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Achieving Mathematical Proofs Via Computers

eldavojohn writes "A special issue of Notices of the American Mathematical Society (AMS) provides four beautiful articles illustrating formal proof by computation. PhysOrg has a simpler article on these assistant mathematical computer programs and states 'One long-term dream is to have formal proofs of all of the central theorems in mathematics. Thomas Hales, one of the authors writing in the Notices, says that such a collection of proofs would be akin to the sequencing of the mathematical genome.' You may recall a similar quest we discussed."

209 comments

  1. godelstheorem? by retchdog · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Why is this tagged "godelstheorem"? It's not like incompleteness magically applies only to electronic computers, as opposed to meatbags...

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    1. Re:godelstheorem? by QuantumG · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I honestly think they need to stop teaching the halting problem to freshmen CS majors. They're just too inexperienced to understand that theory and practice are two different things.. so this whole "limits of computation" thing stifles their enthusiasm.

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    2. Re:godelstheorem? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Of course this applies. No, Gödel's theorem doesn't just apply to computers, but it does apply too!

      And it is actually a very relevant point. Since Gödel proved that a formal system must be either incomplete or inconsistent -- and we do not really know which one applies to mathematics -- it may be that a "central" theorem of mathematics will contradict some other finding, later, which turns out to be equally central.

      Not very likely, but who knows?

    3. Re:godelstheorem? by ComaVN · · Score: 2, Informative

      a formal system must be either incomplete or inconsistent -- and we do not really know which one applies to mathematics --

      Except that we do, and it's incomplete.

      Now, as to which applies to meatbags, my guess is they're both incomplete and inconsistent.

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    4. Re:godelstheorem? by AWhistler · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Not only that, but people should stop using this as a crutch in general. The journey is worth the effort, even knowing that you can never reach the end. This is why I agreed with Godel, Escher, Bach by Hofstadter and disagreed with The Emporer's New Mind by Penrose.

      One of Penrose's conclusions was that any attempt at artificial intelligence is necessarily incomplete, so it won't be possible, while Hofstadter said that it is possible to successively approximate something intelligent, and we can learn a LOT about ourselves in the attempts, and that in itself is worth it.

      At least that is one of the many things I got from the two books.

    5. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 4, Informative

      We already know that a statement like the continuum hypothesis can be proved neither true nor false from ZFC. We don't need Godel's theorem to prove "incompleteness or inconsistency" when we have lots of practical examples of its incompleteness. So your claim of "don't know" is false.

      First order logic is consistent and complete. In fact, Godel proved this. Additionally, consider the set S of all possible propositions of set theory. Somewhere in the power set of S must lie the set of all true propositions. Just take these as your axioms. Voila, a formal system that is both complete and consistent. Your characterization of Godel's theorem is incorrect.

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    6. Re:godelstheorem? by hardburn · · Score: 1

      Since GÃdel proved that a formal system must be either incomplete or inconsistent . . .

      There's a third possibility, which is "not powerful enough to be really interesting".

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    7. Re:godelstheorem? by Chris+Burke · · Score: 1

      I honestly think they need to stop teaching the halting problem to freshmen CS majors. They're just too inexperienced to understand that theory and practice are two different things.. so this whole "limits of computation" thing stifles their enthusiasm.

      I suppose. Personally I find it very useful in explaining why, generally speaking, the only way to really know how a program will respond to certain inputs is to test it. Theory and practice are not all that far apart. In theory, the halting problem only states that there is no algorithm that can answer the halting question for all programs and inputs, given infinite resources and potentially infinite running time. In practice, no such algorithm exists for most programs and inputs on real machines.

      It may stifle their enthusiasm, but it will at least explain why, for example, the only real way to test the control logic for your microprocessor is by writing lots and lots of tests and checking their output. I know that when I entered school I was hoping there was a "magical" (as in unknown to me) method of writing correct programs other than my previous hack->run->debug cycle, but the reality is that formal verification is only practical for a small subset of problems.

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    8. Re:godelstheorem? by BitterOak · · Score: 4, Insightful

      One of Penrose's conclusions was that any attempt at artificial intelligence is necessarily incomplete, so it won't be possible, while Hofstadter said that it is possible to successively approximate something intelligent, and we can learn a LOT about ourselves in the attempts, and that in itself is worth it.

      Not only that, but Penrose doesn't offer any actual proof that AI is impossible, merely speculative reasoning. Therefore it seems doubly important that we continue our attempts to advance AI. Firstly, that the journey itself is worth the effort, and secondly we really need to find out for ourselves if it is possible.

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    9. Re:godelstheorem? by GodKingAmit · · Score: 1

      So far.

    10. Re:godelstheorem? by uncmathguy · · Score: 1

      >Except that we do, and it's incomplete.

      Sorry if I missed the joke if your post was supposed to be ironic, but of course, we don't know that. In fact, Godel proved that it is not possible to prove that mathematics is consistent. And of course, if mathematics is not consistent, then it is trivially complete.

      As for meatbags, I didn't realize such terms applied.

    11. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Isn't non-artificial intelligence necessarily incomplete as well? It's not like the brain has a sprinkling of magic pixie dust that computers can never have.

    12. Re:godelstheorem? by z-j-y · · Score: 2, Interesting

      can human brain be simulated by a Turing machine? It's plausible that human brain obey physics - but is physics Turing computable?

      Of course we can create physical machines that's the same as human brains - million of of them everyday:)

    13. Re:godelstheorem? by AWhistler · · Score: 1

      That *is* one of the corollaries I took away from the two books as well.

    14. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I thought Penrose did essentially think the human brain had some unknown "magic" ingredient that non-human intelligence could never have?

    15. Re:godelstheorem? by kohaku · · Score: 5, Informative

      Why should AI be impossible? Surely it must be possible, with the human brain as evidence? One might argue that the brain is merely a biological computer not fully understood. Unless there is a "higher intelligence" giving humans beings thoughts, then AI must be possible. I suppose this is analogous to a Human "telling" a machine what to think, though, and gives rise to the "who created the creator" argument, but that's getting a little offtopic...
      This comment is somewhat similar to one below for which I apologise, but I wanted to expand on the point slightly :)

    16. Re:godelstheorem? by Draek · · Score: 4, Insightful

      One of Penrose's conclusions was that any attempt at artificial intelligence is necessarily incomplete, so it won't be possible

      But wouldn't Godel's theorem imply that it'd be impossible to build a flawless, all-encompasing intelligence, not necessarily an imperfect one? fsck, even I as a human (allegedly the "superior" intelligence) sometimes feel that my decisions are based solely on the output of a Random() call in my brain rather than logical thought, no reason why a machine has to be different.

      AI isn't about trying to build God, it's just about something that can learn new stuff, or at least that's my take of it.

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    17. Re:godelstheorem? by not-my-real-name · · Score: 1

      One of Penrose's conclusions was that any attempt at artificial intelligence is necessarily incomplete, so it won't be possible, while Hofstadter said that it is possible to successively approximate something intelligent, and we can learn a LOT about ourselves in the attempts, and that in itself is worth it.

      It seems to me that unless there is something supernatural involved (a soul), it should be possible to construct an artificial intelligence. It may be something different than a computer, but it should be possible. The rest is just engineering.

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    18. Re:godelstheorem? by Kagura · · Score: 1

      AI isn't about trying to build God ...

      I hope we reach the singularity in my lifetime. But considering the state of AI at this point in time, I will be long dead before immortality arrives.

    19. Re:godelstheorem? by jonaskoelker · · Score: 5, Insightful

      But wouldn't Godel's theorem imply that it'd be impossible to build a flawless, all-encompasing intelligence, not necessarily an imperfect one?

      Gödel's theorem's concludes, simplified a bit, that it's impossible to know the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about sufficiently complex math. In this context, sufficiently complex means "anything that includes addition and multiplication of natural numbers".

      An AI may be able to prove that sum(range(1, n+1)) == n*(n+1)//2 for all natural numbers n; that is, it may output a string that's a valid proof. Smart ones can, dumb ones can't. Just like humans. Intelligence is what limits you.

      But if a set of axioms and inference rules don't allow for a proof of a given theorem T, no matter how smart you are, even if your silicon brain is smarter than all of mankind, monkeykind and birdkind added up, you can't transcend any limitation that's found wholly outside your intelligence. As in this case, where it's the nature of the mathematics you've made that prevents T from being proven, and not your inability to find the proof.

      Similarly, if we agree that no evidence or reasoning can prove or disprove the existence of god, then no AI can know whether god exists: it's not your knowledge or ability to reason that limits you, it's the nature of knowledge and reasoning itself.

      Looked upon that way, Gödel's theorem doesn't say anything about AI. It says something about the world.

      I don't know what a "perfect" intelligence is. One that can solve all NP problems in O(1) time and space? Or s/NP/Recursive/? Or just something that can solve all recursive problems in finite time? To implement that, all we lack is the ability to store unbounded information in a world of finitely many atoms. Can intelligence do something more than Turing machines? Does that mean the answer is no? Or that we need to connect nerves to the PCI bus?

    20. Re:godelstheorem? by jonaskoelker · · Score: 1

      my decisions are based solely on the output of a Random() call in my brain rather than logical thought, no reason why a machine has to be different.

      It's not random, it's just that every ten seconds you get a hard disk and feel like doing an integrity check.

      No reason why a machine has to be different. [zomfg, I just googled "mecha porn". Rule 34 works, biatches].

    21. Re:godelstheorem? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Really? We have a consistency proof? I would be interested in knowing more about that.

    22. Re:godelstheorem? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 2, Insightful

      My understanding was that Gödel proved that S could not contain itself, which was the downfall of that very argument. Consider a statement about S: "S contains all possible propositions." That proposition may be true, but it is not possible to prove that proposition within S, so S is incomplete. Q.E.D.

      That is a brief summary but even if I misunderstood that, a proven incompleteness by itself still does not prove consistency. They are not mutually exclusive.

    23. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As a scientist, Penrose offers no proof because you can't prove a negative.

    24. Re:godelstheorem? by Draek · · Score: 1

      Exactly. Now, my question is, is an AI required to answer such questions? is an AI even required to be able to add two numbers? Godel's theorem as I understand it essentially states that any system (in this case, our AI), when faced with some questions, will either ignore the answer or give an answer that contradicts itself, but is that a problem?

      As you say, Godel's theorem says more about the world than it does about intelligences per se, and if not being able to prove or disprove a specific statement means our AI isn't intelligent, by Godel's theorem nothing can be, not even us.

      I don't know what a "perfect" intelligence is. One that can solve all NP problems in O(1) time and space? Or s/NP/Recursive/? Or just something that can solve all recursive problems in finite time?

      I was thinking more like a religious God: an intelligence that knows anything and everything in all possible ways that they can be known. But is that the minimum for an AI? I'd be happy with a virtual pet that eats, poops, and barks at strangers without being programmed to know what it means to eat, poop, bark, or what's a stranger. No need to demonstrate long-standing mathematical problems or even do my children's math homework.

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    25. Re:godelstheorem? by Sparr0 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Of course you can prove a negative, usually by contradiction. Assume the opposite and see if that produces a contradiction. If it does, then the original negative is true.

    26. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1

      Propositions are very simple things. They're just strings of characters. You can easily write a computer program to generate all propositions and there's no problem working with the set of all propositions. Given any set, the set of all subsets exists. This is the Power Set Axiom. This set contains every possible set of propositions, so it certainly contains the set of all true propositions.

      An important part of Godel's incompleteness theorems that is often overlooked is that the set of axioms has to be recursively enumerable (r.e). In other words it has to be possible to write a computer program that lists the axioms, and no other propositions. My example fails because even though the set of all true propositions exists, it's not r.e. So it's not the kind of axiom set that Godel's theorems talk about. That's why these theorems can coexist with the example axiom set I talked about.

      The other example I gave was first order logic. The incompleteness theorems don't talk about this either because you can't do arithmetic in first order logic. The theorems only apply to formal systems in which you can do arithmetic. Check out the wording at wikipedia.

      A consequence of the incompleteness theorems is that we can't write a program that systematically lists all true mathematical propositions. But that's *not* what the original article is about. It's about machines checking human-generated proofs, and maybe filling in details. Godel's incompleteness theorems provide no objection to this at all. In principle, checking human proofs is really easy, you just check the axiom or derivation step that was used at each step in the proof. It's an undergraduate programming exercise to do this. The problem is more human than logical: complete formal proofs of non-trivial results are very very long and so don't correspond to what mathematicians actually write.

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    27. Re:godelstheorem? by retchdog · · Score: 1

      I heard that the Fields medalist Michael Freedman was trying to prove P!=NP, by reducing the problem to a corollary of Godel's result (the idea being to construct a mapping from NP-problems to "true statements", such that P-problems wind up in the subset of "provable statements").

      The notion of using the biggest "negative" result in mathematics to solve one of the most elusive problems is truly inspiring.

      I don't know if it'll work though, and I haven't heard much since a few years ago. I've long since given up on pure mathematics myself.

      --
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    28. Re:godelstheorem? by retchdog · · Score: 1

      Yeah, quantum mechanical fluctuations in the microtubules.

      No one really takes this seriously, not to mention that we do have computers which are affected by quantum mechanics.

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    29. Re:godelstheorem? by InfiniteLoopCounter · · Score: 1

      In theory, the halting problem only states that there is no algorithm that can answer the halting question for all programs and inputs, given infinite resources and potentially infinite running time. In practice, no such algorithm exists for most programs and inputs on real machines.

      It may stifle their enthusiasm, but it will at least explain why, for example, the only real way to test the control logic for your microprocessor is by writing lots and lots of tests and checking their output.

      It may stifle enthusiasm a little, but it does get one thinking about such things.

      As I understand it from CS lectures, the halting problem can be briefly summarized by the following argument:

      - Assume there is a halting program.

