Slashdot Mirror
Fixing Security Issue Isn't Always the Right Answer
Trailrunner7 writes "In a column on Threatpost, Bruce Schneier writes that the recent security breach at Newark Airport shows that fixing a given security problem isn't always the right move. 'An unidentified man breached airport security at Newark Airport on Sunday, walking into the secured area through the exit, prompting an evacuation of a terminal and flight delays that continued into the next day. This problem isn't common, but it happens regularly. The result is always the same, and it's not obvious that fixing the problem is the right solution. American airports can do more to secure against this risk, but I'm reasonably sure it's not worth it. We could double the guards to reduce the risk of inattentiveness, and redesign the airports to make this kind of thing less likely, but that's an expensive solution to an already rare problem. As much as I don't like saying it, the smartest thing is probably to live with this occasional but major inconvenience.'"
If you've read the article:
"This kind of security breach is inevitable, simply because human guards are not perfect. Sometimes it's someone going in through the out door, unnoticed by a bored guard. Sometimes it's someone running through the checkpoint and getting lost in the crowd."
Well, in a "sterile" security zone, one unapproved person can ruin everything. Even if you find him/her, they may have given an weapon to somebody else who was screened earlier and passed. Yep, you've got to clear out the zone, verify there's nothing hidden, then rescreen everybody.
This problem isn't common but it happens regularly.
So what you are saying is that it is common?
Regular != common. Halley's comet makes regular appearances (every 75 years or so) but you wouldn't say it's a common occurrence, would you?
Drill baby drill - on Mars
wouldn't it be cheaper to hire a guy to stand there to stop people from coming in?
No, because the people who are capable of staying awake through an entire shift of this duty command very high salaries.
A turnstile (as others have suggested) would be far cheaper. But it doesn't contribute to the security theater, so its not done.
Have gnu, will travel.
This won't work for one reason: The employees will fear for their jobs and not report dangerous incidents.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
Or waterslides! You can't climb back up those.
Passengers book flight online, and program their flight int an RFID tags.
Passengers enter the airport naked, and in small groups. No worldly possessions will be allowed.
Muslims are winnowed at this stage.
(The last mile must be walked to the terminal because of the dragons teeth protecting the airport from demo-trucks.)
Passengers are rendered unconscious using anaesthetic gas.
Robotic staff, load the unconscious passengers into special crates that deal with feeding and excretion.
Passengers are hooked up to neutral interface, and last years crappy films are played directly into their minds.
In case of emergency, all crates have auto-ejectors. First-class passenger crates have parachutes.
Guess, that depends on how the problem occurred?!? What security measure failed and why? Is it as simple as someone just being human, lack of education?
We seem much too willing to spend too much time and money to solve problems where the cost-benefit ratio is all wrong. I want to be safe but, I want to live my life. I would like a bit more life at the cost of a bit less safety. I don't feel safer, I just feel annoyed.
Just ban everyone from airplanes altogether. Problem solved.
(It seems as if we're heading down that road, really...)
The problem with socialism is that they always run out of other people's money. - Margaret Thatcher
The fact that a routine error can cause major institution like an airport to grind to a halt is a sign that its operating procedure needs to be revised. It's stupid to just live with it when there are alternatives
For example, there's been a lot of recent talk about updating our airport screening to look more like Israel's, where they've been thinking about terrorism a bit harder and longer than we have. I'm sure there are other alternatives too. However, remember that the point of terrorism is to cause fear and economic loss to industrialized countries, and to bait us into a self-destructive overreaction. By that standard, they guy who walked through the wrong gate pulled off a pretty impressive piece of terrorism, at basically no real risk to himself. You don't want to enshrine a system where this sort of exploit is possible, or else every group with a quibble can hold an airport hostage.
"It may be costly - but put it this way - how much is your mothers life worth? Your wife? Child? yourself?"
I and they routinely risk life and limb every day driving to work or seeking medical care, and note that resources consumed by one effort are not available for others.
We are much more likely to die in an auto accident, die of hospital borne infection, or die of hospital borne infection after an auto accident than to be greased by Hadji the friendly Jihadist.
"This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
Is it even possible to "verify there's nothing hidden"? You can hide a small knife, or small bit of C4, pretty much anywhere--- taped under a bar stool, in a potted plant, etc.
10 PRINT CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 10
I walked through that exit on Sunday - Continental @ Newark and there's a bored guard and a sign that reads if you pass this sign, you have to go through security again. JFK has a slightly different system where there's a huge (large enough to accommodate a person and their luggage) rotating glass door. No idea if it has a turnstile mode or if it can pushed from either side.
