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Fixing Security Issue Isn't Always the Right Answer
Trailrunner7 writes "In a column on Threatpost, Bruce Schneier writes that the recent security breach at Newark Airport shows that fixing a given security problem isn't always the right move. 'An unidentified man breached airport security at Newark Airport on Sunday, walking into the secured area through the exit, prompting an evacuation of a terminal and flight delays that continued into the next day. This problem isn't common, but it happens regularly. The result is always the same, and it's not obvious that fixing the problem is the right solution. American airports can do more to secure against this risk, but I'm reasonably sure it's not worth it. We could double the guards to reduce the risk of inattentiveness, and redesign the airports to make this kind of thing less likely, but that's an expensive solution to an already rare problem. As much as I don't like saying it, the smartest thing is probably to live with this occasional but major inconvenience.'"
Well, in a "sterile" security zone, one unapproved person can ruin everything. Even if you find him/her, they may have given an weapon to somebody else who was screened earlier and passed. Yep, you've got to clear out the zone, verify there's nothing hidden, then rescreen everybody.
This problem isn't common but it happens regularly.
So what you are saying is that it is common?
Regular != common. Halley's comet makes regular appearances (every 75 years or so) but you wouldn't say it's a common occurrence, would you?
Drill baby drill - on Mars
This won't work for one reason: The employees will fear for their jobs and not report dangerous incidents.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
Or waterslides! You can't climb back up those.
Passengers book flight online, and program their flight int an RFID tags.
Passengers enter the airport naked, and in small groups. No worldly possessions will be allowed.
Muslims are winnowed at this stage.
(The last mile must be walked to the terminal because of the dragons teeth protecting the airport from demo-trucks.)
Passengers are rendered unconscious using anaesthetic gas.
Robotic staff, load the unconscious passengers into special crates that deal with feeding and excretion.
Passengers are hooked up to neutral interface, and last years crappy films are played directly into their minds.
In case of emergency, all crates have auto-ejectors. First-class passenger crates have parachutes.
The fact that a routine error can cause major institution like an airport to grind to a halt is a sign that its operating procedure needs to be revised. It's stupid to just live with it when there are alternatives
For example, there's been a lot of recent talk about updating our airport screening to look more like Israel's, where they've been thinking about terrorism a bit harder and longer than we have. I'm sure there are other alternatives too. However, remember that the point of terrorism is to cause fear and economic loss to industrialized countries, and to bait us into a self-destructive overreaction. By that standard, they guy who walked through the wrong gate pulled off a pretty impressive piece of terrorism, at basically no real risk to himself. You don't want to enshrine a system where this sort of exploit is possible, or else every group with a quibble can hold an airport hostage.
"It may be costly - but put it this way - how much is your mothers life worth? Your wife? Child? yourself?"
I and they routinely risk life and limb every day driving to work or seeking medical care, and note that resources consumed by one effort are not available for others.
We are much more likely to die in an auto accident, die of hospital borne infection, or die of hospital borne infection after an auto accident than to be greased by Hadji the friendly Jihadist.
"This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
Is it even possible to "verify there's nothing hidden"? You can hide a small knife, or small bit of C4, pretty much anywhere--- taped under a bar stool, in a potted plant, etc.
10 PRINT CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 10
Take away the "water" and you have a modest proposal which is just this side of plausible (and hilarious to boot). Want to leave the secure zone? Go down this slide! You can slide your luggage down the luggage chute, next to the passenger chute - no worse treatment than it would get if it were checked. For the elderly or wheelchair-bound, have a staffed elevator. (Bonus: revenue from tips!) And no one's going to run through that one when they're not supposed to.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
Not only that, but I heard a radio phone in show today where a TSA spokesman was asked why we never hear reports of successes. The response was that the TSA had been successful thousands of times in preventing people from traveling. Is that the sole purpose of the TSA, to find plausible reasons to prevent or delay people from traveling ? If their measure of success is the number of people that they prevent from reaching their destination, then they are Al Qaeda's greatest asset.
Nullius in verba
I don't know what the answer is, but "terrorists" could have a field day with this. Imagine a group of a guys going through security the wrong way at a dozen major airports nationwide. The resulting delay due to evacuating everybody, screening the facility, and then rescreening everybody would result in millions if not billions of dollars worth of time and money lost. It is basically impossible to prevent this, the risks are low (this particular guy didn't get caught, and even if you do get caught you'll be out of jail in a short while), and the impact is potentially huge - majorly inconveniencing hundreds of thousands if not millions of people for half a day or more (not to mention all the lost time and money I spoke of earlier). I think this would be much more effective than any previous terrorist incidents, particularly if they did it regularly every couple of months or so.
I take it a step further.
The security theater that has been implemented since 2001 has raised the cost (in dollars, time and convenience) of air travel enough to divert enough travelers to the nations highways that I posit that we as a nation have suffered more death and injury than had we reacted to the Sep 11 attacks by literally doing nothing at all.
We kill more people on the roads annually than more than 15 such attacks would have done.
Meanwhile, UBL's grand master plan stopped working even before the last airplane was grounded that day - the passengers found out that the rules (give hijackers what they want and you get out alive) had changed and the last plane did not make its target. And because everybody knows the new rules of engagement, that plan will never work again - regardless of any changes (or lack thereof) in government policy.
There are exactly 3 things necessary for airport security:
1. Make sure that no luggage gets on the plane without its associated passenger (you can't blow up the plane without going along for the ride).
2. Metal detectors to keep guns out. The alternative is allowing anybody to carry, thus insuring the entire plane will wind up swiss cheese if any funny business starts. That's a less than positive outcome, IMHO.
3. Lock and bar the cockpit doors for the flight's duration.
And for extra credit
4. Research applying the military's UAV technology to the air transport system. If enough improvements can be made in assuring positive aircraft control, there's no reason the flight deck as we know it needs to exist on the plane at all.