      - Now run the halting program on itself. There is no way to tell if it will halt or not, which is a contradiction. Therefore, such a program cannot exist in general.

      Whilst it is a logical argument (the full argument being more mathematical), I don't like this very much. You have to be very specific in placing some restrictions on your problem space. Namely, you can't write an infinitely long code and there is only a finite number of possible inputs. These aspects seemed to me to be glossed over too much, especially the part about inputs which should lead to conditional halting.

      Furthermore, what is to stop you from assessing your code as you are writing it? Why not just test every possible combination of inputs on the code as it is being generated (making the appropriate assumptions so that this does not actually check every combination of inputs)? Whilst not feasible in practice for all scenarios, shouldn't this be possible in theory. I also note that most of the time I spend coding is idle time for the processor.

      Clever checking might then just check for two states where all the dynamic variables are the same (which would probably be easier in practice where methods only contain limited subsets of variables).

      I am not knocking the logic of the halting problem, just how it is introduced as being this general statement that construction of such a program is theoretically impossible. Any human can tell whether or not the hello world programs which came before will halt or not halt after a casual glance. Why cannot a machine employ a simple finite state approach to yield a conditional solution (sometimes the actual answer maybe "unknown" in practice due to random numbers or any code which does not yield the same answer every time for the same inputs) for a possible-to-write program for which all the code is visible?

      Well, that is the end of my rant. If I have got this the wrong way then please feel free to point out problems in my argument.

    30. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Somewhere in the power set of S must lie the set of all true propositions. Just take these as your axioms. Voila, a formal system that is both complete and consistent.

      Such a set is infinite. You want your set of axioms to be finite and you want to be able to enumerate all true propositions from it. Otherwise, we cannot use it.

    31. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Thye difference between theory and practice is greater in practice than it is in theory.

    32. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Let's take a step back and not worry about abstract reasoning for a moment. Here's a concrete example with a very simple function. You really should try to solve this before talking about using "clever checking", etc.

      /* pseudocode: assume "int" is an infinite precision integer with no overflow */
      int collatz_number (int n)
      {
        int steps = 0;
        while (n > 1)
          {
            if ((n % 2) == 1) { n *= 3; n += 1; };
            n /= 2;
            steps += 1;
          }
        return steps;
      }

      (Hint: Nobody knows if it always halts or not. My apologies if you get hooked on this problem too...)

    33. Re:godelstheorem? by Eli+Gottlieb · · Score: 3, Interesting

      One might argue that the brain is merely a biological computer not fully understood.

      Or, perhaps, humans could be nondeterministic and therefore not computers at all.

    34. Re:godelstheorem? by InfiniteLoopCounter · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Again, restrict the problem space to what is feasible. This pathological example is one of infinite complexity that is impossible in practice (int cannot be substituted for an infinite precision integer). There will be overflow or there will be a state where n is the same as a state before after a finite number of steps (there are only a finite number of possible values for n). So this program will conditionally halt for different values of n (of which there is a finite number).

      I was talking about applying theory to something that is possible. Obviously you can set up a simple system which is impossible to execute and generate an infinite space of inputs and outputs. This is plain cheating in reality, often the mistaken realm of application of the halting problem.

    35. Re:godelstheorem? by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 1

      One might argue that the brain is merely a biological computer not fully understood.

      1. How would that be an argument, and not just an analogy?
      2. One might argue that my bedroom walls are a physical computer not fully understood, simply by stating some structural correspondences between it and some Turing machine. Where does that leave arguments to the effect that "the brain is a computer"?
    36. Re:godelstheorem? by johanatan · · Score: 0

      Actually, there is a 'higher intelligence' giving human beings thoughts as you put it (i.e., souls). You don't have to start with this assumption though as the implications of Godel's theorems would lead you to that conclusion if you start with them (and the theorems are pretty rock solid).

    37. Re:godelstheorem? by johanatan · · Score: 0

      Excellent post. You had me up until the part about no AI being able to know whether god exists or not. I just don't understand how that matters. It is but one of infinitely many pieces of knowledge that is beyond the reach of the reasoning facilities of both human and machine alike, no?

      [And, BTW, Godel's refinements to the classical ontological proof of God's existence are quite compelling anyway--so maybe this is not one of the infinitely many pieces of unknowable truths?].

    38. Re:godelstheorem? by johanatan · · Score: 0

      Yes, it is. Reality outruns knowledge.

    39. Re:godelstheorem? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      That may all be true, but it does not apply to the comment I originally made, which had little to do with the original article (please go back and look). I was replying to someone who was asking why Gödel's theorem should apply to computers, since they were not people. (That did, indeed, appear to be what he was asking.)

      My reply was that it applies to computers too. But of course it is a given that it applies in the same way: it would apply to formal systems that might be concocted by computer, as much and in the same way as it applies to formal systems devised by people. That is all. None of the other things you have been saying are really relevant to that train of discussion... and frankly I don't know why you piped up here. I agree with what you say in the final paragraph, as far as it goes, but I do not see how it has any relevance at all to what was being discussed in this particular thread.

    40. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      FYI: The function above can be easily expressed as a 3-symbol, 6-state Turing machine where only 3 of those states do the main algorithm and one of the states is just to catch the halting condition.

      Turing machines that aren't allowed to have infinite tapes are called finite state machines. FSMs are worthlessly boring. Turing machines are interesting because of the possibility of infinite state.

      As for your point about an infinite precision integers: yeah sure, but they can be implemented as strings, and we have TB hard drives now! Have you bothered to consider how large 2^(1,000,000,000,000) is? (Hint: There are only ~2^265 atoms in the known universe.)

    41. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1

      To be frank, I replied to your post because it was the first one to make sense. The parent posts didn't seem to say anything coherent at all.

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    42. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The set of all propositions in set theory does not exist. Given a set X, we have a proposition that states that the empty set is an element of X. This would allow us to realize the set of all sets as a subset of the set of all possible propositions. This would violate Russel's paradox.

    43. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This doesn't disprove the original issue the GP raised though. What you've done is change the problem definition by restricting it to a linear bounded automata (which a real computer is more like, so of course it will halt, eventually), and not a Turing machine. Yes, Turing machines don't really exist due to whole infinite tape, but that doesn't mean you can't say anything useful about how it applies to real machines as well, nor does it disprove the GP's point.

    44. Re:godelstheorem? by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      I can accept that. :o)

    45. Re:godelstheorem? by InfiniteLoopCounter · · Score: 1

      Turing machines that aren't allowed to have infinite tapes are called finite state machines. FSMs are worthlessly boring. Turing machines are interesting because of the possibility of infinite state.

      I put it to you that one could just as easily say that Turing machines are worthless (except to mathematicians) because they cannot be expressed by a real, physical application and set circumstances where it is impossible to make some otherwise useful programs.

      I am not whingeing about anything other than that these things were not discussed properly in the CS lectures I attended. Maybe these things should be left to mathematicians or for later on, as one of the earlier posts suggests.

      I just wanted to present some food for thought to those who may not have their heads around this stuff yet as well as the put forward the idea of checking as the code is being written (something I have yet to see an IDE do well and has the potential to produce faster code). In the process I may have inadvertently angered those such as yourself.

      PS - I do have a lot of time for people studying pure mathematics. Just make sure that people understand that where infinities are involved, you cannot apply a theory to the real world (black holes notwithstanding).

    46. Re:godelstheorem? by AnyoneEB · · Score: 1

      You are talking about static code analysis and formal verification. Basically, you can write proofs that a program works and halts, but programming languages and compilers that work with such proofs are very rare outside of research settings, mostly because proving a program is valid is a very long and tedious process. I suspect mainstream compilers will be getting better about checking if programs definitely halt and other easy proofs (like you seem to be discussing) in the future.

      Also, there is the field of programming languages with very detailed type systems which, among other things, may be able to prove that an integer can never overflow. How much the programmer has to write about those types varies from language to language, but such languages are generally consider research only and too complicated for normal use.

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    47. Re:godelstheorem? by BlueCollarCamel · · Score: 1

      What if you can't prove a negative by contradiction?

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    48. Re:godelstheorem? by InfiniteLoopCounter · · Score: 1

      This doesn't disprove the original issue the GP raised though. What you've done is change the problem definition by restricting it to a linear bounded automata (which a real computer is more like, so of course it will halt, eventually), and not a Turing machine.

      I have three responses to this.

      Firstly, in my post above the GGP you refer to I specifically mention a possible-to-write program with finite inputs and outputs at every stage.

      Secondly, the halting will depend upon the implementation of overflow and is not guaranteed.

      Thirdly, as you are writing the program, you may set limits on the inputs. If there are billions or more combinations you aren't likely to try them all.

      So whilst it does not disprove the GGP's post, it is important to note that the GGP is considering a different problem.

    49. Re:godelstheorem? by CTachyon · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Actually, there is a 'higher intelligence' giving human beings thoughts as you put it (i.e., souls). You don't have to start with this assumption though as the implications of Godel's theorems would lead you to that conclusion if you start with them (and the theorems are pretty rock solid).

      Bullshit. The only thing Gödel's incompleteness theorems prove is that no knowledge, not even human knowledge or even a deity's knowledge, can be both consistent and complete. Human beings are so ridiculously inconsistent that completeness doesn't even enter into the picture and Gödel doesn't apply.

      Alzheimer's is proof by counterexample that souls don't exist. Ever had a relative die of Alzheimer's? My grandmother died of the fast-acting, early-onset form. She was symptomatic in her late 40s and was barely 50 when she was diagnosed. Within 5 years she was behaving like a hypersexed sullen teenager, after 7 years she completely lost the ability to speak a grammatically correct sentence, and 9 years in she died as a bedridden zombie incapable of chewing and swallowing her own food. Her "soul" died piece by piece before my family's eyes, leaving first a wild animal with the power of speech (in the form of babble), and then only an empty husk of a body. The "soul" is divisible, and physical disease can kill it piecemeal by attacking the brain. Therefore, the "soul" is a physical part of the brain. And as flawed as that "proof" is, it's more proof than you offer for your baseless assertions about Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

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    50. Re:godelstheorem? by FrangoAssado · · Score: 1

      Nice post. Some points:

      [...] To implement that, all we lack is the ability to store unbounded information in a world of finitely many atoms.

      Well, even if we had infinitely many atoms, we would still have problems. The Schwarzschild bound limits the amount of energy that can be stored in a volume of space before creating a black hole. So, unless you create a magical way to store information without wasting energy, there's a limit on the amount of information you can store in a given space. Still, this is only a problem if you don't want to wait forever: if you allow unbounded space, the time of computation will be unbounded (because information can't propagate faster than the speed of light).

      Can intelligence do something more than Turing machines?

      Well, that's still very much an open question, but notice that we (humans) can't seem to think of anything better than Turing machines, at least not yet. Even quantum computers only offer better efficiency; they are still capable of solving exactly the same problems than a Turing machine.

    51. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Formal verification is cumbersome but it is practical when the stakes are high enough. In particular, both Intel and AMD use formal verification in addition to testing their processors.

    52. Re:godelstheorem? by Actually,+I+do+RTFA · · Score: 1

      Since Gödel proved that a formal system must be either incomplete or inconsistent -- and we do not really know which one applies to mathematics

      That's a strange characterization. Gödel's first theorem demonstrated that any system will have such premises, using logic much like how the diagonal proof demonstrates that the the number of irrational numbers is greater than aleph-null infinity. And, just like computers could sit down and work forever on just rational numbers, computers could sit down and work forever on provable theorems.

      Gödel's second theorem explains why no consistent system can prove it's own validity. Kinda like science cannot prove the universe is predictable/repeatable, because an attempt to do so utilizes the scientific method, which is based on prediction/reproducibility. Or how math can never prove a=a. You just have to take it on faith.

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    53. Re:godelstheorem? by FrangoAssado · · Score: 1

      We already know that a statement like the continuum hypothesis can be proved neither true nor false from ZFC. We don't need Godel's theorem to prove "incompleteness or inconsistency" when we have lots of practical examples of its incompleteness. So your claim of "don't know" is false.

      Well said. As another example, the "C" of ZFC (axiom of choice) is independent of ZF.

      First order logic is consistent and complete. In fact, Godel proved this.

      No, he didn't. This is a common misconception because of the name of his "Completeness Theorem".

      The "Completeness Theorem" simply states that whatever you can prove (syntactically) with first order logic within a system is exactly what you would accept (intuitively) as true. This is important because it guarantees that if you apply first order logic within a set of (true) axioms, you can only reach things you would normally accept as true; and conversely, if you reason using only the axioms, you can write down your reasoning using first order logic. So, it is only in this sense that first order logic is "complete".

      The Wikipedia article on it (here) makes the distinction clearly, stating that the "completeness" of one theorem is of a different kind than the other, but I recommend this book (sorry, Amazon link), which explains it way better (and much more clearly).

      Additionally, consider the set S of all possible propositions of set theory. Somewhere in the power set of S must lie the set of all true propositions. Just take these as your axioms. Voila, a formal system that is both complete and consistent. Your characterization of Godel's theorem is incorrect.

      Well, sure, but it's kind of a cheat to have infinitely many axioms without a production rule... How exactly do you know what are the axioms (i.e., which element of the power set of S to take)? :-)

    54. Re:godelstheorem? by ComaVN · · Score: 2, Informative

      Sorry, I was wrong.

      --
      Be wary of any facts that confirm your opinion.
    55. Re:godelstheorem? by Maian · · Score: 1

      Great post. Someone mod parent up :)

    56. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As a scientist, Penrose offers no proof because you can't prove a negative.

      Suppose somebody has a refrigerator, and they say "There are no elephants inside this refrigerator." That's a negative, and they can prove it, by opening the refrigerator and looking inside.

    57. Re:godelstheorem? by HungryHobo · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Well this is a decent point. It's impossible to create a truely random number generator in software but you can create one in hardware which, for example, measures the decay of radioactive particals or some such.

