SF Admin Gives Up Keys To Hijacked City Network
snydeq writes "Jailed IT admin Terry Childs relinquished his hold over San Francisco's multimillion-dollar FiberWAN, handing his administrative passwords over to San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, who was 'the only person he felt he could trust.' Childs is still being held on $5 million bail for his lockout of the city's FiberWAN, a case that has been called into question since an insider came forward with details about both the network and Childs himself. The case hinges on No Service Password Recovery commands Childs allegedly configured onto several Cisco devices, as well as dial-up and DSL modems the SFPD has discovered that would allow unauthorized connections to the FiberWAN. Childs intends to 'expose the utter mismanagement, negligence, and corruption at DTIS, which if left unchecked, will in fact place the City of San Francisco in danger,' according to his motion. The Department of Telecom and IS has cut 200 of its 350 IT positions since 2000 — pressure that may have contributed to Childs' actions, according to interviews with current and former DTIS staffers. Newsom secured the passwords without first telling the DTIS that he was meeting with Childs."
From my viewpoint, it appears that Mr. Childs wasn't so much a malevolent person as much as he was paranoid and protective. We've all met this admin before. He won't give you any rights that you may need to do your job because you could screw "his computers". I'm not saying what he did was right or legal but he may not be the white cat stroking, maniacally-laughing villain that the initial news reports made him to be.
Well, there's spam egg sausage and spam, that's not got much spam in it.
I guess Newsom is an MCSE/CCNA and therefore is trusted.
This story has a real obvious 'bad guy' in Childs.
Arrogant, supposedly unstable, egotistical.
But there are odd, contrary, little pieces of this tale that intrigue me.
I'd like to see some comprehensive treatment of this tragicomedy written a year from now, when the dust has settled, and Childs' side of the story can be heard as well.
You can't talk about Wikipedia's flaws on Wikipedia
Did anyone else wonder why a SourceForge administrator had the keys to a city's network.
I will not mourn that which I never had to lose. - Unknown
He was just too embarrassed by the password - ibonkedmymom.
Help a man when he is in trouble and he will remember you when he is in trouble again.
"Childs intends to 'expose the utter mismanagement, negligence, and corruption at DTIS, which if left unchecked, will in fact place the City of San Francisco in danger,' according to his motion."
The fact that one employee had complete control over the network should be enough of a sign. Of course this is management, so they're all likely still confused on what's going on and need to have another meeting.
If he believes that the Mayor is going to be reconfiguring the routers he certainly is a nutjob!
simon
He's probably hoping for whistleblower protection, and intends to show that he was being terminated wrongfully for threatening to blow the whistle.
It may be a desperation move, but until the facts come out, we don't know. If it turns out that he was being terminated wrongfully, it's possible that the city of SF could be forced to keep him on their payroll... on the other hand, I'd speculate that he's grasping at straws.
I've read some about the "situation", and all I think all we know for certain is that we don't know anything for certain yet.
"Trolls they were, but filled with the evil will of their master: a fell race..." -- J.R.R. Tolkien on Olog-hai
You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
Mr. Paranoid Admin with a God complex had big freakin' huge vulnerabilities on his precious network?
Attaching old-fashioned modems to the console ports of routers and switches is sometimes done in order to allow the administrator to remotely access the equipment during a major network failure.
It's not an egregious "vulnerability", assuming the console it password protected. That statement was spun to make it sound like they were back doors, when in reality this was likely done for no other reason than to facilitate emergency maintenance.
Please note I am not defending Childs generally. I'm just saying that the way they've minced words in some of these allegations gives me pause.
So...I certainly don't know if this guy is crazy or not, but there are a few things that I am surprised the /. crowd really hasn't bothered with.
1. The problems between IT and Management are so bad across the board that there is a famous cartoon relating these problems. This famous cartoon spawned the "PHB" reference. So...to listen to an IT guy complain of incompetent management shouldn't be a surprise at all. Please everyone, raise your hand if you have been handed complete and utter bullshit requirements or policies that some "PHB" without a technical clue has demanded that you implement. Now...raise your hand if you were stupid enough to EVER give them administrative rights over ANYTHING.
2. The media has a fucking field day with "evil hackers". This is so bad that the world "hacker" now means criminal and hordes of geeks wimpering and moaning about how the media stole the word. So...the media reporting on yet another "evil hacker holding city hostage" should be taken with a grain of salt. Sensationalist crap reported by people that have less than 0 IT understanding to the masses who also have less than 0 IT understanding. Million to one odds says that if they actually reported the more technical facts of this case the ratings would be near 0 and this story would have never gotten to be so high profile.
3. He did give the password to the person at the top of the chain of responsibility for this. Which to me sounds like the most appropriate thing to do. If you are so concerned that everyone is an incompetent fool then your only option is to go straight to the top. Imagine how much trouble this guy would be in if he gave out these passwords to a bunch of corrupt and incompetent folks who did bring the city down? At least this way everything continued functioning.
Finally...and most concerning to me is a quote from the article.
But without access to either Childs' passwords or the backup configuration files, administrators would have to essentially re-configure their entire network, an error-prone and time-consuming possibility, Chase said. "It's basically like playing 3D chess," he said. "In that situation, you're stuck interviewing everybody at every site getting anecdotal stories of who's connected to what. And then you're guaranteed to miss something."
