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Hackers Fail To Crack Brazilian Voting Machines

blueser writes "From Nov 10th to Nov 13th the Brazilian Government hosted a public hacking contest to test the robustness of its voting machines. 38 participants from private and public IT companies (including the Brazilian Federal Police) were divided into 9 teams, which tried several different approaches to try to tamper with the software installed on the machines, and even to physically interfere in other stages of the process. All attempts (aside from a minor one which would not compromise the overall results) failed, and observations from the participants and neutral observers will be taken into account to improve the process even further. Here is the official announcement for the contest (Google translation; Portuguese original). A summary of the results is available in the Brazilian press (original). Brazilian voting machines use Linux." US voting officials ought to be envious of their Brazilian counterparts, or ashamed, or both. Perhaps this MIT-developed cryptographic voting system offers a way forward.

143 comments

  1. Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    These obviously weren't Diebold machines.

    1. Re:Hmm... by Z00L00K · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Obviously this puts a lot of software produced in the US to shame.

      Today it seems like it's all about selling something crappy for money in the US with an EULA where you free yourself of all responsibility.

      And when someone points out the flaws the lawyers are called in to hide the fact that there is a gap that can put Grand Canyon to shame.

      No wonder that the world has suffered so much malicious software.

      Sure - call me a troll, but it's also an observation. Time to market is more important than quality.

      --
      If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
    2. Re:Hmm... by darkpixel2k · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Time to market is more important than quality.

      Yeah look at Ubuntu. Every 6 months on the dot no matter what the quality.
      And uuh...yeah...Look at Vista. Was that 6 or 7 years to market?

      Your statement doesn't hold up. ;)

      --
      There's no place like ::1 (I've completed my transition to IPv6)
    3. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Quick, somebody blame it on H1B workers.

    4. Re:Hmm... by phantomfive · · Score: 1

      Sure - call me a troll, but it's also an observation. Time to market is more important than quality.

      Customers get what they pay for. If they aren't willing to make security a priority and pay more for it, then they won't get it.

      --
      Qxe4
    5. Re:Hmm... by jhoegl · · Score: 1, Interesting

      The reason for Microsofts constant failure at security and bugs is that they outsource portions of the code still. Win ME was the first time they did that, look what happened. They still dont learn or care about it and outsource code. Look at recent GPL violations for current proof. That and they focus more on crap that has nothing to do with an Operating System.

    6. Re:Hmm... by Ethanol-fueled · · Score: 0, Flamebait

      Bah, it's also an open invitation for the American Gestapo to find vulns and exploit them without reporting them. Latin America is a very politically volatile market and there are plenty of opportunities to play both ends against the middle, so to speak.

    7. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And to let U know I use Xubuntu 9.04 on my P3 computer with 320MB RAM, and It works just fine for all my browsing and development needs...

      Can U even think about running Windows Vista on a machine like that with the performance that I get from my box? What would they call it...Vista lite???

      Its that kind of configurability that pulls people like me towards linux...& by the way Its FREE dude :):) So what U bitchin about!!!

    8. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If they are willing to make security a priority and pay more for it, then they more often than not won't get it, either.

    9. Re:Hmm... by Carl.E.Pierre · · Score: 1

      Some people are allergic to free.

    10. Re:Hmm... by timmarhy · · Score: 1

      Yeah look at Debian, many years was it between releases?

      --
      If you mod me down, I will become more powerful than you can imagine....
    11. Re:Hmm... by buchner.johannes · · Score: 2, Informative

      Simplicity --> greater security (I'm not saying the contest measured something).

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Brazil#The_Brazilian_voting_machines

      The source is available to the parties.

      --
      NB: The message above might reflect my opinion right now, but not necessarily tomorrow or next year.
    12. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And to let U know I use Xubuntu 9.04 on my P3 computer with 320MB RAM, and It works just fine for all my porn browsing and development needs...

      There fixed that for ya

    13. Re:Hmm... by C0vardeAn0nim0 · · Score: 1

      brasil isn't latin america, duffus. barsil is brasil. plain and simple.

      our democracy is a lot more solid than our neighbor's.

      --
      What ? Me, worry ?
    14. Re:Hmm... by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      Look at Vista. Was that 6 or 7 years to market?

      You've got it all wrong. Vista was just Win7 beta.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    15. Re:Hmm... by ThePhilips · · Score: 1

      Debian is server-centric. (Though also hihgly-usable as workstation too.) Long release/support cycles there is the feature, because stability is the priority.

      On other side, I have used for about two+ years Debian Sid as desktop at home. I had only three major breakages in all the time which required me too boot system in single user mode to repair it. And that is unstable branch which is literally "just compiled software". That easily compares to rate of reinstalls I had to do on my Windows workstation, which despite being touted as stable by MS, still breaks very easily and breaks quite often.

      --
      All hope abandon ye who enter here.
    16. Re:Hmm... by ThePhilips · · Score: 1

      Sure - call me a troll, but it's also an observation. Time to market is more important than quality.

      If I had mod points, I would have modded you down. In context of Linux, or any software which wants to give you a choice, you point is largely misplaced and wrong.

      Personally, I'm tired of the overrated excuse - to shuffle half-baked software on users. "Time to market" is a great metric - if you also cut on features. (E.g. what Debian does by excluding from releases software which cannot be stabilized in timely manner.)

      But no commercial company would *ever* do it - because software is sold (or rather it is purchased) based on feature list, not on stability. Stability and security are not features which you can market with a straight face. And that is only when "time to market" excuse is applicable.

      From number of deals I had chance to observe, it never really mattered to end customer. (1) If company spend more time on development and testing (being late to market), generally it would also enjoy faster deployment times (and happy customers). (2) If company pushed on customer long feature list which wasn't even seen once working, then all the time/money saved on development and testing would be wasted during deployment phase - to tie all loose ends. And it might cost more, because during deployment one can't enjoy stability of environment generally found in test labs.

      Now the problem with human nature, that companies which opt for plan (2) earn more money. People still buy software based on length of feature list and few can afford changing software at later date when it was found that it doesn't function as advertised.

      And that is why it is not applicable to software like Linux. First of all, Linux (say Debian) magnitudes more stable and reliable than commercial software. (Because Debian has literally unlimited budget of person/years - commercial companies simply can't afford it.) Second, in the end you still get the choice: commercial software comes with lots of strings attach of how and what you can and cannot do, while with free software many pieces are standard-based and replaceable. Third, if you get to the level of national software, volumes are so high and budgets are so huge that it is not unacceptable idea anymore to actually hire or buy completely a dedicated F/LOSS company to handle the technical side of the project.

      --
      All hope abandon ye who enter here.
    17. Re:Hmm... by sslayer · · Score: 2, Interesting

      The voting system has been widely accepted, due in great part to the fact that it speeds up the vote count tremendously. In the 1989 presidential election between Fernando Collor de Mello and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the vote count required nine days. In the 2002 general election, the count required less than 12 hours. In some smaller towns the election results are known minutes after the closing of the ballots.

      I just don't get it. In Spain we know the results of the election with more than the 90% of votes counted at 21:00, while the election itself ends at 20:00. In an hour more or two, we got the 100% minus the postal votes. And of course our system is just the goold old ballot.

    18. Re:Hmm... by Aldenissin · · Score: 1

      Customers get what they pay for. If they aren't willing to make security a priority and pay more for it, then they won't get it.

      Funny, I didn't pay for Ubuntu, but somehow I feel at least an order of magnitude safer than using Windows, even windows 7. While I haven't got a virus in years (Thank you AVG, which is also free!), I know that
      there are thousands viruses and security holes (even if we haven't discovered them yet) in Windows 7.

        I say sure, stereotypically you get what you pay for; but what about Windows NT where the server version cost something like $800 but was exactly the same except for setup and how many http connections it allowed? (http://oreilly.com/news/differences_nt.html) Microsoft lied and said they were different, but the binaries were compared. I read this somewhere else on Friday night, and now I am looking to sell my unopened copy of Windows 7 that I bought from Newegg for $50 months ago. Screw anyone or any company that has to lie to me.

