Pakistan YouTube Block Breaks the World
Allen54 noted a followup to yesterday's story about Pakistan's decision to block YouTube. He notes that "The telecom company that carries most of Pakistan's traffic, PCCW, has found it necessary to shut Pakistan off from the Internet while they filter out the malicious routes that a Pakistani ISP, PieNet, announced earlier today. Evidently PieNet took this step to enforce a decree from the Pakistani government that ISP's must block access to YouTube because it was a source of blasphemous content. YouTube has announced more granular routes so that at least in the US they supercede the routes announced by PieNet. The rest of the world is still struggling."
So the article isn't clear on it. Does this ISP have an AS number that allows them to upload global routes? I would say that they should lose it. I can't think of another way that a single ISP could take out the whole internet's access to something. Pretty crazy.
Worst. Title. Ever.
What I wouldn't do for the ability to mod "-1, Plain Wrong"
Better technical explanations of the event are available from the Renesys blog and Data Center Knowledge. The erroneous IP assignments spread across the net within 1 minute, 45 seconds of its announcement by Pakistan Telecom, according to a timeline by Renesys. It took about 80 minutes for YouTube to inform its providers that the route had been hijacked. YouTube says it is "investigating and working with others in the Internet community to prevent this from happening again."
All Things Pakistan points out that this may have a political rather than a "cultural" reason - given that a number of videos of election rigging were posted.
Just because other crap smells worse doesn't mean my own crap doesn't stink anymore. All oppression needs fighting, not just the blatant stuff.
Tu quoque? This idiotic line is getting old. Yes, we get it. The US is better than the scum of the Earth that is al-Qaeda and their supporters. But for the love of God, quit justifying wars of aggression and other unconstitutional acts by see, it could be worse. It's only works with mentally challenged people.
Res publica non dominetur
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080225-insecure-routing-redirects-youtube-to-pakistan.html
Professor Karmadillo Songs of Science
Comment removed based on user account deletion
I'll check back for related questions to fill in any blanks later :)
SIG: HUP
But mullahs forbade printing for 200 years, while in Europe it exploded. Mostly it was silly: religious stuff, cartoons, sex, but it was also maps, mathematics, etc.
Internet is about the same as an invention of printing was then. And again they are making the same mistake, again due to a fear of mullahs to lose their power.
Like 500 years ago it will just slow the development of their civilization.
For those of you who actually want to know "How they did it?" posted from: Renesys Blog
/24 that has been hijacked to its providers
/25 routes are first seen from 36561
/25 routes from 36561
which was found from Cydeweys which is updating as the story progresses. Both of those sites seem to be running a bit slow, so hesitate before clicking.
Full text of Reneysys: Pakistan hijacks YouTube.
A few hours ago, Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) began advertising a small part of YouTube's (AS 36561) assigned network. This story is almost as old as BGP. Old hands will recognize this as, fundamentally, the same problem as the http://merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/1997-04/msg00380.html">infamous AS 7007 from 1997, a more recent ConEd mistake of early 2006 and even TTNet's Christmas Eve gift 2005.
Just before 18:48 UTC, Pakistan Telecom, in response to government order to block access to YouTube (see news item) started advertising a route for 208.65.153.0/24 to its provider, PCCW (AS 3491). For those unfamiliar with BGP, this is a more specific route than the ones used by YouTube (208.65.152.0/22), and therefore most routers would choose to send traffic to Pakistan Telecom for this slice of YouTube's network.
I became interested in this immediately as I was concerned that I wouldn't be able to spend my evening watching imbecilic videos of cats doing foolish things (even for a cat). Then, I started to examine our mountains of BGP data and quickly noticed that the correct AS path ("Will the real YouTube please stand up?") was getting restored to most of our peers.
The data points identified below are culled from over 250 peering sessions with 170 unique ASNs. While it is hard to describe exactly how widely this hijacked prefix was seen, we estimate that it was seen by a bit more than two-thirds of the Internet.
This table shows the timing of the event and how quickly the route propagated (this is actually a fairly normal propagation pattern). The ASNs seeing the prefix were mostly transit ASNs below, so this means that these routes were distributed broadly across the Internet. Almost all of the default free zone (DFZ) carried the hijacked route at least briefly.
18:47:00uninterrupted videos of exploding jello
18:47:45first evidence of hijacked route propagating in Asia, AS path 3491 17557
18:48:00several big trans-Pacific providers carrying hijacked route (9 ASNs)
18:48:30several DFZ providers now carrying the bad route (and 47 ASNs)
18:49:00most of the DFZ now carrying the bad route (and 93 ASNs)
18:49:30all providers who will carry the hijacked route have it (total 97 ASNs)
20:07:25YouTube, AS 36561 advertises the
20:07:30several DFZ providers stop carrying the erroneous route
20:08:00many downstream providers also drop the bad route
20:08:30and a total of 40 some-odd providers have stopped using the hijacked route
20:18:43and now, two more specific
20:19:3725 more providers prefer the
20:28:12peers of 36561 start seeing the routes that were advertised to transit at 20:07
20:50:59evidence of attempted prepending, AS path was 3491 17557 17557
20:59:39hijacked prefix is withdrawn by 3491,