Slashdot Mirror
Buffer Overflow Found in RFID Passport Readers
epee1221 writes "Wired ran a story describing Lukas Grunwald's Defcon talk on an attack on airport passport readers. After extracting data from the (read-only) chip in a legitimate passport, he placed a version of the data with an altered passport photo (JPEG2000 is used in these chips) into a writable chip. The altered photo created a buffer overflow in two RFID readers he tested, causing both to crash. Grunwald suggests that vendors are typically using off-the-shelf JPEG2000 libraries, which would make the vulnerability common."
These passports are full featured CPU's with up to 72KB of data. The "RFID reader" is actually a very bad name for a software system that is going to read out these passports. In most documents it will be referred to as an inspection system. It will not only read out the passport, but it will also test the biometrics, communicate with other systems etc.. This is a complicated process that will most likely take place on a full featured CPU, containing a modern OS, and a modern software stack. This allows for maximum flexibility, but it will also make the systems vulnerable for attack.
The only thing the manufacturers of these systems can do is thoroughly test their software, and make the attack possibilities as small as possible. For instance, they should check the signature under the data before passing the data on to the next layers. Of course, for this you need the certificate of the issuing state. You should also test if the underlying libraries that do this initial check are not vulnerable.
Explain to me how this is an "attack" on passport readers?
Passport is scanned
Reader goes casters up
Reader is power cycled
Passport is scanned again
Reader goes casters up
Owner of said passport is hauled off to some secret room where all of their orifices are checked by an ex-prison guard with large hands.
This does show the lack of testing and hardening, but it seems a buffer overflow situation like this would be relatively easy to patch.
You should start with studying English. Your skills our lacking.
...if you pass a cracked RFID chip through a passport reader and then it crashes,
#1: the guard will humanly read your inside cover photo with extra vigilance...the chip is not the only method of ID
#2: you'll probably be detained for a bit while they re-test your passport; if it fails again, they'll tell you to get a new passport
(#2a: or be placed on a no-fly list, because you're a terrorist)
Plus, how exactly would a code-injection exploit work unless it's something like the GDI+ vulnerability that occurred with WMF files? (If a rogue guard is injecting evil code into the machine, the government had waaay more scary problems ahead than with some 'sploiting a passport reader).
All that being said, there are some things (i.e. voting machines) that just should not be electronic-ized, and I feel this is one of them.
Other than "it'll get you through faster!!", what is the point of using chips when, more than likely, the passport clerk has to humanly-read it to verify the info anyway? Especially considering that the particular RFID chip technology used in the passport is going to be obsolete or cracked in 3 years, and most passports don't expire for five or ten years?
FTFA: "If a reader could be compromised using Grunwald's technique, it might be reprogrammed to misreport an expired passport as a valid one, or even -- theoretically -- to attempt a compromise of the Windows-based border-screening computer to which it is connected."
That does it. From now on I'm only travelling to countries which use OpenBSD to operate their border gateway protocols.
And: "Additionally, the International Civil Aviation Organization recommends that issuing countries protect biometric data on the e-passport with an optional feature known as Extended Access Control, which protects the biometric data on the chip by making readers obtain a digital certificate from the country that issued the passport before the equipment can access the information."
Sounds like in the future, the only people who'll be able to traveler with any degree of success will be those who can forge their passports...
Remember this /. story about RFID Passports Cloned Without Opening the Package? I'm not sure if RFID and security will ever get along at a satisfying level or if will be similar to the systematic breaking of DRM locks. Amongst other RFID stories, this "Security analysis report" paper [91 pages pdf, 967k] is most informative (via this blog).
Animoog.org
There is no architecture that is secure from a passionate developer armed with time, IDA Pro and an oscilloscope (if needed).
The problem is, as usual, the use of inherently unsafe and dangerous programming languages like C and C++.
There is no reason why any modern programming language should permit accidental buffer overflows; they are easily preventable without pushing the burden onto the programmer even in programming languages with the same power as C and C++.
'k, I'm staying at home from now on...