Really...so basically these people didn't document ANYTHING. Because config files or not, rebulding your network if you bothered to document things isn't all that hard, it's just time consuming. But straight from their man there they would be stuck interviewing people for anecdotal stories becaues they were too incompetent to bother documenting the network. Nevermind that they seem to have cut their IT staff from 350 to 100 over the last few years. So it sounds like their IT staff was just the favored bucket to take money from, which is hardly new thinking these days. It amuses me to no end when companies/governments treat their IT staff like overpaid housekeeping, largely unneccessary drains on budgets, and an unimportant support function and then scream bloody murder when the shit hits the fan.
The only change I can believe in is what I find in my couch cushions.
Reading a lot of comments about him being a nut job. My question is - what if he isn't? Is it possible that as a administrator of a SAN/Network, he saw some significant security issues, and when he presented them to his supervisors was slammed for reporting the problem -- including being fired? I know from experience the feeling: Management does not like to know that they've screwed up, and will fight kicking and screaming rather that admit that they've done something wrong. For me -- most recently this includes bogus Business Requirements, and critical Business Requirements that are not being met. I've found significant security holes in the where I currently work. Presented the problems to management. The response - don't call use, we'll call you.
What was the point of holding back for so long now. Now he just lost the last hope for his negotiation.
Or, he wasn't holding back in order to negotiate, but because he wanted to get the opportunity to tell all of his grievances to the one person who he thought might have the power and wherewithal to "fix" the situation. From reading about the motions that his lawyers have filed in court, it seems that Childs is willing to risk going to jail just to be able to publicize the hard time he's been having at work for the past couple of years. In fact, he might have willingly accepted or even pursued the prospect of prosecution because he knew that he would then have a public forum to air his views, and possibly embarrass his bosses (which, despite their best efforts, he has).
"Save the network. Save the world."
...Couldn't the guy have just MARRIED the computer system, then claimed that it couldn't testify against him under Spousal Privilege?
Any technology distinguishable from magic is insufficiently advanced.
Although I find your delivery crude, I agree with your message.
I would not be surprised in even the slightest if the now-branded "paranoid" admin is hailed as a hero in the future for exposing precisely what he has set out to expose.
200 people in eight years?
Enough security risks to compel him to likely ruin his life for what he believes is a good cause?
Why is it so silly to give the benefit of the doubt to someone who, up until his last action, has been trusted with some of the most valuable information the city has to offer?
Let's try this one instead:
You're responsible for maintaining a nuclear reactor. Your manager, who has no idea how to actually runs the reactor comes in and demands to be given all of the necessary keys and passwords to the reactor. The reactor is currently working flawlessly, and there is no obvious reason for your manager to need access to the system.
Do you:
A. realize that this could be very bad for the company, and protect the company by refusing to turn over access to an unqualified person?
B. turn over access to the access to an unqualified person, and just hope that they don't do anything which results in anyone's death, or your working 16hr shifts for the next 3 months straight.
I would argue that choosing "B" could be criminally negligent, and that A is the better choice, however, he should also immediately go to HR and explain why he's violating the order.
In this particular case, he might've saved the city of San Francisco millions of dollars in lost productivity from someone getting access who had no clue what they were doing.
Build it, and they will come^Hplain.
Most folks aren't familiar with WAN management, so they probably still don't get what you're saying.
People: Installing backdoors in a WAN saves you a 1+ (sometimes much more than 1+) hour trip somewhere to check a stat or reset a device. Installing backdoors in a LAN is lazy. In other words, the difference is geography. As a WAN manager if you don't have what's called an "out of band" management plan, you're an idiot. (Or you have a micro-sized WAN.) It's also not something that's left secretly, it's planned and secured like any other WAN exposure.
Good luck!
-Matt
unconstitutional state law.
We should be able to work this out. Maybe we can just agree that you get to keep your handguns and I get to get married.
# (/.);;
- : float -> float -> float =
To have someone ELSE give the "key to the city" to the mayor?
I guess Newsom is an MCSE/CCNA and therefore is trusted.
It's actually Newsom's perfect hair that generates a trust enhancement field. Terry Childs saw through this, but recognized the hair as a superintelligent alien symbiont that is on our planet to save us from ourselves, so he gave the passwords directly to the hair.
Martin Luther King once said, "An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law."
It was also a law that the California Supreme Court later declared unconstitutional, so it seems like in retrospect it was a pretty good call.
I agree with many others that point out the gaps in the headlines. The so called "rest" of the story. This circumstance didn't just develop in a week. This case is a classic story of I/T service immaturity - which could be caused by dastardly BOFH's or equally by incompetent management failing to initiate/fund a proper plan. Or both.
Once you strip away the glorius certifications and acronyms that give you credibility, all that's left is your integrity. Terry Childs has gone to jail to keep his intact. So he's either really stupid or really right.
Within the linked article is a link to the original InfoWorld "scoop" that contains copy from a confidential source. That copy contains statements that back Childs as having proposed and promoted an I/T security policy, which would be a first step toward process maturity (having a process in the first place).
My guess is when the dust settles, the story will be as follows:
he NEVER attacked, nor have they claimed he did. They arrested him and charged him the same day they fired him and he wouldn't give up the password. Then started spewing to the press he "might have" created back doors (lines calling his on-call pager) and sabotaged equipment (not restoring the configs on power cycle to protect the network).. which is already being determined as built-in (but rarely used) features being used correctly. So far the ONLY WRONGDOING they have is refusal to give up the password.
They ARRESTED and managed to get $5M bail for not giving up a password... period.. the rest is misinformation, lack of job skill by his boss, or outright LIES. No wonder he didn't give it up sooner!