the hardware. It is unlike any other X86 rootkit in how it intercepts control of the platform and how it stays resident.

      Installing a bunch of crappy malware alongside something as slick as Blue Pill is very much the same as trying to hide a Ferarri in a junkyard lot filled with rusted out Chevy Novas. But, by all means, if Joanna wants to add meaningless obstacles --- let nobody say we allowed those obstacles to impede science!

    2. Re:not a fair test by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      this is clearly not a fair test, no one installs rootkits on virgin installs, also giving a small set of laptops means they have a much larger chance of just guessing which one even if they're wrong from their analysis, and if the rootkit is the only thing that is on it besides an OS how hard would that be to find? look at the file access dates? with no other software installed this should be trivially easy to find.
      Not necessarily. Look, if there's a _good_ rootkit installed on your machine, file access dates, process explorer, hard disk space and all the other naive methods that are suggested throughout this thread aren't reliable sources of information.

      Some of the replies in this thread are just hilarious. "I would just check the hard disk space or open up process explorer and stop the rootkit process!"
  15. comparison by TheSHAD0W · · Score: 1

    If you're talking about two identical laptops, I think the test is unfair. You'd probably be able to determine which laptop was infected simply by measuring boot times - and this sort of test wouldn't be practical in the real world. (I suppose the attacker could make it more like a real-world test by installing different sets of applications on each machine.) A proper test would include several laptops of different manufacture and somewhat different hardware specs.

    1. Re:comparison by SwordsmanLuke · · Score: 1
      I agree. It's too easy - with virgin installs on identical machines - to tell which has been tampered with. If they're all identical adding machines (as many here have suggested) would actually make things easier. Just power them all on at (as close to) the same time as possible and watch. As a result, I doubt if Rutkowska will take the challenge - which will probably be construed as a forfeit, rather than simply refusing to play a rigged game.


      I think she'd be better served to tell them to drop it to one laptop, which she gets to install any (non-rootkit, but possibly malware) software she wishes in addition to Blue Pill. Then they only win if they can show conclusive proof that what they find is actually Blue Pill (perhaps by "cleaning" it off and then seeing if she's still able to access her root kit).

      --
      Any plan which depends on a fundamental change in human behavior is doomed from the start.
  16. Not quite 50/50 by madsheep · · Score: 1

    OK guys I don't think it's going to be as simple as "picking" which laptop they think it is on. I would assume they have to provide some backup/proof as to what they detected and how they know her stuff is on that laptop. This isn't Russian Roulette of computing. The point is also to backup their skills and more importantly their products. This is to get more press and make more $ and I think it's great.

    It's time to put your money where your mouth is..

    1. Re:Not quite 50/50 by anagama · · Score: 1

      I would assume they have to provide some backup/proof as to what they detected and how they know her stuff is on that laptop. This isn't Russian Roulette of computing.

      You are assuming elements of the challenge that aren't there. That is a sure setup to lose.

      Imagine you're in a bar with your friends. You ask the waitress for three glasses of water and two shot glasses of water. You say to a friend, "I'll bet you a drink that I can down three 12oz glasses of water before you can down those two shot glasses of water." Your friend looks at you incredulously and says "No Way -- impossible." You respond "to make it fair, give me a headstart so that I get to completely drink a glass of water and then grab my next glass before you can start. Also, no cheating so we can't touch each other's glasses."

      If youre friend accepts, he already lost because the rules make it impossible to win if you do certain things. For example, you place your empty glass upside on the table over one of his full shot glasses before you grab your second glass. He can't touch your glass so he can never get to the covered shot. You win because your friend assumed he understood the implications of all the rules. If he had asked for more details, he could see the setup. His reliance on his assumptions means a free beer to you.
      --
      What changed under Obama? Nothing Good
    2. Re:Not quite 50/50 by hotdiggitydawg · · Score: 1

      Actually, it's a win-win. With all that water, your "friends" know that it won't be long before you have to drain the lizard, so they can disappear while you're in the bathroom, head off to another bar and actually have a fun night out, without your sorry "I drink water in a bar" ass. But of course, you still get the free drink.

    3. Re:Not quite 50/50 by madsheep · · Score: 1

      Yea, right, this is exactly the same. Man why didn't I think of that. I never think before I post. I'm sure they will just look like complete asses and make a mockery of their respective companies if they cannot reasonably prove their decisions.

  17. Not a good deal by NewToNix · · Score: 0, Redundant
    It's a 50/50 shot if they just point at one or the other laptops and say "there be the Blue Pill'. But She only gets to keep one if they chose wrong.

    This is just nothing at all proof wise --unless their soft can show how it detected the Blue Pill box.

    Now make it three (or more) laptops of her choice and winner takes all... that's a real test of who has the real stuff.

    1. Re:Not a good deal by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Even if they can't find it, it doesn't prove that it's "undetectable." It just proves that they failed to find it. Someone else could look at it again later and find it.

  18. A different challenge for Rutkowska by HaiLHaiL · · Score: 1

    grits?

    --


    reech bee-yond ur clip-0n
  19. Timing Analysis by kmsigel · · Score: 3, Informative

    I saw her talk at BH last year and thought it was very interesting. When it came to detection, however, she waved her hands a bit and claimed that a hypervisor could always alter anything in the PC that had to do with timing so that the OS would always think that the "normal" amount of time had passed for whatever operation it might be trying to time. The idea is that an instruction that the hypervisor intercepts will take longer than the native instruction, and you can detect that. The obvious way to do this is to use the RDTSC (read time stamp counter) instruction, which gives you CPU clock speed precision. The hypervisor can, however, change what the RDTSC instruction returns and therefore makes this timing method useless.

    There are many other sources of timing information in a computer. Serial ports, parallel ports, USB ports, ethernet ports, IO space reads and writes, disk operations, the RTC (real-time clock), etc. I haven't thought too hard about using any of these things in particular, but I would be very surprised if a hypervisor could alter the behavior of all of these things in such a way that they couldn't be used as an alternate source of timing information when determining if an instruction you suspect is being intercepted is taking "too long" or not.