        I agree that Microsoft has done much for the industry, friends have pointed this out when I spout my freedom doctrine. But I think the fellow below said it best:

      "What upsets me is not that you lied to me, but that from now on, I can no longer believe you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

      --
      Like a city whose walls are broken down is a man who lacks self-control.
    19. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's a common misconception that there are multiple years inbetween debian releases. All releases have been LESS THAN two years apart. The lone exception was Sarge, which followed woody by 35 months, just under three years. Given the problems with the Ubuntu 9 series, I think more people are seeing the detriment of time-based releases, as opposed to 'when it's stable' releases.

    20. Re:Hmm... by Wooky_linuxer · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Yeah, but what is your population? From Wikipedia, about 46M. Check Bras(z)il's: 190M. Your area? 500.000 square km, versus 8 millions and a half. And bear in mind that some of the brazilian population live in areas that only can be acessed by boat or airplane - not a big fraction, of course, but we have much bigger dispersion than Spain or any other European country.

      --
      Where is that guy who'd die defending what I had to say when I need him?
    21. Re:Hmm... by easyTree · · Score: 1

      Obviously this puts a lot of software produced in the US to shame.

      This seems to imply that Diebold are *trying* to make secure voting machines.

    22. Re:Hmm... by sslayer · · Score: 1

      I still don't get it.

      We don't go all the 40 million people the same place to vote, nor do we count the ballots one by one.

      We open up nearly all schools, so every one of us is assigned the nearest from his home, just a few minutes walking. Inside each school, there are several ballot boxes, so in the end, there's no more than a few hundred ballots in each box, maybe a thousand at the most.

      Counting that, is just a matter of minutes, and reporting the total count to a central administration is againt a matter of seconds by phone. Of course you then have to take all the ballots and you can recount them all many times you want, and a physical hand signed report from all the members at the school, but anyhow, it's just a matter of parallelizing properly.

      Sure it's more difficult in a place like Brazil, but having a 90% count by the end of the day, seems really feasible to me. Maybe you can enlighten me if I made wrong suppositions, but I suspect there was something really bad done there in those days.

    23. Re:Hmm... by Z00L00K · · Score: 1

      From a linguistic point of view it is latin america, but you may see latin america as central america.

      --
      If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
    24. Re:Hmm... by Z00L00K · · Score: 1

      If you look at the market in general and don't focus on single products the perspective is different.

      The number of products through history that haven't made it far outweighs the number of products that have survived.

      And this isn't limited to applications, look at cars and a lot of other items.

      --
      If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
    25. Re:Hmm... by stevelinton · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Interesting. Sounds like you count at every polling place. Most countries don't do that. They gather the boxes up some smaller set of places (in the UK it's one per constituency) and count them all there. Obvious advantage -- much easier for parties and the press to scrutinise the count; obvious disadvantage -- it takes longer.

      In the US they also have a curious attachment to having huge numbers of elections all at once and putting them all on the same piece of paper. I guess this probably is easier for the voters, at least in the sense of being less work, but it means that hand counting would be infernally complicated because the same ballot papers need to be counted in multiple different ways for everything from president of the USA to town dogcatcher.

    26. Re:Hmm... by sslayer · · Score: 1

      Yeah, we do count every box, and there are always at least four people counting each box. One of them is designed by the local administration, and the other three are chosen randomly from the electorate itself.

      If you're chosen, you are obliged to stay there during the day, and payed 50€ for the inconvenience. Of course, you aren't punished if you present some medical condition, are travelling or that kind of things.

      Also, each party can send as many representatives as they want to each box or school, to verify nothing strange happens.

      If you're interested and can read spanish, you should go read this link. It's from 2005 and discusses the electronic vote and compares it with our actual system.. I'm sorry is too long for me to translate it accurately

    27. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your *version* of his statement doesn't hold up.

      Time to market is important when you want to be the one to sell things to the government, instead of your competitor.

      Microsoft does not have this pressure, because they have no competitors.

    28. Re:Hmm... by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      Counting is a highly parallelizable process. And the number of people who can count is generally proportional to the total number of people in the country. Therefore if all other things are equal, the size of population in a country should have zero effect on the time required to count the votes.

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    29. Re:Hmm... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Um... you're not a troll, you're off-topic. This has nothing to do with GP's post.

    30. Re:Hmm... by mrdtr · · Score: 1

      It seems to me that many equate free with worthless.
      Home made pie made with home grown fruit isn't worth any less than a store bought, mass produced pie.

      Yeah, yeah, I know some will laugh at the comparison - but the principle is still the same.

      A programmer that gets paid isn't a guarantee that that persons code/programmes will be any better quality at their place of employment, than the code/programmes produced at home for free and contributes to open-source such as Linux.

    31. Re:Hmm... by hrimhari · · Score: 1

      I read the link, but there are a few things which aren't clear to me yet:

      1. How many boxes are there to count?
      2. Do you have representatives from all parties at every box when it gets counted?

      Depending on the answer, I'd think that system to be quite expensive.

      Then, regarding some of the arguments presented there:

      For the results to be seriously tampered in one table, it would be necessary to have all "vocales" and the president in agreement. That implies:

            1. President, "vocales" and the administration representative to be from the same party.
            2. All four to have little honor
            3. All four to be bold enough to go against the law.

      Considering that three of them are chosen by chance and don't know each other, what is the probability that these three conditions would happen?

      Maybe Spanish people are extremely law abiding, but I don't see the unlikeliness of that happening if the current government tried to perpetuate itself. Basically it would need only to tamper the selection mechanism to put "loyal" people at the tables. For the Brazilian government to tamper with the election system, they'd have to choose another system. At least that's what I get from the article.

      In any case, this could just be a "silver bullet" case. The Spanish system may work for the Spanish people, but would hardly work for Brazil where fraud is lurking in every corner. And the Brazilian system may work for Brazil, but might not provide any clear advantage to Spain.

      --
      http://dilbert.com/2010-12-13
    32. Re:Hmm... by hrimhari · · Score: 1

      You just couldn't resist sneaking a car analogy in there, could you ; )

      --
      http://dilbert.com/2010-12-13
    33. Re:Hmm... by sslayer · · Score: 1

      1. How many boxes are there to count?

      From the article: En el 2004 había 56.585 mesas electorales, so about 56585 boxes to count.

      And yes, I also think it's pretty expensive. At 50€ per person, it's in fact more than ten million euros per national election. However, we also try to make all the elections happen in the same day, to save money and time. But it's true it's expensive, though we all think it's worth it.

      Maybe Spanish people are extremely law abiding, but I don't see the unlikeliness of that happening if the current government tried to perpetuate itself. Basically it would need only to tamper the selection mechanism to put "loyal" people at the tables.

      I don't think we're enthusiastically prone to law, but the advantadge of our system is that it really doesn't matter if you tamper 1, 100 or 1000 boxes, cause there are fifty thousand of them, and getting 50.000 people, as you say, "loyal" is really difficult, given that anyone can go and help -meaning supervising- with the recount and they could easily get caught tricking the count.

    34. Re:Hmm... by sslayer · · Score: 1

      getting 50.000 people, as you say, "loyal" is really difficult

      I forgot to say it's not only the random elected people that would have to be under government control, it's also the local representatives of the other parties who are supervising each box, and maybe a few of them are corrupt even against their own party, but you would need to buy at least two or three people more per box, and those would be the same who would be willing to buy you to vote or tamper in favour of their own parties, so I doubt very much anything like this could happen.

    35. Re:Hmm... by Wooky_linuxer · · Score: 1

      In 2004 we (in Brazil) had about 406.000 boxes (they were already eletronic voting machines then). That's about 10 times more than Spain at the same year. As stevelington said, we also don't count every box at each polling place (and we didn't do it before switching to eletronic boxes) but take them to a central place. Perhaps your way is faster (as maxwell_demon said below, counting is highly parallelizable, and having more people count makes the results be available faster). But I daresay counting votes is not as easy as it seems. There are null votes, and with a paper vote you might have problems identifying these - and the people at each poll station might not have the authority to decide. Also, I don't know about Spain political system, but Brazil have more than two dozen parties, five or six major ones. That poses additional complications.