      But in that case it still doesn't mean AI is impossible, something is still artificial even if some of it's capabilities have to be instituted in hardware rather than software.

    58. Re:godelstheorem? by sFurbo · · Score: 1

      We already know that a statement like the continuum hypothesis can be proved neither true nor false from ZFC. We don't need Godel's theorem to prove "incompleteness or inconsistency" when we have lots of practical examples of its incompleteness.

      As another poster said, we don't know if it is consistant, and if it isn't consistant, it is trivially complete.

      Additionally, consider the set S of all possible propositions of set theory. Somewhere in the power set of S must lie the set of all true propositions. Just take these as your axioms. Voila, a formal system that is both complete and consistent. Your characterization of Godel's theorem is incorrect.

      Hmm, I'm not sure S is a set at all, it just might be to big. It must surely hold at least one set for set in the theory (X is empty is a theorem for every X), and so it's cardinality must be equal to or bigger then the cardinality af "the set of all sets", which is not a set (see Russels paradox). I might be overlooking something, though. And it doesn't change that much, you can still take all true statements as axioms, but you can't use the formulation you just did.

    59. Re:godelstheorem? by aproposofwhat · · Score: 1

      The other example I gave was first order logic. The incompleteness theorems don't talk about this either because you can't do arithmetic in first order logic. The theorems only apply to formal systems in which you can do arithmetic. Check out the wording at wikipedia [wikipedia.org].

      Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't Godel's second theorem explicitly address Peano arithmetic, which is all first order logic?

      True, you can't address countability (and by extension the halting problem) completely within first order logic, so your point that it is impossible to write a program that creates all true propositions and only true propositions of a formal system holds, but it is possible to create a first order arithmetic, although you can't use it to prove its own consistency.

      That's what I remember from 20-odd years ago, anyway :o)

      --
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    60. Re:godelstheorem? by gtall · · Score: 1

      Peano arithmetic does indeed use first order logic. But it adds extra axioms and an axiom scheme (all instances of induction). It's the additional stuff.

      Goedel's proof assumes a system of a certain complexity, usually one that can code arithmetic. One cannot code arithmetic in just first-order logic since the arithmetic axioms and scheme are not provable in first-order logic.

      Gerry

    61. Re:godelstheorem? by gtall · · Score: 1

      What you are calling Completeness is Soundness.

      Soundness: If I can prove it, then it is true.

      Completeness: If it is true, then it is provable.

      Gerry

    62. Re:godelstheorem? by Corporate+Troll · · Score: 2, Interesting

      While computers are nothing more than finite state machines (with an insane amount of states), their theoretical base can be found in Turing Machines and.... those come in a non deterministic flavour. Take note at the "Equivalence with DTMs" sections.

      So, if the human brain works non-deterministically, it can be simulated by a deterministic "brain". If this doesn't require infinite amount of states (considering what we know of the universe, this most likely won't be the case), it can thus be simulated again with a finite-state machine with an insane amount of states. That is exactly what a computer is, as I said before.

      Throwing around "non-deterministic" won't save you. It might be something else that sets apart the human brain, but it won't be its non-deterministic nature.

    63. Re:godelstheorem? by Corporate+Troll · · Score: 1

      That's one of the best arguments I read for disproving the "soul as an ethereal entity". Not that I believed in that, but next time a "soul exists" discussion comes up, I know how to tackle it.

      Thank you!

    64. Re:godelstheorem? by Welpa · · Score: 1

      As usual, being Slashdot, the louder you are, the more insightful you are modded.

      Bullshit. The only thing Gödel's incompleteness theorems prove is that no knowledge, not even human knowledge or even a deity's knowledge, can be both consistent and complete. Human beings are so ridiculously inconsistent that completeness doesn't even enter into the picture and Gödel doesn't apply.

      WTF does this mean? Which of Godel's incompleteness theorems tells me about deity's knowledge? Godel's theorems have quite precise mathematical content. Your psycho-babble is embarrassing and wrong. But since it's clearly not meant to be understood and you clearly don't know what you are talking about, I'll just point out one specific obvious error: not all formal systems are either incomplete or inconsistent -- they have to be complex enough to contain the natural numbers, an infinite set. I don't know how "souls" and "knowledge" and you grandma relate to Godel but I have a strong suspicion that they don't.

    65. Re:godelstheorem? by Xest · · Score: 1

      Realistically I think what we'll see is convergence. We'll start to produce biological computers and we'll understand how to develop our own biological systems as such. Alternatively quantum computing may indeed provide computers powerful enough develop systems capable of acting just like real, complex biological systems.

      Then it just comes down to the usual argument of semantics. Have you created artificial intelligence or has artificial intellignece failed because you instead just created real intelligence? This is the type of pointless bickering to be expected and that has already resulted in stifling the field a little in the past.

      So that's what we have here, the field of AI is plagued by argument and differences of opinion on basic semantics, when there's no clear definition of even the fundamentals such as what intelligence actually is it's no wonder that we can't decide if AI is even possible or not.

      I prefer to take a more simplistic view on it though, although it overlaps somewhat with what you, and the above posters have already said. My view is that AI research is worth it simply because it consistently provides important and useful results and for me that is reason enough to continue.

      I accept the reasoning that some may argue strong AI is an impossible goal (although I don't believe this is the case personally, I still feel they're entitled to their opinion) what I do absolutely despise is suggestion by some so-called professionals that AI as a whole is pointless because of that unproven premise. It's simply not, it's so utterly important to computing as a whole that it's foolish to write off.

      Those who haven't studied AI sometimes miss the fact that it's unlikely they go more than about 5 minutes using a computer without making use of something that came about as a result of AI research without ever even realising it- whether it's using Google's search engine, whether it's spelling/grammar checking facilities or whether it's compiler optimization when compiling code. If strong AI is impossible or not is irrelevant, AI research is still to this day fundamental to advancement in the field of Computing.

    66. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not necessarily. Alzheimer may just be (and is!) the hardware (brain) problem. The software may be correct, but the composition (the computer) fails.

    67. Re:godelstheorem? by umghhh · · Score: 1

      I would actually welcome if somebody had invented intelligence. I do not care whether it is called artificial or else what but at least we would have something. What we have now instead - well look around for answer.

    68. Re:godelstheorem? by Aris+Katsaris · · Score: 1

      Alzheimer's is proof by counterexample that souls don't exist ...
      Her "soul" died piece by piece before my family's eyes, leaving first a wild animal with the power of speech (in the form of babble), and then only an empty husk of a body. The "soul" is divisible, and physical disease can kill it piecemeal by attacking the brain. Therefore, the "soul" is a physical part of the brain.

      That's an emotional positioning that doesn't make any logical sense. If you say that the soul is killable or divisible or a physical part of the brain, then you've already agreed that it exists, and are merely disagreeing about its properties. And yet you say that it doesn't exist.

      Emotionally I understand what you're getting at: that physical causes can affect the personality, and therefore it causes one to be cynical to believe that the personality resides in some "non-physical" soul.

      I almost completely agree with you on that: I don't believe that souls, even if they exist, would have much of anything to do with personalities. Personalities are just another layer of physicality.

      But I'm nonetheless self-aware. And there's nothing I've read about computation that explains this self-awareness to me. That the personality I am aware of is dependent on my physical brain doesn't explain the fact that I AM aware of it.

    69. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As sad as your counter-example is, it only counters one possible definition of "soul", and does so by assuming a different, physical definition of "soul".

    70. Re:godelstheorem? by kohaku · · Score: 1

      I know this is a little late, but I thought I should thank you for responding to that point. I guess another way of putting it this:

      Assuming there is no higher intelligence giving Humans intelligence, then there is no distinction between natural and artificial intelligence. Ergo, Artificial Intelligence is possible.

      Assuming there is a higher intelligence who has given Humans the capability for thought, then it must be possible to create intelligence, therefore Artificial Intelligence is possible.

    71. Re:godelstheorem? by Sethumme · · Score: 1

      If there is a higher intelligence that is the source of human capacity for thought, then you cannot simply assume that we humans also have the power to create that capacity.

      However, I do like your perspective that intelligence that arises out of natural phenomenon must mean that computers could also be that intelligent.

    72. Re:godelstheorem? by Corporate+Troll · · Score: 1

      No, not late... I read way too much slashdot :-P I like your explanation better. Mine is way too technical.

    73. Re:godelstheorem? by FrangoAssado · · Score: 1

      What you are calling Completeness is Soundness.

      Not quite. Soundness is the converse of Completeness (in this sense, NOT in the sense of the Incompleteness Theorem):

      • Completeness (in the sense of the Completeness Theorem): if it follows by reasoning (i.e., it is "true"), it is also provable applying first order logic to the axioms.
      • Soundness: if it is provable using first order logic to the axioms, it also follows by reasoning (i.e., it is "true").

      It's important to note that First Order Logic is not an axiomatic system per se, it is only a way to derive propositions. Therefore, it is not subject to be Complete or Incomplete in the sense of the Incompleteness Theorem.

      Perhaps there's a confusion with First Order Theory, which is a set of axioms and their derivation using First Order Logic -- the choice of axioms defines which FOT you're talking about, for example Peano Arithmetic or ZFC. These can be Complete or Incomplete in the sense of the Incompleteness Theorem (and indeed are Incomplete).

    74. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      define soul. if the body's acts as a vehicle for the soul, then you've only proven (by example) that a body can deteriorate to the point that the soul has no ability to control it.

    75. Re:godelstheorem? by Chris+Burke · · Score: 1

      They only use formal verification on small and isolated functional units. Using formal verification to ensure your floating point multiplier is correct is one thing, a possible and highly useful thing, using it to verify that your load/store scheduler is correct is another, extremely not-happening thing.

      Formal verification is useful. But the vast, vast majority of AMD and Intel's verification is done via directed tests, directed tests, and then some more directed tests.

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    76. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      even I as a human (allegedly the "superior" intelligence) sometimes feel that my decisions are based solely on the output of a Random() call in my brain rather than logical thought

      I think the same thing about half the posts I read on the Internet.

    77. Re:godelstheorem? by russotto · · Score: 1

      Well, that's still very much an open question, but notice that we (humans) can't seem to think of anything better than Turing machines, at least not yet.

      The Church-Turing thesis states that there isn't any computing device more powerful than a turing machine. It's unproven, however. Also, a google search for "more powerful than a turing machine" brings up a claim that a "real valued neural network" (that is, a neural network where the weights can take on any real-numbered value rather than rational-numbered value) is more powerful than a Turing machine. I assume this claim is not widely accepted, or Church-Turing would be considered refuted.

    78. Re:godelstheorem? by OwnedByTwoCats · · Score: 1

      Then all that is left is exhaustive search. Which may or may not be practical.

      Theorem: There is no 6 foot long, invisible elephant in my cube.
      Proof: Stand in the middle of my cube, wave hands to show no invisible elephant occupies the middle of my cube, and show that a large, invisible elephant anywhere in my cube would have to occupy the middle of it.

      Theorem: There are no tiny, 3 inch long, invisible elephants in my cube, that runs very quickly and quietly.
      Now the proof-by-exhaustive-search is much harder. You have to exclude all possible locations at the same time.

    79. Re:godelstheorem? by kohaku · · Score: 1

      I was wondering if someone would pick up on that, which is why I originally only said "it must be possible to create intelligence" rather than "it must be possible for humans to create intelligence".
      My first thought was that it's a simple logical fallacy:
      1) A higher intelligence can create intelligence
      2) A higher intelligence is intelligent
      3) humans are intelligent
      Therefore, humans can create intelligence
      This seems obviously wrong, at first, but I'm not sure it's quite so simple. Traditional logic doesn't work well when trying to describe things with degrees of truth, such as intelligence. I'm tempted to argue that Mankind's intelligence is the sum of its parts, and the creation of AI should therefore be possible with unlimited population expansion. That's getting into meaningless philosophical territory, and as Kevin Warwick put it, "I feel that we are all philosophers, and that those who describe themselves as a âphilosopherâ(TM) simply do not have a day job to go to".

    80. Re:godelstheorem? by Chris+Burke · · Score: 1

      Namely, you can't write an infinitely long code and there is only a finite number of possible inputs. These aspects seemed to me to be glossed over too much, especially the part about inputs which should lead to conditional halting.

      The code doesn't need to be infinitely long. The Turing Machine only sports an infinite amount of memory. However a real machine can easily have enough memory to make the results the same, for all practical purposes. The real machine does not have infinite processing power, and you don't have an infinite lifespan to wait for the answer. Also, in practice, there is no known algorithm that can tell if even a moderate sized program with moderate numbers of inputs will halt, other than the 'algorithm' of running the program and seeing what happens.

      Furthermore, what is to stop you from assessing your code as you are writing it? Why not just test every possible combination of inputs on the code as it is being generated (making the appropriate assumptions so that this does not actually check every combination of inputs)? Whilst not feasible in practice for all scenarios, shouldn't this be possible in theory. I also note that most of the time I spend coding is idle time for the processor.

      A single function which takes a single uint64_t as an argument, and which does not have any convenient limitations on legal inputs, is already infeasible to test for every input. It doesn't matter how much idle cpu time you have.

      I am not knocking the logic of the halting problem, just how it is introduced as being this general statement that construction of such a program is theoretically impossible. Any human can tell whether or not the hello world programs which came before will halt or not halt after a casual glance. Why cannot a machine employ a simple finite state approach to yield a conditional solution (sometimes the actual answer maybe "unknown" in practice due to random numbers or any code which does not yield the same answer every time for the same inputs) for a possible-to-write program for which all the code is visible?

      Of course you can tell if a trivially simple program halts. With the right formal verification techniques, you can even tell whether a moderately complex program works correctly. For just about anything interesting, the behavior is complicated enough that it cannot be simplified and the only way to determine what the logic actually does for a given input is to run it with that input. Formal verification fails at the point where the expected behavior of the program can only be truly codified by the actual code itself. This is the nature of the halting problem.