    1. Re:Timing Analysis by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ssh -> time server #1 && rtdsc #1
      ssh -> time server #2 && rtdsc #2

      diff them, if they are too far off, you got a bug

      its impossible to do what she is claiming. there are always going to be ways to get time from outside source. the only way to prevent this is to unplug the cable. if so, then what the hell is the rootkit good for?

  20. Given 2 identicle computers by jshriverWVU · · Score: 2, Informative
    Possible solutions:

    1. create dd dumps of both drives and run diffs on the images. Added benefit of also seeing if any lower level filesystem stuff was changed and not just files.

    2. find / -type f -exec md5sum {} \; compare md5sums to find which files are different. Though this will cause a problem with storing the md5, maybe use a ram drive or exclude /media or /mnt.

    1. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You are sooo dumb. The point of the rootkit is to be indetectable: both dump/md5s will be exactly identical, as the rootkit will hide itself (by returning wrong information from low-level disk read routines) That is the point of a blue pill: to preset an alternate reality.

    2. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by CryoPenguin · · Score: 1

      Blue Pill doesn't necessarily have to be on the drive at all, it could be purely in memory, and in a section of memory that never swaps out. Sure in that case you could remove Blue Pill just by rebooting, but if you never detected Blue Pill you might also never have patched the hole by which you got infected, so it can repeat.
      The only generic way I can think of to defeat that is: Install your own Blue Pill first, and have it inspect any later attempt to use the virtualization functions. :)

    3. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by Chysn · · Score: 1

      But you're sort of missing the entire idea of a rootkit. It takes over your system so that you can no longer trust things like dd, find, md5sum. Every command on your system conspires to lie to you. The idea behind the detectors is that you catch the system in a lie somehow. But if you're running the detector on a compromised system, it's got to be really well designed.

      --
      --I'm so big, my sig has its own sig.
      -- See?
    4. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by jshriverWVU · · Score: 1

      That's why I would never run a cleaning system from inside an infected system. When I do commands like I suggested dd/md5sum/ etc.. I do it while running Knoppix as to have a running system completely independent of the system on the hard drive and treat the discs as raw data. Thought this or similar concepts where common-place in recovery efforts.

    5. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is correct to a point. The COMPROMISED system's utilities will lie to you. But you can use a knowingly uncompromised system to check. A linux boot CD, for example. Forensics people mount drives read only to detect changes.

      The challenge should definitely stipulate that the noninfected machine could still be manipulated (so as to change the drive contents, but not in a "malware-like" manner.

    6. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by itzac · · Score: 1

      Of course that works. The goal is to be able to detect the root-kit from inside the running system. This because Joe Windows-user will never use a live CD to check for malware. They want something Norton/McAfee/etc. can do to detect the root-kit.

    7. Re:Given 2 identicle computers by khchung · · Score: 1

      This is informative?!

      1. Result: the 2 images differs, duh. Now go ahead try to figure which one was infect merely from knowing this.

      2. A lot of files are different, duh. Now go ahead and figure how to distinguish between an blue-pill infected file and one infected with a random virus. There are, after all, no restrictions that she can only put in her blue-pill.

      --
      Oliver.
  21. Ob Princess Bride by The_Wilschon · · Score: 5, Funny

    "You guessed wrong."
    "You only think we guessed wrong. That's what's so funny! We switched laptops when your back was turned! Ha ha! You fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! The most famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia, but only slightly less well-known is this: never go in against three high-profile security researchers when a laptop is on the line! Ahahahahaha! Ahahahaha! Ahaha-"
    "And to think, all that time it was your laptop that had malware."
    "They both had malware. I spent the last few years building up an immunity to blue pills."

    --
    SIGSEGV caught, terminating

    wait... not that kind of sig.
    1. Re:Ob Princess Bride by Negadecimal · · Score: 1

      Thanks... I needed a good laugh today!

    2. Re:Ob Princess Bride by Dachannien · · Score: 3, Funny

      I spent the last few years building up an immunity to blue pills.

      You're going to regret that decision in another thirty years.

    3. Re:Ob Princess Bride by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ( s/land-war/cyber-war/ )

      Fezzik: You never said anything about hacking anyone.
      Vizzini: I've hired you to help me with industrial espionage. It's an prestigious line of work, with a long and glorious tradition.
      Fezzik: I just don't think it's right, hacking an innocent laptop.
      Vizzini: Am I going MAD, or did the word "think" escape your lips? You were not hired for your brains, you hippopotamic land mass.
      Inigo Montoya: I agree with Fezzik.
      Vizzini: Oh, the lamer has spoken. What happens to it is not truly your concern. I will wipe it. And remember this, never forget this: when I found you, you were so brimming with malware, you couldn't start your virus checker!
      [turning to Fezzik]
      Vizzini: And you: l33tless, haxless, helpless, pwnz0red! Do you want me to send you back to where you were? Unemployed... in Kashmir!

      Inigo Montoya: You are sure nobody's backtracing us?
      Vizzini: As I told you, it would be absolutely, totally, and in all other ways inconceivable. No one in Guilder.com knows what we've done, and no one in Florin.net could have gotten to their datacenter so fast. - Out of curiosity, why do you ask?
      Inigo Montoya: No reason. It's only... I just happened to check the access logs behind us and something is there.
      Vizzini: What? Probably some local luser, out for a pleasure surf, at night... in... ad-infested waters...

