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With Lawsuit Settled, Hackers Working With MBTA

narramissic writes "The three MIT students who were sued earlier this year by the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority for planning to show at Defcon how they had had reverse engineered the magnetic stripe tickets and smartcards said Monday that they are now working to make the Boston transit system more secure. 'I'm really glad to have it behind me. I think this is really what should have happened from the start,' said Zack Anderson, one of the students sued by the MBTA."

31 of 90 comments (clear)

  1. Summary Fail by Kazrael · · Score: 4, Interesting
    Sad that the summary wouldn't also mention how the lawsuit was settled.

    FTFA:
    1. Prevent them from giving their talk
    2. Judge threw out the gag order
    3. Amicable???

    The settlement ends the matter in an amicable way.

    The article fails to really specify end results, but it sounds like some kind of job deal was worked out where the kids will help improve security.

    --
    Development notes at http://devscribbles.blogspot.com
    1. Re:Summary Fail by urbanriot · · Score: 2, Informative

      Yes, I would also like to know the specifics of the deal. I'm also curious if the EFF lawyer that represented them received payment for his representation in the form of a settlement, or if his work was done entirely pro-bono.

  2. What's this? by fewnorms · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Common sense finally prevailing? Has hell frozen over?
    On one hand I'm surprised that the MBTA has decided to work with these guys to make their system more secure, on the other hand I wish this would happen more often instead of the mindless suing that government organizations and other companies seem so fond of.

    --
    Veni, Vidi, Velcro!
    1. Re:What's this? by kimvette · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Government officials have long since forgotten that they are, according to the Constitution, answerable to us, not vice versa. Having said that I am glad things went the way of the students, and it should ALWAYS be the case. I would not consider those students who pointed out a security issue to be evildoers who need punishment. They are citizens or legal residents who are afforded the right to free speech, which includes alerting folks of poor designs implemented by government agencies.

      --
      The Christian Right is Neither (Christian nor right). See: Matthew 23, Matthew 25, Ezekiel 16:48-50
    2. Re:What's this? by rbrausse · · Score: 3, Insightful

      > Common sense finally prevailing?

      I don't think so, this sounds more like

      "If you can't beat 'em buy 'em"

    3. Re:What's this? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Except the MBTA system isn't fixable. It's just full of fail.

      For starters, the card's balance is stored ON THE CARD and nowhere else.

      Secondly, the fare-taking devices are not hooked up to any sort of network. They just kind of assume that only the special blessed writing device can change the balance on the card.

      This isn't quite as stupid as it sounds since the devices use PKI so that theoretically the write request must be signed by a blessed source.

      Except, rather than use a tested encryption source like AES (which is available), they went with some proprietary 40-bit encryption scheme for the smart card. The ticket was even worse, there they used a 6-bit checksum. Yes: 6 bits.

      So the only way to fix it is to build a network to monitor potential fraud, rip out all the fare-taking devices, and replace every single ticket and smart card.

      Now you can see why the MBTA sued: their massive incompetence means that fixing the problem they created will easily run into the billions of dollars.

      Then again, this is the same group of people who successfully sued the glue manufacturer who created the glue that failed to hold up 2-ton slabs of concrete. Never mind that the glue was never designed for such an application or that no one in their right mind GLUES 2-ton slabs of concrete to the ceiling of tunnels.

    4. Re:What's this? by xaxa · · Score: 2, Interesting

      So the only way to fix it is to build a network to monitor potential fraud, rip out all the fare-taking devices, and replace every single ticket and smart card.

      Which is what they should have done from the start, and is what they did in e.g. London, where a hack exists for the cards, but isn't worth the effort because a tampered card can be blocked within 24 hours.

      Then again, this is the same group of people who successfully sued the glue manufacturer who created the glue that failed to hold up 2-ton slabs of concrete. Never mind that the glue was never designed for such an application or that no one in their right mind GLUES 2-ton slabs of concrete to the ceiling of tunnels.