      It's like the saying "In theory, there's no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is." Well this is the opposite. In this case there should, theoretically, be a large difference between theory and practice. Yet, in practice, the halting problem applies to the majority of interesting programs despite their finite memory size.

      --

      The enemies of Democracy are
    81. Re:godelstheorem? by risk+one · · Score: 1

      That depends on where the nondeterminism comes from. If it arises from a chaotic process, then the system (if not the exact behavior) can be modeled in a computer. Computers can approximate this kind of non-determinism very well. (Strictly speaking it's deterministic, but given some non-zero measuring error it becomes non-deterministic).

      If the non-determinism stems from some quantum process, and this is truly the key to intelligence then there may be some trouble (I think this is Penrose's thesis), but I really seriously doubt that this is the case. Neurons by themselves are pretty simple machines. It's the fact that there's 20 billion of them that makes AI a difficult question.

      The emergence of intelligence from a large interconnected network of simple machines is the problem. I can't imagine that the whole system is chaotic, but small bits of it may be, to provide some kind of randomness to the brain. Considering how easy it is to write a random number generator on a deterministic computer, I doubt this will be a big part of the problem either.

    82. Re:godelstheorem? by russotto · · Score: 1

      Your summary of the proof of the non-computability of the halting problem is not right; the answer to whether the theoetical halting program itself halts; it's "true" for all inputs. You need a diagonalization proof. You construct a goofy program takes as input another program, returns false and halts if that program returns "false" using itself as an input, otherwise it loops forever. Then you ask the halting program if the goofy program halts on the halting program. That leads to a contradiction; the only way the goofy program halts on the halting program is if the halting program returns false, and the halting program by definition can't return false ("does not halt") when executed on itself.

      None of this has anything to do with using a computer to assist in formal mathematical proofs, however.

    83. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      WTF does this mean? Which of Godel's incompleteness theorems tells me about deity's knowledge? Godel's theorems have quite precise mathematical content. Your psycho-babble is embarrassing and wrong. But since it's clearly not meant to be understood and you clearly don't know what you are talking about, I'll just point out one specific obvious error: not all formal systems are either incomplete or inconsistent -- they have to be complex enough to contain the natural numbers, an infinite set. I don't know how "souls" and "knowledge" and you grandma relate to Godel but I have a strong suspicion that they don't.

      Incompleteness theorems tell us, for example, that an infallible deity cannot know the integer solutions for all Diophantine equation. Agree?

    84. Re:godelstheorem? by kavau · · Score: 1

      Penrose's argument sounds a bit like: "We know we will never be able to exceed the speed of light, so we should stop trying to build spaceships."

    85. Re:godelstheorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, this doesn't refute the Church-Turing thesis at all. Turing machines are discrete -- any information they store is in the forms of zeroes and ones, or for that matter in the letters of any finite alphabet. A real number encapsulates an infinite number of bits, though, so if you can really take on any real weight then you have the ability to manipulate much more information in a single operation than a Turing machine would.

    86. Re:godelstheorem? by MrResistor · · Score: 1

      I never heard anything about the halting problem until my 300 level algorithms class. Then again, I'm just going to a CSU, not a "good" school.

      --
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    87. Re:godelstheorem? by hawkfish · · Score: 1

      One of Penrose's conclusions was that any attempt at artificial intelligence is necessarily incomplete, so it won't be possible

      That wasn't what I got out of it at all.

      Penrose is a physicist who is interested in quantum gravity. His point was not that artificial intelligence is impossible, but rather that we are probably missing the physics needed for it. In Shadows of the Mind he describes four positions on AI and like many of his critics, you have reduced this list to two i.e. "B" (AI indistinguishable from us is possible with known physics) and "D" (Mysticism) and applied a false dichotomy argument to accuse him of mysticism. In fact, Penrose is a proponent of position "C" (intelligence is a physical phenomenon, but requires unknown physics) and goes on to argue that what is missing is related to quantum gravity. You don't have to agree with him, but please don't misrepresent his position.

      --
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    88. Re:godelstheorem? by TheoMurpse · · Score: 1

      I can't tell what you're asking. Are you asking what it means if:

      1. Let A be a hypothesis.
      2. We want to prove A.
      3. Assume not(A)

      and no contradiction is arrived at? If that's your question, then the answer is: the original theorem has been neither proven nor disproven.

    89. Re:godelstheorem? by ioshhdflwuegfh · · Score: 1

      [...] Hofstadter said that it is possible to successively approximate something intelligent, and we can learn a LOT about ourselves in the attempts, and that in itself is worth it.

      You mean: there is a Cartesian God?

    90. Re:godelstheorem? by ioshhdflwuegfh · · Score: 1

      You could object it also by noticing that the argument "One might argue that the brain is merely a biological computer not fully understood." implies also the argument "But what guarantees us that, when we better understand the brain, it will still remain to be considered a biological computer?".

    91. Re:godelstheorem? by retchdog · · Score: 1

      No. The deity may know them, but it could not describe them to you or, arguably, another deity.

      --
      "They were pure niggers." – Noam Chomsky
    92. Re:godelstheorem? by jonaskoelker · · Score: 1

      There are real numbers that no turing machine can handle.

      A number is computable if there is a turing machine that on input z outputs digit number z of that number [you pick the base, the turing machine is constructed according to the base you pick].

      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitin's_constant for an example of an uncomputable number.

      If a computational formalism starts out by allowing any real number into the mix, it raises the question: how do you input Chaitin's constant?

      You can either conclude that the model can't be realised because it would take infinite time and/or space to represent Chaitin's constant, or that something is completely wrong.

      If Chaitin's constant can be finitely represented, you can (probably) construct a halting decider from it, but those are proven to not exist, so the mathematical foundation contains contradictions. See the discussion of Gödel's theorem(s) for all that wackiness :)

    93. Re:godelstheorem? by johanatan · · Score: 0

      Good analogy. The soul is something like software I think as it can change over time.

    94. Re:godelstheorem? by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      > But I'm nonetheless self-aware.

      So you say. I can arrange for my computer to make the same assertion.

      --
      Warning: this article may contain humor, sarcasm, parody, and perhaps even irony. Read at your own risk.
    95. Re:godelstheorem? by Aris+Katsaris · · Score: 1

      - You don't have a soul!
      - Yes, I do. I define my soul as my self-awareness, I therefore do have one.
      - We're not convinced you're self-aware! Nothing you say can prove it.
      - Thankfully I don't need to prove it or convince you. I was merely explaining as a courtesy why *I* am not convinced by *you*. Now if you aren't convinced of the existence of your own self-awareness, then I can potentially accept that *you* don't have souls.

    96. Re:godelstheorem? by Undead+NDR · · Score: 1

      The "soul" is divisible, and physical disease can kill it piecemeal by attacking the brain. Therefore, the "soul" is a physical part of the brain.

      I don't necessarily believe in the soul, but your example does not prove its inexistence. One could counter by making a conjecture that the brain is simply an interface between the soul and the physical world.

    97. Re:godelstheorem? by CTachyon · · Score: 1

      Which of Godel's incompleteness theorems tells me about deity's knowledge?

      For one: in many cases, there isn't an answer. Take Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Zermelo was surprised that a certain statement wasn't true in ZF set theory, so he formulated the Axiom of Choice ("Every set has a choice function"), which was later proven to be independent of the ZF axioms.

      Choice makes a certain amount of intuitive sense... except that it leads to the Banach-Tarski paradox, which doesn't. But the absence of Choice means that you can't pick a real number from the real number line, because at best you'll pick a computable number — and the set of computable numbers is only countably infinite, which is far smaller than the uncountably infinite real numbers. So, if Choice is false, the real numbers don't exist. That doesn't make much sense, either.

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    98. Re:godelstheorem? by CTachyon · · Score: 1

      That's an emotional positioning that doesn't make any logical sense. If you say that the soul is killable or divisible or a physical part of the brain, then you've already agreed that it exists, and are merely disagreeing about its properties. And yet you say that it doesn't exist.

      I'm essentially arguing that the "soul" is a attribution error. Ancient peoples saw leaves rustling in the wind and, having no knowledge of high pressure systems or the ideal gas law, they assumed that an intelligent higher being must've caused the wind. So they invented gods to explain wind, and whatever emotional effect the wind happened to have on them was explained as a message from the gods.

      Likewise, modern religious people see their fellow humans thinking intelligently and having self-aware philosophical thoughts and, having no knowledge of how the underlying neurons and brain chemistry bring about this state of affairs, they assume that an intelligent higher being must've put some kind of magical animating force (i.e. a "soul") inside each individual to make them intelligent and unique.

      The problem: the pro-soul crowd can't come up with a good explanation for who or what has a soul, or how you can spot one. Most say that humans, and humans alone, have souls. Some say that higher primates have souls, but not fish. Others say every physical thing has a soul, up to and including places. None of them can sort anything out or come to any sort of agreement — and don't even bring up AIs or Turing tests. To me, the whole thing looks like the proverbial "angels on the head of a pin" debate.

      What's more, even though they all agree that humans seem to have them, they can't agree on when humans get them. Catholics are fond of saying that the soul is inserted at the moment of fertilization — but that would mean homozygous twins share a single soul, which contradicts their belief that the soul is eternal and indivisible. Others believe that the soul gets inserted at some later point — some cultures have held that the soul grows and isn't even fully formed until adulthood.

      If you ask me, though, all the thinking about "souls" is misplaced. They're personalities, not souls; they're physical, not spiritual; they're mortal, not eternal; and they don't survive death.

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    99. Re:godelstheorem? by CTachyon · · Score: 1

      I don't necessarily believe in the soul, but your example does not prove its inexistence.

      I actually obliquely referenced this in my post, when I said "And as flawed as that 'proof' is, it's more proof than you offer for your baseless assertions about Gödel's incompleteness theorems." I'm quite aware that there are many nebulous ideas about the soul that disclaim all testable predictions and are thus impossible to prove one way or another.

      One could counter by making a conjecture that the brain is simply an interface between the soul and the physical world.

      Sure, the idea's been done before, notably by Descartes and his wild-a** guessing about the pineal gland. But there's the deeper question of what the soul does. The more we discover about the materialist workings of the brain, the less mysterious thoughts become, and the result is that Interactionism is gradually giving way to Epiphenomenalism: where the "soul" experiences the body's sensations but only erroneously believes that it has control over the body, as it just happens by coincidence that (through purely materialistic means) the body acts as the soul independently had willed.

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    100. Re:godelstheorem? by CTachyon · · Score: 1

      If you ask me, though, all the thinking about "souls" is misplaced. They're personalities, not souls; they're physical, not spiritual; they're mortal, not eternal; and they don't survive death.

      Oh, and despite all that, I'm a cheerful optimist.

      --
      Range Voting: preference intensity matters
    101. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1

      > You want your set of axioms to be finite

      The axioms of set theory are not finite. Look up the 'axiom' of comprehension. It's an infinite axiom schema. Even in simple arithmetic the 'axiom' of induction is an infinite collection of axioms.

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    102. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1

      > I'm not sure S is a set at all, it just might be to big. How can it be too big? Propositions are just *finite* strings of characters. There's nothing mysterious about them. Not only do they form a countable set, it's a few minutes work to write a computer program to enumerate them all. You don't need a set of all sets to make the set of all propositions.

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    103. Re:godelstheorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1

      Thank you for pointing out my egregious errors. So let me say what I should have said: every proposition of *propositional calculus* is provably true or false. That is a counterexample to the incorrect statement of Godel's first incompleteness theorems above. I've no idea how I drifted from propositional calculus to first order logic and on a good day I'm fully aware that Godel uses two different sense of completeness - after all, I've read the same book as you.

      A sad story about that book. I read it on the recommendation of the author himself. He said I should get back to him if I had any questions. So I compiled my list of questions and got ready to send it to him. And then I found he'd died of bone cancer. It's a great loss to the world.

      > it's kind of a cheat to have infinitely many axioms without a production rule...

      Absolutely. That's the whole point of Godel's (incompleteness) theorems. If you fail to mention the production rule then you're talking about the wrong thing.

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    104. Re:godelstheorem? by FrangoAssado · · Score: 1

      Thank you for pointing out my egregious errors. So let me say what I should have said: every proposition of *propositional calculus* is provably true or false. That is a counterexample to the incorrect statement of Godel's first incompleteness theorems above. I've no idea how I drifted from propositional calculus to first order logic and on a good day I'm fully aware that Godel uses two different sense of completeness - after all, I've read the same book as you.

      No problem :-). This is one of those subjects that it is very easy to misremember something if you don't work with it often. When I read your post, I went back to that book to write my reply :-)

      A sad story about that book. I read it on the recommendation of the author himself. He said I should get back to him if I had any questions. So I compiled my list of questions and got ready to send it to him. And then I found he'd died of bone cancer. It's a great loss to the world.

      Whoa... I didn't know he had died. A great loss, indeed.

      > it's kind of a cheat to have infinitely many axioms without a production rule...

      Absolutely. That's the whole point of Godel's (incompleteness) theorems. If you fail to mention the production rule then you're talking about the wrong thing.

      Agreed.

    105. Re:godelstheorem? by geminidomino · · Score: 1

      Theorem: There are no tiny, 3 inch long, invisible elephants in my cube, that runs very quickly and quietly.
      Now the proof-by-exhaustive-search is much harder. You have to exclude all possible locations at the same time.

      Not at all. Simplicity in itself

      1. Calculate volume of cube (simple geometry will suffice here).
      2. Seal off cube.
      3. Fill cube to capacity with water.
      4. Drain water into measuring container
      5. volume(water) == volume(cube) ? No elephants : elephants

      Explaining to IS why your computer is shorted out and suffering severe submersion damage is left as an exercise for the reader.