    4. Re:Ob Princess Bride by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're my hero

    5. Re:Ob Princess Bride by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Joana:
      All right: where is the malware? The battle of wits has begun. It ends when you decide and we both compute, and find out who is right and who is dead.
      Ptacek:
      But it's so simple. All I have to do is divine from what I know of you. Are you the sort of woman who would put the malware onto her own laptop, or her enemy's?
      Ptacek:
      Now, a clever man would put the malware into his own laptop, because he would know that only a great fool would reach for what he was given. I am not a great fool, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of you. But you must have known I was not a great fool; you would have counted on it, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of me.
      Joana:
      You've made your decision then?
      Ptacek:
      Not remotely. Because malware comes from Australia, as everyone knows. And Australia is entirely peopled with criminals. And criminals are used to having people not trust them, as you are not trusted by me. So I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of you.
      Joana:
      Truly, you have a dizzying intellect.
      Ptacek:
      Wait till I get going! Where was I?
      Joana:
      Australia.
      Ptacek:
      Yes -- Australia, and you must have suspected I would have known the malware's origin, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of me.
      Joana:
      You're just stalling now.
      Ptacek:
      You'd like to think that, wouldn't you? You've beaten my giant, which means you're exceptionally strong. So, you could have put the malware on your own laptop, trusting on your strength to save you. So I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of you. But, you've also written malware, which means you must have studied. And in studying, you must have learned that computers are vulnerable so you would have put the malware as far from yourself as possible, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of me.
      Joana:
      You're trying to trick me into giving away something -- it won't work --
      Ptacek:
      It has worked -- you've given everything away -- I know where the malware is.
      Joana:
      Then make your choice.
      Ptacek:
      I will. And I choose ---- what in the world can that be?

  22. Installed on both would be best by Shivetya · · Score: 1

    Activate it on both and see if they can tell.

    and to make it even more fun, put something extra on them too.

    --
    * Winners compare their achievements to their goals, losers compare theirs to that of others.
  23. The State Of The Challenge So Far by tqbf · · Score: 5, Informative

    Helu. I'm Thomas Ptacek, one of the four challenge team members --- Slashdot left out Dino Dai Zovi, who kicked this off by writing a virtualized rootkit at Matasano last year.

    Joanna has responded to our challenge. We invited her to stipulate any terms she deemed reasonable. She proferred:

    • Five (5) laptops instead of two (2), as a defense against lucky guessing.
    • We can't crash the machines in the process of testing.
    • We can't spike the CPU on the machine for more than one (1) second.
    • We have to open source our detector, and she'll open source her rootkit.
    • We have to arrange to have her paid between $384,000 and $416,000, and wait six months.

    You can probably predict our response.

    Here's where it stands: all parties agree that by Black Hat '07, Blue Pill will not be in a state where it is hard to detect. Our detection techniques are likely to detect Blue Pill at Black Hat. Blue Pill requires six months of engineering time to get to a state where Joanna is confident that we can't detect it.

    Here's why you care: a few weeks ago, Microsoft decided that Vista Home would not allow virtualization, in part because of the threat of virtualized malware. To the best of our knowledge, there have been two (2) real hypervisor rootkits ever produced: Joanna's Blue Pill, and Matasano's Vitriol. Neither has ever been seen in the wild, because neither has been released to the public. Meanwhile, our team is preparing to demonstrate at Black Hat this year that hypervisor malware is actually even easier to detect than the kernel malware operating systems like Vista are already exposed to.

    Joanna's Blue Pill work, along with all the rest of her work (check out this project, where she turns AMD security hardware against forensics devices), is top-notch. In a weird, secretive space like security, this is how science gets done. Joanna chooses a side: it's possible to make undetectable malware. We square off on the opposite side. Then we debate it using code, presentations, papers, and I guess Slashdot stories. Hopefully, in the end, we all learn something.

    Hope this stays interesting for everyone. Thanks for paying attention!

    1. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Those 5 stipulations look like one of those "WHICH OF THESE DO NOT BELONG" SAT questions...

    2. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
      In a weird, secretive space like security, this is how science gets done.

      This may qualify you as a particularly rarefied level of server chimp, but hardly as a "scientist".

    3. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by brunascle · · Score: 1

      any speculation that the price is simply to get you to back down?

      anyway, let us know when Joanna responds to your response to her response.

    4. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by dbrecht · · Score: 1

      "We would expect an industry standard fee for this work, which we estimate to be $200 USD per hour per person." I have never heard of a programmer being paied 200$ an hour... Perhaps I should have stayed in Computer Engineering rather than switch to Electrical?

    5. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That seems to answer all of the comments and suggestions on the thread so far. Thanks for updating us on the current situation.

    6. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by dpilot · · Score: 1

      Ms. Dr. Evik sez, "One Meeelion Dollars! Well OK, how about $416,000?"

      --
      The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
    7. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by tqbf · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You should become a secure programmer, which is the rate she's working from. There aren't enough secure programmers to go around.

    8. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by AMuse · · Score: 1

      I haven't watched too much of this debate so far, but assuming you're being honest with your post (hey, I haven't background checked you!) I want to extend some sincere Kudos to you and her for having this kind of competition in the security industry, diametrically opposed, and NOT resorting to childish name-calling or logical fallacies.

      I see a ton of research teams contradicting each other on a daily basis online and often they take things very personally. It brings me a rare bit of optimism to see two teams of professionals duking it out professionally and without malice.

    9. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by itzac · · Score: 1

      That's not what she'd be paid, it's what she would bill. Typically the difference between wage and billing rate is a factor of about 3. For example, I'm paid ~$30/hr, but my company bills ~$100/hr for my time. The difference covers administrative costs (like support staff) and other overhead (like rent and equipment). How do you think receptionists get paid?

    10. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by swillden · · Score: 1

      "We would expect an industry standard fee for this work, which we estimate to be $200 USD per hour per person." I have never heard of a programmer being paied 200$ an hour... Perhaps I should have stayed in Computer Engineering rather than switch to Electrical?

      <shrug> I'm often billed out at more than $200 per hour as a programmer skilled in security. My employer keeps most of that, of course. Were I working freelance I couldn't bill that much, but I could easily get $100, and I'm nowhere near as good as Rutkowska and her colleagues. My company has plenty of people that are in her league, and they bill out at over $400 per hour.

      Security engineering and research is a fairly well-compensated field, because it takes a certain kind of person and it requires a great deal of dedication. If you find this stuff fascinating, it's a good idea to pursue it; it's good for you and the industry needs more talent. If you're fascinated by making money, go into business instead. You'll make more and won't add yet another semi-clued voice to confuse the security issues.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    11. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by tqbf · · Score: 1

      The difference between what Joanna "gets paid" and what she bills at is very small.

