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The Slow Bruteforce Botnet(s) May Be Learning
badger.foo writes "We've seen stories about the slow bruteforcers — we've discussed it here — and based on the data, my colleague Egil Möller was the first to suggest that since we know the attempts are coordinated, it is not too far-fetched to assume that the controlling system measures the rates of success for each of the chosen targets and allocates resources accordingly. (The probes of my systems have slowed in the last month.) If Egil's assumption is right, we are seeing the bad guys adapting. And they're avoiding OpenBSD machines." For fans of raw data, here are all the log entries (3MB) that badger.foo has collected since noticing the slow bruteforce attacks.
The obvious solution is to use public/private key authentication and disallow password logins.
This is much safer anyways, since your private key and your passphrase stays on your local machine always, so even if the server is compromised and the SSHd is bugged, no one will have immediate access to your login token.
I swear, some of the most adaptive, sophisticated, and advanced techniques seem to be coming out of the Botnets.
It's my (admittedly probably crazy) idea that we WILL begin to see "emergent intelligence properties" out of some sophisticated system at some point in time, whether it be Google, an AGI lab, or a botnet. I shudder at the prospect of our first AI of power will have grown from one of these botnets.
NOTE: I'm not saying this will happen tomorrow, but extrapolating the current state of botnets relative to the current state of other systems leads me to believe, on a relative basis, systems may be complex relative to one another as they are today. If that is the case, well... that would be bad.
If you can read this... 01110101 01110010 00100000 01100001 00100000 01100111 01100101 01100101 01101011
In principle, OpenBSD is no more or less vulnerable to weak username/password pairs than is any other OS. I suspect that, on average, OpenBSD machines are more likely to be set up for keypair auth; but any that aren't are in the same boat as everybody else(since, after all, username/password guesses aren't OS weaknesses, OSes are supposed to respond to correct username/password pairs.)
There is still reason to avoid them, though. Because OpenBSD is something of a niche system, you can make plausible inferences about the systems running it. Specifically, they most likely have admins who are interested in security and are watching activity fairly closely, and are more likely than average to do something about it. If you are doing something illegal, why attract such attention?
Bots were knocking on my door to the point I was worry about performance degradation. I know there are many ways to defeat these but here was my solution.
In hosts.deny /var/www/html/allow.txt
-----------------
sshd:ALL EXCEPT
-----------------
Create a simple cgi-script (password protected and accessed via secret random url) that writes your browser IP address to the allow.txt file and all those nasty botnets and go to hell.
These people are a tremendous illness upon the world. If it were legal, I would contribute to a bounty on the lives of the people responsible for this stuff. These people make me beyond sick. I have said it many times and sometimes I actually mean it -- if I knew of someone involved in this sort of business close by, I would appear on the news shortly thereafter. And I am pretty sure I am not alone in this sentiment.
At the risk of being unpopular ..... Just turn off the Internet already!
Don't forget about the economies surrounding botnets. There are two sides, those that profit from the botnets (the operators), and those that profit fighting the botnets (the fighters). Additionally, there are those that profit from providing botnet remedial "solutions" whilst not being in either of the primary (operator or fighter) categories. If botnets ceased to exist, there would be a *lot* more lost on the fighter and solution side than on the operator side. So... like SPAM, this raises the question of just who actually benefits the most from botnet existing.
You can infer a lot about the OS from the way it crafts it's packets. Nmap does a rather good job with host identification. I don't know all the things it does, but more or less it's a case of "Find an open port, send is various kinds of packets, see how it reacts."
Probably it is just avoiding secure hosts, like yours. OpenBSD hosts tend to be secure because it is selected by people who put security before other requirements.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
ipchains is Linux's 2.2 kernel firewall protection. BSD uses 'IPF'.
No matter what system you're using, a closed port is a closed port.
I think the main selling point between the two would be that IPF is slightly better performing and that iptables has quite a few addons that make for niceness if you know about and how to use them.
Bye!
sudo nmap -O host
will usually do the trick.
Free Manning, jail Obama.
OpenBSD doesn't use ipchains -- it uses pf, which many people -- myself included -- like a lot. OpenBSD is secure and easy to get routing.
The end result is the same, but pf can be easily adapted to many tricks like this, automatically blocking SSH bruteforcing.
I'd give the beginners using Ubuntu a break. They're overwhelming sometimes, but the community growing is a good thing. I'm sure someone I've introduced to Linux has needed online help (badly!), but another friend I introduced to Linux really dug in and we're now both better developers because of it. You just don't know.
Here. I admit. I'm part of the so-called "whitehat guys" who profit from stoping the botnets. But since I have no ethics or morals, I dont really stop them, I just give them kickbacks to make it look like I'm stopping them.
Now excuse me while I go get a back massage on from the hot ladies serving me martinis on the beach in Tahiti. Me and my fellow whitehats are making millions off you poor fools. If you only knew!
(adjust your tinfoil good sir, you are blocking the wrong signals)
I do computer and network security for a university.
This distributed SSH password guessing is not a new tactic. We have seen and tracked this tactic off and on for over a year.
If this tactic was a game changer, we would have seen it ramp up before now. It would occur all the time. But it doesn't. It only seems to occur during holidays.
At it's heart, this tactic is not any more effective than non-distributed password guessing. Either way, the attacker has to enumerate the same number of guesses before finding a hit. If a machine is vulnerable, it will be successfully attacked by either approach to password guessing. If it is not vulnerable, neither approach will work.
Modern hacking is a economic activity. It must balance risk and reward. This attack doesn't offer any more reward than conventional password guessing. It's main feature is to try to change the risk side of the equation.
Conventional SSH password guessing is noisy. One machine will portscan for TCP/22. Then it rapidly guesses passwords against everything that responds. That one machine is usually lost to the attacker. Automated defense systems block it. Also, defenders report it to the owning ISP. The only way this works for the attacker is if he can harvest more that he loses.
The distributed guessing attack is also noisy, but in a different way. Currently, we see the attacker start by sacrificing 1 computer to do a TCP/22 portscan. At this point, he has already risked as much as a conventional password guessing attack. Then he feeds the results to a bunch of bots. Each bot then takes turns guessing passwords. Each bot guesses 1 password at a time. However, each bot guesses against multiple SSH servers at the same time.
This attack is inherently more risky that conventional password guessing. The attacker exposes many of his computers. If we can detect and respond, this attack is not as cost effective as conventional password guessing.
It is easy for my university to detect and respond to these attacks. We detect it in three different ways.
1) Each attacker has a distinctive network behavior pattern. We can automate detection by looking at aggregate Cisco netflow data.
2) It is trivial to pick off this attack using a SSH honeypot.
3) We use a network visualization tool to watch aggregate SSH activity. This password guessing is obvious on our visualization tool.
Once we have detected the attackers, we respond to them in the normal way. We block them. We inform our peer institutions and the authorities. We inform the owning ISP.
The main difference in this situation is that detection and response is easy if you have access to aggregate traffic or multiple SSH servers. It is difficult if you only manage 1 SSH server.
I don't expect this form of attack to last much longer. I am sure that everybody else is adapting. Once the defenders adapt, this tactic is too expensive to be used.
Miles
You can infer a lot about the OS from the way it crafts it's packets.
Similarly, you can learn a lot about a person from the way it crafts it is sentences.
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