Cybercriminals Refine ATM Data-Sniffing Software
BobB-nw writes "Cybercriminals are improving a malicious software program that can be installed on ATMs running Microsoft's Windows XP operating system that records sensitive card details, according to security vendor Trustwave. The malware has been found so far on ATMs in Eastern European countries, according to a Trustwave report. The malware records the magnetic stripe information on the back of a card as well as the PIN, which would potentially allow criminals to clone the card in order to withdraw cash. The collected card data, which is encrypted using the DES algorithm, can be printed out by the ATM's receipt printer, Trustwave wrote."
DES doesn't really mean "Designed Extremely Secure" ....
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An ATM is not a desktop computer. WTF is an ATM doing running Windows?
They have to understand that 'eating the loss', while it may make sense from a short term financial perspective does nto make sense for a longer term perspective. There are superior methods out there to verify credit card information, we don't need to use the same method that was used 50 years ago.
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..."on ATMs running Microsoft's Windows XP operating system..."
Let me be the first to say "ur doin it wrong."
When your ATM asks if you want to install an ActiveX control, you always say "no."
How many years do I have to keep telling them that?
I RTFA (yes, yes... I know) but I couldn't find the answer to the most obvious question... how does the rootkit get installed?
If no physical access to the real PC inside the ATM is needed.. that's really cool!
But if you need to plug an usb drive in, this actually reduces the field of the potential thieves by several orders of magnitude...
M
"Are you sure you want to withdraw this money?"
"Will you spend it wisely?"
"You don't seem to have much left, have you planned for an emergency?"
. . . etc. . . .
Schroedinger's Brexit: The UK is both in and out of the EU at the same time!
Why a bank's IT / security team would feel it appropriate to operate ATMs that run Windows is completely beyond me. I mean, if bankers were really that stupid the world economy would probably have crumbled by now. Oh, wait. . .
Facts have a liberal bias.
Once I found a gas station near my work that the pumps where running a version of Windows back around 1999-2000. If you swiped your card and pulled the nozzle at the same time the little LCD screen showed a BSOD and you got free gas. I fill up there for 1 week until they closed the station and changed the pumps. Never got charged a cent!
To run any "public financial transaction device" certain compliances are required and many of these are related to physical security, data security and communications security standards. Clearly, the presence of malware on ATM core software indicates that the ATM security standards are either not being met or are terribly inadequate.
It occurs to me that one rule that might go a long way to making machines like ATMs (or even voting machines) more secure against corruption is a requirement that the system software should be stored in a read-only format such as CD/DVD or ROM chips. CD/DVD ROMs would probably be the most flexible method and various self-check measures could help ensure that the CD/DVD ROM was genuine. (Say, for example, a validation black-box device of some sort.)
With enough engineering and hacking, even this method could be thwarted I am sure but it would certainly raise the bar significantly beyond "crack the machine open, connect the system drive to a USB adapter, insert additional code, close up" which is the method of entry I suspect is most used. If there was limited to no local storage and ROM-based operating systems and software combined with solid verification technologies, it would take some serious knowledge to compromise such machines.
This sort of method would make running Windows XP as the operating system considerably more difficult, but if they are hard-set on running Windows, I am sure they would find a way to comply if it were required.
Plus firewall, 'nuf said. The problem is when people break into the back of a machine and physically install malware on it... if you have people breaking in or social engineering their way into the back of a physically locked machine then you are going to have problems. I don't care if it's running some logic flow on an EEPROM, it's still going to be hacked.
What is this 1980? What countries are still using magnetic strips for credit and debit cards?
Well, the USA for one. 1 debit card and 2 credit cards in my wallet right now. Everyone is chip-less, the electronically readable information is in the mag stripe on the back, old-fashioned raised numbers and letters for the imprinting machines are on the front.
Granted, they're all issued from the bank, but it is one of the largest in the USA, not some mom-and-pop outfit.
"Flame away, I wear asbestos underwear"
there are many ATMs in the UK that use Windows XP as their OS of choice. Having personally seen crash screens and machines caught in a restart loop.