      --
      Where is that guy who'd die defending what I had to say when I need him?
  2. Maybe? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Maybe US hackers are better?
    Nah, seriously, we should try to hack their machines here, even though I don't think we'll do much better.

  3. Diebold by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Sweet. They fixed it.

    Oh, wait... Brazilian...

  4. Anonymous Coward by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    Of course not! There were a brazilian of 'em!

  5. Everyone raise your hand... by Loopy · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...if you think the person who actually cracked it would admit it before cashing in.

    1. Re:Everyone raise your hand... by KamuZ · · Score: 1

      How would you have done it to be sure everything went OK?
      No risk to sell the hack to a candidate or tamper data just for the kicks.

      Sincerely, i can't think on any.

  6. Doesn't change a thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Failure to find a flaw does not prove absence of a flaw. Even if it did, I still need to trust the people handling the machines that the machines I'm voting on are the ones that were tested, because there is no way for me to verify that in an actual voting situation. A paper ballot vote is completely observable and does not require trust. Electronic voting is unnecessary and undemocratic.

    1. Re:Doesn't change a thing by gzipped_tar · · Score: 5, Insightful

      1. How do you know that "A paper ballot vote is completely observable and does not require trust"?

      2. "Electronic voting is unnecessary and undemocratic." -- There are democratic political systems and undemocratic ones. There are no such thing as "democratic" or "undemocratic" technology. Technology is neutral; it depends on who is using it and how it is used.

      --
      Colorless green Cthulhu waits dreaming furiously.
    2. Re:Doesn't change a thing by gzipped_tar · · Score: 1

      D'oh, my last sentence was malformed. I wasn't really paying attention to what I was typing. I meant to say "Technology is neutral; its outcome depends on who is using it and how it is used." FTFM.

      --
      Colorless green Cthulhu waits dreaming furiously.
    3. Re:Doesn't change a thing by dvice_null · · Score: 3, Insightful

      > Failure to find a flaw does not prove absence of a flaw.

      And failure to find an unicorn doesn't prove absence of a unicorn. I claim that there is no flaw. It is now your job to find the flaw and prove me wrong.

      > A paper ballot vote is completely observable and does not require trust.

      So you think that computers can't be trusted, because you don't trust people handling them, but you can trust paper, because you trust people handling them?

    4. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Mr.+Freeman · · Score: 1

      There is no way for you to verify that the paper ballot you are using is an actual legitimate ballot. I suppose you could call some city department and have them certify the ballot, but you could do the same thing for the voting machines. Electronic voting is not necessarily undemocratic. It's only undemocratic if it's being used in an undemocratic way. You could abuse paper ballots the exact same way you could abuse electronic machines.

      The only real difference here is that no one has tried to sell the government paper ballots that don't count your votes, or lose your votes, or change your votes, or fail to leave a paper trail. Electronic machines done right are just as secure as paper ballots.

      --
      -1 disagree is not a modifier for a reason. -1 troll, flaimbait, redundant, overrated are NOT acceptable substitutes.
    5. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      A paper ballot vote is designed to be observable. You can simply look at all the steps in the design and see that you can observe what's going on.

      Electronic inherently relies on trust in an authority of some kind (e.g. the company which built the system, or a certification agency which vouches for the validity of the system). That is a fundamentally undemocratic property, therefore electronic voting is undemocratic.

    6. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Mr.+Freeman · · Score: 3, Informative

      "I claim that there is no flaw. It is now your job to find the flaw and prove me wrong."

      Not really. It is your job to prove to me that there is no flaw. It's the same thing with a paper ballot. You still have to prove to me that there is not a flaw in the paper ballot. Of course, I can look over the ballot in all of about 15 seconds and see that it's the correct ballot. It's far harder to find a race condition in a voting machine running proprietary software that causes miscounted votes.

      --
      -1 disagree is not a modifier for a reason. -1 troll, flaimbait, redundant, overrated are NOT acceptable substitutes.
    7. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Electronic voting is necessary and more democratic for the many disabled people who cannot fill out a paper ballot on their own.

    8. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      1. I can stand next to the people counting the paper. Everyone with half a brain can do the same. Every single step along the line is easily verifyable with just primary school knowledge (reading and counting). Unlike checking the source, the binary and the hardware.

      2. Technology is neutral but a process can be democratic or undemocratic. The voting process with paper is democratic because it is transparent to everyone. The voting process with machines is transparent only to a very small fraction of the people, this makes it undemocratic.

    9. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It requires even less knowledge to include bogus people in the voter list. And yet less knowledge to harass voting point staff into letting the voters for "insert corrupt party name" bring a few of their own pre-filled ballots from home. This can be done more complex with well-designed electronic system (as in, a disgruntled voting point attendant may allow a few protesters copy strong evidence that election were rigged). Not that I think anyone allowed testing that part of voting system design.

    10. Re:Doesn't change a thing by icebraining · · Score: 1

      It's far harder to find a race condition in a voting machine running proprietary software that causes miscounted votes.

      That's why these voting machines run Linux and an OpenSource counting software.

    11. Re:Doesn't change a thing by Patch86 · · Score: 2, Informative

      Proving the absence of something is impossible, or close to it. No matter how hard he looks and says "it still seems to be flawless", you can ALWAYS claim that there is still the possibility of a hidden flaw.

      It's always the job of the person claiming the existence of something to prove it, not the other way around. If you think there is a flaw, show us your proof, or at least your reasoning. If you can't, we wont have reason to believe you.

    12. Re:Doesn't change a thing by corrie · · Score: 1

      Basically, just because many current implementations of electronic voting are failures, don't blame the concept of electronic voting. As the polulation grows, electronic voting has the potential to make voting more accessible, fair and efficient. Paper voting does not.

      You can cheat using either paper voting or electronic voting.

      Just because you can cheat in any particular system does not make it undemocratic.

    13. Re:Doesn't change a thing by corrie · · Score: 1

      What is the point of standing next to someone counting the paper? Can you stand next to all of the people counting the papers, right across the country? Were you standing next to all of the ballot boxes at all times?

      The paper voting system is exactly as transparent as electronic voting.

    14. Re:Doesn't change a thing by lennier · · Score: 1

      "There are no such thing as "democratic" or "undemocratic" technology. Technology is neutral;"

      That's not actually the case.

      The basic architecture of any system is NOT politically neutral, it very deeply influences how that system can be used and whether control is centralised or distributed. If you want a stable democratic system, you really need distributed control - otherwise, you will constantly be fighting the centralisation tendency of the architecture. In a centralised system, even with your best efforts, the closest you can come to democracy will be a sort of elected central proxy - which due to its lack of transparency can easily devolve into a soft dictatorship.