      I'm no civil engineer, but I doubt we're talking PVA here.

    5. Re:What's this? by Gman14msu · · Score: 3, Informative

      Then again, this is the same group of people who successfully sued the glue manufacturer who created the glue that failed to hold up 2-ton slabs of concrete. Never mind that the glue was never designed for such an application or that no one in their right mind GLUES 2-ton slabs of concrete to the ceiling of tunnels.

      Well that`s just a blatant misstatement, and while I`m not saying the MBTA is a well run organization, they don't need additional problems attributed to them.

      First of all, the slabs of concrete that fell were part of the Big Dig, which is run by Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, not the MBTA. Both are poorly run transportation organizations in Massachusetts, but they are not the same.

      Secondly, the suits in the ceiling collapse were brought by the Massachusetts Attorney General's office not the MBTA. They were brought against many of the companies involved, including the adhesive company and Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the primary consulting firm. The Turnpike Authority was not really to blame, it was either BPB for using an adhesive meant for wall panels for ceilings, or the adhesive company for not realizing their product was being improperly used. Both were sued by the Massachusetts Attorney General's office and paid millions to the state.

  3. should have happened from the start by nurb432 · · Score: 2, Informative

    To have lost a suit?

    Knowledge must be free or freedom is compromised. If that information is somehow 'embarrassing', to damned bad as its part of the price of freedom.

    --
    ---- Booth was a patriot ----
    1. Re:should have happened from the start by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Knowledge must be free or freedom is compromised.

      I wouldn't want to compromise your freedom... so what is your credit card number?

    2. Re:should have happened from the start by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Thank you! You have just captured the central hypocritical ideology of Slashdot:

      "Information yearns to be free! Unless, of course, its my information, which must be protected at all costs!"

  4. Re:nothing new by Ethanol-fueled · · Score: 2, Insightful

    YMMV, but they usually won't offer you a job unless (1) you don't cause trouble and (2) you politely let them know about it and (3, optional) you offer a workaround or a fix.

    More likely, if you're caught hacking then you'll be confined to monitored house arrest and unpaid servitude as an FBI snitch-bitch. And that's after making the deal which will keep you out of prison.

  5. It's hush money by NoKaOi · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Okay, so fundamentally, the MBTA's goal is to prevent the kids from making their knowledge public. The kids' goal is probably to make a name for themselves, and maybe do something cool by defeating the MBTA's security.

    The judge threw out the gag ording, which I assume means the kids can legally make the knowledge public (even if they'll be sued later). By "hiring" the kids to make recommendations on their security, everyone saves a bunch of legal costs, the MBTA keeps the kids' from going public with the exploits, and the kids still get to make a name for themselves, and maybe make a few dollars. Everybody wins. That doesn't mean the MBTA actually cares about anything the kids have to say in their recommendations.

    1. Re:It's hush money by Eil · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The kids' goal is probably to make a name for themselves, and maybe do something cool by defeating the MBTA's security.

      Their goals are unknown, so it's not anyone's place to assume. However, the traditional hacker motive has been to discover how a (often closed) system works, figure out if there are any defects, and share the information gained with other hackers and the public. Hackers of all walks (including and perhaps especially open source developers) have a natural distaste for technology whose details are intentionally hidden from them.

      The judge threw out the gag ording, which I assume means the kids can legally make the knowledge public (even if they'll be sued later). By "hiring" the kids to make recommendations on their security, everyone saves a bunch of legal costs, the MBTA keeps the kids' from going public with the exploits, and the kids still get to make a name for themselves, and maybe make a few dollars. Everybody wins.

      No, everybody doesn't win:

      1. The public still doesn't know that their tax dollars were spent on a shoddy system that can be exploited easily.

      2. Regardless of whether the gag order was lifted later, the MBTA still got what they wanted which was to silence the hackers and chill any other research being performed on the system by others.

      3. Hackers in general will continue to be censored by bogus court orders and injunctions whenever some company doesn't want their horribly-designed product described publicly for what it is.