Which one is really better? Not sure but the guard @ JFK seems to be paying attention anyway. Isn't a full height turnstile the easiest way to fix this?
Have fun getting your luggage through that thing.
We've had airport security for decades. When did it start? Early seventies? The only time we needed airport security to work, it didn't. Why do we have to shut down an entire airport because one hapless person entered the wrong room? It's a terrible over-reaction, making us all look like wusses. It's like seeing people freak out because they see a spider. Big deal. Take the spider outside, end of story. No evancualtions. No freak-outs. No delays.
The thing is, the last time we had a real incident, at Christmas, the guy managed to get on and do everything necessary to kill a few hundered people. Only the incompetence of the bomb maker saved the plane and the guy burned his nuts.
So what did we do? Throw him in jail. Get him lawyered up so he won't talk, and THEN our illustrious Czar of Homeland Security gets up and says, "The system worked."
WTF????? Just WHAT about the system worked? What is she smoking?
It did NOT work. It was epic fail. With all these regulatons, with all this taking your shoes off, go through the detectors, 3 oz of liquid max, the delays, evacuations, and freak outs over nothing, the system still is epic fail.
How about a moderation of -1 pedantic.
One of those moving walk ways that moves only in the direction of the exit and completely fills the width of the exit corridor. When someone is detected trying to walk the opposite direction, it can speed up a little and wake up the guard who is posted - because there is always already a guard posted. This would be less obstructive than a turnstile door/gate which is a pain to pass luggage, wheelchairs, children's strollers, etc. through.
"Fixing security issues isn't always the right answer." Haven't I heard this before... from Microsoft?
I've abandoned my search for truth; now I'm just looking for some useful delusions.
a guy from Slovakia had a bomb on a plane and nobody even noticed :) http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/fury-over-slovakia-smuggling-explosive-on-flight-440837.html)
Although I agree the investment is probably not worth it at most airports, at places like the big 3 in NYC, O'Hare, Boston, etc, it would be fairly easy to put a "peoplemover" at the exit to the concourse. I.e. get on the moving belt, ride out of the exit door. To "accidentally" go the wrong way would be HIGHLY unlikely. They already have these things all over the airports, just install a few (side by side?) at the exits. Let the guards and cameras sit there and watch. Hell, a camera could use motion detection to flag/alarm if it detected a "person" or object going the wrong way any significant distance....
He didn't say it would be hard to fix, he said it probably isn't worth spending loads of money on a small problem.
Nerd rage is the funniest rage.
You'd need to make it *much* larger to accommodate carry-on luggage. And you'd need to put in a lot of them to make sure that people aren't standing in line for minutes to get *out* of the terminal just because a few planes disembarked at the same time. And that means making an enormously wide hallway to accommodate several over-sized turnstile gates. And because the grandma in the wheelchair still can't push through one on her own, and to allow rapid evacuation in case of an emergency, you *still* need a security guard to make sure that when grandma goes through, terrorists, or more likely, clueless travelers, don't wander through before it shuts.
Your post isn't informative, it's a poorly thought out "I could do it better" that fails to factor in real world concerns.
$_ = "wftedskaebjgdpjgidbsmnjgcdwatb"; tr/a-z/oh, turtleneck Phrase Jar!/; print
1. Turnstyle gates won't work in the event of an emergency that triggers evacuation. Imagine hundreds of people trying to flee an airport terminal. Now imagine those people trying to flee said terminal through the contraption in your link. It isn't a pretty thought. Yes, they have turnstyle-like doors in other indoor buildings, but those are always accompanied by regular doors with crash bars that can be easily opened by anyone inside the building. Sure, you could add regular doors next to the turnstyle, but as soon as you have a situaion where someone on one side of a door can hold it open for someone on the other side you've lost any sense of security.
2. An emergency isn't the only case in which such doors would be an issue. Whenever I leave a terminal it seems like at least a few hundred people are leaving it with me. I can only imagine what a hinderance a turnstyle would be to such a group - especially considering luggage, disabilities, and people trying to keep groups of children together.
At the Seattle airport (SeaTac) they have what I believe are motion sensors around terminal exits (in addition to a guard(s)). These sensors can detect when someone is entering rather than exiting the terminal exit. If they detect an entrant they set off an alarm. I know that isn't a full-proof solution, but it isn't like we are really safe at an airport anyhow.