    12. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by Man+On+Pink+Corner · · Score: 1

      WTF, I'm a very secure programmer. I even drive a Miata with a rainbow-colored Apple sticker. Nobody's paying me $200/hour.

    13. Re:The State Of The Challenge So Far by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Congratulations for proving it.

      You're 100% right. With the way current CPU allowing hardware virtualization works, it's impossible to hide an "undetectable rootkit".

      I'm running Xen / Linux as a dom0 / Linux as domU and Windows as HVM domU. Tell me how you're going to install Windows as an HVM domU on that system when there's already an hypervisor present!? You simply can't, short of emulating Windows (instead of hardware-virtualizing it).

      I can't wait to see the open source code of your project and all the various ways you'll use to bust that "undetectable hypervisor rootkit" myth.

  24. Virii and RootKits by purduephotog · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I have been repairing computers for friends/coworkers for some time and Rootkits scare me. I run the MS tools, the blacklight, the A2Free, the hive comparators.... and pray that I'm not missing something. It's either that or re-install their OS, and since they come with DELL OEM licenses before Dell shipped CDs, that's a crapshoot.

    The last machine I worked on actually had 'new' virii on them, which went off to AVira and Norton as a 'new' virus and was included in the next days updates. Insane.

    My brother in law wants a new computer because he no longer trusts his disk - it's been infected so many times that he figures it's easier to get a new system (I've reimaged it several times to fix the problems). I keep pointing out that it only takes one infection to get ruin the new computer, but he's adamant ...

    Why can't we just get along...

    (and don't tell me to put Ubuntu on peoples laptops...)

    1. Re:Virii and RootKits by anagama · · Score: 1

      (and don't tell me to put Ubuntu on peoples laptops...)

      Put Kubuntu on these people's laptops.
      --
      What changed under Obama? Nothing Good
    2. Re:Virii and RootKits by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Apparently you haven't been doing it long enough to know how to detect and defeat root kits.

      or long enough to know it's Viruses.

      Why don't you set their machine up correctly?
      The only virus I have even had on my windows machines was one I compiled myself when I did security work.

      Yes, I scan my system regularly.
      Yes, I monitor my connection.
      Yes, I have a router and firewall separate from my machines.
      Also, my family isn't stupid, so when I explained the issues with email and links and banners, they starting using smart computer skills. So I hardly get a call from them, and they all use windows.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    3. Re:Virii and RootKits by purduephotog · · Score: 1

      Errr, no, you misunderstand. I get them AFTER they've been infected. Not before. Well, not usually- like my Sister in Law and her constant re-infections. In her defense though, someone got in and a new 0 day virus was updated... aol=updates.exe Kinda interesting to find out you're responsible /included in the next round of antivirus updates.

      I do instruct with proper firewalls, etc, but if they don't listen... and they now run nearly a dozen apps to keep the systems clean. Sounds like Over kill to me, but whatever works.

    4. Re:Virii and RootKits by BobMcD · · Score: 1


      Put Ubuntu on peoples desktops?

      Have you at least gotten that brother-in-law to use Firefox or some other non-IE browser? It's a good start and it should handle most of the porn site's he's visiting without picking up all that malware...

    5. Re:Virii and RootKits by purduephotog · · Score: 1

      That's the funny thing. He swears he does. Yet somehow I always find porn on the machine.

      Now I even covered for him once- claimed all the porn on the machine was due to a virus (to his wife). You know how it goes, protect your own. But he still swears to me he didn't download it. So if it's not him, and it's not her... then what is it? Their stupid chinchillas ? Right...

      Anyways, that's how I think they got infected the 3rd time- codec download.

    6. Re:Virii and RootKits by BobMcD · · Score: 1


      Well, if he's worried you're going to get him into trouble, he's bound to lie about it. His sex life really isn't any of [our] business, and isn't all that relevant to fixing his computer. Should you have to face it in the future, try and hold off any value judgements, if you can. Something along the lines of:

      "I don't really care WHAT you do with it, it's your computer after all. Just remember that certain web site owners would sell your PC (and your mother) for a nickle. You need to protect yourself from these kinds of sites. Also remember that for each slimeball site, there's at least two good guys that will give you the products you want without the garbage. Shop around, use a safe browser, and never, never install anything unless you know EXACTLY what it is. You'll be surprised how many sites work even when you decline their pop-ups."

      His denial won't help. Neither would yours, unless it actually IS the chinchillas... :)

    7. Re:Virii and RootKits by purduephotog · · Score: 1

      Indeed.

      That's the rub- I really *don't* care. Whatever floats your boat. You like? Great. Just help me hold back the tide here...

      Anyways... here's hoping it'll be fixed someday.

  25. They aren't looking for the Rootkit though by Ryan274 · · Score: 1
    "The crux of the matter is that a perfect emulator of any sufficiently complex system would have to be a bug-free program, and we don't know how to write those yet,"

    Compare this to making a "secure" operating system - every bug doesn't have to be secured - just the ones that are being exploited. Same with anti-virus programs - they don't catch all viruses, only what they know to look for.

    So the rootkit doesn't have to be perfect to be invisible to *most* users... it just has to hide from the AV software (or other security). And as the security software gets better... so can the rootkit, ie, in the next "version" add the bugs that the security programs are looking for.

    --
    Who needs progress when you have profits?
  26. A better strategy for Rutkowska by igotmybfg · · Score: 3, Interesting

    If I were her, I would put Blue Pill on both machines. This has two advantages for her: First, the examiners' obvious strategy of comparing runtime aspects (CPU %, execution time, IO, etc) between the two machines fails, because now both machines incur the VM overhead penalty, and second, if the examiners pick out one of the machines as infected, she can 'prove' them wrong by showing the infection on the other one (given the contest rules of one clean machine, one infected machine). It's worth noting that that's not a real proof, because if the examiners really can deduce the presence of Blue Pill, then they could just show that both are infected. But this strategy definitely defeats the 'compare execution' plan that the examiners have said they are going to use.

    1. Re:A better strategy for Rutkowska by brunascle · · Score: 1

      but then the whole thing would moot, since she wouldnt be following the rules. any results would be meaningless.