    106. Re:godelstheorem? by sFurbo · · Score: 1

      Hmm, I see... But wouldn't "X is not empty" be a propostion for all sets X? How can it not be? This seems to lead to a variant of the Berry paradox.

    107. Re:godelstheorem? by MrResistor · · Score: 1

      I'm not convinced that particle decay is random, I think it's more likely that we simply haven't found the trigger yet.

      --
      Under capitalism man exploits man. Under communism it's the other way around.
  2. what is a central theorem? by Hatta · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics. So if they're just limiting it to "central" theorems, how do they decide what's central and what's not?

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    1. Re:what is a central theorem? by eldavojohn · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics. So if they're just limiting it to "central" theorems, how do they decide what's central and what's not?

      Just because a list is incomplete doesn't make it any less useful, does it?

      I'm certain Wikipedia, any of Google's search results & my list of liqueurs to pick up on the way home are all incomplete ... although they are all highly useful.

      To answer your question, I would start with all the theorems that are the most employed/referenced by other theorems and work from there. Who knows what might turn up?

      --
      My work here is dung.
    2. Re:what is a central theorem? by jfengel · · Score: 4, Interesting

      TFA also says:

      When it comes to central, well known results, the proofs are especially well checked and errors are eventually found. Nevertheless the history of mathematics has many stories about false results that went undetected for a long time.

      In other words... maybe, just maybe, there's a hole in one of the theorems we use all the time, and an error would have severe ramifications. Or at the very least, there might be an opportunity lurking in an assumption we didn't realize we were making, like the way non-Euclidean geometry was just sitting there waiting to be discovered.

      They're not really "limiting" it to central theorems, so they don't need a definition. But the more important (read, broadly-used) a theorem is, the more interesting it will be to have the proofs double-checked by a computer.

      That computer proof may itself be wrong if the programmers are wrong, but as with the proofs we already have, it's just one more set of "eyes" looking for problems.

    3. Re:what is a central theorem? by exp(pi*sqrt(163)) · · Score: 1, Interesting
      > Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics

      It doesn't need Godel to figure out that you can't make a list of all possible true statements in mathematics. Given that even a child knows that there are an infinite number of true statements I can only think that you cite Godel in an attempt to give your trivial observation an exaggerated air of authority.

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    4. Re:what is a central theorem? by Bromskloss · · Score: 1

      Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics.

      I didn't know that was what he really proved, but in any case, why do we have to bring up Godel every time it comes to automated proving? Godel surely doesn't forbid us to search for proofs of a given statement, or even search for new theorems, if we can (in some automated fashion) determine if they are interesting or not.

      And how do I enter non-ASCII characters? >-(

      --
      Swedish plasma phys. PhD student; MSc EE; knows maths, programming, electronics; finance interest; seeks opportunities
    5. Re:what is a central theorem? by melikamp · · Score: 3, Informative

      Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics. So if they're just limiting it to "central" theorems, how do they decide what's central and what's not?

      Godel proved that you can never have a complete and recursive list of axioms for arithmetic. Regardless, "central" in TFA means well-known, which, IMHO, is fair enough. Letting a computer know proofs of all major results seems to be a necessary step on the way to building a silicon mathematician.

    6. Re:what is a central theorem? by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 2, Interesting

      It's no worse than standard mathematics done by humans. There's no indication that humans can present a proof of a theorem that says it has no proof (for instance, can you prove "this statement has no proof of its truth" is true or false or neither?), so humans are no more powerful than a formal system in which one can construct Godel's incompleteness proof.

      Specifically, I'm sure that the "central" theorems they're referring to are ones nearest to set theory or some other basic set of axioms. It's much harder to prove Fermat's last theorem or the Poincare Conjecture with complete formalism than it is to prove simple theorems of arithmetic. Once the central theorems are proven, it is simpler to tackle more complex theorems using the already proven theorems as lemmas.

    7. Re:what is a central theorem? by Bromskloss · · Score: 4, Funny

      on the way to building a silicon mathematician.

      I think we have one at our department. He's, like, very stiff.

      --
      Swedish plasma phys. PhD student; MSc EE; knows maths, programming, electronics; finance interest; seeks opportunities
    8. Re:what is a central theorem? by florescent_beige · · Score: 1

      Godel proved that you can never have a complete and recursive list of axioms for arithmetic.

      The Incompleteness Theorem:

      For any consistent formal theory that proves basic arithmetical truths, an arithmetical statement that is true but not provable in the theory can be constructed. That is, any theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete.

      What's this about recursive?

      --
      Equine Mammals Are Considerably Smaller
    9. Re:what is a central theorem? by Ann+Coulter · · Score: 1

      The "elementary arithmetic" (Peano arithmetic) is recursive.

    10. Re:what is a central theorem? by melikamp · · Score: 1

      The set of all true statements of arithmetic does exit, but we cannot write a program that would reliably recognize true statements (i.e., always halt with a definite answer). We cannot even have a program that would recognize some set of axioms which we could use to derive all facts of arithmetic.

    11. Re:what is a central theorem? by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 1

      I strongly doubt that this is the case; but it would be philosophically fascinating if computerized mathematical proving were worse than the math done by humans. If it could be demonstrated that building a system that replicates what humans can do is impossible, rather than merely difficult, that would strongly suggest that human consciousness is Something Other.

      I have no reason to believe that that is the case, and I am very strongly inclined to doubt it; but were it so, this might be one of the few places that you could actually demonstrate it.

    12. Re:what is a central theorem? by demi · · Score: 1

      Use the HTML entity for Gödel?

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      demi
    13. Re:what is a central theorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Lists can be (countably) infinite can't they?

      Maybe the OP meant "list" colloquially, as in "set".

    14. Re:what is a central theorem? by sustik · · Score: 5, Informative

      > Godel of course proved that you can never have a complete list of all true statements in mathematics.

      Bzzzt. Wrong.

      What Godel proved was that all mathematical thruths cannot be described by a finite axiom system. The statement that there is a single empty set cannot be proved. Similarly continuum = aleph_1 cannot be proved; in both cases one may argue that these are so "obvious" that they need to be accepted as axioms.

      Note that continuum = aleph_1 was a strongly accepted conjecture as much as the Riemann hyp today.

      I studied set theory and models. It is fascinating that you can have a countable model of set theory! This model is basically built from a countable set with countable many subsets accepted as sets, etc. The rest of the subsets an "outsider" can see are not known inside the model. We denote this model (which is a counatble set for the ousider aka meta theory) by M. The natural numbers are in M, denote it by A. A is known in the model and A is an infinite (countable) set.

      The set containing the subsets of A, denoted by P(A) is different depending on whether you look inside or outside the model! Outside it is an uncountable set, of course. In the model world it is Pm(A) and it appears uncountable again, but for the outside observer it is actually the intersection of P(A) and M. Bear with me another minute!

      In the model world of M the Pm(A) appears not countable. What does that mean? It means that there is no 1-1 mapping between A and Pm(A). In the outside there is a mapping of course, since both sets are countably infinite. This mapping (a function) is actually a set (everything is a set: function, relation etc.) so a mapping denoted by F between A and Pm(A) exists outside. However F is not an an element in M so it does not exist inside the model.

      There is a way to extend the model M into something called M(F) by 'forcing' F to be in M. Basically we add F and everything else that need to be added to still have a valid theory inside M. It is not trivial to do this, it was discovered and proved by P. Cohen an analysis guy (not a set theorist). Set theorists of course run with this ever since. The careful picking of F allows different M(F)-s to be created and that leads to results showing that continuum = aleph_1 is not the only possibility. One can 'force' a bunch of other alephs under the continuum. (What aleph exactly can continuum be is also interesting to set theorists at least.)

      Now there is one model called L which consists of the 'constructible' sets and nothing else. In L continuum=aleph_1. There are in fact theorems based on the assumption that V = L, that is V the world consists of only constructible sets.

      You may wonder how this L can be defined. I cannot go into the details, but one eye-opening fact though is that you can define Lm inside the above M model!!! This Lm is a countable model of L and in some sense a minimal model of set theory if I recall correctly.

      So one may take the position that we want mathematical thruths in L the minimal system. (This resonates with Occam's razor.) Of course note that there is no axiomatic system describing L.

      I want to emphasize that if we fix a model then each statement has a truth value; but there exist truths which cannot be proved working inside the model only.

      For the usual applied math we could say we assume V=L. (Or any other well defined model for that matter.) Note againg that aleph_1 == continuum in L, because there are no other alephs that could fit "between". The mathematicians inside L see this as this: we cannot prove that aleph_1 == continuum in fact there could be something between, but it is not constructible from what we have.

      I hope this helped.

    15. Re:what is a central theorem? by networkBoy · · Score: 1

      I'm fairly sure this search isn't very useful.
      -nB

      --
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    16. Re:what is a central theorem? by TheVelvetFlamebait · · Score: 1

      That's why I've always preferred the silicone mathematician.

      --
      You know, there is a difference between trolling and pointing out the flaws in your reasoning. Just saying.
    17. Re:what is a central theorem? by melikamp · · Score: 1

      Oh my god, it's a word??

    18. Re:what is a central theorem? by selfdiscipline · · Score: 0

      But our current body of theorems biases us to look for theorems that are well connected with them.

      How do we know that our mathematical knowledge isn't just a local maximum?

      --


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      Incite and flee.
    19. Re:what is a central theorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      for instance, can you prove "this statement has no proof of its truth" is true or false or neither?

      Actually I have a proof right here:

      Choose $k\in\mathbb{N}$ such tha__CARRIER LOST__

    20. Re:what is a central theorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The proof of a single empty set is simple.

      The axiom of the empty set establishes existence.

      The axiom of equality establishes uniqueness.

      Two lines.

    21. Re:what is a central theorem? by mesterha · · Score: 1

      What Goedel proved is that a sufficiently complex formal system can not be both consistent and complete when using a recursive set of axioms

      In other words, for any useful set of mathematical axioms, there will always be legal statements in the language that are undecided by the axioms. The statements can be assumed either true or false and the system will still be consistent.

      That's the message to take from Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Mathematics can never be complete because there is always a new statement that is neither true nor false. We can either add the statement or its negation to create a new axiom. Either choice is just as valid; there are no fixed Platonic truths. Just choose the one that is most convenient for what you are trying to do.

      --

      Chris Mesterharm
    22. Re:what is a central theorem? by martin-boundary · · Score: 1

      Yes, and they usually come in pairs.

    23. Re:what is a central theorem? by smallfries · · Score: 1

      You must be trolling. As you well know there are many instances of infinite sets that can be enumerated effectively.

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    24. Re:what is a central theorem? by aproposofwhat · · Score: 1

      Consider the computerised proof of the 4-Colour theorem.

      It may be that there is a nice, clean analytical proof out there waiting to be discovered, but every attempt to find it so far has failed.

      What was possible was to reduce the problem to one that was solvable by enumerating a finite set of possible graphs.

      TFA (well, one of them) explains the process quite well.

      I still spend the odd insomniac night trying to figure out a purely analytical proof, though - for no other reason than pure stubbornness and Luddite tendencies :o)

      --
      One swallow does not a fellatrix make
    25. Re:what is a central theorem? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      how about the central limit theorem?

      (runs and hides)

  3. Tagged Supercomputing by lazynomer · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Do you really need supercomputers in all practical cases?

    1. Re:Tagged Supercomputing by fractic · · Score: 4, Informative

      No, in general formalizing a proof does not require a lot of computer power. Usually it takes a lot of man power instead. Most current proof assitants are actually proof verifiers. The user has to break down the proof to elementary steps that the program can verify.

      Now sometimes a computer is used to verify a lot of cases by brute force computation. Often this is not done in an actual proof assistant but within a computer algebra package. But this is also met with a sceptical eye.

      The four colour theorem is perhaps one of the most famous formalized theorems. It was orginally proven by a large computation. But noone could really verify this. Recentely (2004) it was formalized completely in the proof assistant Coq (actually a custom extension). This formalized proof did require a lot of computer time allthough just on a normal computer, not a supercomputer.

    2. Re:Tagged Supercomputing by lazynomer · · Score: 1

      I suspected as much; thanks for your answer.

      Still, ain't it super computers can help mathematicians?

    3. Re:Tagged Supercomputing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, in general formalizing a proof does not require a lot of computer power.

      Neither does a spell-checker.

    4. Re:Tagged Supercomputing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yup. Or else using PVS would be as simple as invoking the "grind" command for proving anything and everything.

  4. Which central theorems by florescent_beige · · Score: 1

    aren't already proven? Principia Mathematica did the basics and I always assumed more advanced theorems became proven as required.

    Maybe someone just wants to do Principia Mathematica volumes II through L but doesn't that already in effect exist?

    --
    Equine Mammals Are Considerably Smaller
    1. Re:Which central theorems by bcrowell · · Score: 3, Informative

      Which central theorems aren't already proven? Principia Mathematica did the basics and I always assumed more advanced theorems became proven as required. Maybe someone just wants to do Principia Mathematica volumes II through L but doesn't that already in effect exist?

      Well, one issue is that the Principia Mathematica undoubtedly has errors in it. No human being could ever write a book of that length without making a single mistake. So there could be some value in producing the same results on a computer, which doesn't make the same kind of mistakes a human does. Another issue is that the Principia Mathematica works within a certain axiomatic framework, and I believe that framework is different from the most popular axiomatic framework used today, which is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, with the axiom of choice (ZFC). (They were both produced around 1910, but the WP article says that PM used a complicated system of types, which is probably different from anything in ZFC.)

      More broadly, for people who are interested in the foundations of mathematics, there's no clear way to decide that one set of axioms is superior to another. Some people feel that ZFC is too strong, because it asserts the existence of things that can't be explicitly constructed. Those people may be interested in seeing how much of mathematics can be proved using purely constructive methods. With a weaker set of axioms, some results may be impossible to prove, while others may be possible to prove, but the proofs may be extremely long compared to the proofs in ZFC -- so long that using a computer may be a real help.