Take away the "water" and you have a modest proposal which is just this side of plausible (and hilarious to boot). Want to leave the secure zone? Go down this slide! You can slide your luggage down the luggage chute, next to the passenger chute - no worse treatment than it would get if it were checked. For the elderly or wheelchair-bound, have a staffed elevator. (Bonus: revenue from tips!) And no one's going to run through that one when they're not supposed to.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
I've got a better solution. Change it back to where the airport screeners work for the airlines (like they did before 9/11). Then the TSA sends people out to test airport security and fines the airlines when they find security breaches.
The truth is that all men having power ought to be mistrusted. James Madison
I don't know what the answer is, but "terrorists" could have a field day with this. Imagine a group of a guys going through security the wrong way at a dozen major airports nationwide. The resulting delay due to evacuating everybody, screening the facility, and then rescreening everybody would result in millions if not billions of dollars worth of time and money lost. It is basically impossible to prevent this, the risks are low (this particular guy didn't get caught, and even if you do get caught you'll be out of jail in a short while), and the impact is potentially huge - majorly inconveniencing hundreds of thousands if not millions of people for half a day or more (not to mention all the lost time and money I spoke of earlier). I think this would be much more effective than any previous terrorist incidents, particularly if they did it regularly every couple of months or so.
So you are saying there is a market for menacing turnstyles that intimidate people who near them?
Man: Walks toward turnstyle.
Turnstyle: Don't even think about it.
Man: Stops, looks at the turnstyle, confused.
Turnstyle: I might be electrified. Did you think of that?
Man: But... I am going through the right way!
Turnstyle: How do you know I'm programmed to care?
and your carry-on baggage should be of the approved size and shape to fit through, um, TSA-standard luggage receiving orifices.
I'll believe that when I see it.
I take it a step further.
The security theater that has been implemented since 2001 has raised the cost (in dollars, time and convenience) of air travel enough to divert enough travelers to the nations highways that I posit that we as a nation have suffered more death and injury than had we reacted to the Sep 11 attacks by literally doing nothing at all.
We kill more people on the roads annually than more than 15 such attacks would have done.
Meanwhile, UBL's grand master plan stopped working even before the last airplane was grounded that day - the passengers found out that the rules (give hijackers what they want and you get out alive) had changed and the last plane did not make its target. And because everybody knows the new rules of engagement, that plan will never work again - regardless of any changes (or lack thereof) in government policy.
There are exactly 3 things necessary for airport security:
1. Make sure that no luggage gets on the plane without its associated passenger (you can't blow up the plane without going along for the ride).
2. Metal detectors to keep guns out. The alternative is allowing anybody to carry, thus insuring the entire plane will wind up swiss cheese if any funny business starts. That's a less than positive outcome, IMHO.
3. Lock and bar the cockpit doors for the flight's duration.
And for extra credit
4. Research applying the military's UAV technology to the air transport system. If enough improvements can be made in assuring positive aircraft control, there's no reason the flight deck as we know it needs to exist on the plane at all.
The subway in Paris had tall narrow gates that would open (rather than a turnstyle). That worked really well and would keep all but the most aggressive from jumping over. They were at least 6 feet tall.
Sure, it would be inconvenient, but not as inconvenient as having the terminal emptied.
This is why there's a wait before the first person is let in. The staff in an airport are trained to look under every seat, etc.
Unless, of course, his accomplice was one of the staff. How hard is it to get a job as a baggage handler, a flight attendant, a contracted guard, or those check in people? Probably not too hard. Or, someone else sneaks in with fake uniform and ID, then F around while holding the goods while everyone else in uniform is "searching the zone" then hand "it" back once regular travelers are returned and sneak back out, thus eliminating the job interview/background check/hiring phase.
Also assumes they didn't sneak a screwdriver in to unscrew the .. whatever .. and hide something inside or behind the .. whatever .., and leave the screw loose enough to remove by hand. Like an air duct, or an electrical outlet, or plumbing access panel, or computer thingy...
And you can't seriously tell me that every boxed item in the gift shop was opened and searched. Or even more sneaky, buy an item from the shop, take it home, stuff what you want in the item, someone else sneaks it back into the store (reverse shoplift), you buy the same item again, now with extra something. Or really special bottled water. Etc.
"Science flies us to the moon. Religion flies us into buildings." - Victor Stenger
Good thing you got modded up - I wish you'd posted this logged in, because it's a good point.
We've gone so far overboard on security that our own security responses often exceed the costs that an actual attack would impose.