    2. Re:A better strategy for Rutkowska by igotmybfg · · Score: 1

      I don't agree. If the examiners really can detect the rootkit, then they should be able to detect it twice. Also, in real world scenarios, the examiner (like a virus or malware scanning app) won't have access to two identical machines, one with, and one without.

    3. Re:A better strategy for Rutkowska by brunascle · · Score: 1

      i guess it depends on the judge. what i was thinking was that if the test returns true for both machines, the judges will assume there's something wrong with the test and go back to the drawing boards.

    4. Re:A better strategy for Rutkowska by Have+Blue · · Score: 1

      The producers could defeat this by buying a brand new machine of the same configuration at retail and using that for the compare execution plan. It wouldn't be any more cheating than what you suggested.

  27. OT: Slashdot IT slogan by cant_get_a_good_nick · · Score: 1
    The slogan for IT stories, as opposed to "news for nerds, stuff that matters" is

    it is what it is Hmm, weird to have a quote from "Boogie Nights" as the slogan for IT.
  28. Debunking Blue Pill myth by mapkinase · · Score: 4, Informative

    I found this useful:

    Debunking Blue Pill myth

    --
    I do not believe in karma. "Funny"=-6. Do good and forbid evil. Yours, Oft-Offtopic Flamebaiting Troll.
    1. Re:Debunking Blue Pill myth by WK2 · · Score: 1, Interesting

      I would mod you up, but I have no points.

      The Blue Pill is indeed a myth. It is detectable. All you have to do, is check if you are running under a virtual machine. Contrary to the claims of Joanna Rutkowska, this is easy, not impossible. If you didn't think you were running under a VM, but you are, something is wrong.

      It is also removable. Simply reboot the machine. I didn't say re-install, but reboot. If blue pill were to install files to the hard drive, the files would be detectable in an offline scan. Because Joanna claims that even an offline scan would not detect blue pill, it doesn't write to the hard drive. Because it doesn't write to the hard drive, it is not persistent.

      On the other hand, Joanna's claims are often moderately dishonest, at best. There is no such thing as completely undectable. If you sneezed 10 years ago, there is evidence of it somewhere.

      She hasn't released the code. She might have legitimate reasons, but this is normally considered inexcusable for security research. All we have to go on is "what she says."

      --
      Write your own Choose Your Own Adventure. http://www.freegameengines.org/gamebook-engine/
    2. Re:Debunking Blue Pill myth by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It is also removable. Simply reboot the machine. I didn't say re-install, but reboot. If blue pill were to install files to the hard drive, the files would be detectable in an offline scan. Because Joanna claims that even an offline scan would not detect blue pill, it doesn't write to the hard drive. Because it doesn't write to the hard drive, it is not persistent.

      You'd have to be careful with the reboot, since the VM could reboot the OS without actually rebooting the machine thus keeping the VM in memory, it could even simulate power off by shutting down the OS and using suspend to RAM. What could be a problem for the VM is running the machine's BIOS when you "reboot" so you don't get suspicious, but maybe a sophisticated Blue Pill could handle that. To be sure of getting rid of the Blue Pill you'd have to physically remove power from the machine.

      As to her not releasing the code, that is understandable if she believes what she claims is true, and if she doesn't think the code is useful in fixing the security hole, since it will then have more potential for harm than good. If it takes her a year to produce an undetectable Bill Pill releasing the code would save another hacker a lot of work in reproducing it and also make it available to less capable hackers.

  29. If you're like me... by sdaemon · · Score: 1

    ...then you count Windows Vista as malware to begin with. Free laptop!

  30. Nate Lawson is a partial fraud by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I don't know enough about the details of the challenge or if it is meaningful. I do know Nate Lawson is at least partially a fraud.

    Nate Lawson claims credit for Decru DataFort (never hesitating to push his claim in every place I see his name mentioned, for example: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/columnItem/0, 294698,sid14_gci1256055,00.html ). His claims range between having designed DataFort to having written the first implementation.
    The truth is, Nate Lawson left Decru very shortly after joining (probably less than 4 months), long before DataFort was in any way well defined, let alone implemented. In addition, whatever little work he did initially contribute was thrown out as close to useless.

    How do I know? I started at Decru shortly before Nate Lawson left and I still work there. The building janitor has contributed more to DataFort's existence than Nate Lawson has.

  31. Blue Pill and Windows? by gEvil+(beta) · · Score: 1

    It should be really easy to detect which Windows machine has had the blue pill used on it--it's the one that's able to stay up for four hours.

    --
    This guy's the limit!
  32. Pfft. As if I would by Colin+Smith · · Score: 1

    and don't tell me to put Ubuntu on peoples laptops... ITYF Fedora much easier to support.

    HTH
    --
    Deleted
  33. Re:Rutkowska is such a babe. by deviceb · · Score: 1

    amen... shes so sexy
    i would love to hear her talk about rootkits while.. ..

    --
    Kill your TV
  34. A Duck by fogbrain99 · · Score: 5, Funny

    Just weigh the machines. The heavier one would have to have the extra files and stuff.

    1. Re:A Duck by f00man · · Score: 0

      Yea, you'd better duck.

  35. It seems cheap to me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Assuming that Joanna is correct in her assertion and that she demonstrates it at some point. It will then be out 'in the wild' and you will have a working detection (if your assertions are also correct). How much do you think your company will make by selling 'protection' until the others can catch up? If you will make less than Joanna is asking then your product isn't actually worth very much, however, I think that you believe differently. Being paid for one's time, and expecting a share of your profits because she is prepared to explain how she does it, seems reasonable to me.

  36. which means that by commodoresloat · · Score: 4, Funny

    the other laptop is a witch!

  37. Don't you people know who she is?? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    She is the infamous Rutkowska, after whom the term rutkit, later bastardized to rootkit was named!