      Some examples of technology which is natively centralised and anti-democratic (generally the same thing as 'a natural monopoly - 'economy of scale' applies so a few large players dominate):

      * capital-intensive industrial manufacturing and power generation - large plant investment required
      * nuclear power - same as above, only extreme safety concerns and military involvement increase the centralisation
      * the 'telecoms' (Bell) model of 'smart networks' where policy is in the middle
      * mainframe computing
      * cloud computing - in many ways it's a return to the
      * Google - search technology now requires
      * railroads
      * silicon chip fabrication
      * Monsanto-style modern agribusiness, especially with hybrid seeds, genetic engineering and patenting
      * large hydro dams and regional water-control policies
      * fiber-optic networking at the national trunk level
      * the division of the Web into two tiers of browsers vs servers, where access to servers requires renting
      * compilation and shipping of binary-only modules as a software engineering practice - those who don't have access to the compilers become a lower class
      * C++ and .NET - large languages with syntax and semantics defined by central bodies, highly dependent on the exact implementation of the toolchain

      Some examples of technology which is naturally distributed, therefore pro-democratic:

      * small-scale power production - windmills, solar (though not the production of solar cells themselves)
      * organic horticulture, permaculture - can be done locally with small investment
      * open source software production
      * WiFi mesh networking
      * the basic architecture of TCP/IP - 'end to end principle' which puts policy at the host, and where every host can get an IP
      * Wikis
      * the original CERN WWW concept where every browser could also edit and every host was a server
      * scripting languages and interpretation generally as a software engineering practice vs compilation
      * Forth and Lisp - small languages whose syntax can be redefined by the user and give them the same rights as the language designer or compiler implementer

      This is not a null distinction. The requirement for democracy in technology puts some very specific requirements on the *shape* of that technology. Some of the people who have investigated this are E.F. Schumacher (father of the 'appropriate technology' movement) and Christopher Alexander (Pattern Language) as well as Chuck Moore, Richard Stallman, and many of the Lisp people. Also Jacques Ellul in his critique of the 'technological society', Marshall McLuhan ('the medium is the message') and Dee Hock (founder of Visa and 'chaordic commons').

      But as a society, we haven't really yet grasped how important is shape of our tools, and how our tools affect our whole life - including our political aspirations. You can't actually build a democracy with centralising forces, but we're still trying.

      --
      You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
    15. Re:Doesn't change a thing by AndrewRUK · · Score: 2, Insightful
      I beg to differ. Of course it's not possible for one individual to observe the entire election, but with paper ballots anyone can understand how the election works:
      1. voter goes to polling centre
      2. collect & mark ballot paper
      3. place ballot paper into locked ballot box
      4. when polling is over the locked boxes are taken to the counting location and opened
      5. ballot papers are then counted by hand (machines can be used the speed up the counting, but the option of hand-counting is still there) and the result is announced.

      Anyone can understand how this process works, and can observe it in full (except for the actual point when the voter marks their ballot paper, since it's a secret ballot.) And here in the UK, there are observers throughout, not least from the various political parties (each of whom has an interest in ensuring that there isn't any fraud being committed against them) and the media. And if there's a dispute about the result, the counting can be easily verified.

      Compare this to using an electronic voting machine:

      1. voter goes to polling centre
      2. select preferred candidate on screen and click "vote" (or whatever the UI is)
      3. ...
      4. when polling is over, the numbers from the machines are collated and the result is announced.

      (I have deliberately left out how the votes are actually counted, as I'm not familiar with the actual systems in use, and (more importantly) this is how it will appear to most voters - as a magic box that takes their selections as an input and spits out a result as the output, with no understanding of how it does that.)
      In this system the vast majority of the electorate will have no understanding of how it works, and nobody can observe the actual counting, they are reliant on techies checking the machines and saying "yes, this works properly." And if there is a dispute about whether the machines have counted the votes properly, there is no way to do a recount to verify the result. (I am deliberately ignoring electronic voting machines which produce a paper receipt, because in the event of a dispute the receipts can be counted - the machine is there just providing a faster method of counting.)

      The first step to transparency is for people to be able to understand how the system is meant to work, only then can you move on to confirming that the system does work as it is meant to. Do you see now why paper voting is more transparent that electronic voting?

    16. Re:Doesn't change a thing by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      And how do I, as voter, verify that at the time I'm casting my vote the machine is indeed running that exact open source software, and not some other software which presents me with the same interface, but skews the results? With paper ballots at least I can know that whatever I vote really ends up in the ballot.

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
    17. Re:Doesn't change a thing by hrimhari · · Score: 1

      -1 Troll?

      (...) tried several different approaches to try to tamper with the software installed on the machines, and even to physically interfere in other stages of the process.

      --
      http://dilbert.com/2010-12-13
  7. for what it is worth... by Sir_Lewk · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Cracking contests are warning sign number 9 on Bruce Schneier's list of security snake oil warnings.

    Warning Sign #9: Cracking contests.

    I wrote about this at length last December: . For now, suffice it to say that cracking contests are no guarantee of security, and often mean that the designers don't understand what it means to show that a product is secure.

    --
    "linux is just DOS with a UNIX like syntax" -- Galactic Dominator (944134)
    1. Re:for what it is worth... by Narpak · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Yet I find the concept of actively encouraging people to hack your system, through for instance competitions, far more comforting than insisting that the only security is total secrecy. Particularly in the field of electronic voting systems.

    2. Re:for what it is worth... by Nathrael · · Score: 0, Flamebait

      And in addition - who knows, maybe they actually *did* find something and "just" don't want to disclose their findings, instead preferring to use the exploits themselves. Latin America is a rather less-than-stable political climate, after all.

      --
      A good education is a bit like a STD - it makes you unsuitable for a lot of jobs and gives you a desire to spread it.
    3. Re:for what it is worth... by Yvanhoe · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I would also add that having an uncrackable machine from an exterior attacker says nothing about the ability of a government to tamper an election.

      --
      The Wise adapts himself to the world. The Fool adapts the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the Fool.
    4. Re:for what it is worth... by C0vardeAn0nim0 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      except that if you read the arcticles, you'll see that it was more an auditing proccess done by several diferent professionals than an actual contest.

      --
      What ? Me, worry ?
    5. Re:for what it is worth... by BoppreH · · Score: 2, Informative

      Given the low prize, it's highly possible.

      But Brazil does have a stable political climate. Lot's of claims of corruption, but everything have been on its tracks for so long that is boring.

    6. Re:for what it is worth... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Particularly in the field of electronic voting systems a cracking contest is snake oil.
      That is because the real threat for voting system integrity is not hackers but corruption of people that are in some way in control over the voting systems.

    7. Re:for what it is worth... by Narpak · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Particularly in the field of electronic voting systems a cracking contest is snake oil. That is because the real threat for voting system integrity is not hackers but corruption of people that are in some way in control over the voting systems.

      I will claim that open and verifiable oversight over any voting process is of the utmost importance. However I can not agree that that simply having a cracking contest is "snake oil"; unless it is presented as absolute proof that the entire process itself is incorruptible. The "corruption of people" is an potential threat in all voting systems regardless of method; electric, paper, mechanical, or what have you.

    8. Re:for what it is worth... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Latin America is a rather less-than-stable political climate, after all.

      You shouldn't generalize. Florida may be part of Latin America by now, but it's certainly not in Brazil.

    9. Re:for what it is worth... by swillden · · Score: 1

      Cracking contests are warning sign number 9 on Bruce Schneier's list of security snake oil warnings.

      Warning Sign #9: Cracking contests.

      I wrote about this at length last December: . For now, suffice it to say that cracking contests are no guarantee of security, and often mean that the designers don't understand what it means to show that a product is secure.

      It should be pointed out that Schneier was talking about ciphers, not voting machines, and he was talking about companies announcing cracking contests and using the announcement as an indication of security, in lieu of actually providing enough information to allow serious review of security.

      It's the combination of secrecy and cracking contests that is the snake oil warning sign. The only way we can determine if something is secure is to have lots of smart, knowledgeable people with full access to the details try to break it. With crypto stuff, this is normally done by publishing at academic conferences and in academic journals and then encouraging other academics to give it a shot, but that's far from the only way to do it.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    10. Re:for what it is worth... by noidentity · · Score: 1

      Yes, inviting attempts to crack the systems, but trumpeting the fact that nobody publicized a successful crack isn't reassuring. Consider the rewards. Win cracking context: $MONEY. Manipulate election: $POWER + $BIG_MONEY.

    11. Re:for what it is worth... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      Yeah. On other side, in a famous powerfull contry, To tamper a election you have to only cause problems and delays when couting the papers, so you can have a court to rule at your favor, at some famous state, at a re-election of an beloved guy.
      So in this case you don't have to do a risky count.

    12. Re:for what it is worth... by Xest · · Score: 1

      Yes, and to put it into context this is the same Brazilian government that asked it's nations botanists to do an audit of all known plant species in the country to get an idea of how many were endangered for an official report. The botanists used the criteries set by CITES - the international treaty on endangered species, to classify the status of the plants and around 3000 species were endangered.