  6. Hack first, ask later? by CannonballHead · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I haven't been able to find it in my brief perusal of the link... does anyone know offhand if the MIT students asked permission first, or if they just did it, planned the talk, and then got in trouble?

    If the former, MBTA is messed up. If the latter, I would have to honestly say that the MIT students should have thought about what they were doing and asked before they decided to hack something and tell others how to do it.

    If someone asked me if they could do a security audit on my house and I said sure, that'd be cool. If they broke in, were going to give a talk about it to some other dudes and THEN I found out about it, I'd be a bit upset, too. Would I want to fix my security, sure, but I'd be kinda mad they did it without asking. Just because you CAN break in doesn't mean you have a right to do it, it's still MY property, not yours...

    1. Re:Hack first, ask later? by cob666 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      I'll probably get slammed for this but I really can't stand when people compare every incident of 'hacking' to breaking into somebody's house. The MIT students didn't break into anything, they reverse engineered and hacked an MBTA card.

      As far as I'm concerned, the MBTA should have done a bit more R&D and implemented a system that wasn't so easily compromised.

      Also, I believe that historically most system flaws are not fixed UNTIL they are hacked and exploited.

      --
      Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law - Aleister Crowley
    2. Re:Hack first, ask later? by Achromatic1978 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Right, and the fiber switches that they accessed? They were there for the taking, too, right?

    3. Re:Hack first, ask later? by SuperBanana · · Score: 4, Interesting

      I really can't stand when people compare every incident of 'hacking' to breaking into somebody's house. The MIT students didn't break into anything

      I can't stand it when antisocial self-described geniuses think that they have the right to touch/use/mess with other people's stuff simply because they're doing so via electronic signals. If it doesn't belong to you, don't mess with it. That's lesson some of us learned when we were in kindergarten.

      They went way beyond what would be considered "white hat" activities. They made up IDs and lied their way into MBTA headquarters, went into a conference room, and plugged in their laptops and played around with the network. Let me repeat that for you: they essentially broke into private property and used a private network by physical location.

      They also went into network closets all over the system where they knew they didn't belong, which is trespassing. It doesn't matter if the door is locked or not.

  7. SLAPP by Adrian+Lopez · · Score: 3, Insightful

    The Transit Authority's SLAPP lawsuit has served its purpose: it prevented the students from speaking at Defcon. In the end there was no judgment sought, for no judgment was necessary in order that the Transit Authority's wishes be granted in full. The speakers were silenced without trial, and now we're told this should be interpreted as a kind of "happy ending".

    It's not a happy ending. It's sad. Very sad.

    --
    "In prison you just have to shut your eyes and take it. Here you have to shut your eyes and give it."
  8. Re:nothing new by Dahamma · · Score: 4, Informative

    Interestingly, they really didn't meet any of the conditions you stated!

    A couple of bits from the first link:

    The passage in the Defcon show guide describing their talk begins, "Want free subway rides for life?" That line was removed from the description of the talk posted at the Defcon Web site.

    Can't see that as not causing trouble (at least from the MBTA's perspective...)

    The researchers refused to give the transit authority information about security flaws in its system ahead of the talk, the filings state.

    Which is not particularly polite - and in fact definitely takes them out of any resonable definition of "White Hat"...

    And while hacking around on a smartcard they bought shouldn't be illegal (as long as they don't actually use it for free rides), this bit:

    They say they were able to access fiber switches connecting fare vending machines to the unlocked network

    is the kind of thing that gets people under said house arrest...

    To be honest, these guys were pretty lucky for the way this whole thing turned out. They freely admitted in their published talk that they illegally accessed a gov't network and planned on explaining how to get "free subway rides" to a room full of hackers without revealing how to the gov't organization about to get screwed over... at the very least they could have expected a protracted court case that made their life hell for the next couple years...