    1. Re:Don't you people know who she is?? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I always thought it was 'rutting kow skank' and they just shortened it to rutkowska :)

  38. Forbidden Vista Virtualization by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Here's why you care: a few weeks ago, Microsoft decided that Vista Home would not allow virtualization, in part because of the threat of virtualized malware. I've heard this line of reasoning before and still don't buy it. Why would a malware author care about Windows licensing terms? He's *already* engaging in an illegal business; what extra risk is there in making someone else to unknowingly violate their Vista EULA?

    The no virtualization restriction has nothing to do with malware (or DRM) and everything to do with making sure that Ubuntu, Apple, and everyone else with an OS can never distribute an install disc that automagically backs up the user's existing OEM Vista Home environment into a VM. Simple, seamless, incremental transitions away from Windows scare Microsoft much more than any malware (especially now that they've discovered they can keep their 90%+ market share when over half their users are infected with malware).
  39. Penis Envy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Come on, everyone knows it's just penis envy, because Joanna is WAY "l33ter" then all three of those dweebs put together.

  40. If Blue pill was true by geekoid · · Score: 1, Insightful

    then the same technology could be used for DRM.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    1. Re:If Blue pill was true by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Dude, that is what the TPM chips in newer computers are for.

  41. Drinking cocoa by Tony · · Score: 2, Funny

    A guy walks into a doctor's office. His right eye is bloody and bruised. "Doc," he says, "I've got a problem. Every time I drink cocoa at home, my eye hurts."

    The doctor, shocked at the condition of his new patient's eye, runs a gamut of tests, ruling out allergies or other clinical issues. Thinking the issue may be psychosomatic, he sits his patient at a table on which rests a tin of cocoa mix, a thermos of hot water, a cup, and a spoon. He invites the gentleman to mix up the cocoa and take a sip.

    The man pours hot water into the cup, and dumps in a couple of heaping spoonfuls of mix, using the spoon to mix vigorously. He then drinks from the cup, and immediately screams. Hastily placing the cup on the table, he clasps his hands to his eye.

    "Interesting," the doctor proclaims. "Have you ever considered removing the spoon before drinking?"

    (and don't tell me to put Ubuntu on peoples laptops...)

    This seems to be a problem of your own making. If you refuse to remove the spoon, you will continue to hurt your eye.

    --
    Microsoft is to software what Budweiser is to beer.
    1. Re:Drinking cocoa by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or, you can choose to believe that there is no spoon.

  42. Re:Rutkowska is such a babe. by u38cg · · Score: 4, Informative
    --
    [FUCK BETA]
  43. Re:Wouldn't that... by Joebert · · Score: 1

    Geek or not, that comment probably just lost any smidgen of a chance you had of ever getting laid.

    --
    Wanna fight ? Bend over, stick your head up your ass, and fight for air.
  44. Iocane rootkit by Quantum+Jim · · Score: 0, Redundant

    Vincini: But it's so simple. All I have to do is divine from what I know of you: Are you the sort of man who would install the rootkit into his own computer or his enemy's? Now, a clever man would install the rootkit into his own computer because he would know that only a great fool would install what he was given in a popup. I am not a great fool so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of you. But you must have known I was not a great fool - you would have counted on it - so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me!

    Westley: You've made your decision then?

    Vincini: Oh not remotely! Because Blue Pill comes from Australia, as everyone knows, and Australia is entirely peopled with copyright infringers. And copyright infringers are used to having people not trust them as you are not trusted by me so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of you.

    Westley: Truly, you have a dizzying intellect.

    Vincini: Wait 'till I get going! Where was I?

    Westley: Australia.

    Vincini: Yes, Australia! And you must have suspected I would've know the rootkit's origin so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of me.

    Westley: You're just stalling now.

    Vincini: You'd like to think that wouldn't you?!? You've beaten my giant password which means you're firewall's exceptionally strong, so you could've installed the laptop in your own computer trusting on your processing power to save you, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of you. But, you've also bested my Spaniard, which means you must've studied - and in studying you must've learned that man is mortal, so you would've installed the rootkit as far from yourself as possible, so I can clearly not choose the laptop in front of me.

    Westley: You're trying to trick into giving away something. It won't work.

    Vincini: It has worked! You've given everything away! I know where the rootkit is!

    Westley: Then make your choice!

    Vincini: I will. And I choose... What in the world can that be?!?

    Westley: What? Where? I don't see anything.

    Vincini: Oh well I... I could've sworn I saw something... No matter.

    Westley: What's so funny?

    Vincini: I'll tell ya in a minute. First, let's boot up. Me from my computer and you from yours.

    Westley: You guessed wrong.

    Vincini: You only think I guessed wrong. That's what's so funny! I switched laptops when your back was turned! Haha! You fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders. The most famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia, but only slightly less well known is this: never go in against a Sicilian when identity theft is on the line! HAHAHAHAHAhaha! aHahahahaha! aHahaha!

    *bluescreen of death*

    --
    It is impossible to enjoy idling thoroughly unless one has plenty of work to do.
    - Jerome Klapka Jerome
  45. Inconceivable! by GottliebPins · · Score: 1

    You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.

  46. Just use Computer Forensics! by ettlz · · Score: 1

    Like CSI, you know, dust the keyboards for prints.

  47. Malware by gmuslera · · Score: 1

    She will lose. In both the antivirus will detect that Windows is installed, so both will have malware, blue pill or not.

  48. The fact is by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    She IS wrong to make such a statement no matter what stupid game they pay to prove who is right. You simply cannot make a program that can be 100% undetectable. How would you even know it was running or doing it's job ? Hey I just installed an undetectable program on your computer, prove me wrong. It's a flawed idea right from the start to stand behind such an obvious wrong statement.
    As I posted on her blog to achieve a 100% undetectable rate you'd more or less be defying all the known principles of the universe, declare a new absolute that I've create code so great that it cannot be outsmarted. riiiiight

    Name one other thing in the universe that is 100% reliable. Even light has limits to it's absolute status and it's supposed to be
    THE constant. Then you consider it's just a program made by some flawed human mind over the course of a tiny amount of time and tell me how logically you could believe that it's going to produce this result of absolute undetectable status. It's just not possible.

    It might be virtually undetectable, but it's not going to be 100% and the fact the author makes such statements discredits her to some degree like any scientist making wild claims that more or less fly in the face of modern reasoning.