      After delaying and delaying when no one could understand why, the government finally released the compiled list.... .....with only about 1000 species listed as endangered.

  8. Nice idea by quantaman · · Score: 1

    Of course this doesn't really guarantee it's secure (nothing does) but it indicates they're taking security seriously. I am curious if they had full access to machines for a while before the competition, 3 days is a lot of time to try out a bunch of exploits you've worked out, but it's not a lot of time to try to find those exploits if it's the first time you've seen the system.

    --
    I stole this Sig
    1. Re:Nice idea by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It indicates no such thing. The only thing it shows is that they understand public relations. It's a marketing effort.

    2. Re:Nice idea by quantaman · · Score: 1

      It indicates no such thing. The only thing it shows is that they understand public relations. It's a marketing effort.

      It's not a great indicator but it is an indicator.

      There are a zillion things you can do to improve security, a hacking contest is one of them.

      Now this is relying on the fact that the contest was done fairly, which I don't know. That's one of the reasons I questioned if they had access to all the available info before hand.

      And voting machines aren't a typical software security situation. For software you can make the software available to anyone who wants a crack at it (har har!). But for voting machines the hardware is a critical component. It's expensive and hard to update remotely so it may not be available to all researchers. As well there are legitimate reasons to restrict the availability of machines to make it more difficult to set up fake voting stations.

      For voting machines hacking contests may be the only way to give outside researchers a fair chance to break the machines.

      --
      I stole this Sig
    3. Re:Nice idea by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      There are a zillion things you can do to improve security, a hacking contest is one of them.

      No, it's not. A hacking contest is nothing but a marketing instrument. It is meant to distract the public so that they shift their attention from the fundamental, inherent problems of electronic voting to mere problems of implementation. Apparently it's working.

    4. Re:Nice idea by Patch86 · · Score: 1

      Says you.

      Assuming you aren't a hopeless caveman with a fear of computers, there is nothing inherently bad about electronic voting. Paper voting has been scammed plenty enough times, of course, so it's not like it's tampering with perfection; improving voting security should be a massive priority.

      Assuming this is only the end stage of a long a concerted programme of looking at security, it is a perfectly reasonable (and reasonably effective) way or looking for flaws. If it is all they've done, then yes, it's probably snake oil.

    5. Re:Nice idea by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm not going to reiterate all the points, as they've already been made in other threads, but the biggest inherent flaw of electronic voting is that it, by construction, requires people to trust a relatively small group of people who claim that the system works as described. Any attempt to change this by giving voters a means to verify the result compromises the secrecy of the vote (and enables vote selling and coercion) or is to complex for laymen to understand (bringing us back to the trusting a small group of people problem).

      This fundamental problem can not be solved by implementing electronic voting "correctly". There is no implementation which removes that fundamental flaw. It is hardly understandable why people still want to give up a simple yet effective system, the manual paper ballot which is counted in public, for a system that cannot ever satisfy all requirements of a democratic election.

      I see how someone could be led astray by assurances of security, but only if they do not think about the problem. Anyone who knows and considers the arguments should see why electronic voting is a bad idea. At that point, the only remaining answers to "why anyway?" are ugly.

  9. What about changes in hardware? by dredwerker · · Score: 1

    Didnt some of the American ones have hardware that changed? Slightly but differed to the original spec. Then someone finds a buffer overflow etc.. Its a minefield but then again finance companies manage to have secure machines. You just have trusted people using them. As a pc support person I couldnt touch the two pcs that made millions of pounds in transfers it was the external company that supported them.
    Also:
    If you cant trust one person - have technical representatives at each pollling station from each party.
    Or get two diff machines from diff companies and get people to hit two buttons on two machines.
    Or have a paper backup.
    Or all of the above.

    --
    On a long enough timeline. The survival rate for everyone drops to zero. Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club, 1996
  10. What is the threat model? by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Is this exercise realistic given the need to protect against well hidden back doors, tampering by election officials, and sloppy procedures (like letting a vendor install uncertified patches just before an election)? They tested only a narrow range of dangers.

    The right way to do something like this is at design time.

    They deserve credit, though, for doing things so much better than the US.

  11. Interesting by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Obviously we should make our voting machines out of Brazilians like they do, it seems to work well.

  12. Wrong solution by bwashed75 · · Score: 1

    Rather than focusing on the machine itself it is much more important to make sure that the results are verifiable. Here's my take:
    1) Give the voter a randomly chosen voter number.
    2) Reveal the vote for each voter number in some puclic channel. (Yes I mean print each and every one's vote in the newspaper)
    3) Extend voter's obligations to include reading the newspaper the next day.
    4) Have volunteers count the number of people entering each voting station.

    If everyone is happy with his own entry in the newspaper and the volunteers are happy with the number of entries, then the election went well.

    1. Re:Wrong solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      2) Reveal the vote for each voter number in some puclic channel. (Yes I mean print each and every one's vote in the newspaper)

      That's how we did it for some votes in FidoNet decades ago. Everyone provided a "password" with their vote, and the result was published with all the passwords. Everyone could check if the own vote was counted correctly.

      It wouldn't matter if the machine was hackable. Un-hackable doesn't exist, only verifyable (by simplicity or design).

    2. Re:Wrong solution by KClaisse · · Score: 2, Insightful

      How could you then verify a person's claim that their vote was changed? How do you prove that they aren't just changing their own mind at the last minute? I mean if every single vote in a voting machine was changed then you could very easily say that there was some tampering involved, but say a person tampered with many many systems across many states. And then say this person tampered with only a small percentage of votes on each machine and only to a randomly selected group of people (no connections to each other, random number of people). Then it wouldn't be apparent that there was any tampering involved, just a few people who wanted to change their vote after the fact. Just my thoughts....

    3. Re:Wrong solution by Mr.+Freeman · · Score: 1

      And then how do you verify the million or so people that misread the paper or just want to cause shit and claim their vote was not counted properly? Not trying to rail on your idea, but this does present one hell of a practical problem that needs to be taken into account.

      --
      -1 disagree is not a modifier for a reason. -1 troll, flaimbait, redundant, overrated are NOT acceptable substitutes.
    4. Re:Wrong solution by AndrewRUK · · Score: 1

      In addition to Mr. Freeman's points, this would weaken ballot secrecy - at present, if someone wants to find out how you voted, their only method is to ask you, and they have no way to verify your answer. With your system, they can demand your voter number and then check the newspaper.

    5. Re:Wrong solution by bwashed75 · · Score: 1

      A receit from the voting machine would take care of that. You get a receit back from the machine stating your voter number and your vote. It does introduce the problem that you have to carry a piece of paper revelaing your vote for a while, but you only need to keep the receit until you have verified that the same voternumber+vote combo is registered in the official records. Alternatively you could hand your receit over to someone you trust. If $yourfavouritetrustworhyorg is present at the voting station, you could hand it over to them immediately and let them monitor the official records.

    6. Re:Wrong solution by bwashed75 · · Score: 1

      How would it be easier to demand someone to reveal his vote number than demand him to reveal his vote?

      The mapping from you to your vote number has to be yours and yours only. If that is not ensured, I agree that this system is broken. I don't see, however, any reason why that mapping would or should be revealed.
      (See also reply to Mr. Freeman.)

    7. Re:Wrong solution by AndrewRUK · · Score: 1

      Unless you're relying on people to remember their vote numbers, you need to issue the numbers in a written format. And the person wanting to know how you have voted can demand that you show them this written copy of your vote number.

      I agree that your system would work if the mapping from voter to vote number can be kept private, but bear in mind that any crypto system involving people is vulnerable to rubber hosing.

    8. Re:Wrong solution by bwashed75 · · Score: 1

      Rubber hosing is a potential issue, but there are 2 factors that limit the risk:
      1) The written receit only needs to be kept until your entry is confirmed in the public records.
      2) You are free to hand your receit over to anyone you trust and they could verify the public record for you. This could be individuals or an organisation.