      Still other people are interested in seeing what can be done in an axiomatic system that's stronger than ZFC. For instance, such a system may have sizes of infinities that are larger than the sizes of the infinities in ZFC, and they may even have creatures like the set of all sets. One thing that tends to happen when you try to make stronger axiomatic systems is that it becomes much more difficult to avoid internal inconsistencies. I can imagine that a computer could be helpful in finding things like that. If you're fiddling around with the computer proof system and it comes up with a result that 1+1=3, then you've learned something interesting: your set of axioms is bogus.

      One thing you really have to be careful about if you're working in this kind of field is that you don't want to inadvertently assume some result that someone else has proved in some other axiomatic system, and that seems obvious to you, but that actually isn't provable (or hasn't yet been formally proved) in the system you're working in. That's the kind of thing where I'd imagine a computer system would be really helpful. It wouldn't allow you to make those assumptions. In general, if you look at almost all published mathematical work, it never states which axiomatic system it's assuming, and that's because in most fields of mathematics we expect that the results are unlikely to depend on which particular foundation you're working in. E.g., I doubt that Wiles' proof Fermat's last theorem even bothers to state that it starts from ZFC, and most mathematicians probably have a strong expectation that it doesn't matter whether you pick some other foundation, Wiles' proof will still be valid. Nevetheless, it's possible that that's not true. Abraham Robinson, for example, claimed that ZFC had been carefully engineered to make the real number system work correctly, and therefore claimed if you wanted to use a different system of numbers (such as the hyperreals, a system that includes Newton- and Leibniz-style infinities), you might be better off using diffrent axioms.

    2. Re:Which central theorems by z-j-y · · Score: 1

      and most mathematicians probably have a strong expectation that it doesn't matter whether you pick some other foundation, Wiles' proof will still be valid.

      what do you mean by a proof being valid in another set of axioms? that there is a simple way to translate the proof into the 2nd system and it'll be true then?

    3. Re:Which central theorems by bcrowell · · Score: 1

      what do you mean by a proof being valid in another set of axioms? that there is a simple way to translate the proof into the 2nd system and it'll be true then?
      yes

    4. Re:Which central theorems by DiegoBravo · · Score: 1

      >> So there could be some value in producing the same results on a computer, which doesn't make the same kind of mistakes a human does.

      Except if it has one of the first Pentium's...

      Seriously, even if the "math prover" is right, who proves the "math prover"?

    5. Re:Which central theorems by John+Hasler · · Score: 1

      > Except if it has one of the first Pentium's...

      Which doesn't make the same kind of mistakes humans do.

      > Seriously, even if the "math prover" is right, who proves the "math prover"?

      The point is that if a human and a computer agree it is more likely that they are right than when two humans (or two computers) agree because the weaknesses of the human and the computer differ.

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    6. Re:Which central theorems by johanatan · · Score: 0

      E.g., I doubt that Wiles' proof Fermat's last theorem even bothers to state that it starts from ZFC, and most mathematicians probably have a strong expectation that it doesn't matter whether you pick some other foundation, Wiles' proof will still be valid. Nevetheless, it's possible that that's not true.

      I'm glad you said that. I think it's not only possible, but quite likely as knowledge increases.

    7. Re:Which central theorems by DMUTPeregrine · · Score: 1

      Metamath is doing pretty much this, for ZFC. It's an interesting project. All 193 propositional calculus theorems from the Principia Mathematica have been proven. >8000 theorems total proven.

      --
      Not a sentence!
  5. Uh... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    One long-term dream is to have formal proofs of all of the central theorems in mathematics

    And what theorems would *those* proofs be based on?

    1. Re:Uh... by florescent_beige · · Score: 1, Informative

      Axioms.

      --
      Equine Mammals Are Considerably Smaller
    2. Re:Uh... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Axioms.

      boy.do.i.feel.dumb.

  6. The exact opposite is true by l2718 · · Score: 5, Informative

    In fact, Godel proved the exact opposite: that you can make a list of all true statements of mathematics. Godel's completeness theorem states that every statement that follows from the axioms is in fact deducible from the axioms in finitely many logical steps. It is thus possible to enumerate all true statements by enumerating all deductions. Godel also has proved an "incompleteness" theorem. That more famous (and less important) result is that there are statements that are true in specific models yet not provable from the axioms. It implies that there is no algorithm to decide whether a given statement is true -- but this has nothing to do with enumerating all true statements. (Yes, I am a mathematician)

    1. Re:The exact opposite is true by z-j-y · · Score: 1

      that sounds good, except
      1. number theory is not axiomizable, its truth is not effectively enumerable.
      2. an axiomized theory is enumberale, but why these axioms? are they consistent? are they ... true?
      3. not all theorems are equal, human obviously have a way to focus on "interesting" ones, that's not what a mechanized list can satisfy.
      4. enumerability is just theoretical, there is no efficient algorithm at all.

      I'm not a mathematician.

    2. Re:The exact opposite is true by bcrowell · · Score: 1

      Godel's completeness theorem states that every statement that follows from the axioms is in fact deducible from the axioms in finitely many logical steps
      How would you even define a notion of "follows from the axioms" that didn't presuppose proof in a finite number of steps? If there were a distinction between "provable" and "provable in finite steps," it seems like you'd have to define what it meant to prove something in an infinite number of steps, and then show that for every infinite-length proof there was also a simpler, finite-length one. But I'm really having a hard time imagining what it would mean to have an infinite-length proof of something.

    3. Re:The exact opposite is true by melikamp · · Score: 1

      Yes and yes, except that your first sentence is a bit unclear. "That you can make a list of all true statements of mathematics" is just saying that the set is countable.

    4. Re:The exact opposite is true by z-j-y · · Score: 1

      proof implies finite steps. "proof in finite steps" is just to reassure the readers.

    5. Re:The exact opposite is true by z-j-y · · Score: 1

      the set of all statements is countable, so is the subset of all true statements. however, it doesn't mean you can count it:) There "exists" a way to count it, but nobody knows how. (Some people think that's just B.S. and reject such mathematics)

    6. Re:The exact opposite is true by melikamp · · Score: 4, Informative

      How would you even define a notion of "follows from the axioms" that didn't presuppose proof in a finite number of steps?

      GP is talking about a concept known as logical implication. A set of axioms logically implies a statement if that statement is true in every model satisfying those axioms. A model is a particular interpretation of a set of axioms. Say, if your only axiom is (For all x, For all y (x+y = y+x)) then an abelian group of order two is a model, and so is Z, and so is any mathematical structure where operation + is, in fact, commutative.

      "Provable" (or "deducible"), on the other hand, means that there is a finite sequence of formulas which constitutes a formal deduction of a statement from the axioms.

      As logicians, we work in the meta-theory, which is widely accepted to be ZFC. A model is just a certain kind of set. Giving a rigorous definition here would be excessive, but we can at least mention that models are "big" objects which include the universe of discourse. So a model for natural numbers omega would, naturally, include the infinite set omega. "A logically implies B" is a statement about how A and B relate in various models. Compare that to "B is deducible from A", a statement about existence of a finite formal deduction, which, in meta-theory, is a different kind of set. A deduction is literally a record of finitely many formulas over a finite alphabet.

    7. Re:The exact opposite is true by melikamp · · Score: 1

      I agree, I was just saying that the original sentence was somewhat ambiguous, but may be it's just me.

    8. Re:The exact opposite is true by jonaskoelker · · Score: 1

      It is thus possible to enumerate all true statements by enumerating all deductions.

      It implies that there is no algorithm to decide whether a given statement is true -- but this has nothing to do with enumerating all true statements.

      I'm confused. Please clarify.

      If it's possible to enumerate all valid proofs I propose the following proving algorithm: Run through all valid proofs; once you get to a proof whose conclusion is the theorem you want to prove, return that proof.

      [if you don't know whether your theorem is true or not, run the above algorithm on its negation as well].

      What's wrong with my algorithm?

      (Yes, I am a mathematician)

      FWIW, At my university, computer scientist are presented with Gödel's theorem before the mathematicians are. Yes, I am a computer scientist. Just in case anyone cares about anyone's credentials more than their arguments.

    9. Re:The exact opposite is true by lexDysic · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If it's possible to enumerate all valid proofs I propose the following proving algorithm: Run through all valid proofs; once you get to a proof whose conclusion is the theorem you want to prove, return that proof.

      [if you don't know whether your theorem is true or not, run the above algorithm on its negation as well].

      What's wrong with my algorithm?

      The problem is that some propositions P have the following two properties:

      1: P has no proof
      2: (not P) has no proof.

      So your algorithm searches forever and you don't know if it just hasn't found anything yet, or if there is nothing to be found.

      --
      Think! It ain't illegal yet!
      George Clinton
    10. Re:The exact opposite is true by Zalbik · · Score: 1

      In fact, Godel proved the exact opposite: that you can make a list of all true statements of mathematics

      You must be using some obscure meaning of "true" I am not aware of.

      Godel proved that the set of true statements is uncountable. There is no countable set of axioms that can be added to number theory that make it complete. If the truths of mathematics were countable, this would not be so.

      As Wikipedia put's it:
      "Gödel's theorem shows that, in theories that include a small portion of number theory, a complete and consistent finite list of axioms can never be created, or even an infinite list that can be enumerated by a computer program. " here

      IIRC, the set of provable statements in mathematics is countable...

    11. Re:The exact opposite is true by mapkinase · · Score: 1

      Godel's result is rather philosophical, than technological (and not scientific, of course). It gives you idea that the most fine technology that humans come up with - math - is short-ranged, finite, which logic breaks at far range. And that is fine for real life apps.

      It limits logic, which is a sign for us not to put it on top. It is a mathematical equivalent of finiteness of human experience.

      There are things beyond of our scope. Some of them are not important, and some of them are and we cannot handle them scientifically.

      Greatest minds that came to the frontier of the science of their time realized that.

      --
      I do not believe in karma. "Funny"=-6. Do good and forbid evil. Yours, Oft-Offtopic Flamebaiting Troll.
  7. Answer me this... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Benchmarks have shown that Via processors have much lower floating-point performance compared to their competitors (i.e. Intel and AMD) so why exactly are they using Via chips to achieve mathematical proofs?

    1. Re:Answer me this... by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 1

      You do realise that there is more to math than arithmetic, right? There are very large areas of mathematics that can be done with very minimal computation, float or int, and a fair few areas that don't need numbers at all. Many, though not all, proofs fall in this category.

    2. Re:Answer me this... by colmore · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Knowing a little bit about formal proofs and a fair bit about programming, but nothing about the computerized verification or generation of formal proofs, I really doubt the FPU is used for this stuff.

      --
      In Capitalist America, bank robs you!
    3. Re:Answer me this... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Probably because you don't use floating point arithmetic in the computer analysis of mathematical proofs, numbnuts.

  8. Metamath Proof Explorer by Manchot · · Score: 4, Informative

    There's a website called Metamath which does a lot of what the article is talking about. It starts from the ZFC axioms and works its way up to thousands of elementary theorems, all proved completely formally. Pretty cool, if you're in to that sort of thing.

  9. Um, no, no, NO! by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 5, Informative

    Godel's completeness theorem states that every statement that follows from the axioms is in fact deducible from the axioms in finitely many logical steps.

    That Gödel's Completeness Theorem for first-order logic--predicates, individuals, quantifiers ("for all," "exists"), and truth connectives (not, or, and).

    Godel also has proved an "incompleteness" theorem. That more famous (and less important) result is that there are statements that are true in specific models yet not provable from the axioms.

    The incompleteness theorem is about arithmetic: natural numbers defined in terms of 0 and the successor relation, addition and multiplication. For any set of axioms you pick for arithmetic, there are true statements of arithmetic that cannot be proven from those axioms.

    It implies that there is no algorithm to decide whether a given statement is true -- but this has nothing to do with enumerating all true statements.

    I'm not completely sure of how relevant the incompleteness of arithmetic is for what you're saying, but I am sure of this: first-order logic is complete, but the validity of a statement in first-order logic is undecidable. Therefore, you don't need to bring in Gödel's incompleteness theorem for arithmetic to conclude that in many important cases.

    1. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by jonaskoelker · · Score: 1

      For any set of axioms you pick for arithmetic, there are true statements of arithmetic that cannot be proven from those axioms.

      Or false statements that can be proven. Consider the set of all well-formed formulas.

    2. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 1

      If you picked a set of axioms that could prove a false statement of arithmetic, I wouldn't call those a "set of axioms for arithmetic" in the first place. I know I'm playing a bit fast and loose with all of this, but it does seem clear to me that if a set of axioms proves a statement that isn't true in all models of arithmetic, then one shouldn't be calling it "a set of axioms for arithmetic."

    3. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by chthonicdaemon · · Score: 1

      The power of GÃdel's work is that he also provides a method (GÃdel numbering) to convert theorems in other domains to integer arithmetic. This is how he screwed with Russel and Whitehead.

      Not that I think an automatic theorem prover is useless, just saying.

      --
      Languages aren't inherently fast -- implementations are efficient
    4. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by khallow · · Score: 1

      The incompleteness theorem is about arithmetic: natural numbers defined in terms of 0 and the successor relation, addition and multiplication. For any set of axioms you pick for arithmetic, there are true statements of arithmetic that cannot be proven from those axioms.

      No, it's not. It's providing a counterexample to a particular claim, that happens to be in the part of math that you term "arithmetic". In particular, there's no reason to expect that this incompleteness property is restricted to axiom systems derived from arithmetic.

    5. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 1

      No, it's not. It's providing a counterexample to a particular claim, that happens to be in the part of math that you term "arithmetic". In particular, there's no reason to expect that this incompleteness property is restricted to axiom systems derived from arithmetic.