One dude, maybe a thousand dollar fine/couple days in the clink, can shut an airport down for much of a day, costing millions. Classic asymetrical warfare.
Heck, the terrorists have already switched from attacking the secure areas to attacking the approach to the secure area. Ever seen the queue to get into the secure airport area? I have a nasty imagination. Just take a suicide bomber, no need for a plane ticket, and have him approach the security area like he's got a ticket and is going to board. Then detonate when in a particularly crowded spot. Heck, he could even have a fairly massive 'carry-on' filled with explosives.
Then again - if I was a terrorist I wouldn't be looking at transportation right now. That's where we're looking. I'd look elsewhere for my targets.
I don't read AC A human right
It may be costly - but put it this way - how much is your mothers life worth? Your wife? Child? yourself?
Obviously they are not worth very much if any of them step outdoors, or drive a car, or are present in a metro city, or do any of the hundreds of daily activities that have a much much MUCH higher chance of killing you.
In 2008, the number of American who died from a terrorist attack was about 260.
All of those except 4 were NOT in the USA. [1]
4 deaths from terrorist attacks in an entire year on US soil.
Also in the whole year of 2008, there were 37,261 deaths from auto accidents. [2]
You are 9315 times more likely to die from an auto accident, be it one you caused, one someone caused into you, or you are walking down the street and two other motorists bring the accident to you on the sidewalk.
That is almost 4 orders of magnitude higher!
For every person killed by a terrorist in this country, nearly 10,000 people are killed by a car in the exact same amount of time.
If you willingly put yourself and mother and wife and child in the situation of 'being out doors' then clearly you value them and yourself 1000 times less than if a terrorist attack was your only concern.
My question to you is, why are you so willing to spend a million dollars to stop a terrorist attack, without spending the equally valid and necessary ten billion dollars to have all cars banned and removed from the roadways?
References:
1 - http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html
2 - http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx
Back in the 80's I was working for an oil company and had to catch a flight to a different city to make a determination on a potentially contaminated batch of jet fuel. This was to a very small fuel terminal that did not necessarily have the right equipment to capture a sample of fuel. What I was dragging along with me was some sampling and analysis gear. Being in a hurry, since this was going to be a flight to an airport, to do work on airport property, catch a flight back the same day, I hand-carried my gear along.
Here is how the conversation went at security screening;
"Miss, what is this thing in the box?"
"Oh, that's a test bomb"
-- you can imagine what happened next, needless to say I was NOT catching that flight and United would not reschedule me on ANY flights for several days. ---
What I had was a "bacon test bomb" http://www.koehlerinstrument.com/products/K27700.html it was packed in a wooden crate that I was hand-carrying on-board the aircraft. It is just a shiny steel cylinder, about the size of a thermos container but has a funky plunger assembly inside and a length of coiled up line to lower it into the tank.
It is used to grab a sample off of the bottom of a storage tank so I could in turn, run flash-point tests on a 50,000 BBL tank of aviation fuel. The airline was rejecting the batch, claiming that it was contaminated with gasoline (bad, bad thing for jet aircraft).
Since then I have learned to give pause when speaking to security screeners
Tisha Hayes
Ok I worked as a policeman at a major UK airport when we had a multi-axis threat from the Middle East and Northern Ireland.
I am astonished that such a response could have been considered.
We frequently had perimeter breaches when passengers, protesters or general members of the public thought it would be a good idea, fun or political to go where they were not meant to. Our S.O.P was:
Find and detain the person using total CCTV coverage.
Ascertain the reason for the breach and from that the treat level.
From the step above the S.O.P that followed was, in 90% of the cases as follows:
Examine the high quality CCTV footage of the persons movements. (You do have high quality CCTV of all corridors and areas don’t you?)
Send in an Explosive Detection Dog (You do have them on 24 Hrs a day don’t you?) to follow the route of the intruder.
Carry on as normal.
Now this is a very simplistic synopsis of a very complex set of procedures but it expresses the mentality of the approach.
The option to close any airport or even a very small part of one was only called as part of a detailed ordered S.O.P and given the HUGE costs and resultant chaos a very last step in the process.
It seems to me that the Newark operation, both security and operations are still woefully lacking in pre-planned structured S.O.Ps
The cumulative effect of all those wars is that they also breed more terrorists. This terrorism hydra needs resentment caused by the civil casualties we're (un)happily providing where ever we're fighting, to regenerate itself again and again.
cpghost at Cordula's Web.