      If you put your receit in a box together with 1000 others immediately after you have voted you reduce the risk of having your vote exposed. You do have to trust the people/organisation looking after that box that they will fulfill your obligation to check the public records, though. But you're free to choose whom to give that receit to yourself.

    9. Re:Wrong solution by AndrewRUK · · Score: 1

      Depositing the receipts with a trusted third party of the voter's choice is only marginally better than not having the anonymised vote numbers, since it means that your still relying on someone else to verify the counting process, and so the only benefit over having "trusted" audits of the voting machines is for those voters who decide to take the inconvenient option of keeping their receipts and checking in the newspaper themselves.

      TBH, if you're introducing receipts into the process, why not have the voting machine print a receipt which is seen by the voter and then deposited into a ballot box, and provide for these receipts to be counted in the event of a dispute about the accuracy of the results from the machines? In this scenario, concerns about the lack of transparency with voting machines are lessened, because the machines are not providing the "definitive" result, they are just speeding up the initial count. (See my other post on this article for why I prefer this option.)

  13. Josh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    FYI- Real hackers do not attend public events such as this.

  14. What incentive is there? by Skapare · · Score: 3, Funny

    If there was a strong incentive or motive, that might have made a big difference. If all you get from success in cracking is the recognition, that won't bring in all the possible methods. OTOH, if there was a genuine and significant prize, like actually taking leadership of the country, or a billion dollars, you might find the machines can be cracked.

    --
    now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
  15. uh, 4 days.... useless by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Besides anyone who plans on hacking these machines would definitely not attend an event such as this.

  16. Try again! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    Actually, they ARE Diebold machines! When I turned 18 and voted for the first time I was really surprised to see that the voting machines here in Brazil have Diebold logos... and this was around the time when electronic voting was starting to make noise in the US due to insecure Diebold machines. However, I suspect that the Brazilian machines are actually designed by some national organization and only the manufacturing of all the thousands of machines is outsourced to Diebold.

    Weve been voting with these machines for over 10 years, if Im not mistaken, and not a single major flaw has ever surfaced. Some small problems may have occurred without anyone noticing, but weve never had an election result deviate wildly from poll numbers, so it seems trustworthy to the extent that we can detect.

    Goes to show that electronic voting machines or even Diebold are not the whole problem, you just need some transparency and supervision of the whole process... DEFINITELY not closed source!

    1. Re:Try again! by C0vardeAn0nim0 · · Score: 4, Informative

      they were designed under the electoral court's orders by universities and private companies. after the design was ready, the manufacturing was outsorced to several comapnies, one of them was procomp, that later was purchased by diebold.

      diebold doesn't own the designs or the copyright to the software. the electoral court does. so if diebold is thinking about selling similar machines in US, they'll have to pay our govt. royalties.

      --
      What ? Me, worry ?
    2. Re:Try again! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the story is accurate, it'd be worth every penny to them. Certainly cheaper than designing their own machines from scratch, and with proven results.

  17. If I were here, I'd have cracked the machine with a hammer

  18. What does this prove? by KClaisse · · Score: 1

    Just because a few people didn't find a flaw in the time the spent there doesn't mean there isn't one. If someone found a hack, someone who actually wanted to exploit it, do you actually think they would divulge that kind of information? I would keep my mouth shut and let them think it was secure. Then it would make it even easier when the time came to mess with election results.

    1. Re:What does this prove? by cameigons · · Score: 1

      It's always possible. But then again just like people think traditional voting system is secure. Very specialized software that run on top of special hardware, as I suppose this voting machines do, are similar to airplanes navigation systems or even engines of cars. What I mean is, they can be much more closely controlled than people. Call me a misanthrope(or a engineer :p) but I trust machines I understand better than people with good references to get things done the way I expect.

    2. Re:What does this prove? by maxwell+demon · · Score: 1

      But the problem is that you cannot be sure that you are faced with the machine you understand, even if you analyzed the machine which is supposed to be there up to the last detail. That's because after all, there are still humans who have to put the machine in place, feed it with the candidates to vote on, etc. And how do you know for sure that none of them tampered with the voting machine?
      With paper ballots, you only can manipulate on the day of the election (well, in principle you could manipulate the ballot by omitting a candidate, but it's quite unlikely that this would go unnoticed). With voting machines, you can manipulate days or even weeks before. The longer the time span, the harder it gets to make sure that manipulation doesn't happen. Checking that no one manipulates during a full day may be hard, but doing so for weeks, day and night, is at least an order of magnitude harder.

      --
      The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
  19. Only three days? by cameigons · · Score: 1

    It usually takes more than three days to hack anything which flaws aren't by any means evident. It sure shows the voting machines are quite secure, but does that really show that they are "unhackable"?

  20. Florida 2000 by mangu · · Score: 1

    A paper ballot vote is completely observable and does not require trust

    I beg to disagree. Apart from things like hanging chads and butterfly ballots, which can be corrected by proper voter instruction, paper ballots are subject from a large number of possible frauds, ranging from relatively unsophisticated methods like ballot stuffing to more advanced methods like ballots numbered with invisible ink.

    Besides, as every corrupt politician knows, the best way is not to commit fraud at the ballot itself, but at the counting process. Unless there was only one vote for a candidate at one ballot, no one knows how the other people voted, and who will ensure the counting is done right?

    1. Re:Florida 2000 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      I see that your experience with the process is from an environment which has already abandoned the democratic system of using a pen to make a cross in front of the name of the candidate or party of your choice and putting the ballot in a ballot box that is under public supervision. That box is usually opened at the end of the day, also under public supervision, and the votes are counted (again, in public). An electronic voting system may be an improvement on the very flawed system that you associate with paper ballot voting, but it is a huge step back from a proper democratic election.

    2. Re:Florida 2000 by mangu · · Score: 1

      the democratic system of using a pen to make a cross in front of the name of the candidate or party of your choice

      Don't you mean after the candidate's name?

      That box is usually opened at the end of the day, also under public supervision, and the votes are counted (again, in public)

      Yes, and being in public means no mistake is possible, right?

  21. Working link of pics, video of the voting machines by cameigons · · Score: 2, Informative
  22. Hackers Fail to Crack Brazilian Voting Machines by Dun+Kick+The+Noob · · Score: 1

    for now.

  23. Why not open source it? And the human flaws? by etinin · · Score: 0

    I still have serious concerns about the current voting system. Heck, last time I heard, the version which had its source inspected by the Supreme Court wasn't necessarily the final version. If they don't really know what's in there, who does? How hard would it be to bribe someone in the company. And, worse than technological flaws, are always the human flaws. Cases of people who work at the polling stations (they do unpaid compulsory work) voting for people who didn't vote are not unheard of. Besides, the statistical samples taken to avoid frauds are VERY, VERY weak.

    --
    "I decided I could write something better than everything out there in two weeks. And I was right." - Linus Torvalds
    1. Re:Why not open source it? And the human flaws? by agoliveira · · Score: 2, Informative

      The source *is* open. Anyone from any political party or organized entity can request and have access to all source and follow all the procedures. The final binaries are signed by all interested parties as well and the system can be audited at any time. I know no system is fail proof but I believe they covered as much as they can and honestly, the paper system is also week to social pressures and bribing as well. That's the week link: people, not technology.

      --
      Scientia est Potentia
    2. Re:Why not open source it? And the human flaws? by etinin · · Score: 0

      But, as I tried to mention, last time I checked (last elections) there was no assurance the signed binaries were actually the audited code. There's noone auditing the compilation of the binaries.

      --
      "I decided I could write something better than everything out there in two weeks. And I was right." - Linus Torvalds
  24. The successful atempt wasn't about the system by joaobranco · · Score: 2, Informative

    According to the newspapers, the successful attempt was on the carrying bag for the media (which I assume carries the data required). It seems lack of physical security still can happen, but the media is supposedly cryptographically signed, so replacing it would be hard in any case.