      That's a silly objection. What you're saying just means that we could, in principle, show that some other axiomatic theory is incomplete. That's certainly true, but Gödel's incompleteness theorem for arithmetic is still a theorem that proves that arithmetic is incomplete, and says nothing about any other axiomatic theory or part of math. If you got some proof that some other, non-arithmetical axiomatic system is incomplete, that'd be an interesting result, but it's not Gödel's theorem.

    6. Re:Um, no, no, NO! by TheoMurpse · · Score: 1

      natural numbers defined in terms of 0 and the successor relation

      OK. It's time for an all-out war between you {CS nerds, set theorists, etc.} and us {number theoreticians}. Zero isn't a natural number, guys!

  10. Re:math doesnt matter by boshi · · Score: 0

    But can you prove it computationally?

    --
    Blog
  11. Proof is discrete by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Benchmarks have shown that Via processors have much lower floating-point performance compared to their competitors (i.e. Intel and AMD) so why exactly are they using Via chips to achieve mathematical proofs?

    A formal proof is not a numerical calculation. A formal proof is, basically, a set of premises, a conclusion, and a set of steps that justifies the conclusion, given those premises and a set of rules that define your proof system. The premises and conclusions are logical formulas, which are basically symbolic trees, and the proof steps relating the premises to the conclusion are all discrete too. So there is no essential numerical calculation going on at any point here.

    1. Re:Proof is discrete by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's not the only way of doing formal proofs. For a trivial example, if you want to prove that two polynomials of degree n are the same, another approach is to evaluate the polynomials at n+1 different points and see if you get the same answers. This is an essentially numerical proof.

      IIRC, I read about this in A=B. Or maybe it was somewhere else. But A=B (which can be downloaded for free) is well worth a read anyway.

  12. Re:math doesnt matter by colmore · · Score: 1

    Unfortunately his presidency will either be incomplete or inconsistent.

    And then there are leaders out there like Castro, who doesn't seem to halt.

    --
    In Capitalist America, bank robs you!
  13. Important for the long term evolution of CAS by starseeker · · Score: 4, Interesting

    CAS, or Computer Algebra Systems, represent one of the most useful tools for handling practical application of complex mathematics. The package Feyncalc, built on Mathematica and used for High Energy Physics, is one such example. The problem with using these systems is that they can't be trusted by the people using them. There is always that risk of "did the programmer do something that buggered this case" or "did they get that formula wrong when they translated it to code?" The traditional answer is a combination of by-hand verification and learning to "trust" certain abilities of some systems over time - lots and lots of use creates a certain confidence that the bugs have been shaken out of well-used functionality. But that lingering doubt remains - "is it REALLY right?"

    There are philosophical questions at the root of this issue. On the most abstract level is the question of whether knowing something is true is important compared to knowing WHY it is true - purists might argue if we don't know the latter the problem isn't answered. I'll state up front that for the problem I'm interested in solving - KNOWING my answer to a problem is correct - I'm willing to trust a machine that is proven by humans to be able to verify proofs as correct to verify MY solution to a particular problem. Or, put another way, that once the correctness of the checker is proven all statements of correctness from that checker are also proven. This is not a universal assumption, but if one is willing to make it things get interesting.

    Most proofs mathematicians attempt are not the types of problems posed by high energy physics - proving the solution to a specific integral is the correct solution would be of minimal value as a mathematical revelation. For the practical focus of scientific use of CAS however, the question of whether the system just gave the correct solution to that integral is all important. Moreover, the mathematical axioms behind the statement of correctness are not of immediate concern - they interest mathematicians, but the physicists want to USE that result. There's a contradiction here, because to be trustworthy in a mathematical sense the foundational system within which that integral was evaluated and what assumptions were made in the process MUST be considered. What to do?

    Trustworthy computer verification of proofs offers an answer to this dilemma. A CAS designed to incorporate proof logic awareness into its core system and algorithms could be asked to produce a "proof" of its answer based on the steps it used to create that answer. This proof can then be subjected, just like any human written proof, to the rigors of verification. A human COULD (in theory) do the checking if they wanted to. In practice, an incorporated proof verifier could examine the CAS's proof for flaws. If none were found, for the specific problem in question, the user could then know that the answer they have IS correct, regardless of any potential flaws in the CAS (which will hopefully be reduced dramatically by the design rigors needed to implement routines that can support supplying the proof logic in the first place). The trust tree has been reduced to the proof verification routine and the software and hardware needed to run it, which is a MUCH smaller trust tree than the whole of the CAS.

    The practical realization of such a system is probably decades in the future. It could be done only as an open source system, where the entire mathematical and scientific community contributed to an ever expanding body of trusted knowledge which could be built upon. Many extremely difficult problems would need to be solved - an immediate problem is how to organize mathematics into a coherent framework in a scalable way via computer. Category theory is probably the answer, but what does that mean in terms of system implementation? What about the programming language that must be put behind the mathematical definitions, even if the conceptual framework of Category Theory in Computer is addressed?

    --
    "I object to doing things that computers can do." -- Olin Shivers, lispers.org
    1. Re:Important for the long term evolution of CAS by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 1

      Hence why programs proving theorems should be proved also.

      Also the program should catch OS inconsistencies an direly alert them to the user of the CAS, as those could create errors also.

      --
    2. Re:Important for the long term evolution of CAS by JamesP · · Score: 1

      And who proves the programs that prove the programs?!?!?!

      --
      how long until /. fixes commenting on Chrome?
    3. Re:Important for the long term evolution of CAS by starseeker · · Score: 1

      At some point human beings will prove something - that is the "core" of the system in a proof sense. All that we can hope for is "if this checker is correct, everything that follows is correct." The checker will probably be the subject of ongoing human study, due to its importance.

      There are still two advantages - one is that with intense focus on a small code base, the odds the checker is correct go up. Two, if a flaw is found the re-checking of the entire body of knowledge that depends on it being right can be automated. Both of these situations represent an improvement over simple human proof checking, which also requires "trust" of the human brains doing the checking. Humans are known to mess up on occasion, so massively redundant checking of a simple proof checker has the potential to greatly increase rigor.

      This situation is a bit like some reactions to Godel's incompleteness statements - Godel's work does not preclude the immense usefulness of mathematical systems and proofs within them. Just as the ultimate requirement for human verification at some stage does not mean that automated proof checking is useless.

      --
      "I object to doing things that computers can do." -- Olin Shivers, lispers.org
  14. Inevitable Godel's Theorem discussion by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Godel's Theorem has to be the most misunderstood statement of all time. I won't attempt a statement here because, right or wrong, I will get 10 incorrect corrections, maybe one correct one. There's kind of a mini Godwin's law in effect for any discussion here about something with the words "automated" and "theorem" in the title. Inevitably it will devolve into bickering about Godel's Theorem, even though it *plays no role at all in what these projects are trying to accomplish*. They merely want to record a giant database of theorems and proofs, to aid in finding further theorems and proofs. Even without Godel's Theorem, since there are infinitely provable statements, the list would never be complete anyways.

    1. Re:Inevitable Godel's Theorem discussion by z-j-y · · Score: 1

      You have just described Godel's theorems perfectly according to http://uncyclopedia.wikia.com/wiki/Incompleteness_Theorem

  15. BS by Secret+Rabbit · · Score: 1

    It is nothing but BS that the computer is better than human. Not to mention profound stupidity to think that the computer is infallible i.e. it is programmed by humans.

    I read the first bit of Freek Wiedijk's article and it's political nonsense. All they've done is use the word "formalization" to describe the process of encoding mathematics "in the computer". What this does is hijack the common notion of formalization for use for there own purposes. Because, formalization is good, right? Well, not if you read and really understand what it does, and infinitely more important, does NOT mean in this context.

    Point of fact, using computers does NOT take human minds out of the equation. It just hides them giving people the illusion of a more effective system.

    1. Re:BS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Still, it's kinda neat to be able to reduce the correctness of a bunch of proofs to the correctness of a single proof verification program.

    2. Re:BS by Raenex · · Score: 1

      It is nothing but BS that the computer is better than human.

      It's certainly better at performing repetitive tasks reliably.

      Not to mention profound stupidity to think that the computer is infallible i.e. it is programmed by humans.

      Where was that claimed in the article?

      Because, formalization is good, right? Well, not if you read and really understand what it does, and infinitely more important, does NOT mean in this context.

      What do you think formalization means? How is computer formalization different?

      Point of fact, using computers does NOT take human minds out of the equation. It just hides them giving people the illusion of a more effective system.

      Computer formalization is just a tool, like a calculator. It isn't meant to replace humans, but instead be used by them.

    3. Re:BS by Xest · · Score: 1

      Ask a computer to do something complex correctly once and it'll do it right every time.

      Ask a human to do something complex correctly once and they will regularly screw it up.

      You're right that computers aren't infallible and yes they are programmed by humans but that ignores the thing computers are better at than humans - repetitive tasks. These are often key to proving something. The point is to program something you often only have to get it right once then the computer will get it right as many times as you want after that. Humans simply can't do the same, computers aren't infallible but humans are extremely fallible.

      Even to give a basic example, I wrote a very basic function that takes a dynamically sized ordered list of coefficients and a value of x to solve a polynomial of the order relevant to the size of the list of coefficients passed to it (pass it a list of 5 coefficients and a value for x and it'll handle the 4th order polynomial ax^4 + bx^3 + cx^2 + dx + e). I also proved it correct using mathematical induction. I can be sure that this simple function will always solve an nth order polynomial for me. Can you guarantee that a human will be able to correctly calculate even a 10th order polynomial correctly every time without fail for 100 values of x? Can you guarantee that they could do it in the same few seconds that my algorithm takes to do it?

      I thought not.

    4. Re:BS by Secret+Rabbit · · Score: 1

      It's certainly better at performing repetitive tasks reliably.

      Not really. It's just good at doing basic operations (i.e. basic arithmetic) repeatedly. That is assuming that what it's doing is input BY A HUMAN correctly. This is drastically different than checking a proof.

      Where was that claimed in the article?

      I cited my reference. If you would care to click a link, you'd find it.

      What do you think formalization means? How is computer formalization different?

      They are just putting in the exact same data as exists elsewhere (assuming there was no error on data entry) and running a human coded (i.e. flawed) program over it and calling that formalized mathematics i.e. formalized to them means "computer encoded". How exactly is that any more formally checked than a human going over it?

      Computer formalization is just a tool, like a calculator. It isn't meant to replace humans, but instead be used by them.

      You need to stop assuming and start reading. Again, I cited my reference. Go read it.

    5. Re:BS by Secret+Rabbit · · Score: 1

      Ask a computer to do something complex correctly once and it'll do it right every time.

      Only if it was told how to do that thing correctly in the first place. For what you said to be true, the programming running must have zero defects. Have you used a computer lately?

      Ask a human to do something complex correctly once and they will regularly screw it up.

      You don't understand the peer review process. Look into that before commenting further in this context.

      Also, you need to stop thinking of Maths as arithmetic or basic algebra. Higher Maths, which is what we are talking about here, is very *very* different. This basic fact completely deflates your "example." Again, look into this before commenting further in this context.

    6. Re:BS by Raenex · · Score: 1

      [profound stupidity to think that the computer is infallible] I cited my reference. If you would care to click a link, you'd find it.

      The Wiedijk article, "Formal Proof -- Getting Started", never says infallible. In fact, it starts with "ensuring a reliability that is orders of magnitude larger than if one had just used human minds." That doesn't mean infallible.

      I think instead that you are talking about the physorg.com article, which doesn't even list an author. Even that one says "nearly infallible", but that article is just a popular press writeup anyways.

      They are just putting in the exact same data as exists elsewhere (assuming there was no error on data entry) and running a human coded (i.e. flawed) program over it and calling that formalized mathematics i.e. formalized to them means "computer encoded".

      The program is written once and is used many times to verify many proofs. The program uses a limited set of rules applied recursively to prove things back to axioms. So, the more the program is used, the more confidence is gained.

      How exactly is that any more formally checked than a human going over it?

      Formal mathematics is based on axioms and rules of logic that are mechanical in application. Human proofs don't go back to axioms. Humans often make mistakes that the computer would not have, because they do proofs in an ad hoc way -- not formal.

      It isn't meant to replace humans, but instead be used by them.

      You need to stop assuming and start reading. Again, I cited my reference. Go read it.

      You need to start providing quotes that back up what you say. Especially when the article you cited says the opposite: "I do not mean that the computer should take steps that a mathematician would need to think about. Formalization of mathematics is about checking, and not about discovery."

      I suspect, again, you are referring to the physorg.com article.

      You should read the articles yourself -- the PDFs from the AMS, not the physorg.com one.

    7. Re:BS by Secret+Rabbit · · Score: 1

      The Wiedijk article, "Formal Proof -- Getting Started", never says infallible. In fact, it starts with "ensuring a reliability that is orders of magnitude larger than if one had just used human minds." That doesn't mean infallible.

      Hyperbole. Look it up.

      The program is written once and is used many times to verify many proofs. The program uses a limited set of rules applied recursively to prove things back to axioms. So, the more the program is used, the more confidence is gained.

      The program will be full of bugs just like any other program. In a zero defect environment this is unacceptable. You are also assuming a level of triviality of the process that isn't so. You really need to become familiar with Higher Mathematics before speaking on these topics. As in, you keep thinking (and implying) that Mathematics is about adding things and "turning the crank." It just isn't so. Not even for checking.

      And even IF this process can be written into an algorithm, we are decades (at least) away from it. And even then, there is still a significant human factor to overcome in data entry (disregarding the flawed program).

      Formal mathematics is based on axioms and rules of logic that are mechanical in application. Human proofs don't go back to axioms. Humans often make mistakes that the computer would not have, because they do proofs in an ad hoc way -- not formal.

      Human proofs do indeed go back to axioms. How? Because all the machinery of Mathematics tracks back to them. One doesn't need to reformulate the proof into its most basic terms if all the techniques used in it have already been checked out.

