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Sequoia Threatens Over Voting Machine Evaluation
enodo writes "Voting machine manufacturer Sequoia has sent well-known Princeton professor Ed Felten and his colleague Andrew Appel a letter threatening to sue if New Jersey sends them a machine to evaluate. It's not clear from the letter Sequoia sent whether they intend to sue the professors or the state — presumably that ambiguity was deliberate on Sequoia's part. Put another clipping in your scrapbook of cases of companies invoking 'intellectual property rights' for bogus reasons." Sequoia seems to be claiming that no one can make a "report" regarding their "software" without their permission.
I am sure the state of New Jersey can tell Sequoia to accept this investigation or say good-bye to any certification. Sequoia is just making themselves look bad and like they have something to hide.
Jumpstart the tartan drive.
Yes, that is *exactly* what we want Sequoia to do. Sue a Priceton professor & *security* researcher.
Bullet. Meet foot.
There is a war going on for your mind.
It's not clear from the letter Sequoia sent whether they intend to sue the professors or the state -- presumably that ambiguity was deliberate on Sequoia's part.
In other words, this is a scare tactic with nothing to back it up, pure and simple. If Sequoia thought the would have had actual grounds to sue, you can bet that they would have been chillingly specific in their letter.
When people resort to these sort of tactics to attempt to dissuade you, you can be assured you're doing something right.
____
~ |rip/\/\aster /\/\onkey
and see that the only reason Sequoia is pissed off is that they either
a. are afraid that there are gaping security holes in their machines
b. KNOW that there are gaping security holes in their machines
all the privacy zealots will no doubt say that my "if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to be afraid of" mentality is misguided, but let's take a step back and see what is on the line here. this is NOT about personal data, this is about objectively evaluating the security of a device that is going to be used in a VERY public fashion. do lamp makers threaten Underwriters Laboratories for wanting to make sure their device works as intended?
In Soviet Russia jokes are formulaic and decidedly non-humorous.
That's often the results with certain voting machines.
The Mothership
Yes, but nothing is stopping Sequoia from being hung in the court of public opinion.
Sure there is, apathy.
If this gets thrown out, it will really dent future attempts to use methods like this to shield shoddy products.
If you ask me, Sequoia has been given some very bad legal advice. Didn't anyone stop to think about the public relations nightmare this would cause? Not to mention damage to their business.
Any voting system should be verifiable by any member of the voting populous. Having a PhD in computer science should not be prerequisite for understanding the voting system. You also shouldn't have to take somebody else's word for it either. Pen and paper hand counted ballots make sense, because anybody can see exactly what's going on, and fully understand the process. If voters don't understand the voting system, then they might as well not even be voting.
Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
> but if they can help a democrat steal an election...
And what's your opinion if it's helping a republican steal an election?
Whatever response you give me, the words "a democrat" did not need to be in your post. Stealing an election is WRONG, whether it's a democrat or a republican. You took a very good post and diminished it with a bit of partisanship. I notice that you said "democrat" where usually the party affiliation is capitalized, so maybe you're scooting by on a technicality. But at that point we're parsing to the degree that we criticize politicians for.
The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
That's why the ballots can be counted, or viewed by multiple parties, who should all agree on the final counts. Anybody should be allowed to stand around and watch the counting. I'm not saying that no fraud would happen, because it's happened in the past, and it will happen in the future. I'm just saying that it should be obvious to the voting public when fraud is happening. The problem with machines, is that even if they are verified, it's impossible to know what code is running on it when you walk up to it on election day. Think of game consoles. They try to make it so you can only run licensed content. But people always find a way to run homebrew/pirated games. You can verify the machine all you want. There's no guaranteeing that the same machine will actually be used on election day. You could probably even put a completely different machine in front of people on election day, possibly in the same casing, although that's not even necessary, and people wouldn't even know they were using the wrong machine, because each polling district uses different machines.
Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
and you too.
If their contract declares as such then they are in the right.
However, it should be a requirement at the state level, if not federal, to require this sort of outside verification and study. If a manufacturer does not agree to it then they should be considered for the application. Fair is fair.
Don't want to be hold accountable then don't expect our money.
I am quite sure some other company will step forward if there is money to be made and their intellectual property rights are protected. I am all for testing and certification by outside groups but I also realize that there is investment here and that needs protected first. What must come first is OUR rights, our rights to know that outside experts have certified a solution and future implementations will protect our vote. Surely some company will step up to this for the money. Maybe it will be the kick in the pants for some group already in place to do so.
* Winners compare their achievements to their goals, losers compare theirs to that of others.
Sequoia welcomes all such responsibly executed review activities.
... if they've nothing to hide ...
Obviously they don't. Anyone claiming that Ed Felten is unable to responsibly execute such a review should have her head examined. More to the point however, it is equally obvious that they are very much aware of Professor Felten's reputation, and would very much rather he didn't execute a responsible review of their equipment.
Hey
The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
No, it's not the same problem. It's easy for people to watch the movements of pieces of paper, make sure they end up where they belong, and count them. It's much harder to do the same with electrons.
The solution for paper ballots is based on four principles: transparency, adversarial conditions, counting everything in a way that, if done right, makes double-entry accounting look like a random number generator, and decentralization.
Transparency means that every step of the process is done in the open, with multiple people watching. Adversarial conditions means that the people watching include representatives (i.e. campaign workers) of all candidates, who are highly motivated to ensure that the others don't cheat. In Scotland, for example, each candidate can even apply their own seal to the ballot boxes in addition to the electoral commission's seals, so they can verify for themselves that boxes haven't been swapped, opened, or lost. A fraudster would have to be able to duplicate the seals of every political party in addition to the electoral commission.
As for counting, every ballot paper must be accounted for. Polling stations start with a known number of blank ballots (verified by all candidates) and they must count the number of ballot papers issued, used, spoiled, and not used, as well as the number of ballots that end up in the ballot box, and if the numbers don't add up right then one can deduce that funny business is going on.
Finally, decentralization is important. With safeguards in place, it may still be possible to cheat in a few locations (although you'd have to get campaign workers from all sides to look the other way), but widespread fraud serious enough to steal a whole election becomes extremely difficult. It is difficult to compromise the process in many locations at once. And even though the central counting facility receives the counts from each polling station and adds them up, it can be made to echo the numbers back and discrepancies can be spotted. A centralized electronic system, though, can be compromised at the center, you don't have to take over every polling station.
"It is the exact same problem."
Hardly.
Think of the issues in logistical terms. In a paper-ballot system, tampering with a ballot box in such a way as to make any appreciable difference in the vote result would require tools, materials, physical access and a certain amount of time and effort within a relatively small window of opportunity.
With an electronic system, if the state isn't allowed to run simulated elections or do detailed inspection of the voting machine and software, the window of opportunity for tampering is huge, the potential for altering the result is high, and the risk of detection is minimal.