  25. Paper vote inspection is sampled by mangu · · Score: 3, Interesting

    You can simply look at all the steps in the design and see that you can observe what's going on.

    How can you, personally, be sure that every vote in every ballot in the country was counted correctly? Paper votes are sensitive to "economic power" frauds. The party which can put more inspectors in the process is the one which controls the counting.

    In Brazil there was a big affair in the 1982 Rio de Janeiro state governor elections, when the leftist candidate Brizola denounced an attempt to subvert the vote counting, in what became known as the "Proconsult scandal". According to Brizola's party, this fraud attempt was performed with the collusion of the right-wing media organizations, which presented fake exit polls indicating a victory for the rightist candidate.

    In any major election there are many people working together and one must inevitably trust a lot of people involved in the counting. No ordinary citizen has the resources to monitor an election by himself, the support of the party is needed.

    In these days, any political party should have lots of people who know and understand computing technology. It's much easier and cheaper to let a trusted team of computer experts do a thorough audit on the software than to get a large team of scrutineers to watch every little detail where a paper ballot can be defrauded.
     

    1. Re:Paper vote inspection is sampled by gzipped_tar · · Score: 1

      It's much easier and cheaper to let a trusted team of computer experts do a thorough audit on the software than to get a large team of scrutineers to watch every little detail where a paper ballot can be defrauded.

      /academic mode on

      Actually this point could be pushed a step further.

      The verification of the correctness of a computer can even be made automatic. At least in theory. We won't even need a team of human experts. Furthermore, once a particular model of machine pass the verification, it could be expected to work very reliably (so you have a very high chance of it still working properly as intended in the next three runs), not like humans who are unstable by nature.

      /academic mode off

      In real world, power corrupts. Election corruption has happened and will happen again. Instead of limiting the use of technology, why not limit the power instead? Electronic voting in its current form may be abused to better hide the criminals, which is sad. It is possible to be abused because too many things are being made secret. We need to remove this artificial secrecy.

      --
      Colorless green Cthulhu waits dreaming furiously.
    2. Re:Paper vote inspection is sampled by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The votes are counted by people from different parties, and these make sure the number of votes they count are the same everyone else claims.
      It is not perfect, you have to have a mature and democratic process and culture, but that's about it. Assuming you can influence a lot of places, you cannot influence as many as you can if you control the machines.

      Not everything new is better. I will always want pen, paper and humans doing the counting, even if it takes all day to vote and count, which usually does.

      Open source helps, but it does not eliminate the added problem.

      I do not want this crap in my country.

  26. Wrong way to look at it. by PopeRatzo · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It's funny that they'd crow about the fact that "hackers" couldn't break their security in three days. Hacking a voting machine isn't a timed athletic contest. It might take 4 days, or a week, or a year, but once it happens, the damage from a hacked election could be catastrophic for a nation.

    The problem with voting machines is that somebody has to make them, usually a private company. Private companies are after profit. Profit + elections can be a disastrous combination. The effects of private money have turned the US political system into a bad joke.

    The way to secure and fair elections is not through any proprietary technology, that's for sure.

    --
    You are welcome on my lawn.
  27. Formal proof by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    I wonder, with all the universities around, and those news about a 'formally proven' OS kernel, if a team of researchers couldn't attempt to formally prove a modular voting software system (maybe using the OS kernel that's already proven)?

    Sure, it may be troublesome, but with government funding, it's a work that can be done, and independently verified by anyone that knows how to read such proofs.

  28. actually is closed source software by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    the software is actually is closed source software according to wikipedia.

  29. Not the real hackers by michelcultivo · · Score: 1

    Before you do the attempt you have to explain what you're planning to do, and the procedures have to stay with the TSE. The real hackers don't get their hands on that voting machine, only the security companys and universities can do the tests.

  30. Ridiculous prize by BoppreH · · Score: 4, Funny

    It's important to note that the prize for the winner is of just R$ 5.000, a little under $ 3.000. This certainly scared most experts away.

    On a side note, you guys have just slashdotted our fucking Superior Election Court website. I hope you are happy.

    1. Re:Ridiculous prize by BRSloth · · Score: 1

      $3000 may be too low for you. It may be too low for my Australian standards. But, as a Brazilian who worked 10 years in the field there, R$ 5000 is about TWICE what a top software engineer is paid in a month.

    2. Re:Ridiculous prize by dskoll · · Score: 1

      I would not enter such a contest unless the prize were at least a year's salary. The amount of effort required for a real security assessment is worth a lot more than a month's salary.

    3. Re:Ridiculous prize by XCondE · · Score: 1

      R$ 5000 is about TWICE what a top software engineer is paid in a month.

      Bullshit. I used to earn about R$4k/month (after taxes) back in 2003-2004 working as an IT infrastructure manager. I had software engineer peers on the same salary level. This was in Rio; you could probably make 30-50% more in Sao Paulo.

  31. Shill by Gothmolly · · Score: 1

    Sure, the 'best crackers' couldn't hack it, see? So its secure, see?

    --
    I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
  32. only where necessary by reiisi · · Score: 1

    Electronic balloting machines should be used only where necessary, for people who physically need help.

    And they should simply print a bubble sheet like the ballots everyone else uses.

    A ballot recorded only electronically is too hard to observe in a meaningful way.

    --
    Computer memory is just fancy paper, CPUs just fancy pens with fancy erasers; the 'net is just a fancy backyard fence.
  33. Misleading headline by Legion303 · · Score: 2, Funny

    More accurate: "Successful Brazilian voting machine hackers stay quiet, wait for election day."

  34. Re:Hmm...Hmm... by elkto · · Score: 1

    Then again, with nothing to gain in a public competition/venue, the real hackers worth their salt are holding back.
    It's worth more to them to crack the devices later, offering the ability to somebody who would pay them substantial sum of money to sway an election.
    If you want to wear a tin foil hat, you might come to think the whole hacking competition was rigged for the benefit of the government...... Nah...

    Either way you look at it, it makes the whole event suspect.

  35. Proves nothing by dskoll · · Score: 1

    While cracking the machines would prove that they are insecure, failing to crack them proves nothing. It only proves that one group of people at a particular time couldn't crack them.

  36. obligatory... by TheSHAD0W · · Score: 2, Funny

    Hackers Fail To Crack Brazilian Voting Machines

    Give them time, a brazilian is a lot of machines!
    Ba-doom-boom-tss.

  37. NOT USABLE IN USA by Philip+K+Dickhead · · Score: 1

    For a system to be adopted in the US, it needs to be closed source, proprietary and subject to the anti-tampering and reverse engineering provisions of the DMCA.

    Fraud and covert manipulation are essential "checks and balances" in the American system, ensuring that the interests of minorities like banks, insurance, pharmaceutical and petro-chemical industries are protected from the tyranny of the majority.

    --
    "Speaking the Truth in times of universal deceit is a revolutionary act." -- George Orwell
  38. What has democracy become? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I've traveled a fair bit and I can tell you that there is a fair range of very distinctive political systems in the world that are all rubber stamped as democracies. Some of these democracies would not look like much of a democracy to us in the West.

    It is important to note that the system we have today was conceived hundreds of years ago when philosophers started looking for something better than Absolute Monarchies. Back in the 1500s, everybody assumed that it was a natural thing for a country to have a King and for the monarch to have absolute power. We laugh at them today. Will there be people laughing at us in the future?

    I think the biggest advantage of advancing efforts in the area of electronic voting is increased representation. Today, we elect a dude who goes to Washington and we don't hear much from him for the next few years until he comes back to us asking for more votes. We have very little representation as voters. It is even worse in the case of Presidential elections since our system (i.e., USA) does not follow a policy of one-man-one-vote. Therefore, our representation in Washington is minimal. It would be better if we as a population could vote more often and an electronic system could help with that. I don't know what the solution is but I would like to see more popular representation in Washington. I don't think We, the people, would have voted to pay with our hard-earned dollars for a bail-out to every major financial institution in this country. Would we?

    PS: After Florida 2000, we in the US can't say crap about any other voting system in the World.