      And again, computers can't handle most things. One of them being creativity. Mathematics is creative, so is checking it. Fact. You should also stop assuming that human aren't involved in this "formalization" process. Because they are. They are there from the data entry, to compilation to machine language, to the interpreter. Humans are there every step of the way. The process is nothing more than a "computers can do things so much better than us, let's use them" in a context where this doesn't apply.

      You need to start providing quotes that back up what you say. Especially when the article you cited says the opposite: "I do not mean that the computer should take steps that a mathematician would need to think about. Formalization of mathematics is about checking, and not about discovery."

      It is you that needs to start reading (and educating yourself as well) as I said nothing of the sort. Checking Mathematics requires creativity as well. Perhaps different creative muscles, but it still requires creativity none-the-less. The computer will do no more a good job in this than humans because humans will actually be involved in this process more than the old one. And worse yet, there will be those that won't understand this process involved in it that will throw much more chaos into the process.

      If this "formalization" is to make any progress, what is needed is Pure Mathematicians, Theoretical Computer Scientists, and Logicians to get together. Not these hacks doing ridiculously pre-mature work.

      I suspect, again, you are referring to the physorg.com article.

      You should read the articles yourself -- the PDFs from the AMS, not the physorg.com one.

      I did read the AMS article. That is why I referenced it. Is your mind such a sieve that you can't retain information for that short of a time after quoting it?

      But, I'm really tired of explaining these things that are trivial to people that actually know something about real Maths to programmers. Expect no reply. But, it would also be in your best interest to only comment on things that you are competent in. Just a suggestion.

    8. Re:BS by Raenex · · Score: 1

      Hyperbole. Look it up.

      So you're the one who is spreading bullshit by replacing strong claims with absolutist ones. Keep on attacking those straw men you have created.

      The program will be full of bugs just like any other program.

      This is meaningless. Not all software is created equal. Some software is rock solid. The size and complexity of the software matters. The construction and verification of the software matters. The more a particular piece of software is used the more dependable it is. You're just painting all software with a broad brush.

      And even IF this process can be written into an algorithm, we are decades (at least) away from it.

      The process of checking already has been turned into an algorithm. You can look at the list of significant theorems that have been proved in multiple systems.

      And even then, there is still a significant human factor to overcome in data entry (disregarding the flawed program).

      Yes, this will always be a source of errors, whether the computer is used or not. The point is to reduce the room for error. It is much easier to check a specification is correct than to human-verify every step of the process. The goal is to write in formal language what you intend to prove, and if that goal is written correctly, the rest can be computer verified, with help from the human to guide the proof.

      If this "formalization" is to make any progress, what is needed is Pure Mathematicians, Theoretical Computer Scientists, and Logicians to get together. Not these hacks doing ridiculously pre-mature work.

      Progress is being made and people from all fields are working together. That curmudgeons like you dismiss everything out of hand with shallow arguments doesn't change that.

      I did read the AMS article. That is why I referenced it.

      You used words and statements made in the physorg.com that weren't made in the AMS article -- where in fact opposite statements were made. You have never once quoted something from the article. You made shallow arguments that were addressed by the article which you professed to have read.

      If you did read it, you didn't do it very carefully or with an open mind.

      But, I'm really tired of explaining these things that are trivial to people that actually know something about real Maths to programmers.

      That's ok, the world will move on without you.

  16. No, it doesn't work. by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If it's possible to enumerate all valid proofs I propose the following proving algorithm: Run through all valid proofs; once you get to a proof whose conclusion is the theorem you want to prove, return that proof. [if you don't know whether your theorem is true or not, run the above algorithm on its negation as well].

    That needs a couple of small amendments:

    1. You shouldn't run the algorithm on the statement and its negation in sequence, because the basic algorithm will never terminate for an unprovable statement. To harden the algorithm, you should interleave the runs for the statement and its negation: as you enumerate each valid proof, you check whether the conclusion is either your statement or its negation.
    2. Strictly speaking, what's relevant here is not the "truth" of a statement, but rather its validity given the axiomatic theory. A valid statement is one that is true under all interpretations of the theory; an invalid statement is false under all interpretations of the theory; a contingent statement is one that's neither valid nor invalid, since it's true under some interpretations of the theory and false under others.

    Intuitively, your algorithm fails if the theory admits of contingent statements (as first-order logic does), or if the theory is incomplete (as arithmetic is). If you feed it a contingent statement, it will never terminate, since no proof will have either the statement or its negation as its conclusion. Same goes if your theory is incomplete and you feed it one of its Gödel sentences.

    If you can prove that for every statement in the language, your axiomatic theory has a proof either of that statement or its negation, then your algorithm works for that theory. (The textbook I used calls such theories syntactically complete, but books often use just "complete" for this property, which is different from Gödel's "(in)completeness"...)

    (All of the above assumes the axiomatic theory is sound to start with, i.e., there are no proofs of invalid statements. If your theory is unsound, you've got bigger problems.)

  17. Just make it stop by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The question of whether or not God exists is pure sophistry. A sufficiently intelligent agent would pay it no more heed than the question, "Do concepts live in barns?"

    Similarly, Godel's theorems are often portrayed in sophist manner. They prove interesting and perhaps surprising facts about mathematics, but they don't say anything remotely close to "some truth is unknowable".

  18. Pardon me by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

    I meant "inconsistency and incompleteness are not mutually exclusive".

    On the contrary, they often go hand-in-hand.

  19. The whole discussion is flawed. by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Penrose, Hofstadter and you all share a basic assumption: that there exists a "real" property that the word "intelligence" denotes. I think that assumption is flawed.

    The alternative view is that "intelligence" is just a term in a cultural classificatory scheme. This implies several things:

    1. There isn't really a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be "intelligent." What the various uses of the word share is a set of family resemblances.
    2. The classification is tied to a bunch of cultural practices. In the case of "intelligence," it's easy to come up with alternatives: the distribution and specialization of labor, and the assignment of rights and responsibilities. In the first case, we give certain jobs to people who are "intelligent," while giving others to people who are "not intelligent"; in the second, we assign the full range of civil rights and responsibilities to people who have a fully developed "intelligence," but deny rights to, and excuse from responsibilities, people whose "intelligence" is lacking (children, defense of insanity).
    3. The term, therefore, is culturally variable and historically contingent. A hundred years ago, it was common opinion among educated westerners that women, children and non-whites were not "intelligent" and did not "think," often with specialized technical vocabulary for explaining the cognitive faculties of "non-intelligent" humans. Today people have seemingly serious arguments about whether a computer can be "intelligent." What happened during that time? Universal suffrage, decolonization, the rise and fall of behaviorist psychology, the rise of cognitive science, increasing secularization of culture, etc. (The derogation of women's and minorities' cognition does continue, however, but expressed in newer terms: instead of saying that women and negroes experience "henids" instead of "thinking in ideas," people today say that women or African-Americans on average have lower IQ than white men, and that IQ is subject to significant inheritance (see Lawrence Summers or The Bell Curve)).

    Basically, arguments about whether machines can "think" are cosmological arguments; what's really at stake is not what machines can do, but rather, our ideas of what the world is, what people are, and how people relate to the rest of the world; in particular, the relationship between people and machines.

    So now we come at my personal, half-serious test for machine intelligence: can I bring a civil lawsuit against a computer, or the state press criminal charges against it? More generally: can a machine have responsibilities in the same sense that a person does?

    The first point of this is that the most fundamental gulf between people and machines isn't a physical or a cognitive gulf: it's a social gulf. Whether a machine has responsibilities isn't determined by any property intrinsic to the machine itself; it's determined by how people actually relate to the machine. Intrinsic properties of the machine aren't irrelevant, but they're neither necessary nor sufficient.

    The other point is to highlight that the word "intelligence" in AI is being used in a technical and artificially narrow, purely cognitive sense, that doesn't reflect the whole range of implications that the word has in our culture. If we take the broader view, "intelligence" isn't just about cognition; it's at least as much about moral agency. We can turn the whole machine intelligence issue on its head by suggesting that we don't call humans "intelligent" because we catalogued their intrinsic cognitive faculties and found that they met an independent criterion of "intelligence"; rather, we call them "intelligent" because we regard them as moral agents, and from that assumption, it follows that they are are intelligent. Then, the reason we don't regard machines as intelligent is simply that we don't regard them as moral agents.

    1. Re:The whole discussion is flawed. by Thiez · · Score: 1

      > The derogation of women's and minorities' cognition does continue, however, but expressed in newer terms: instead of saying that women and negroes experience "henids" instead of "thinking in ideas," people today say that women or African-Americans on average have lower IQ than white men, and that IQ is subject to significant inheritance (see Lawrence Summers or The Bell Curve)

      Let's be honest, the IQ thing is true. But the differences between men and women are rather small (3-4 points according to wikipedia) but they are REAL. What does this mean? That about 40% of women are smarter than the average male. Nobody with a functioning brain would use IQ scores as proof that women are retards. While IQ appears to be related to race (which may or may not be strongly influenced by culture), if you really want to go that way you would probably have to admit you are inferior to Asians (unless you are Asian, kudos to you). But even if you are an asian male, it can't be that hard to find a black woman who scores higher than you.

    2. Re:The whole discussion is flawed. by Estanislao+Mart�nez · · Score: 1

      IQ is a value judgement posing as a fact judgement. If somebody has a high IQ, it must means that they performed well at a task that the designers of the IQ test chose as a "good" task, at the expense of other tasks. Basically, IQ indirectly measures skills that are valuable in certain social contexts. The division of labor in our economy makes us distinguish different skill sets as being suited for different kinds of labor, and the economic arrangements remunerates some kinds of labor at a higher rate than others.

      A different society could value different skill sets at different rates than we do. Therefore, those societies' tests for their own "valuable skill quotients" would correspondingly have different results than ours.

      All of this only reinforces the point I was making: IQ and intelligence aren't intrinsic properties of people, but rather, a contextual set of relationships between people. Talk about intelligence and IQ as reified properties is basically hiding historically contingent social relations under a seemingly timeless cosmological blanket.

  20. bug in the papers on bugs by mennucc1 · · Score: 1
    Thomas Hales starts his essay discussing the impact of software bugs on society, and claiming

    On average, a programmer introduces 1.5 bugs per line while typing.

    That's quite wrong, a better estimate is that, on average, a programmer introduces from 1.5 up to 5 bugs per 100 lines while typing.
    A bug in a paper about bugs... quite fitting.

  21. Re:math doesnt matter by aproposofwhat · · Score: 1

    And then there are leaders out there like Castro, who doesn't seem to halt.

    And that's despite 638 attempts at forced termination.

    --
    One swallow does not a fellatrix make
  22. Perhaps you misunderstand what a soul is. by MickLinux · · Score: 1, Insightful

    It seems to me that there's this revolutionary new religion out there, called Judaism, that has a creation myth that better describes a soul. Then there's this offshoot cult of Judaism, that takes it a step farther... so let me try to explain.

    When (in the creation myth) Adam eats the fruit, having been told "the day you eat the apple, you die", he begins to die. That is, his body starts to fall apart. But as his body falls apart, his soul -- tied to his body -- starts to fall apart, too.

    So when Adam completely dies and his body disintegrates, his soul has also basically disintegrates. That's why, in Judaism, they have such things as the statement "The dead do not praise God" (Hezekiah, also the psalms, also ecclesiastes).

    And Judaism basically leaves it at that. So when you saw your grandmother's body and soul disintegrating, that's basically what you were seeing.

    But the Christian cult of Judaism takes it a bit farther, for through a good deal of evidence and analysis, they the creator-being who created Adam (and all of us) as being identical with the spirit of Love. But even Love cannot love what does not exist. So the death and disintegration are a denial of the power of that Love.

    Yet this creator being is also identified as being all-powerful. So they understand that certain events about 2000 years ago, in which the entropy of death and disintegration are set reverse, are this creator being simply exerting His power as He would be expected to do.

    Which is a very revolutionary idea, that entropy can be reversed, especially considering that all our physics and even mathematics does not imply that it can be. On the other hand, our physicists and scientists have not been able to observe a creation event, which explains why they are trying to get CERN going (not realizing that if they did trigger a creation event, they still would not be able to observe it). But it should be observed that arguably a creation event is itself a reversal of complete entropy. So our 2nd law of thermodynamics, while completely valid in the frame of reference of our universe, probably is not universally valid.

    --
    Correct Horse Battery Staple: 72 bits of entropy. Enter "Correct H" into google. When it generates the phrase, that's
    1. Re:Perhaps you misunderstand what a soul is. by TheoMurpse · · Score: 1

      entropy of death

      Hasn't CPR proven that death is not entropic?

    2. Re:Perhaps you misunderstand what a soul is. by johanatan · · Score: 0

      Actually, the Christian sect of Judaism believes that the soul is eternal. Though, the GP may have witnessed a soul disconnecting from its body, he did not (in my view) witness the soul ceasing to exist...

      he merely saw it slip out to eternity.

    3. Re:Perhaps you misunderstand what a soul is. by CTachyon · · Score: 1

      It seems to me that there's this revolutionary new religion out there, called Judaism, that has a creation myth that better describes a soul. Then there's this offshoot cult of Judaism, that takes it a step farther... so let me try to explain. ... So our 2nd law of thermodynamics, while completely valid in the frame of reference of our universe, probably is not universally valid.

      And that, ladies and gentlemen, is the crankiest crankery I've ever seen cranked.

      --
      Range Voting: preference intensity matters
  23. Theorems with Informal Proofs. by spaceturtle · · Score: 1

    Well, the list of theorems for which informal proofs have been presented is finite. The goal of this project is to formalize those proofs so they can be verified by proof checkers rather than to prove random facts.

    Actually even if we just limit the Central Theorems to "a mathematical statement that has been claimed to be true", then we still have a finite list. (and there is little need to prove a statement true if nobody cares whether it is true or not)