    1. Re:The fact is by itzac · · Score: 3, Insightful
      It is possible to circumvent any single method of detection. And it's even possible to circumvent circumvention detection. In the real world this would become an arms race: security experts would find a way to detect the root-kit, and the next one would be able to evade that method of detection. Eventually, however, the hypervisor would spend enough cycles evading detection that the user would get tired of his bogged down machine and would just reinstall the OS.

      I don't disagree with her theory, but in practice it is difficult enough to achieve that it will probably never happen.

  49. Re:Rutkowska is such a babe. by turbine216 · · Score: 1

    god i wish i had mod points.

    it's creepy shit like this that makes me love slashdot.

  50. No file access dates. by Burz · · Score: 1

    The test is for in-memory exploits which do not get written to disk. The malware may not persist through a reboot, but many crucial systems have long uptimes.

  51. Plan by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    1) pull hard disk mount ro
    2) diff against image ...
    3) Profit!

  52. Current climate... by DimGeo · · Score: 1

    I would be careful to work on such a challenge, if I were her :) . I suppose the best step for her would be to decline politely.

  53. Re:Rutkowska is such a babe. by BobMcD · · Score: 1

    Wait, what?

    Per TFL:

    A mystery? It's more than obvious that Mrs. Rutkowska is a transsexual Obvious?

    Not to several of the posters above this one, at a minimum...
  54. they should give her the software first by anton_kg · · Score: 2, Interesting

    it's not clear if it's gonna be new software from Symantec or just the current version of antivirus.
    If it's something new, they should give her a change to play with it first.

  55. Re:Wouldn't that... by justinlee37 · · Score: 1

    Someone modded this Troll, but it's clearly supposed to be Funny.

    Congratulations on wasting some tool's mod point. There's some guy out there who can't tolerate the word "cunt," even when it is part of a hilarious and clever pun. He's just that much of a tool.

  56. She's full of it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    From http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/

    The detector can not consume significant amount of CPU time (say > 90%) for more then, say 1 sec. If it does, then it's considered disturbing for the user and thus unpractical.

    This is almost as ridiculous as the $380000++. Hell, many places use (crappily configured) virus scanners that use 90% cpu for half an hour. Besides, an 'undetectable' rootkit is disturbing enough that most people wouldnt care about being disrupted for quite a bit longer than a sec.

  57. million dollar laptop by lucky130 · · Score: 1

    She should choose two of those 'Million Dollar Laptops' reported on a while back :).

  58. rootkit detection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Fill the HD with data. When it runs out of free space, check for unaccounted disk space. If there is any, you detected a rootkit :)

  59. They are (were) confident by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Mixed feelings:

    They (vendors) were confident in their original post but when money is on the table the said nope.

    For the record; I do think $200 dollars an hour is a little excessive for two people. Per person, per year would be $208,000 (100x40x52 = 208,000). I know experienced / top rated neurologist in the US: They don't make that kind of money.

    Hopefully they can come to a better financial understanding. Vendors should put up the cash; but Joanna Rutkowska should be a little more reasonable on the price.

    If the vendors are so sure; then they should have nothing to worry about; right?

    FYI: The cost of living in Poland:
    http://www.expatfocus.com/expatriate-poland-curren cy-costs

  60. easier than that by r00t · · Score: 1

    Check how much RAM appears to be installed and how much is used by the OS.

    To win, she needs laptops that are NOT identical.

  61. better condition by r00t · · Score: 1

    Five laptops, one with her stuff, and the other four with benign virtualization. :-)

    I mean, really, how are you to be sure it isn't just something like VMWare?

    Testing for specific products has problems. The list of products is unbounded and unknowable. (VMWare, Virtual PC, Parallels, Qemu+KVM... and even future products) Her malware can pretend to be Qemu+KVM, and how would you know it isn't?

    1. Re:better condition by tqbf · · Score: 1

      Because an operating system running on Qemu behaves differently, in measurably quirky ways, than one running under (a) VMWare, (b) Virtual PC, (c) Intel VT-X Virtualization and (d) native hardware. Validating that assertion is the point of the challenge.

      How I'm sure it's not just something like VMWare is that we wrote a hardware-virtualized rootkit ourselves and saw Joanna's talk last year and have read everything else Joanna has produced and, to the extent that the word of "yet another security researcher" matters to you, Blue Pill is real, Joanna is hard core, and her work is nothing like VMWare (which isn't a trap-and-execute hardware VMM).

    2. Re:better condition by r00t · · Score: 1

      Being somebody else in the field, I have to call bullshit on that one. Sorry.

      You can detect a VM. Well, you can if you ignore the issue of Crusoe-like processors and you have an external time reference.

      You can not detect intent.

      Suppose I hacked VMWare to be malicious. I can do this; it is but a bit of reverse engineering. Then what, you'd recognize that I had hacked VMWare to be malicious? Sure, would you like to sell me a bridge too?

    3. Re:better condition by tqbf · · Score: 1

      I'm not sure we're talking about same "field", if you think what Joanna is doing is infecting something like VMWare. Joanna is using the trap-and-exec virtualization extensions of the AMD hardware to hide code and intercept system activity. She's not installing a dynamic-code-rewriting full-scheduling virtualization package on the machine.

      Hardware virtualization works at a layer above software virtualization. Unless VMWare is now using VTX/SVM (ring -1), you can install a VTX/SVM hypervisor over VMWare (ring 0), and therefore hyperjack a VMWare machine. But if you already have a VTX/SVM hypervisor installed, that hypervisor can trivially prevent ring 0 code from hitting ring -1.

      When hardware virtualization is widespread, Blue Pill will be moot; we will be talking about individual vulnerabilities inside of hypervisors, not about a general class of exposure on the platform.

    4. Re:better condition by r00t · · Score: 1

      Of course VMWare is using VTX/SVM now. Qemu definitely does, at least on a Linux host. Other products do as well.

      Virtualization goes beyond Joanna-style and VMWare-style uses. Think about DRM. Think about stopping people from cheating in online games. Now you may call this malware, but you won't get everybody to agree with you. These products can be really thin low-overhead VMs. They can let the OS punch right through to native hardware.