  39. Translation by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 1

    My translation [explanatory comments in brackets]:

    Test of the security of the electronic voting system

    From Tuesday to Friday this week, 10 to 13 November, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) will hold the first public testing of security in electronic voting machines that will be used in the elections of 2010, and of the other provisions of the electronic voting system. During those days, 38 specialists in computer science and network engineering will try try to find vulnerabilities in the [voting computer] programs in a competition conducted within the court. The purpose is to test the software and to receive contributions for the improvement of computerized voting.

    The participants who submit the three ideas most relevant to improvement of the system will be awarded 5,000 reais [about 2,873 U.S. dollars], 3,000 [$1,724], and 2,000 [$1,149]. This initiative to expose the electronic ballot box system for public testing is unprecedented in the Electoral Court. The tests were approved unanimously during a TSE administration meeting on 30 June 2009. The public testing of security in the electronic voting system [used in Brazil] will serve to verify possible vulnerabilities in the system, for example, whether it is subject to possible violations or fraud.

    Minister Ricardo Lewandowski was appointed by the Court to coordinate the testing. In his opinion, this is an opportunity to demonstrate the security of electronic voting machines, as well as to show "the total transparency with which the Court deals with the subject". The results will be analyzed and disseminated by a committee composed of members outside Electoral Tribunal, called the Evaluation Committee.

    -----

    My comments: As Brazil has shown over the years, it is possible to make secure voting software. The fact that so many vulnerabilities in U.S. voting software have been easy to demonstrate gives many the impression that the vulnerabilities are there because some group wants to exploit them.

    As the article says, the purpose of the test was partly a demonstration of the openness of the Brazilian electronic voting system. There were, of course, other tests for vulnerabilities in the voting software used in Brazil, but they were done privately.

  40. Backdoors done right by 4D6963 · · Score: 1

    So, the machines' backdoor cannot be used by just about any hacker? Well good to know!

    Put in a different way, that's as if you made a contest out of making people try to log through SSH into your machine, to prove that *you* can't log into it.

    --
    You just got troll'd!
  41. What does this "cracking contest" prove? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Absolutely nothing...

    Just because the 38 so-called "experts" failed to crack the voting machine does not prove that the machine is secure at all.

    All it proves is that those "experts" lacked the skill or knowledge to crack it.

    It will funny (and quite ironic) when some 16 year old, with a little too much time on his/her hands, cracks the machine. Only to prove that those 38 experts should probably not be in the security industry in the first place..

  42. This statement is BS... by duwde · · Score: 1

    I'm Brazilian and this media statement is full os shit, why ? 1st - To try to hack it you had to submit a paper telling EVERYTHING you would try to hack... Any hacker knows that "hacking" isn't easy, and you must adjust your techniques every time, so it is virtually impossible to design a paper telling what you're going to do. Hacking isn't simply mathematics and scheduled procedures... 2nd - They would allow you very limited access to the voting machine in a controlled everinoment and on a limited time. Hacking takes days to understand the code, flaws ans possible ways to exploit it. It can't be done under pressure in a few days. 3rd - No REAL hacker would show his personal information and submit it to the goverment. Why ? It's very clear that everyone who enlisted was added to a federal police database of "possible suspects" and only the winner (almost impossible to archive, due the circunstances) would gain anything. So the chance of winning was very low, and being exposed wasn't worth the try. If they want a REAL test, they must: 1 - Allow anyone read the full source-code 2 - Put some of those voting machines on the internet with full-access. (login and passwords) 3 - Let us try anything without pressure. 4 - Offer a REAL prize, like US$100.000. 5 - Get a chance to try to hack it without being exposed in the first-hand. Of course whoever wins must reveal his identity, but only the winner (and everything that would come from that) would be known. That said, it was just a media statement... I can BET there are a lot of flaws in the system...

  43. Why do we feel the need to have a gov? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Remind me again why we need a government to steel from us and hit us?
    I do most things in my life without a government and know that I could vote better with my money in a free market.
    Check out Stefan Molyneux's work to truly understand freedom. http://fdrurl.com/PA

    But if we do really feel like we need a gov why don't the machines print out a receipt and then we put receipt in a ballot. that way we can have real time results and then still get a paper count in the days' weeks after to confirm the electronic ballot.

  44. What about corrupt officials by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    someone must have to administer the machines with some kind of administrator privileges. Did these tests include whether corrupt election officials could effect the result? Most likely the only way to prevent that would be to have some sort of printed reciept... oh wait that's just paper ballots all over again.

  45. Is a Lie from Brazilian TSE by TheDarkMaster · · Score: 2, Informative

    First, is not the Brazilian goverment but the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (supreme election jury or something like this in English).

    And all the test is a ugly lie.

    The... "hackers" are public workers, not really hackers. And they are forbidden to use really "hacker" methods like disassemblers, sniffers and etcetera, only the "approved" methods. Is like you ask to a thief to try to bypass your security system, but allows then to use only a paper clip. Ridiculous, but the TSE do not care.

    --
    Religion: The greatest weapon of mass destruction of all time
    1. Re:Is a Lie from Brazilian TSE by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Not a Lie. What TSE did not allow is using remote attacks which would not work anyway since ballot machines are NEVER connected to a network and similar attacks that could not ever work. So no time wasted with ineffective vectors of attack.

      Brazilian people really lacks auto-estime in a shameful way. If it's made for a brazilian than it's bound to corruption or inefficience and so on. Really a shame to think like that.

      I'm very proud of our ellection system, it works and is clean. TSE (Electoral Supreme Court) can even have corrupts on their ranks but the technicians that actually implement the election laws are not bound to any political affiliation and are dedicated to eliminate risks of attacks and corruption. I know cause I worked there and saw it with my own eyes. (and yes, I know how the system works).

      Just to show: source code to ballot machine and central processing application IS open to any political party that wants to look at it. At time of ellection it's compiled and digitally signed in a ceremony that political parties participate. At any time during the election a party can request to verify all the software on the ballot machine to certify it's the original, verified one. Central code is also signed and is very simple. Anyway, each ballot machine prints a copy of the total votes on each candidate and political party at the end of the election and some copies are distributed to political parties observers that can check what was the computed value of any specific ballot machine on central system, so checks can be made about what was printed and what was computed (should be the same, obviously). They DO check often and never found a difference.

      Parts of Brazil are very poor and is much cheaper to buy a vote with a bag of rice or bean or half of 50 note (like 28 dollars) and then deliver the other half after the candidate has beend elected. There are even pure threat to some communities where they are demanded to produce votes for an specific candidates or would suffer retaliation of the bandits, for example. All cheaper than corrupt the electoral system, which would be extremely difficult and so extremelly expensive. So expensive it would be prohibitively hard to implement.

      That's all for now.

    2. Re:Is a Lie from Brazilian TSE by TheDarkMaster · · Score: 1

      My point is: If you really need to test if your system is secure, you cannot say to the "thief" what he can try or not try. You say to then "try all you can do", and if he after this is unable to invade, your system passed on test.

      --
      Religion: The greatest weapon of mass destruction of all time
  46. Corrected headline by Minwee · · Score: 1

    "Hackers Decline to Reveal That They Cracked Brazilian Voting Machines"

    It's almost as if they had some incentive to keep it to themselves.

  47. Attack of the Clones by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In my reading on the subject (I follow the Brazilian interest group run by Amilcar) I find that the most likely actual case of election fraud in recent years involved cloning of the machines by duplicating the card. This was observed in the statewide election of 2006 in Alagoas (a very weird place to be from). You just let voters enter their votes on one machine, then deliver another machine with the same serial number but different votes to the tallying authority. This gambit is helped along by the fact that precinct authorities transport the machines containing the votes to the center in a police car. The police are a major source of corruption of all kinds in Brazil ... and how.

    In Alagoas, investigators found duplicate machine cards and other physical equipment partially burned out behind the warehouse of the company to which machine set-up was outsourced for that election. The ownership structure of the outsourcer is pretty interesting, too.