Slashdot Mirror
Fixing Security Issue Isn't Always the Right Answer
Trailrunner7 writes "In a column on Threatpost, Bruce Schneier writes that the recent security breach at Newark Airport shows that fixing a given security problem isn't always the right move. 'An unidentified man breached airport security at Newark Airport on Sunday, walking into the secured area through the exit, prompting an evacuation of a terminal and flight delays that continued into the next day. This problem isn't common, but it happens regularly. The result is always the same, and it's not obvious that fixing the problem is the right solution. American airports can do more to secure against this risk, but I'm reasonably sure it's not worth it. We could double the guards to reduce the risk of inattentiveness, and redesign the airports to make this kind of thing less likely, but that's an expensive solution to an already rare problem. As much as I don't like saying it, the smartest thing is probably to live with this occasional but major inconvenience.'"
Well, in a "sterile" security zone, one unapproved person can ruin everything. Even if you find him/her, they may have given an weapon to somebody else who was screened earlier and passed. Yep, you've got to clear out the zone, verify there's nothing hidden, then rescreen everybody.
This problem isn't common but it happens regularly.
So what you are saying is that it is common?
Regular != common. Halley's comet makes regular appearances (every 75 years or so) but you wouldn't say it's a common occurrence, would you?
Drill baby drill - on Mars
This won't work for one reason: The employees will fear for their jobs and not report dangerous incidents.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
Or waterslides! You can't climb back up those.
Passengers book flight online, and program their flight int an RFID tags.
Passengers enter the airport naked, and in small groups. No worldly possessions will be allowed.
Muslims are winnowed at this stage.
(The last mile must be walked to the terminal because of the dragons teeth protecting the airport from demo-trucks.)
Passengers are rendered unconscious using anaesthetic gas.
Robotic staff, load the unconscious passengers into special crates that deal with feeding and excretion.
Passengers are hooked up to neutral interface, and last years crappy films are played directly into their minds.
In case of emergency, all crates have auto-ejectors. First-class passenger crates have parachutes.
Guess, that depends on how the problem occurred?!? What security measure failed and why? Is it as simple as someone just being human, lack of education?
We seem much too willing to spend too much time and money to solve problems where the cost-benefit ratio is all wrong. I want to be safe but, I want to live my life. I would like a bit more life at the cost of a bit less safety. I don't feel safer, I just feel annoyed.
Just ban everyone from airplanes altogether. Problem solved.
(It seems as if we're heading down that road, really...)
The problem with socialism is that they always run out of other people's money. - Margaret Thatcher
The fact that a routine error can cause major institution like an airport to grind to a halt is a sign that its operating procedure needs to be revised. It's stupid to just live with it when there are alternatives
For example, there's been a lot of recent talk about updating our airport screening to look more like Israel's, where they've been thinking about terrorism a bit harder and longer than we have. I'm sure there are other alternatives too. However, remember that the point of terrorism is to cause fear and economic loss to industrialized countries, and to bait us into a self-destructive overreaction. By that standard, they guy who walked through the wrong gate pulled off a pretty impressive piece of terrorism, at basically no real risk to himself. You don't want to enshrine a system where this sort of exploit is possible, or else every group with a quibble can hold an airport hostage.
"It may be costly - but put it this way - how much is your mothers life worth? Your wife? Child? yourself?"
I and they routinely risk life and limb every day driving to work or seeking medical care, and note that resources consumed by one effort are not available for others.
We are much more likely to die in an auto accident, die of hospital borne infection, or die of hospital borne infection after an auto accident than to be greased by Hadji the friendly Jihadist.
"This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
Is it even possible to "verify there's nothing hidden"? You can hide a small knife, or small bit of C4, pretty much anywhere--- taped under a bar stool, in a potted plant, etc.
10 PRINT CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 10
We've had airport security for decades. When did it start? Early seventies? The only time we needed airport security to work, it didn't. Why do we have to shut down an entire airport because one hapless person entered the wrong room? It's a terrible over-reaction, making us all look like wusses. It's like seeing people freak out because they see a spider. Big deal. Take the spider outside, end of story. No evancualtions. No freak-outs. No delays.
The thing is, the last time we had a real incident, at Christmas, the guy managed to get on and do everything necessary to kill a few hundered people. Only the incompetence of the bomb maker saved the plane and the guy burned his nuts.
So what did we do? Throw him in jail. Get him lawyered up so he won't talk, and THEN our illustrious Czar of Homeland Security gets up and says, "The system worked."
WTF????? Just WHAT about the system worked? What is she smoking?