  9. Those kids should keep their eyes and ears open .. by jc42 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Many organizations, both governmental and corporate, have a tendency to react to employees (or consultants) finding security problems by harrassing, firing, and/or suing them. We already know that the MBTA has management that takes this approach. So the kids should be carefully documenting everything they do, with an eye towards defending themselves from or countersuing the MBTA for the MBTA's actions against them if they do their job well.

    Something I've been noticing in particular is that when I read management characterizations of security "hacking", it almost always sounds like a description of what I do routinely as part of all software debugging. In the eyes of management, the media, and the courts, all software developers are "hackers", and they mean this term as a criminal indictment. We are all suspect, especially when we give them bad news about what their systems are already doing.

    --
    Those who do study history are doomed to stand helplessly by while everyone else repeats it.
  10. they did not have permission at all by SuperBanana · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I know this goes against the Slashdot perception of how these "kids" were sweet, innocent little virgins who did no wrong, but:

    • They went into closets they knew they didn't belong in (that's entering/trespass, look it up; it doesn't matter if the door is locked. If it is locked, then it's BREAKING and entering)
    • They used forged documents (IDs) and lied to security officers and T employees to get into MBTA office space (that would be fraud, forgery and uttering)
    • They plugged into the network in those offices (more specifically, meeting rooms) they knew were private and used them to access the MBTA network (computer/network trespass.)

    Then, they used the modified MiFare cards in gates- they had photos showing them using the cards in gates. That's THEFT and FRAUD, people. You can't walk into a bank, cash a fake check for $500, and then publish a paper and say "the banking system is insecure!", and be shocked and amazed when you're charged with forgery and uttering.

    1. Re:they did not have permission at all by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Except the MIT students weren't charged with shit. No fraud, no violation of the CFAA--nothing. MBTA's entire case was a preliminary injunction against the students for presenting their findings at Defcon. That gag order was lifted in mid August and the case was dismissed in October. The only "news" now is that the students completed helping the MBTA secure their systems against the vulnerabilities that were presented in the Defcon presentation. IOW, THEY GOT AWAY WITH IT! HAR!. And, of course, MBTA got help in securing their system after they pulled their head out of their asses and decided that these guys could actually help them. So, win-win for everyone.

    2. Re:they did not have permission at all by cob666 · · Score: 2, Informative

      They went into closets they knew they didn't belong in (that's entering/trespass, look it up; it doesn't matter if the door is locked. If it is locked, then it's BREAKING and entering)

      In Mass the simple act of pushing open a door to gain access to any unauthorized area is breaking and entering.

      --
      Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law - Aleister Crowley
  11. And this is a good outcome? by cdrguru · · Score: 2, Informative

    The problem is there was a implementation of a system with some potential exposures that nobody was exploiting. Quite possibly, no exploitation was because of a lack of knowledge rather than any impractacality of the exploit.

    Sure, everything could be made more secure. Did you know that there are only about 100 unique car key "encodings"? This means that if you have a Ford the chances are excellent that your key will open the door of some other Ford in an airport parking lot. Or a mall. Why isn't this a huge problem - it sure sounds like it is a huge exposure, doesn't it. Well, partly it isn't exploited because nobody knows about it, or almost nobody.

    Security by obscurity works and it is cheap to implement. Actually closing all those holes can be extremely expensive and in the physical world it probably doesn't work any better.

    So how do you avoid spending millions of dollars for needless security? Well, first off you can strongly discourage security probing. Next, you can defend your obscurity because it is cheaper than fixing the holes someone discovered.

    Which is better in the public interest: having a truely "secure" transit card system or preventing the disclosure of information that will certainly lead to exploits? It almost doesn't matter how much fixing the security might cost as long as it is $1 more than keeping the holes secret and defending against probing.

    Do we really want public institutions spending large amounts of money to make things "secure" when exploiting holes in public infrsstructure is illegal anyway?

    Paying these folks anything, even fifty cents, just encourages more people to follow in their footsteps.