      VTX/SVM makes things easy. Everybody and their dog will write a VM. You've written one, haven't you? (if not, get going!)

      Back to the point though: detecting the mere existance of a VM is not enough. Qemu is currently easy to detect, but you can not know if it has been modified to be malware. Some yet-to-be-invented (or kept secret) VM can not be recognized by your software; at best you might be able to detect that a VM of unknown nature might be in use.

      Don't forget Transmeta. If you found yourself running on an unrecognized CPU of that nature, what could you do?

    5. Re:better condition by tqbf · · Score: 1

      I have no idea why you are assuming that it is hard to differentiate between Qemu and Blue Pill, Blue Pill and VMware, or for that matter VMWare and Parallels. But the fact that you think Transmeta is an obstacle for us, when Transmeta supports neither the AMD nor Intel hardware virtualization extensions in question, tells me we're simply on a different wavelength. I'll take you at your word that there's some important point you're making. If you'd like to produce a hardware-virtualized rootkit for us to (attempt to) detect, we'd be happy to show you the point we're trying to make.

    6. Re:better condition by r00t · · Score: 1

      You misread. Of course you can identify these current, existing, unmodified products. It's damn easy.

      You're not producing a tool that can identify a malware VM in a reliable way. Your tool is completely unsuitable for including in something like a commercial malware detection tool. You'll get false positives on new (future) technology. (new non-malware VMs, and new Crusoe-like CPUs with the CPU itself looking like a VM) You'll get false negatives on "known" VMs that have been hacked.

      As for producing a hardware-virtualized rootkit: done it (currently Intel-only), with a feature list that would make your skin crawl, and not making it public. :-) I'm surely not alone; virtualization is trivial with the new CPU features.

  62. BTW, why Blackhat instead of DefCon? by r00t · · Score: 1

    DefCon is way easier to attend. It's cheap and we need only 1 vacation day to attend. Blackhat costs an arm an a leg and, last I checked, was in the middle of the week.

  63. Any Leeto would realize ;p by int21hex · · Score: 0

    Any leeto would realize that the only place for a truly undetected rootkit is at microcode level. To acomplish that you hope that the designers of the chip where human and left ample room to play with. A code cave is such no matter what level of abstraction you implement the ability to change.

  64. Easy Peasy by syusuf · · Score: 1

    Just install Windows on it, malware than 95% of the population don't detect.

  65. Game over by Nazlfrag · · Score: 1

    Well now we know that CPU usage is an indicator of the rootkit, a detector shouldn't be too hard. Thanks author of the undetectable rootkit for telling us how to detect it!

  66. Re:Wouldn't that... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Agree 100% with siblings, screw the uptight mods.

    Very witty, nice job!

  67. only 50%? by v1 · · Score: 1

    Giving them a 50% chance of guessing right seems lame, and the reward for beating 50% odds is only a single laptop, which is equally lame.

    Give her 10 laptops and let ber BP one of them. If they guess wrong, she keeps all 10.

    THAT'S fair.

    I am also having to assume the software must be installed and run by a 3rd party, so we don't have any engineers "snooping" around the system for anomolies to direct their software to investigate. Not that a true 100% BP would mind that, but lets keep everyone honest.

    --
    I work for the Department of Redundancy Department.
  68. destiny by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I love this! People with last names that spell their destiny in one way or another. Archimedes. Newton. Einstein.

    By the way, the Wachowski brothers have "wachac" as a meaningful root ("wachac" loosely means "to doubt" in Polish).

    Sorry, but Rutkowska wins this and subsequent rut-kit challenges.

  69. Re:Rutkowska is such a babe: Agreed, 110% by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "it's creepy shit like this that makes me love slashdot." - by turbine216 (458014) on Friday June 29, @03:26PM (#19692861)

    Nothing against you personally, turbine, because I don't even know you, but I have to offer a contrasting opinion here:

    It's creepy shit like that here, OR elsewhere ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Joanna_Rutkowska ), that make me hate it @ times... especially this shit, a quote from that wiki page:

    "t's more than obvious that Mrs. Rutkowska is a transsexual"

    Wtf! Some jealous, do-nothing dork online, that can't even BEGIN to accomplish what this chick has, has to go & write stuff like that... my god, what has the world come to.

    Grow up, is all I can say to whoever the unhappy pud was that wrote that shit on Wikipedia (that she's a transsexual, wtf!) about this lady...

    The world needs more like her, imo @ least & certainly in THIS art & science: Computing!

    In computers, I consider her the "Yuriko Deathstrike" of the internet:

    http://xmen.ugo.com/images/galleries/xmen_deathstr ike_girlfriends/6_180.jpg

    (Smart, pretty, & DANGEROUS AS HELL (if she chose that route, thank goodness she has not))

    APK

    P.S.=> She makes me proud to be polish (& so do their kids outta academia that year in & year out, turn out to be the BEST programmers out of academia there is, bar-none!)... apk

  70. payment by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'd pay 384,000$ to see Joanna nekkid

  71. Rutkowska is a joke by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm sorry /. nerds, but that blue pill is a fairy-wanna-be-hacker tale.

    It is a fact that no such "blue pill" could hide itself from a timing attack.

    Rutkowska is a joke and her random babblings are full of logical fallacies.

    I've got several Core 2 Duo running with an hypervisor (currently running Xen HVM with a Linux dom0 and a Windows dom0). Now, please, Rutkowska, show me how this box could have an hypervisor rootkit and still allow me to run Windows in an HVM domain ???

    It is impossible, which is a fact. Oh, no, wait, it is possible... IF you then emulate Windows (instead of running it natively in an hardware virtualized domain). But guess what, it would be so dog slow that the "timing attack" would be myself noticing that something super-fishy is going on (note that here it's the lamest of all "timing attack" I'm doing... If I was really concerned I'd realize the timing attack from another system, through the network).

    We're back to square one: it is impossible to write an hypervisor rootkit that resits a timing attack.

    She's a joke... And that's a fact.