It did NOT work. It was epic fail. With all these regulatons, with all this taking your shoes off, go through the detectors, 3 oz of liquid max, the delays, evacuations, and freak outs over nothing, the system still is epic fail.
How about a moderation of -1 pedantic.
Take away the "water" and you have a modest proposal which is just this side of plausible (and hilarious to boot). Want to leave the secure zone? Go down this slide! You can slide your luggage down the luggage chute, next to the passenger chute - no worse treatment than it would get if it were checked. For the elderly or wheelchair-bound, have a staffed elevator. (Bonus: revenue from tips!) And no one's going to run through that one when they're not supposed to.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
I don't know what the answer is, but "terrorists" could have a field day with this. Imagine a group of a guys going through security the wrong way at a dozen major airports nationwide. The resulting delay due to evacuating everybody, screening the facility, and then rescreening everybody would result in millions if not billions of dollars worth of time and money lost. It is basically impossible to prevent this, the risks are low (this particular guy didn't get caught, and even if you do get caught you'll be out of jail in a short while), and the impact is potentially huge - majorly inconveniencing hundreds of thousands if not millions of people for half a day or more (not to mention all the lost time and money I spoke of earlier). I think this would be much more effective than any previous terrorist incidents, particularly if they did it regularly every couple of months or so.
I take it a step further.
The security theater that has been implemented since 2001 has raised the cost (in dollars, time and convenience) of air travel enough to divert enough travelers to the nations highways that I posit that we as a nation have suffered more death and injury than had we reacted to the Sep 11 attacks by literally doing nothing at all.
We kill more people on the roads annually than more than 15 such attacks would have done.
Meanwhile, UBL's grand master plan stopped working even before the last airplane was grounded that day - the passengers found out that the rules (give hijackers what they want and you get out alive) had changed and the last plane did not make its target. And because everybody knows the new rules of engagement, that plan will never work again - regardless of any changes (or lack thereof) in government policy.
There are exactly 3 things necessary for airport security:
1. Make sure that no luggage gets on the plane without its associated passenger (you can't blow up the plane without going along for the ride).
2. Metal detectors to keep guns out. The alternative is allowing anybody to carry, thus insuring the entire plane will wind up swiss cheese if any funny business starts. That's a less than positive outcome, IMHO.
3. Lock and bar the cockpit doors for the flight's duration.
And for extra credit
4. Research applying the military's UAV technology to the air transport system. If enough improvements can be made in assuring positive aircraft control, there's no reason the flight deck as we know it needs to exist on the plane at all.
Good thing you got modded up - I wish you'd posted this logged in, because it's a good point.
We've gone so far overboard on security that our own security responses often exceed the costs that an actual attack would impose.
One dude, maybe a thousand dollar fine/couple days in the clink, can shut an airport down for much of a day, costing millions. Classic asymetrical warfare.
Heck, the terrorists have already switched from attacking the secure areas to attacking the approach to the secure area. Ever seen the queue to get into the secure airport area? I have a nasty imagination. Just take a suicide bomber, no need for a plane ticket, and have him approach the security area like he's got a ticket and is going to board. Then detonate when in a particularly crowded spot. Heck, he could even have a fairly massive 'carry-on' filled with explosives.
Then again - if I was a terrorist I wouldn't be looking at transportation right now. That's where we're looking. I'd look elsewhere for my targets.
I don't read AC A human right
Back in the 80's I was working for an oil company and had to catch a flight to a different city to make a determination on a potentially contaminated batch of jet fuel. This was to a very small fuel terminal that did not necessarily have the right equipment to capture a sample of fuel. What I was dragging along with me was some sampling and analysis gear. Being in a hurry, since this was going to be a flight to an airport, to do work on airport property, catch a flight back the same day, I hand-carried my gear along.
Here is how the conversation went at security screening;
"Miss, what is this thing in the box?"
"Oh, that's a test bomb"
-- you can imagine what happened next, needless to say I was NOT catching that flight and United would not reschedule me on ANY flights for several days. ---
What I had was a "bacon test bomb" http://www.koehlerinstrument.com/products/K27700.html it was packed in a wooden crate that I was hand-carrying on-board the aircraft. It is just a shiny steel cylinder, about the size of a thermos container but has a funky plunger assembly inside and a length of coiled up line to lower it into the tank.
It is used to grab a sample off of the bottom of a storage tank so I could in turn, run flash-point tests on a 50,000 BBL tank of aviation fuel. The airline was rejecting the batch, claiming that it was contaminated with gasoline (bad, bad thing for jet aircraft).
Since then I have learned to give pause when speaking to security screeners
Tisha Hayes