    1. Re:And this is a good outcome? by cob666 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Did you know that there are only about 100 unique car key "encodings"? This means that if you have a Ford the chances are excellent that your key will open the door of some other Ford in an airport parking lot. Or a mall. Why isn't this a huge problem - it sure sounds like it is a huge exposure, doesn't it. Well, partly it isn't exploited because nobody knows about it, or almost nobody.

      I had a VW Passat in the mid 90's and after leaving work one afternoon I walked to my car (I worked in a photo store in a strip mall), unlocked the door, got in and the car wouldn't start. I remember looking up and thinking it was odd how dark my sunroof was until I realized there was NO sunroof. I got out of the car and it was a slightly different color than my car but I was able to lock and unlock the doors with my keys!

      --
      Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law - Aleister Crowley
    2. Re:And this is a good outcome? by Dun+Malg · · Score: 4, Informative

      Did you know that there are only about 100 unique car key "encodings"? This means that if you have a Ford the chances are excellent that your key will open the door of some other Ford in an airport parking lot.

      Untrue. Ford (the example you offer) has since 1984 used a key with 10 cut positions with 5 possible depths, which is 9,765,625 (5^10) possible combinations. The door only uses the first four cuts, so in theory the odds are 1 in 625 that any given key will open a random car's door. With worn locks and/or intentionally half-cut tryout keys, that drops to 1 in 256 at best. The ignition uses the last 6 cuts, so it's only a useful trick for getting at the contents of the car. The reason it's not a problem is that opening a random car door is largely useless, and opening a specific car door can be accomplished much quicker through methods other than standing there going through a giant ring of tryout keys.

      It almost doesn't matter how much fixing the security might cost as long as it is $1 more than keeping the holes secret and defending against probing.

      Except that fixing the problem is a a predictable, one time expense, and "keeping it quiet" is a never-ending process. The latter will continue forever until the former action is taken, so now which path is cheaper?

      --
      If a job's not worth doing, it's not worth doing right.
  12. Last year's card by Alari · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Considering all you need to do to "hack" MBTA's system is to use last year's card for that month, I hope the awesome brainpower of MIT can improve the situation somewhat.

    --
    I use Windows... like a two dollar wh.. why don't I just go ahead and not finish that sentence.
  13. Re:nothing new by DMalic · · Score: 5, Informative

    You're reading verbatim the brief where the MTBA lies their butt off. The students were not only fully in the right, but 110% - they offered all relevant information, were not planning to provide any illegal or directly damaging info in their talk, etc etc. The MBTA wasn't willing to listen, fix their problems, or even admit they had one - the bureaucrats running it were more interesting in covering things up, which is how this whole fuss got started.

  14. Re:nothing new by Thinboy00 · · Score: 5, Informative

    Interestingly, they really didn't meet any of the conditions you stated!

    A couple of bits from the first link:

    The passage in the Defcon show guide describing their talk begins, "Want free subway rides for life?" That line was removed from the description of the talk posted at the Defcon Web site.

    Can't see that as not causing trouble (at least from the MBTA's perspective...)

    The researchers refused to give the transit authority information about security flaws in its system ahead of the talk, the filings state.

    Which is not particularly polite - and in fact definitely takes them out of any resonable definition of "White Hat"...

    And while hacking around on a smartcard they bought shouldn't be illegal (as long as they don't actually use it for free rides), this bit:

    [snip]

    From another FA

    The students said they tried to contact the MBTA around July 20 through their professor Ron Rivest, who teaches in MIT's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, but did not actually connect with the agency until around July 30.

    It's been a crazy week for Anderson, who looked haggard -- he said it took him 18 hours to travel by air to Defcon and he had not slept since Thursday.

    And another:

    Mahoney [the MBTA attorney] praised a security analysis the students had prepared for the agency, saying the information in it convinced them of the vulnerability.

    Looks like you're wrong, or one of TFAs is wrong anyway.

    --
    $ make available
  15. Re:So get rid of the officials by RyuuzakiTetsuya · · Score: 2, Insightful

    So California's Prop 8 was wisdom?

    --
    Non impediti ratione cogitationus.