Why they are using windows, I don't know to be honest. Why they'd be using a Linux distro, I don't know. The banks probably don't know either, as far as I'm aware they get their ATMs from companies like NCR or IBM (or Diebold, as we've seen before) who are the companies who supply the software. It just so happens that the software they write is written for Windows Operating System. Remember, the cost of hiring someone who can programme for Windows is significantly less for someone who can programme for Linux (As they will likely also be able to programme for Windows, thus, with a larger skill-set they'll demand more money) And a bulk licence for Windows where they're churning out 1,000+ ATMs boils down to next to nothing.
The cheapest programmer, the cheapest hardware, a slightly costly OS. Something has to be a weak link, and the exploiters exploit it.
It pays to be obvious, especially if you have a reputation for being subtle.
A reasonable report via http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/03/atm_trojans/ and something slightly more technical http://regmedia.co.uk/2009/06/03/trust_wave_atm_report.pdf via trust wave.
It's the problem of legacy support. Cards still have magstripes because on occasion you'll come across a situation where there isn't a chip reader, and ATMs (presumably) still have magstripe readers for the occasions that the card doesn't have a chip. If you've got access to the OS, as the criminals mentioned in the article do, you can presumably activate whatever reader you like.
There's also the fact that this is Eastern Europe - without wanting to perpetuate negative stereotypes, I think it is quite fair to comment that they are not the most developed economies, and as such large scale investment in upgraded technology may well be low down on the list of priorities.
I'm not sure why the US often seems to share in this kind of technological resistance. A combination of large size and historical mistrust for coordination from a central authority might make it difficult to get cooperation on new projects from everyone simultaneously, I guess, which greatly exacerbates the legacy tech issue.
Read the summary again and it's obvious.
Eastern European Countries have this problem. Home of Russian mafia expansion, home of corrupted and weak police forces, home of guys who make so little a couple hundred bucks in bribe works well, home of scammer's money laundry operations, etc.
There doesn't need to be an exploit beyond "Eastern European Country" involved.
10. Don't always run as root
9. Don't open attachments from unknown sources
8. Don't run Windows!
7. Don't run Windows!
6. Don't run Windows!
5. Don't run Windows!
4. Don't run Windows!
3. Don't run Windows!
2. Don't run Windows!
1. Don't run Windows!
From TFR:
"Additionally, the malware harvests what is believed to be key or PIN data, saving the
information in a file C:\WINDOWS\kl."
So, they waffle on whether the PIN is captured. The filename "kl", does imply "KeyLogger", though.
Perhaps Eastern European ATMs are built differently that those in North America...maybe "saving a bit of money" by doing the encryption of the PIN in the PC, instead using an encrypting secure keypad.
Or, since the same keypad is used for PIN entry and regular input, perhaps the control signal that tells the keypad whether to encrypt or pass keypresses through has been tampered with...so the entered PIN comes through as normal keypresses, and is encrypted by the malware and passed on after logging to the file?
Or, maybe it's just a guess on the part of the author.
Certainly there is plenty fo corruption in the Eastern European countries, however it's not like other countries are spared the same problems; American TV producers can't seem to get enough of the Good Cop / Bad Cop diametric, as though heaven and hell had a street address. Why is it popular? Because it's a hot topic: people know corruption in the police sector is rampant in America.
What of banks? You can almost be sure that banks in the West, now famous for their abusive secrecy and gambling, would not dare let their customers know the same thing was happening at an ATM near you.. Having lived in both 'sides' of Europe, I wish you luck with those Reagan-era East/West generalisations.
"which would potentially allow criminals to clone the card in order to withdraw cash. "
Heh... the joke is on the hacker. I have no money in my bank account to withdraw!
A friend of mine had his atm card in a Bank of America machine to withdraw money when the power went out. When it came back on a few seconds later, he was greeted with the Windows XP Embedded splash screen before the atm interface came up. The machine didn't realize it still had his card, so he couldn't get it back. (This is especially funny since he is a MS fanboy.)
This brings up a serious question. You need some cash in an unfamiliar state or country, and you come across an ATM. How do you know if you can trust it?
Given the number of people who've been scammed by everything from bolt-on ATM card skimmers to oldschool fake night deposit boxes, this is worth worrying about.
The standard security mantra is, "only use trusted hardware to authenticate yourself", but that can't happen here.
Anyone have any ideas for an ATM authentication system that will both prove to the bank that I am who I say I am, and prove to me that the ATM isn't stealing my authentication keys?
The only solution I can think of involves trusted hand-held devices like cell phones or keychain password tokens.